Demarcation of the Lebanese-Israeli Maritime Border: A Qualitative Shift for Lebanon, Hezbollah, and Iran

When Lebanon and Israel reach a deal to demarcate their maritime border, the oil and gas will not be the only benefit reaped by Lebanon, as a deal will also mean there would be no war between the two countries as long as the basic guarantees in the agreement stipulate that the front would not be heated, there would be no tension, and no provocation from either side. Hezbollah is a silent party to the pledges of pacifying the border and not starting a confrontation. This means that Hezbollah, backed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, has decided to ‘dissociate’ itself from any developments in Syria and Palestine, and refrain from using the Lebanese borders and front to retaliate for the sake of Syria and Palestine. Whether this transformation has taken place for pragmatic, financial, and political calculations for both Hezbollah and Lebanon; as part of a behind-the-scenes deal between Iran and Israel/the United States amid ongoing efforts to revive the JCPOA; or as a result of gains-and-losses calculations by Tehran and Hezbollah, it is important to stop and take stock of the benefits while insisting on protecting Lebanon’s national wealth from the greed of the ruling class in Lebanon. This requires creating a sovereign wealth fund and overcoming suspicious and selfish opposition whether from the Shia Duo (Hezbollah-Amal) or the Free Patriotic Movement, or anyone else with their disgraceful agendas. However, this also will not be enough: All parties taking part in the current effort, be it the United States, the United Nations, the energy companies, or the insurance companies, have a responsibility to not allow the national oil and gas wealth to become an easy prey for the corrupt powers in Lebanon.

The demarcation of the border will be a guarantee for donor countries that Lebanon will be on solid ground and that there would be no war there. The priorities of the Najib Mikati government have included the demarcation of maritime borders, legislative and presidential elections, respecting constitutional commitments, and reaching an agreement with the IMF. A source close to the government said that Lebanon has reached the midpoint in this journey, with the demarcation set to pave the way for the IMF, investments, and renewed confidence from donor countries.

Negotiations set to take place in the coming days over technical details of the border demarcation deal will be direct talks between Lebanon, Israel, and the United States with the participation of the UN. This means that the United States is present as a party on the negotiating table, as a guarantor of a deal not just a broker. The role played by the skilled mediator Amos Hochstein has been central to the optimism surrounding the deal, and he will not fail to do his utmost to complete it and safeguard it against the manoeuvres of Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon. It is a crucially important achievement for both countries and the Biden administration, which is in need for such a win.

There are verbal pledges that Israel will not provoke Hezbollah, because its interests are better served by extracting gas and not becoming implicated in a war that will prevent the exploitation of oil and gas wealth – as long as Hezbollah does not provoke it first. There are verbal pledges from Hezbollah too that it will not heat up the Lebanese front with Israel, on condition that Israel does not provoke it either. Hezbollah too, not just Lebanon, will reap benefits from the demarcation of the border and the exploitation of oil and gas.

In the equation of non-provocations and silent understandings on pacifying the Lebanese-Israeli border, Lebanon will enter a qualitatively new phase of relations with Israel. Iran and Hezbollah, in turn, are entering into an agreement with Israel, which is also a major shift, despite their denials and protestations. Indeed, pragmatism has required the Iranian regime to recalculate and reposition itself, in light of its domestic situation, the stalling of the nuclear negotiations, and the requirements of economic recovery in Iran which means Iranian money is needed in Iran, not to finance Hezbollah’s projects against Israel in the Lebanese front.

Meanwhile, the Syrian front between Iran/Hezbollah and Israel needs venting of tensions and not escalation, which would harm the IRGC and the Iranian regime’s domestic and regional projects. For this reason, the Iranian leadership has concluded that turning a blind eye to agreements with Israel is useful, while not being compelled to deal directly and publicly with these agreements.

The uprising led by young Iranian women and men following the death of Mahsa Amini and dozens others in recent weeks impacts Iran’s general calculus, but is not directly linked to Iran’s decision not to block an agreement to demarcate borders between Lebanon and Israel. That is unless a sudden development takes place after the time of writing. The Iranian leadership has resolved to put down the uprising and deflate it of all potency, confident that the protests are fleeting. However, the Iranian leadership is not certain that the nuclear talks are completely finished.

The US midterm elections have forced all sides to take a step back, and think again about how to reach a deal between the United States and Iran, but after the elections in November. This is perhaps a key reason why Tehran has shown good will and has not disrupted the agreement to demarcate maritime borders to extract oil and gas. Europe remains vital for Iran, and on it the latter relies to push the Biden administration into signing the nuclear deal. The European powers have urged Tehran to show good will also in this issue, for reasons related to oil and gas supplies as well as the nuclear issue.

The international environment must have also influenced Iran’s calculus, especially the developments in the Ukraine war that are unfavorable to Russia, from the astonishing defeats that have exposed the Russian army, to the voices talking about a change in the regime in Russia, meaning Vladimir Putin.

This unexpected development cannot pass without an effect on the regime in Tehran, which understands the language of regime change. Amid these developments, a self-reassessment is probably being undertaken by Iran’s rulers and their partners in Lebanon, particularly in light of the isolation of Iran and Hezbollah compared with the openness and change in the Arab Gulf states, for example. Perhaps Hezbollah’s leadership concluded that pacifying the Lebanese front would bring relief, and started using the language of the Lebanese state’s exclusive responsibility for demarcating maritime boundaries with Israel, to avoid admitting it was instructed to consent by Iran, and that it was responsible for blocking the extraction of Lebanon’s natural wealth amid economic collapse. This does not mean that Hezbollah has finally returned to the Lebanese fold, but it may be an important step towards the Lebanonization of Hezbollah.

Proving the intent that this wealth will be allowed to belong to Lebanon requires an honest commitment to establishing a sovereign wealth fund. Popular pressure is important here so that Lebanese citizens are not kept out of the loop of deciding their future.

The sovereign fund must be under the supervision of the Lebanese state, the exploration companies, and the UN, although the Lebanese state will be the one to sign the agreement. One of the key conditions in the agreement is establishing the sovereign fund – including for practical reasons such as the cost of insurance, which will be lower if there is a sovereign fund.

Today, the Lebanese government and parliament’s first responsibility is approving the creation of this fund. If they fail to do so, Lebanese citizens and the international partners must hold them to their responsibilities.

A source who has been part of the efforts that brought us to where we are now, on the verge of signing an agreement to demarcate maritime boundaries, said that all sides are in agreement not to mix the issue of sea borders with land borders. Hezbollah does not support the demarcation of land borders with Israel or Syria. Hezbollah does not want an end to arms supplies and smuggling through Lebanese-Syrian borders, and does not want Damascus to have to answer a years-long question from the UN: Are the Shebaa Farms Lebanese or Syrian?

The Syrian government has never responded, and most likely will not respond. It considers Shebaa Syrian territory and will not accept to remove the mandate of UNDOF between it and Israel and remove Shebaa from the scope of occupied Syrian territories and grant the region to Lebanon. Who knows, perhaps silent accords are also being prepared along the Syrian-Israeli front, and Damascus does not want to get ahead of itself or close the options available to it.

As one Lebanese expert who took part in preparing the agreement said, “Perhaps we have reached this point after suffering for long under the culture of coexistence with war…today we are yearning to live in a culture of peace”.