Dali update - 2
Port of Baltimore SeaGirt Terminal, credit: Port of Baltimore. Photo by Bill McAllen

Dali update - 2

2023-Mar-28 18:36 EDT

FuelTrust has been answering questions from regulators, reporters, and consultants today in light of the #Dali collision with the Francis Scott Key bridge at the Port of Baltimore.

The NTSB has impounded fuel samples from the ship secure locker and drawn samples from the manifold. They have extracted the Voyage Data Recorder. That information will likely not be available to the public (including us) for quite some time.

We confirmed our prior statements with multiple third-party data sources. Further, we confirmed there is no record of fueling in Elizabethtown, NJ, which correlates with our internal data. We also compared the draught of the vessel entering the Panama Canal and it's exit north toward the US, and there was no change, further indicating no bunkering occurred there. We also identified the loading craft ("fuel barges") of the prior two fuel loadings ("bunkerings") in Asia.

There was a discrepancy between differing AIS providers yesterday and this morning, and there currently is a "data sync lag" on the port call transfers of cargoes in NJ and Baltimore that happened before the accident. This is not uncommon. We hope that another day will allow the many systems across many countries and companies involved to get the data aligned and available.

There was a post yesterday on X.com by a retired Maersk Chief Engineer postulating that the engine system control computer could be the root problem source. While this is a possibility (and I cringe to challenge such an experienced source), it is mitigated by the redundant, battery powered, engine control system computer. We do understand that the simultaneous outage of the 3 electrical generators would indicate a control system source - yet the electrical generators use a different control system than the propulsion engine, which also failed. The simultaneous power failure of all 4 of those engines, plus the temporary restart of at least one generator (probably the backup generator) also failing, lean toward a fuel source problem, rather than an electrical or computer source.

There was a statement in several online articles/posts, attributed to one of the crew, that there was a heavy smell of fuel oil in the engine compartment following the first outage. That too, would contra-indicate a control system failure while supporting the probability of a fuel problem source.

That being said - in any incident, never close the door on the "outside possibilities". There is still MUCH not known here.

On a side note - we've been asked by some folks in the industry about the use of the sulfur exhaust scrubber on the vessel potentially allowing this vessel to use HFO rather than MGO - since it's extremely uncommon to have catastrophic contamination of MGO, and most incidents of "going dark" have happened when using an HFO at sea. Chesapeake Bay and the ports are environmental control areas - not allowing the use of an open loop scrubber. Further, exhaust flue visuals match the profile of MGO, not treated HFO (heavy fuel oil). When MGO is found contaminated, it is most commonly the result of organic oils being disposed of into marine fuels to avoid of the costs of recycling them.

Lastly - we have been AGHAST as some xenophobic statements made online regarding the nationality/ethnicity of the crew or the ship's country of ownership. To be clear - THIS CREW ACTED QUICKLY TO NOTIFY AUTHORITIES - allowing that crucial few minutes to close the bridge traffic. THE CREW action, along with the swift action of the Port Control & Police to stop all bridge traffic - SAVED LIVES. We should be thankful for their cool-headedness in the face of looming mortal danger to themselves and their vessel.

要查看或添加评论,请登录

FuelTrust的更多文章

社区洞察

其他会员也浏览了