In defence of India's Private Defence Sector

Why Indian Private Defence Industry needs to watch its back; China and Pakistan have their steely gaze on them

One fine night in May of 2019, a burglary took place in one of the offices of Dassault Aviation in Paris. Some safes were broken into, money and documents were stolen. A fairly routine burglary if one might argue, but alarm bells rang in Dassault’s HQ, the French Defence and Foreign Ministry and the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD). You are probably wondering what a burglary in an office in Paris had to do with India, but the documents purportedly stolen were key to India’s security needs. The office safes had documents concerning India’s purchase of 36 French Rafale fighters, the state-of-the-art 4.5 generation aircraft that were destined for the Indian Air Force at the time (they are now all delivered) and while Indian Air Force (IAF) officials and their French counterparts promised a thorough investigation, it’s still not known whether the documents stolen compromised India’s defence or not.

Come to think of it, this scenario has played around in Indian public sector defence establishments for years now. Plain jane espionage, honey traps, cyber hacks and what have you have been used to siphon key data about Indian deployments and equipment knowledge by its adversaries, either directly or through use of third parties. It’s the oldest trick in the book, used by countries alike, including India, when they want to know what their adversary is up to and how to counter them in times of war. The information sought can sometimes hit bullseye, blunting the capability of the adversary during war and potentially influence its outcome. All of which forces the aggrieved to revise strategy, rebuild equipment or completely alter equipment to negate the effects of espionage, a time consuming and rather expensive affair.

In recent times, think tanks and defence watchers in Pakistan have shown great concern over the rise of India’s private defence industry. With the Government of India (GoI) having opened up India’s defence equipment manufacturing and development to private industry just over a decade ago, Indian manufacturing conglomerates and start-ups have made a beeline outside MoD. Despite the rather arduous acquisition process that can stretch for years, recent years, especially the skirmishes with Pakistan and China in 2019 and 2020 have hastened GoI’s push towards ‘Make in India’. From drones to 155 mm guns, Indian private defence manufacturers are gearing up for a windfall. And the attention of adversaries.

What these firms need to do is build a robust security apparatus around themselves. Companies that have cracked contracts with the MoD need to ring fence themselves from potential human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) efforts of the enemy. Cyber security apparatus needs to be significantly beefed up and filtration and background checks of employees needs to be much stronger. Indigenous development of defence equipment would always mean an adversary would rather go to great lengths to understand the development and technologies that go into it, because it may or may not have a parallel in the defence world.

It’s not simply about protecting blueprints and files, but even the people who develop such technologies shouldn’t fall prey to adversarial moves. China has, in its dealings with US defence technologies done everything, from using signals intelligence to simply hiring people from US defence companies as well as planting their own moles to extract information. While US Defence contractors and manufacturers have wisened up in recent years, the damage has been immense. From fifth-generation fighter technology to transport and Airborne Early Warning aircraft to several small and large developments, China has been able to significantly close the gap with the US through espionage and subsequent reverse engineering/engineering using blueprints and documents. A more detailed article on China’s efforts can be done in a subsequent article and the lessons India can learn from them.

Bottomline is, Indian Private Sector Defence establishment is as valuable to India’s sovereignty and security as is its public sector units. It’s important to safeguard them from potential nefarious plots of its enemies, because it also hurts partners and buyers of Indian defence equipment, an industry that’s potentially headed for explosive growth over the next decade or so.

India’s defence aspirations certainly need defending.