Déjà vu in Uzbekistan

The international community, including Tashkent's closest partners in the West, those within the OSCE community, and the United Nations have long called for Uzbekistan to enable the rise of political and social pluralism. Yet, no election in the country's history has ever been assessed as fair or democratic, even when nominal “opposition” parties are permitted to participate. The main conclusion of the most recent 2019 parliamentary elections was that despite the fact that five parties ran for seats in the Oliy Majlis and the Uzbek people enjoyed greater relative freedom under President Mirziyoyev, neither the parties nor the electorate dared to challenge the status quo.

Put bluntly, there is no political competition in Uzbekistan. The reason, based on years of analysis, is that Tashkent remains paranoid about the political implications of registering non-governmental organizations and especially groups with political goals. The regime has long suspected these emerging groups of promoting “anti-state” sentiments and somehow “jeopardizing” peace and public safety.

The Uzbek government’s default position is to enable the existence of its own chartered and preferred NGOs, groups with which it is comfortable and which we have long called “GONGOs” (government-organized non-governmental organizations). But impressively, this distinction with a very definite difference has been noticed, not least by the Uzbek public. And so there was a lot of talk about the lack of real opposition in Uzbekistan last year around the parliamentary elections. In mounting its defense, what we heard again and again from regime officials was that the nation needed an opposition grown organically and “from within,” not something imported or aided by foreign elements. And while many regard such statements cynically, a silver lining is that at least the Mirziyoyev Administration has, in effect, conceded the need for an organic opposition.

Well, now there is a group that has emerged organically and from within during the last year, led by Hidirnazar Olloqulov, an economics professor and the former rector of Termez State University, Surkhandarya. Olloqulov is not “imported” in any sense of the term. Indeed, he is instead very much a byproduct of the system that only grudgingly accepts the need for an opposition. He is currently not in the government, and, as far as we know, he is not associated with any of the existing parties. His group wants to register a party called "Truth and Development." They have had several appointments with the Justice Ministry, which is in charge of the registration process.

Olloqulov told VOA that the founders of the party wanted to meet this weekend to finalize the platform. But the place they reserved for their meeting was suddenly closed for renovation and Olloqulov was dispatched to Andijan to be interrogated by the local police there. The details of these developments are unclear. But Olloqulov does say that his home was surrounded by the National Guard and his family mistreated by the authorities. Over the last year, some other members of his group complained of similar pressure. At least 20,000 signatures are required to register. And along the way to their prospective registration, several "Truth and Development" supporters say they have been interrogated by the security services.

Uzbek social media is full of denunciations of, and disappointment with, the system. This includes a very vocal group of Olloqulov supporters. Let the group register, they say, and open the way for something different. But the public at large still does not know much about this would-be party and its leader, so, ironically enough, in seeking to perhaps quiet their voices by pushing and coercing them, the authorities have, in fact, only increased the level of publicly curiosity. For those who are paying attention, the dominant question is why the authorities are so gun-shy about letting this group even come close to formal registration?

And to these many observers, the story seems eerily familiar: this is not a “new Uzbekistan” at all. These harassments, or whatever they are, even in the eyes of the government, is exactly what Uzbeks went through over the last three decades. If the leadership is as confident as it claims to be when it says “there is no way back and the democratic course is firm,” then why not allow these groups to meet, much less register?

So, let’s see who Olloqulov is, and what his platform is about. What real concerns do you—the state—actually have? What precisely is Olloqulov suspected of? The public wants to know, so the authorities should permit the public to know.

Democracy, as the world knows well, is not just a function of creating parties if those parties, in turn, don't really differ from each other and are in lockstep with the leaders and the establishment interests that are in power. Democracy, rather, is what the hundreds of recommendations Tashkent has received over the years say it is: it is freedom of expression and thought, freedom of assembly, freedom to petition and question those in power and their interests, and it is be able to run for any office, even President—as Uzbekistan’s own laws permit.

This is something that Olloqulov says, he wants to do. Democracy says, let the citizens decide.