Decoding Türkiye - The ‘T’ In NATO

With the recent altercation between leaders of the two NATO members viz. Türkiye and Germany, we examine Türkiye’s stand on the wars, its position in the world's most powerful military alliance and offer some opinions on how the United States views Türkiye as a contributing member.

Note: This article has been written considering the updates up to November 28, 2023.

Introduction

Nestled between one of the most cardinal geopolitical landscapes (and now probably one of the most conflicted zones in the world at this moment), lies Türkiye (formerly known as Turkey) - having its century old origins in the Ottoman Empire. Known for its dazzling monuments, attractive tourist locations, and palatable cuisines, the country has been ravaged by a recent earthquake, inflationary and economic pressures, political instability and now been bordered by two regional conflicts turned global wars.

Around six decades ago, backed by the fear of a Soviet invasion, Türkiye joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – a military alliance in February 1952 and has continued as a permanent member since then. As a contributor to the alliance, Türkiye has been an instrumental cog in the system by guarding NATO’s interests in the Black Sea, Mediterranean Region, and Southwestern Asia. Housing close to fifteen NATO/US Armed Forces bases (as of 2019), Türkiye currently ranks second in its contribution of personnel to NATO’s armed forces. The Incirlik Air Base and the Izmir Air Base serve as the key air force bases for The United States’ Air Force which continue to provide the United States a strategic visibility in the Mediterranean region (and now in the hostile Southwestern Asia). Apart from housing the Air Force, the United States has also ensured an active Naval presence in the Mediterranean and the Black by deploying its 6th fleet for regular maritime exercises – the most recent one being earlier in November 2023 with USS Gerald R. Ford and USS Dwight D. Eisenhower.

On the defence front, data from trusted sources shows a gradual decline in Türkiye’s military spending both in real (currency USD) and nominal terms (as a percentage of GDP) between 2019 to 2022. However, the nation has recently announced a 150% increase in its defence budget for the year 2024 with an estimated spending of US$ 40 billion as compared to the current spend of US$ 16 billion. With having its skin in the game back in 2017, by being dismissed from the F-35 development program, Türkiye’s chicanery helped in procuring F-16s from the USA worth US$ 20 billion in exchange for Sweden’s admission to the NATO in 2022. Not only that, but it had also managed to ‘convince’ Stockholm in lifting of the arms embargo imposed on it back in 2019.?

Similarly, it urged Finland to strengthen its anti-terror laws, abjure the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and People’s Protection Units (YPG), and address Türkiye’s extradition requests for terror suspects. (This was one of terms that Türkiye had on the table at the time of admission of Sweden as a NATO member as well).

While Türkiye has no nuclear weapons of its own, it has been granted the right to store and deploy nuclear weapons in the capacity of a NATO member. Overall, Türkiye has been ranked 11th out of 145 countries in terms of military power in 2023 on the Global Fire Power Rankings Index and the strongest in the Southwest Asian and Middle Eastern Region.

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Türkiye And the Israel-Palestine War

As one of the most dominant powers in the Mediterranean region, Türkiye has inevitably and indirectly been pulled into the conflict zones – both the Russia-Ukraine and the Israel-Palestine wars. It is thus imperative for Ankara to champion the re-stabilization of peace within the region for political, economic and security purpose. However, the question is – does the country led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan willing to act as a balancing power or will it use this as an opportunity to advance its interests to recover from its inflationary economy and bolster its defence capabilities?

?A quick walk down the timeline on Türkiye’s relations with Israel and Palestine. Türkiye was one of the first Islamic-majority states to recognize Israel as a sovereign state back in 1949 – only a year after Israel declared independence. Nevertheless, it continued to support Palestine’s struggle for freedom including engaging diplomatically with Tel Aviv during the 1967 Six-Day War asking Israel to withdraw from the Palestine land that it occupied. From 1967 until 2010, relations with Israel remained largely neutral with Ankara continuing to support Palestine’s fight for freedom while walking on eggshells to ensure there is limited diplomatic conflict with Tel Aviv. The relations between the two nations however soured (and led to a diplomatic fallout) when Israel attacked the Mavi Marmara – a Turkish flotilla bound for Gaza for providing humanitarian aid. The attack by the Israeli commandos led to the death of around 10 onboard the ship and a subsequent expulsion of the Israeli ambassador from Türkiye. Relations gradually normalized after half a decade only until Israeli security forces killed dozens of Palestinian protestors who protested against the separation fence that Israel built around Gaza.

However, it is interesting to know that the economic impact as a consequence of these actions was negligible. In fact, trade between the two countries continued to flourish with trade volumes hitting about US$ 9.5 billion as per a recent statement by President Erdogan.

In the most recent development, we saw the Turkish president engage in an argument with the German chancellor at a press conference conducted in Berlin. President Erdogan openly criticized Israel’s actions. Addressing Israel as a terror state, it accused Tel Aviv of war crimes relating to bombing of civilian facilities and killing children.

Overall, we thus witness Türkiye maintaining a fine balancing act between advancing its own interests vis-à-vis continuing to extend its support to the Palestinians. A possible explanation for this approach is to ensure that Ankara continues to maintain good trade and economic activities with the regional partners, maintain cordial relations with the NATO members but at the same time, keep the local majority Islamic populace happy by extending its support to the Palestinians.

As per a 2021 US Department of State report, about 99% of the Turkish population is Muslim. The 2023 Turkish elections showed a different side to Türkiye – one where approximately 50% of the 85 million population did not want the incumbent President to come back to power. Perhaps, a strong statement in favour of the Palestinians could act as a pacification for the dissenters (and the mass population) and President Erdogan could probably hope to regain his lost support by the 2028 election timeline.

On the flip side, an augmented pro-Palestine approach could affect Türkiye’s support from the West. It has already faced the consequences of the procurement of the S-400 missile system from Russia back in 2017. The USA led by then Donald Trump slapped sanctions on Ankara and removed it from the F-35 programme citing security concerns. In 2023, in a bid to overcome the repercussions of the dismissal from the F-35 programme (and thus, inability to procure these jets), Türkiye is looking to procure around 40 Eurofighter Typhoons only to be met with resistance from Germany, being one of the co-developers of these fighter jets.

Ankara thus might resort to the age-old tactic of cajoling its ‘allies’ when in need, only to play a Sweden or Finland like card in the future. As of now, one can only guess or at best, plausibly prognosticate on what Türkiye might decide upon as a major regional power.

Türkiye and The Russia-Ukraine War

Almost 24 months ago, the world was shocked with the unexpected news of the declaration of a war. A war in its true kind, and the largest attack on a European country post World War II. A war that was initiated by the world’s second most powerful military against its neighbouring state, Ukraine.

The West criticized Russia’s actions and assured Ukraine of continued military and humanitarian assistance to combat the Great Bear. While the West continues to extend its support to Ukraine, it is adopting a more cautious approach – factoring in their domestic economic, defence and demographic aspects. The United States too is occasionally contemplating a reduction in aid and funding (though the US Secretary of Defence did announce a US$100 million funding aid last week) even though the people of the United States want it to continue supporting Ukraine.

Amidst the diplomatic rigmarole between the Western nations, Türkiye yet again is deftly deploying its ‘neutrality’ policy. President Erdogan, while publicly promoting Ukraine’s admission as a member to the NATO, has taken no steps to recalibrate its relations with Russia. This becomes even more delicate considering that Ankara is a NATO member, and that NATO was formed once upon a time with an objective to counter the erstwhile Soviet Union. Would it not be the objective of a military alliance to also ensure limited relations with a state (which may be referred to as an adversary) engaged in a war with a potential member? In fact, this question was indirectly addressed in a statement at the NATO’s Brussels Summit in 2018. Paragraph 5 of the Brussels Summit Declaration explicitly states the suspension of all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia, while remaining open to political dialogue.

However, there are various reasons why Ankara feels that this might not be needed.

For one, Russia and Türkiye have been one of the most significant and important trade partners. As of 2019, trade volumes between the two countries were at US$ 26,309 billion with Türkiye being a net importer of approximately US$ 22,000 billion. Conversely, trade volume between Türkiye and Ukraine in 2019 amounted to a meagre US$ 4.8 billion.

Second, energy constitutes one of the most important elements of the relationship between the two nations. The Turkstream (a natural gas pipeline between Russia and Türkiye) contributes to close to 45% of Ankara’s natural gas requirements and keeps the houses warm during the winters. Further, the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant project has instrumental in Türkiye becoming a member of the ‘nuclear power plant status’ club. The project has jointly been undertaken with support from Russia and the estimated cost of US$ 20 billion has been borne fully by Russia. The plant is expected to meet around 10% of Türkiye’s power needs annually. Thus, this greatly reduces the dependency on carbon emitting fuels such as coal or natural gas for generating electricity.

Third, Russia currently has a strong grip on Crimea and thus on its only warm-water port of Sevastopol. Geographically, this means that the Russian Navy has a significant degree of control on the operations of the Black Sea. This also explains why the Black Sea Grain Initiative was so significant, not just for Russia or Ukraine but also for the world.

Fourth, in the event of Türkiye (either independently or as a NATO member) counters Russia, they face an immediate supply chain challenge. While the NATO nations bordering the Black Sea (Türkiye, Bulgaria and Romania) will be able to counter the Russian invasion, one cannot deny that it is more difficult to have an efficient supply chain of men, equipment and resources from thousands of miles away as compared to Russia (and its allies) having more established and robust regional supply chains. In any case, an outbreak of such a conflict is unlikely considering the economic and humanitarian impact associated with such a decision.

Thus, just as in the case of Israel and Palestine, we foresee the Turkish stance to be largely neutral and its proclivity towards domestic interests.

Türkiye – A Necessity for the NATO?

With the aggressive stance adopted by the President Erdogan led nation, one might question as to whether Türkiye is indeed a reliable and indispensable NATO member. It is interesting to note that this is not the first time that Türkiye has been in conflicted situations with its fellow NATO members. Until recently, Türkiye and Greece maintained cold relations due to the disputed control over areas of the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea. Apart from that, Türkiye also has tense relations with Germany especially with Berlin blocking the proposed acquisition of the Eurofighter Typhoons by Ankara.

Earlier in July 2023, Erdogan had commented on the riots in Paris a consequence of the France’s colonial past and linked it to Islamophobia .

Currently, the Washington Treaty, 1949 (the founding agreement behind the NATO) does not contain any provision regarding the termination of membership from the Alliance or the expulsion of a member. Thus, one might presume that it is difficult to expunge a member from the Alliance. However, there are two important aspects which one may consider in this regard.

One, Article 3 the Washington Treaty states that all members “are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.” Thus, this means that any repeated instances of breach of commitments under the Agreement may lead to a unanimous vote of all the other members (except the one committing such breach) to suspend or expunge the defaulting member. Second, Article 60(2)(a) of the Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties, inter-alia, provides for the suspension of the operation of the treaty in whole or in part between themselves and the defaulting State.

Thus, if Türkiye does end up breaching its commitments materially under the Washington Treaty, there may be possibilities of its expulsion. However, what constitutes materiality is an ambiguity which can be determined only by a unanimous agreement between the other member nations.

Looking at the present circumstances, it is unlikely that the United States will adopt the extreme measure of suspension or termination of Türkiye’s membership. At best, it can issue warnings or undertake certain stringent measures such as the removal of Ankara from the F-35 programme.

This is primarily due to Türkiye being an important strategic partner for the United States houses a significant number of US military bases, guarding the entire Mediterranean region, and balancing Russian hegemony.

Additionally, Ankara also controls the Straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles which handle a significant amount of maritime traffic and acts as a gateway of entry into Europe and Western Asia. It is estimated that around 50,000 vessels pass through the Bosphorus Strait annually – almost twice that of the Suez Canal.

Lastly, the United States is aware of Türkiye’s intention to construct the Istanbul Canal. This canal, if constructed, will result in decongestion of traffic in the Bosphorus Strait and lead to contributing to Türkiye’s revenues on account of passage of commercial vessels. Currently, Ankara earns no revenues from the Bosphorus Strait since it is bound by the Montreux Convention. The construction of the canal will also allow Türkiye to bolster its naval capabilities by the construction of ports and naval facilities.

As NATO completes over seven decades, it has thirty-one full time members. And while it can boast of its military might and an unbreakable alliance, considering the current geopolitical scenario, Türkiye indeed does have a circumstantial advantage. And looking at the history, President Erdogan will miss no opportunity in using subterfuge to act in Ankara’s own interests over that of the NATO. How far the United States and the other NATO allies willing to compromise on such actions only depends on how quickly the situation in the region stabilizes and NATO creating enough leverage to abate the consequences of the Turkish impudence. Until then, the T in the NATO might just continue representing “Türkiye.”