The Decline of King Coal:The Miners' Strike of 1984-85: A Modern Luddite Struggle?
Nigel Morris
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a case study in managed transition In the annals of British labour history, few events loom as large as the Miners' Strike of 1984-85 and the earlier uprising of the Luddites in the early 19th century. While separated by over 170 years, these two working-class movements share striking parallels that reveal common economic pressures and a resistance to forces seemingly beyond their control.
The Luddites, skilled textile workers in the industrial heartlands of England, rose up between 1811 and 1816 to protest the introduction of new labour-replacing machinery. Fearing for their livelihoods, they sought to curb technological change by smashing the machines they saw as existential threats. Their name became a byword for reactionary opposition to progress.
Fast forward to 1984, and the miners of Britain faced a similar sense of upheaval. The Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher was determined to downsize and reform the unruly coal industry. Pit closures loomed, spelling potential job losses on a massive scale for the tight-knit mining communities that depended on collieries for their economic survival.
When the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) called a national strike in March 1984, it unleashed a bitter, year-long conflict reminiscent of the Luddites' desperation. The miners sought to preserve not just their jobs, but an entire way of life bound up with the coal industry since the industrial revolution.
Like the Luddites, they perceived an assault on their livelihoods from powers – in this case, Thatcher's free-market policies and program of privatisation – that threatened to render them obsolete. The technologies were different, from mechanized looms to modern "coal-cutting" machinery, but the underlying fear of obsolescence was familiar.
There were key differences, too. The Luddites engaged in machine-wrecking, while miners embraced peaceful protest and endured violent clashes with police on the picket lines. But the miners' motivations echoed those of their forebears – to protect their hard-won skills and communal traditions in the face of economic "progress."
Both movements were ultimately defeated – Luddite unrest was crushed by the British state, while the year-long miners' strike ended in a divisive loss. Yet their resistance etched them into the collective memory as icons of working-class struggle against the tides of industrialization and free-market economics.
In this light, the miners of 1984-85 can be viewed as modern-day Luddites, waging an uphill battle to resist not machines themselves, but the political and economic forces behind them. Historian Eric Hobsbawm called the Luddites "machine-breakers" – the miners sought to break a different kind of machine, that of Thatcherite market reforms and policies threatening their way of life.
Viewed through this lens, both the Luddites and the miners defiantly took their stand in the face of sweeping economic changes, fighting – if ultimately unsuccessfully – to hold back the tides of "progress" that washed away their livelihoods and communities. Theirs was a shared struggle to shape their destinies rather than accept changes being imposed upon them.
The economic forces that were driving the closure of coal mines in the UK during the late 20th century were multifaceted and can be outlined as follows:
Declining demand for coal:
Uncompetitive coal industry:
Oversupply of coal globally:
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Environmental concerns:
Economic policies and privatization:
Structural changes in the UK economy:
These economic forces, combined with political and ideological factors, created a perfect storm that led to the widespread closure of coal mines across the UK in the latter part of the 20th century. The transition away from coal was seen as inevitable by many, but the pace and management of the closures remained a point of contention, particularly in regard to the impact on mining communities and workers.
Handling the Coal Mine Closures: Was There a Better Way?
The pitched battle between the miners and Margaret Thatcher's government during the 1984-85 strike was the culmination of years of escalating tensions. At its heart was the government's determination to downsize and reform Britain's unruly coal industry through widespread pit closures. But could this wrenching transition have been managed in a way that didn't leave entire communities economically devastated?
The human costs of the mine closures were immense. Tight-knit villages across Britain's coal country saw their primary economic engine grind to a halt as pit after pit was shuttered. Generations-old ways of life were swept away, with few viable economic alternatives.
Critics argue the Thatcher government bungled the closures, fixated on defeating the militant miners' unions rather than implementing a coherent regional economic plan. Mines were shut en masse with little consultation and scant efforts to attract new industries to these heavily mining-dependent areas.
Proponents of Thatcher's policies countered that the closures were a necessary rationale response to increasing overmanning, uneconomic "unviable" pits, and competition from cheaper energy sources. Further delays, they argued, would have prolonged the inevitable decline at even greater cost to the public purse.
But many economists contend the closures could have been better managed with a more gradualist, coordinated approach of selective pit closures tied to investment in local retraining and rebuilding plans.
They point to examples from other mining regions that implemented "phased transition" plans which closed unviable pits over time while retraining miners for emerging industries before their local pit was shuttered. Coupled with targeted regional aid and infrastructure investment, these areas were able to blunt some of the economic body blows of losing their primary industry.
The Welsh mining village of Crynant is sometimes cited as done right. Over a decade, the local coal company worked with unions and councils to diversify the economy with light industry and service jobs, while retraining miners before the local pit's closure.
Of course, it's impossible to extrapolate Crynant's experience to every coalfield. And Thatcher's free-market ideology was intrinsically hostile to the notion of slow, centralized transition planning across Britain's coalfields. But the devastation wrought on other mining towns suggests hastier action amid the adversarial strike context made for a more chaotic, mismanaged outcome.
In hindsight, more foresight and consultation with unions and local leaders may have identified opportunities to stagger closures, retrain workers and incentivize new businesses and industries before grim fate utterly befell one-industry towns. Instead, many former pit villages still grapple with entrenched, intergenerational joblessness and lack of economic viability three decades later.
Given the inevitability of coal's decline, most analysis suggests a more measured transition may not have prevented hardship and pain. But it may well have softened the blow for many proud pit communities consigned too swiftly to the slag heap of industrial history.