Is there a definition for laytime?

Congestion on the port (blanketed berth unavailable) and different unique occurrences (e. g. unique clauses and implications) have triggered inconsistency in defining graduation of laytime. The lousy climate no longer affects, in general, the graduation of laytime. (…)?

The concept of "arrived ship" is a requirement for the commencement of laytime. The prevailing ruling was settled in The El Oldendorff & Co GmbH v Tradax Export S.A. (The Johanna Oldendorff) and confirmed in the Federal Commerce and Navigation Co Ltd v. Tradax Export SA (Maratha Envoy). They were cases where the berth was not available at the arrival of the vessel due to congestion at the port. The congestion led the vessel to wait at 'an area of the port' instead of reaching the berth for load and discharge operations to commence.?

In the Oldendorff case, Lord Reid established a test to consider the vessel an "arrived ship". The test set three basic requirements for this concept. First, the ship must have reached the destination specified in the charter. Secondly, it must be at the practical and immediate disposal of the charterer, being ready and in a fit condition to receive or discharge her cargo. Thirdly, the charterers or their agents must serve a particular notice of readiness. When the three requirements above are satisfied, the vessel is considered an "arrived ship". Under English law, that consideration plus the validity of NOR (Notice ready to load or discharge) allows the laytime to commence to run.?

It is important to note that the first condition (requirement) of the concept of "arrived ship" is defining the destined place for the arrival of the vessel. There was inconsistency in the law for determining the meaning of "port" and applying it to peculiar cases. In Loanis Steamship v Rank, the Court of Appeal defined the definition of 'port' to settle guidelines for determining the destined arrival place in port charters where a port has been nominated. The term 'port' was related to the term 'the commercial area of the port'. By that time, Loanis Steamship was the prevailing ruling in defining the ship as arrived.?

There was a modification in the ruling. In the Sociedad Financiera de Bienes Raices S.A. v Agrimpex Hungarian Trading Co (The Aello), the vessel had not directly berthed in the port of Buenos Aires and stayed waiting at a usual area within the port, which was 22 miles from the loading area. Parker L. J. formulated a test (Parker test). This test applied meaning to the term "commercial area of the port". The test settled limits and held that the Aello had not arrived in the port. The reasoning was that a vessel only became an "arrived ship" when she, attending to the other requirements, was placed within the commercial limits of the port. The term "within" was crucially added and denoted two implied implications: The vessel must be within the port's commercial limitations, and the port's commercial area is within the port. Lord Parker stated that the destined place in the port charter is that part of the port [within the port] where the vessel "can be loaded when a berth became available". One can argue that this interpretation of the "port" reduced the concept of "commercial area of the port" formulated previously in the Leonis case. Stephen Girvin states that '[t]his allowed for the possibility that congestion at the berth prevented the vessel from 'arriving', in the technical sense. The decision generated uncertainty over the related matters, including the commencement of laytime, because it changed the understanding of the vessel's arrival time. This paper cannot affirm the extent of the Parker test's effects on other cases. The Parker test understanding was criticised by commentators and refuted by the Court in the future judgment of the House of Lords.?

The Parker test was overruled by another test (Reid test) established in E. L. Oldendorff & Co. G.m.b.H. v. Tradax Export S.A.??The House of Lords applied the decision of Leonis v. Rank. It overruled its own decision in The Aello. It was understood that Johanna Oldendorff had arrived while she was waiting at the usual waiting place where vessels (of her specific category) remain for a berth to become available for load and discharge operations to commence. The facts of the case were that the Johanna Oldendorff arrived at the Mersey Bar Light Ship and pilot on January 2nd, 1968, at 16:30 hours, laying there at anchor overnight. She then moved to Prince's landing stage, mooring there at 10:30 hours on January 3rd. She was ordered by the port authority to leave and arrived back at the anchorage off the lightship at 14:40 hours. It was held that the Johanna Oldendorff became arrived ship when she reached the Bar Anchorage so that laytime begins at 08:00 hours on January 4th.?

A new test, the Reid test, was established for settling the time of arrival of the ship and, consequently, measuring the commencement of laytime. Lord Reid, therefore, lay down two conditions: (i) that the ship should be within the port; (ii) that she should be at the immediate and effective disposition of the charterers. The inference of these conditions leads to the following ruling. (…)?

According to the Johanna Oldendorff decision, the vessel to be considered arrived "…must, if she could not go immediately to a berth, have reached a position within the port where she was at the immediate and effective disposition of the charters: a place where waiting ships usually lay". The "usual place" meant not to restrict the destined place area so as it did the Aello's test. The term "commercial area of the port" was abandoned. But the inconsistency over the matter was not annihilated. There is space for future case discussions about the meaning of place "within the port", which the vessel usually waits for a berth become available.?

A question remained unanswered at that time: What should be understood by place "within the port"?

This article believes that the judgment handed down in?The Maratha Envoy?added details to the original ruling on "arrived ship", which in turn increased the sentence of laytime commencement. Among other matters, it defined the term "within the port". The elements added are consonant with the decision in The Johanna Oldendorff.?

The House of Lords ruled that?The Maratha Envoy?could not be considered arrived ship as she was waiting for a berth to become available at a place outside the legal, fiscal and administrative limits of the port of Bake. Diplock L.J. stated, 'it lies 25 miles from the mouth of the river in an area in which none of the port authorities of Weser ports does any administrative acts or exercises any control over vessels waiting there'. The lordships' House applied the Reid Test and considered the vessel not arrived in this case.??

According to Michael Summerskill, in order to decide whether a vessel has arrived at a port, the Courts "will [need to] consider first the commercial meaning of the term". But different from previous cases, the commercial meaning of the term "within port" is not as discretionary as it was in?Leanis Steamship v. Rank, but might mean now the "extent of the activities of the port authorities [that can vary from port to port], whether exercised by virtue or a specific law or regulation or otherwise, and whether acknowledged by port users or not".?

Several elements were drawn in Maratha Envoy to define the destined place for timely arrival and its consequences (inclusive commencement of laytime).?

The criterion "administrative, fiscal and legal limits of the port" seems to be added for measuring the place within the area of a port (broader area) that vessels were apt to be recognised as "arrived ship" while waiting for a berth to become available. (...)