Czechs in talks with Germany on tanks as they send theirs to Ukraine - Russian isolation won’t spark ‘acute’ oil supply crunch: IEA
Al Arabiya: Czechs in talks with Germany on tanks as they send theirs to Ukraine
The Czech Republic is in talks with Germany on the supply of tanks that would allow the Czechs to send more of their Soviet-era tanks to Ukraine, Defense Minister Jana Cernochova said late on Wednesday.
The Czech Republic may get Leopard tanks from Germany, but probably not the most modern variant, Cernochova said on Czech Television.
“I think we are on the right, good path,” she said. “It concerns acquiring Leopard tanks.”
She said they may be “somewhere in the middle” between he old Leopard 1 and newer Leopard 2 versions.
The Czechs have 30 modernized T-72M4CZ tanks assigned to its tank unit and several dozen more in storage that have not been modernized.
The country has already sent some of its non-modernized tanks to Ukraine after Russia’s invasion started on February 24.
The Czechs have also sent more heavy equipment to Ukraine, from army depots and private arms companies, including artillery, fighting vehicles, anti-aircraft equipment and multiple rocket launchers.
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Russian isolation won’t spark ‘acute’ oil supply crunch: IEA
Russia’s growing isolation will not create an “acute” global oil supply crunch as production from other countries is rising and demand from China is falling, the International Energy Agency said Thursday.
?The IEA, which has previously warned that Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine could spark a global supply “shock”, said EU and G7 plans to ban Russian oil imports would “accelerate the reorientation of trade flows” and force Russia to slash production.?
“Even so, steadily rising output elsewhere, coupled with slower demand growth, especially in China, is expected to fend off an acute supply deficit in the near term,” the agency, which advises developed countries, said in a monthly report.
After supply fell by nearly one million barrels per day in April, losses could widen to three million barrels per day in the second half of the year, the agency said.?
The United States and other rich nations decided to tap their emergency oil reserves in a bid to tame crude prices.?
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24 sent oil prices soaring, but a strict Covid lockdown in China, the world’s biggest importer of crude, has since weighed on demand.
The IEA said “steadily rising” output from the United States and Middle Eastern members of OPEC+ will help offset losses from Russia.?
Excluding Russia, world oil output is set to grow by 3.1 million barrels per day from May through December, it said.?
World oil demand growth, meanwhile, is forecast to slow to 1.9 million barrels per day in the second quarter, more than half the pace from the first three months of the year.
But it is expected to grow again from April to August as driving and jet fuel consumption pick up during the holiday season.?
Demand for 2022 is expected to reach 99.4 million barrels per day, an increase of 1.8 million barrels per day.?
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DEBKAfiles: Qatar to help Iran free moneys frozen by sanctions
Qatar emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani arrived in Tehran on Thursday, the first Gulf ruler to pay an official visit to the Islamic Republic. Sources in Doha report that the emir promised to help Iran get its hands on the funds frozen by Western sanctions. The Qatari ruler next visits the UK and Germany.?
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Al-Arabiya: Qatar’s Emir arrives in Iran to help salvage 2015 nuclear deal?
Qatar’s ruler, Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, has arrived in Iran, Iranian state media reported on Thursday, as the Gulf state tries to help end a row between Tehran and Washington over revival of the 2015 nuclear deal.
While Iranian state media portrayed the visit as proof of Iran’s expansion of ties with regional countries, a source briefed on the visit told Reuters on Sunday that the emir’s trip was aimed to bring the parties to the Iran nuclear pact to “a new middle ground.”?
The stakes are high, since failure to reinstate the pact could carry the risk of a fresh regional war, with Israel, Iran’s arch-foe, threatening military action if diplomacy collapses.
Almost a year of indirect talks between Tehran and Washington to save the pact has been on hold since March, chiefly over Tehran’s insistence that the US remove the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its elite security force, from the US Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list.
Washington has made it clear that it has no such plans, while also not ruling it out.
Iran’s hardline rulers believe that an uncompromising approach, spearheaded by the country's strongly anti-Western Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, can force Washington to accept Tehran’s demands, Iranian officials told Reuters last month.
Under the 2015 pact, Iran curbed its sensitive uranium enrichment work, a possible pathway to nuclear arms, in return for the lifting of economic sanctions.
But in 2018, then-US President Donald Trump ditched the pact and reimposed sanctions on Iran, prompting Tehran to retaliate by gradually breaching the pact's nuclear curbs.?
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Reuters: China's Iranian oil imports ease on poor margins, lure of Russian oil
·??????Summary
·??????April imports estimated at 650,000 bpd - Vortexa
·??????Q1 Iran exports average 840,000 bpd, almost all to China - Kpler
·??????Independent refiners face shrinking margins
·??????Displaced Russian Urals crude heading to China
?SINGAPORE/LONDON, May 9 (Reuters) - China's Iranian oil imports in April came off peak volumes seen in late 2021 and early 2022 as demand from independent refiners weakened after COVID-19 lockdowns pummelled fuel margins and on growing imports of lower-priced Russian oil.
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The easing of Iranian oil purchases, which still make up some 7% of imports by the world's largest crude importer, came as Western diplomats have largely lost hope in reviving a 2015 nuclear pact while high oil prices emboldened Iran to take its time to return to an agreement.
A revived nuclear deal would allow Iran to boost its oil sales beyond China - Iran's number one customer for the past two years - to previous clients in South Korea and Europe.
Meanwhile, Russian crude, displaced by falling demand in Europe on growing concerns about sanctions over Russia's invasion of Ukraine, is heading to China. Russia sent tens of thousands of troops into Ukraine on Feb. 24 in what it called a "special operation"
Initial assessments by Vortexa Analytics showed China imported nearly 650,000 barrels per day of Iranian crude in April, slightly less than the nearly 700,000 bpd discharged in March.
Kpler, another data analytics firm, tentatively pegged Iran's April exports at 575,000 bpd, down from an average of 840,000 bpd in the first quarter of 2022, though the agency expected to revise up April volumes in coming weeks.
China's independent refiners, also known as teapots and situated mostly in the eastern province of Shandong, are key Iranian oil buyers. The refiners have since February reduced crude imports, operating under half their capacity in April as soaring prices, tighter import quotas and COVID lockdowns squashed margins, traders said.
"The Iranian barrels started having difficulties finding buyers since February, after independent plants cut throughput," said Emma Li, China analyst with Vortexa.
At least six cargoes of Iranian oil totalling eight million barrels have not been able to offload at Chinese ports, floating off Shandong and Zhejiang ports for more than three months, Li added.
In contrast, China's sea-borne crude imports from Russia jumped 16% in April from March to about 860,000 bpd, the highest since last December, Refinitiv data showed.
Though the April Russian supplies were dominated by its Far East export grade ESPO blend, the prospect of growing Urals cargoes being forced out of Europe is providing a new lure for the teapots.
At least one teapot refiner bought one June-arriving Urals cargo at a discount of $6 to $7 a barrel to Brent on delivered basis, traders said.
That compared with Iranian oil, transacted at $5 a barrel under Brent.
"Teapots are facing terrible margins and plentiful oil on offer. Dealing Iranian and Russian barrels both carries risks, so refiners would be careful and picking the cheaper supplies that offer relatively better margins," said a trading executive with a Shandong-based refiner.
To avoid U.S. sanctions, Iranian crude has been exported to China marked as oil from Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Malaysia, traders have said.
Aware of the Chinese purchases, U.S. President Joe Biden's administration has chosen not to enforce the sanctions against Chinese individuals and companies.
China's foreign ministry did not respond to request for comment. Iran's oil ministry also did not respond to a request for comment.
Chinese customs data last reported imports of 260,000 tonnes (1.9 million barrels) of Iranian oil each in December and January, in its first official record in a year.
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Arab Food Insecurity and Political Failure
Current disruptions in the food supply chain highlight long-standing problems for Arab countries.
By ?Hilal Khashan?- May 12, 2022
The Arab region, extending from the Persian Gulf in the east to the Atlantic Ocean in the west, faces severe shortages of several staple foods. Given that at least 65 percent of people in most Arab countries are poor or vulnerable to poverty, it’s little surprise that hunger and malnutrition are prevalent in the region. Even in oil-rich Saudi Arabia, conservative figures place at least 20 percent of the population below the poverty line. Poor government planning, demographic changes, water scarcity, climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic and unresolved conflicts all contribute to the problem. And today, the war in Ukraine is revealing the extent of these vulnerabilities, which will continue to plague the region long after the war’s conclusion.
Water Scarcity
Of the world’s 17 most water-stressed countries, 12 are in the Middle East and North Africa. Even though the Arab region includes 5 percent of the world’s population, its share of the world’s freshwater is less than 1 percent. Arab countries import more than half of their food supplies, spending 5 percent of their gross domestic product on these imports.
These problems have affected countries in different ways. In Iraq, drought, sandstorms, high temperatures and external restrictions on water flows have led to 60 percent water loss. Turkey’s and Iran’s aggressive dam construction policies have hugely aggravated water supply problems in both Iraq and Syria. In Egypt, Addis Ababa’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has deprived the country of 25 percent of its Nile water supply. Israel’s virtual monopoly of the Jordan River system has further worsened Jordan’s severe water scarcity.
In Syria and Iraq, where 12 million people have lost access to water, wheat production is collapsing. Land under cultivation shrank by half last year in Iraq, where the population will double by 2050 but potable water will decrease by 20 percent because of declining precipitation, which constitutes 30 percent of the country’s water supply. The Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources says that unless Turkey releases more water into the Euphrates and Tigris rivers – which flow into the Shatt al-Arab waterway south of Baghdad – they will dry up in 20 years. In Syria, around 60 percent of the water flow comes into the country from Turkey, which has used the resource as a political weapon to increase its influence in Syria. It typically releases more water into Syria in the winter, when dams reach maximum capacity, threatening their structural integrity. During the dry summer season, reduced water flows can cause immense economic losses in agriculture and fisheries.
Saudi Arabia has already depleted its underground aquifers, having used annually 5 square miles of its nonrenewable fossil water on farming. Even though Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council countries have nearly 900 water desalination plants, farming remains unviable, with more than half of the plants’ output going toward household use. In Algeria and Morocco, where water shortages are rising, agriculture depends heavily on rainfall, which is unpredictable.
Outdated Technology
Water scarcity isn’t the only problem, however. The lack of agricultural productivity is also a result of outdated technology and cultivation techniques, as well as poor planning and management. Inefficient irrigation systems such as flood irrigation consume 40 percent more water than sprinkler or drip irrigation. Agricultural cooperatives are scarce, and Arab governments do not provide incentives for expansion, resulting in the perpetuation of small, family-owned lots that are not suitable for modern irrigation and mechanized cultivation. Agriculture also lacks sufficient fertilizers and pesticides. These issues lead to low yields, averaging 1.3 tons per hectare, compared to the world average of 3.6 tons per hectare. High birth rates – around 2 percent compared to the world average of 1 percent – complicates the situation.
The region’s arable land totaling 70 million hectares, 30 percent of which are in Sudan, would be sufficient to meet its agricultural needs. What Arabs lack is a workable irrigation system and the ability to work together. But corruption and personal politics often stand in the way. In Iraq, the government doesn’t seem to take the water situation seriously. In 2018, it allocated $15 million, about 0.2 percent of its budget, to address water issues. Iraq needs to invest at least $180 billion in dam construction and irrigation projects to tackle its acute water scarcity over the next two decades. Syria’s water issues predate the 2011 uprising. Metropolitan Damascus, with a population of more than 4 million inhabitants, frequently experiences water cuts that last several weeks. Half of Syria’s water treatment facilities are inoperable because of the war, reducing available drinking water by 40 percent over the past decade and causing sewage water to contaminate supplies.
Government Failures
Arab countries are the world’s leading grain importers, but Russia’s war on Ukraine has revealed the vulnerability of the region’s lack of self-sufficiency. Even though Russia and Ukraine export only 12 percent of the world’s food, their proximity to the region makes their products substantially cheaper and more competitive than those of other food exporters. The conflict has been especially disruptive to Arab countries because of the importance of bread in Arab diets. Around 35 percent of caloric intake in Arab nations comes from bread alone. Some countries, such as Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon, import more than 70 percent of their wheat.
Shortages of food staples, including bread, cooking oil and legumes, are common, notably in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco, and have forced the ruling elite to take steps to avoid possible revolts. For years, Algerians have complained about food scarcity and inflated prices, as their purchasing power dropped by 40 percent over the past six years. The cash-strapped government’s detachment from the crisis and decision to reduce imports have increased the level of public frustration. In Egypt, the country’s 20th century irrigation policy, which culminated in completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1970, did not lead to an agricultural revolution. Instead, the gap between local food production and imports has increased, reaching an alarming rate in recent years. Domestic grain yields totaled 69 percent in 2000, but local production decreased to 45 percent in 2018. During the same period, its locally grown legumes declined from 56 percent to 37 percent, and the downward trend has continued.
Arab regimes are more concerned about security than food independence. For example, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco spend five times, 12 times and 25 times more on defense than on agriculture, respectively. Some in the Arab region proposed, all the way back to 1956, establishing a common Arab market in preparation for launching an economic union – but the idea never materialized. The 2005 Arab League summit in Algiers and the 2007 summit in Riyadh presented a strategic vision to achieve Arab food security by developing an economically efficient agricultural sector, properly managing environmental resources and enhancing farmers’ quality of life. Arab agriculture ministers approved the summits’ recommendations during the 2008 meeting of the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development in Bahrain. The recommendations included developing modern agricultural techniques and encouraging investment in agricultural processing. They also called for improving farming competitiveness and investing in human resource development.
But Arab regimes ruined the prospects for launching a successful agricultural revolution. They rejected possibilities to cooperate, preferring to import food that annually costs the Arab region more than $100 billion and exposes it to price fluctuations and import disruptions due to foreign conflicts. Arab dictators willfully contributed to wasting their countries’ meager water resources. In 1992, Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein ordered the drying up of the Mesopotamian Marshes in southern Iraq, where insurgents sought shelter, destroying its agriculture, fisheries and unique biodiversity. In the early 1990s, Syrian President Hafez Assad diverted sewage water to the Barada River, which crossed through Damascus and provided the capital with water for domestic and agricultural use. He also rerouted its canals away from his palace for security reasons. His son, Bashar, changed the direction of the river mouth to flood rebel areas outside Damascus.
Impact on Public Health
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, the number of people who go hungry in the Arab region has risen by more than 90 percent over the past two decades, exceeding 69 million in 2020. One-third of the region’s 420 million people suffer from malnourishment. More than 20 percent of children under five suffer from stunted growth. Eight percent are underweight, and 11 percent are overweight, primarily because of poor diets, which exceeds the international average by 5 percent. In Yemen, 45 percent of adults suffer from hunger, and 60 percent of young people are anemic. In Sudan, more than 20 percent of the country’s 45 million people suffer from severe hunger, which could double under its military-controlled government. These figures are particularly stark given that Sudan could feed most of the Arab region if it was able to meet its full agricultural potential.
In wealthy GCC countries, however, overnutrition is a big problem. The Arab diet depends heavily on refined flour and rice, and variety in food consumption is either beyond most people’s means or is not part of the traditional cuisine. In addition, government subsidies do not cover wholesome foods. Unhealthy eating habits have contributed to high rates of suffering from chronic diseases, especially diabetes. A quarter of adults in GCC countries will become diabetic by 2030. In Saudi Arabia, more than 50 percent of people over 30 are prediabetic. In Egypt, 21 percent of adults have diabetes, and an equal percentage are prediabetic.
The Arab region has failed to tackle the underlying causes of its food issues and thus is unlikely to overcome them in the near future. Achieving sustainable development requires resolving the endemic food crisis and exiting the vicious cycle of poverty. This process involves reprioritizing state objectives from defense to agriculture and reversing internal migration patterns that saw a massive population movement from rural areas to urban centers over the past half-century. These demographic changes weakened the agriculture sector yet failed to promote other productive industries. Arab rulers may be eager to develop their countries, but they are unwilling to abandon their fixation on regime stability and order.
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Hilal Khashan is a Professor of political science at the American University of Beirut. He is a respected author and analyst of Middle Eastern affairs. He is the author of six books, including Hizbullah: A Mission to Nowhere. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2019.) He is currently writing a book titled Saudi Arabia: The Dilemma of Political Reform and the Illusion of Economic Development. He is also the author of more than 110 articles that appeared in journals such as Orbis, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Middle East Quarterly, Third World Quarterly, Israel Affairs, Journal of Religion and Society, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, and The British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.
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