Delayed Submission of Police Investigation Reports: A Shared Responsibility with Far-Reaching Consequences
Haider Ali Khan
Litigation Lawyer | Lecturer | LLM in International Business Law | Graduated from UClan- UK |
The criminal justice system is plagued by inordinate delays in submitting investigation reports, perpetuating a culture of impunity and eroding public trust. A landmark judgment by the Hon'ble Lahore High Court, authored by Justice Shahbaz Rizvi and Justice Ali Zia Bajwa, sheds light on this critical issue. [ 2024 LHC 3574]. Each sentence of this judgment is a masterclass in jurisprudence, quenching the thirst of knowledge for law students passionate about understanding the Ins and outs of systematic deficiencies "Delayed Submission of Police Investigation Reports and process optimization."
This judgment not only exposes the culpable nexus between Public Prosecutors and Police in delaying the submission of "Police Reports" but also underscores the shared responsibility of other key stakeholders. The non-submission of "Police Reports" is, in fact, a collective failure of Area Magistrates, Criminal Justice Coordination Committee, and Superintendents of Prisons, who are all integral to the criminal justice machinery.
This judgment highlights the fact that the criminal justice system relies heavily on the investigating agency and prosecution department, which are entrusted with critical statutory duties. The investigating officer plays a pivotal role in gathering evidence and compiling investigation reports in a timely manner. Delays at this stage can violate Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
The late submission of an investigation report also violates several Constitutional provisions in Pakistan, specifically Articles 4, 9, 10, and 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter ?the Constitution?). Article 4 ensures that individuals are dealt with according to the law, and delays violate the due process of law. Article 9 protects personal security and liberty, which are compromised by extended incarceration and prolonged uncertainty. Article 10 provides safeguards for arrest and detention, and delays hinder the right to a timely trial resulting in prolonged detention. Finally, Article 10-A guarantees a fair trial, and justice delayed is inherently unjust. The delayed submission of investigation reports flagrantly breaches Article 10-A, undermining the right to a fair trial. Such delays compromise due process, leave both the accused and the victim in a state of uncertainty, and undermine public trust in the judicial system.
When Investigation reports were stuck in limbo, and justice was being denied. In a last-ditch effort to salvage the situation, the Government introduced an amendment to Section 173 of the Code in 1992, aimed at expediting the submission of investigation reports. This amendment involved the insertion of a proviso clause following subsection (1)(b) of Section 173 of the Code. The inserted proviso clause has been reproduced below for better understanding: -
[provided that, where investigation is not completed within a period of fourteen days from the date of recording of the first information report under Section 154, the officer in charge of the police station shall, within three days of the expiration of such period, forward to the Magistrate through the Public Prosecutor, an interim report in the form prescribed by the Provincial Government stating therein the result of the investigation made until then and the Court shall commence the trial on the basis of such interim report, unless, for reasons to be recorded, the Court decides that the trial should not so commence],
The 1992 Amendment ushered in a significant procedural shift, requiring investigation reports to be submitted through the Public Prosecutor. This strategic move enables early prosecutorial involvement, allowing for expert assessment and opinion on the report's merits. By engaging prosecutors at the outset, the system ensures meticulous evaluation, identifies potential flaws, and fortifies evidence to withstand legal scrutiny.
The prosecutor's preliminary review is instrumental in:
- Scrutinizing reports for deficiencies
- Providing corrective guidance
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- Ensuring legally cogent evidence
Even interim reports must be accompanied by the prosecutor's opinion, highlighting investigative shortcomings. This rigorous process guarantees that reports are not only informative but also vetted for quality and integrity.
This collaborative approach enables the prosecution to oversee the timely submission of investigation reports, ensuring seamless progression of criminal cases. Both the investigating agency and prosecution department share responsibility for delays.
However, The judgment illuminates the vulnerabilities in Section 9 of the Punjab Criminal Prosecution Service Act, 2006, notably the potential for abuse within Subsection 5(a).
Although designed to create a successful prosecutorial model, the above provisions have been misused by investigating agencies and prosecutors. Returning defective investigation reports has led to years-long delays in criminal cases. The misuse of Section 9 (5) (a) of The Prosecution Act has rendered the proviso to Section 173(1) of the Code redundant, as even interim reports are now withheld from the courts under the guise of defective reports. The law, originally enacted to facilitate the successful prosecution of criminal cases, has unfortunately led to miscarriages of justice in countless cases. The ambit of Section 9(5)(a) of The Prosecution Act is strictly confined to the act of returning a defective investigation report for the rectification of its deficiencies. It does not extend to directing the investigating officer to reinvestigate or craft the evidence against the accused. In our considered opinion, a ?defective investigation report? is intrinsically distinct from a ?defective investigation? itself. Allowing the prosecution to review and direct the rectification of investigative flaws would unleash a torrent of reinvestigations, creating ample opportunities for tampering with evidence in an overzealous pursuit of convictions in every criminal case.
The following paragraph of this landmark judgment highlights the delicate balance of power between the prosecution and investigating agencies.
However, at the conclusion of the investigation, when the investigation report reaches the prosecutor, he cannot be permitted to return it to the investigating agency simply because it lacks plausible and cogent evidence sufficient for conviction. Instead, the report should be forwarded to the court, accompanied by his assessment as required under Section 9(7) of The Prosecution Act. This ensures that the prosecution does not overstep its bounds, but rather lets the chips fall where they may within the judicial process. Returning the investigation report to the investigating agency after the completion of the investigation to rectify defects in the investigation process would constitute an overreach, going beyond the purview of the provisions of The Prosecution Act.
The ruling unequivocally states that the current system is flawed and requires reform, underscoring the imperative need for a sweeping overhaul of the existing framework. For far too long, the submission of investigation reports has been beset by inefficiencies and delays, eroding the integrity of the justice system and undermining public confidence. The court's acknowledgment of these systemic flaws serves as a clarion call for stakeholders to converge and implement meaningful reforms. By addressing the entrenched deficiencies and streamlining the process, it is possible to restore the integrity of the justice system, ensure that justice is served in a timely and effective manner, and revitalize public trust.