CURRENT CONFLICTS AND MUSLIM AND ISLAMIST STATES: THE CASE OF IRAQ

5.1 War and Peace in Iraq: Political Philosophy vs. Organised Violence

The terrorist attacks of September 2001 in the US by Islamist suicide bombers prompted a massive US-led military operation that ousted the radical government of Taliban from power in Afghanistan and led to the fleeing of the leaders of the Al-Qaida organization, the primary sponsor of the 2001 attacks.[i] The neo-conservative US administration at the time, declared a War on Terror, whereby it reserved the right of preventive strikes against those it considered potential terrorist threats against the United States.[ii] Attention was thereafter focused on the dictatorship on Iraq, where for decades the tyrannical government of Saddam Hussein had resulted in a brutal suppression of the Iraqi people and had caused two major wars with Iran and Kuwait.

The Ba’ath party, to which Saddam Hussein belonged, was, however, a secular socialist political organization.[iii] Its northern neighbor, Syria, was also affiliated to the same though that had not led to particularly warm relations between the two countries. Iraqi politics, therefore, was a discourse of totalitarianism pursued through socialist principles with zero tolerance for dissent. There were no strong religious contributions, officially or unofficially, into a system that was willing to gas its neighbours as well as its own population.[iv] Therefore, as contemptible a dictator as he was, Saddam was far from an Islamist fundamentalist. To date no hard evidence has been presented to the world to show a credible link between the former Iraqi ruler and Islamist radicalism.

In its international dimension the expansionist designs of Saddam had already started a war with Iran in 1980 that had lasted for seven years and had consequently earned the unceremonious title of the longest war of 20th Century. Later in 1990 the Iraqi leader had invaded and occupied Kuwait declaring it the nineteenth province of Iraq.[v] That had led to the most successful ever application of collective security in human history, whereby a united world assembled its forces and resources, led by the United States, to reverse the invasion and force the aggressors out of Kuwait.

Moreover, there were talks by US high officials, including former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that new US policy centred on fostering stability in the Middle East based on democratic governance and not vice versa.

The "freedom deficit" in the broader Middle East provides fertile ground for the growth of an ideology of hatred so vicious and virulent that it leads people to strap suicide bombs to their bodies and fly airplanes into buildings. When the citizens of this region cannot advance their interests and redress their grievances through an open political process, they retreat hopelessly into the shadows to be preyed upon by evil men with violent designs.[vi]

This new approach seemed to promote a greater Middle East that boasted freedom of speech and democratic governance. Freedom of the people, it was believed, expressed in libertarian fashion, could be the key to solving the phenomenon of arbitrary killings preached and practiced by Islamist radicals.

It was against the backdrop of these factors (a brutal dictator in Baghdad, who was also an aggressive adventurer abroad, the new terrorist threat posed by radical Islamists against the West in general and the United States in particular and the perceived remedy: to purge the Middle East of dictators) that the plans to invade and occupy Iraq in 2003 were put into effect.[vii] Despite opposition by many countries including Russia, France and Germany, the US-led forces, backed by the United Kingdom and Spain amongst others, expectedly managed to topple the Iraqi regime in a relatively short period of time sending Saddam into hiding. The ‘major combat’ phase of the military operation in Iraq, as declared by President Bush, came to end on 1 May 2003 around forty days after it had started on 20 March of the same year. There was perhaps little doubt on the military outcome of the conflict, even though according to some, unlike the war in Afghanistan a couple of years earlier, it had failed to secure the full and unequivocal support of the United Nations.

The road to rebuilding Iraq as a country and institutionalizing democracy, however, was fraught with hurdles right from the beginning. The military victory over Saddam was not easily translated into winning the peace in the country. The war had been won but peace had not been secured. This baffled US policy makers, who wondered why peace was proving so elusive to them in Iraq. After all, if freedom and democracy were the foundations of peace and stability, why then despite the new-found democracy in the country the streets of Baghdad and other cities in Iraq were the scenes of carnage and violence? What were the missing ingredients in Iraq for peace and stability to be secured?

The first observation to be made was that whilst war is a military project, peace is generally a political discourse. That had been witnessed in Afghanistan only very recently, where the process of peace-building was still underway.[viii] Therefore though the number and the quality of military hardware may be a deciding factor in war, they do not seem to have a comparable impact on the peace process. Perhaps this point eluded policy makers in Washington at the time. The second observation relates to the very question that was being asked. The question ‘why peace had not been won in Iraq’ should perhaps be rephrased into: ‘why had the liberal peace not been won in the non-liberal post-conflict polity of Iraq?’ That rephrased question could perceivably better guide attention to the elements that have possibly contributed to the impasse in that country. As Arabs say, ‘a good question is half the answer’.

Three possible sets of answers could be identified in response to that question:

·     External factors, both state and non-state actors. This would include regional and non-regional countries as well as organizations such as Al-Qaida.

·     Conspiracy theory, which would view the violence in Iraq as planned in order to divide up the country along the sectarian lines of Kurds, Sunnis and Shi’as.[ix]

·     The non-compatibility of the liberal mechanism applied in post-conflict non-liberal Iraqi society, which caused disharmony and discord.

The first set of factors would cover a wide range of countries. Many a powerful state were against the US-led invasion of Iraq to begin with. One instance was former president of France, Jacque Chirac, who had openly stated his opposition to military action against Iraq and had threatened to veto any resolution in the UN Security Council that sought to authorise such action. That had led to open and hostile postures between Washington and Paris that involved other countries also. The political resentment found its ways into the language of leaders rebuffing one another, newspaper headlines and even French fries being renamed freedom fries in the US.[x] The question remains if the hostility of these countries to the invasion and occupation of Iraq, emanating from perceived national interests, diminished after the war had started.[xi]

Regional countries were also unsure about the US designs on Iraq. Would the ousting of Saddam not have consequences for their own countries? Iran and Kuwait, both subject of Iraqi dictator’s aggression in the past, must have felt relieved at the prospect of removing Saddam from power. However, in the case of Iran, policy makers in Tehran must have wondered if they were not next on the list of Washington to come under military attack. It was perhaps this concern that prompted Tehran to temporarily halt its nuclear activities in 2003 in fear of crippling US military reprisals.[xii] Saudi Arabia and other regional states, including the littoral countries of the Persian Gulf, also had mixed feelings about the US-led invasion of Iraq. If democracy was to replace the totalitarian regime in Iraq, would that not act as a catalyst for democratic change in their own countries?[xiii] These and other concerns produced a murky picture, wherein it was difficult to locate the exact perceived interests of each state as regarded the military defeat of Saddam’s regime. Accordingly, it may be argued that a host of countries may have not been so eager for a successful outcome of the US-led invasion of Iraq.

The second scenario portrays the much-loved, and subscribed to, conspiracy theory in the Middle East. In this instance, this conspiracy narrates the designs of the big powers to divide up Iraq along sectarian lines. The grounds for such a policy are two-fold. Firstly, experience has shown that dealing with smaller states is much easier than bigger ones. Larger countries are by definition more powerful particularly if they possess oil or other such important sources of energy. Accordingly three different smaller states within Iraq, carved up along sectarian lines, would be less likely to threaten their neighbours or be a menace to international peace and security than one central large Iraqi state. Secondly, as Iraq is basically the amalgamation of three different millet system of the dissolved Ottoman Empire, put together by Britain, there may be little that bonds the three different ethnic groups within the country to form a nation. The gap between them in instances is so large that works against the formation of a cohesive community. There may in fact, in certain respects, be antipathy and deep-rooted hostility between them.[xiv] Long term peace within the country may accordingly be only guaranteed by separating these sects in order to facilitate self-determination for each. It may be noted that these sectarian groups never lived together as one country under a democracy. It was always the use of force that coerced them to live together in peace.

There are, on the other hand, grounds that can negate conspiracy theorists on designs to break up Iraq along sectarian lines. Firstly, any serious prospect of statehood to the Kurds, let alone the act itself, could potentially trigger unrest and demands for secession amongst the Kurdish population in neighbouring countries, most probably Turkey. There is little doubt, in such a case, over the military response of Turkey and possibly Iran and Syria. The region would then be embroiled in a long-term conflict that could threaten regional stability. Therefore the outcome of the break-up of Iraq could in fact have adverse consequences for peace and security. Secondly, the establishment of an independent Shi’a state in the south could place it under the strong influence of Shi’a Iran rendering it little more than a satellite state; a prospect hardly to be cherished by Washington either.

The third answer, which deals with the non-compatibility of the Iraqi society as a whole with the principles of Western-style democracy, is the focus of this section. Without intending either to endorse or to dismiss the previous two sets of factors, the attention here is on this last option. At the outset we have to be clear what is meant by liberalism and liberal peace? There are no canonical definitions of the term liberalism[xv] but for the purpose of this work four correlates of this precept will be taken into consideration. They are a) nationalism, b) rationalism, c) secularism and d) individualism.

To begin with the first correlate, one must tend to the term nation. Is there an Iraqi nation and what can one make of Iraqi nationalism? Despite various sets of commonalities introduced as criteria for nationhood, such as history, religion, language, customs, race, etc. it may be safe to assume that there are no universally agreeable set of conditions that would enable a single definition of this term. In Europe, for instance, race plays a more prominent part in nationhood compared to the United States. Shari’ati’s ideological claim that common pains, rather than any thing else, give rise to a nation is yet another variation on this precept.[xvi] Thus the question turns into what set of criteria should we adopt if we are to talk of an Iraqi nation? Close examination reveals that the commonalities between various sects of the Iraqi people may be less than one may expect. The three components of the Iraqi population, the Shi’as, the Sunnis and the Kurds, were all separate parts under the Ottoman Empire and amalgamated into one country by the United Kingdom in the wake of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Mandate system authorized by the League of Nations. It was accordingly a country formed out of political convenience rather than the imposing realities of history and tradition.[xvii] That is why Al-Wardi talks of “the disjointed nature of Iraqi society held together by geographical imperatives of coexistence in the same space rather than a common sense of shared history and purpose.”[xviii] He continues:

The people of Iraq are divided among themselves and their sectarian, ethnic and tribal struggles exceed those of any other Arab people.[xix]

One of the striking differences between the three different groups in Iraq, is that despite the main common religion of Islam and the shared language of Arabic, there are very few, if any, common heroes that would transcend sectarian divides. In cases the national hero of one sect may in fact be seen in adversarial light by other sects. For example, Mostafa Barzani, a national hero in the eyes of the Kurds of Iraq, is looked down on by the Sunni-populated central Iraq. Equally, Saddam Hussein, a hero for some Iraqi Sunnis, was a demonic figure for the majority of Iraqis that comprised almost all the Shi’as and the Kurds of the country. The lack of bond amongst the various sects in Iraq had perhaps hampered the establishment of a truly national Iraqi institution with the possible exception of the Iraqi army, which ironically was disbanded by the United States after the fall of Saddam.

Therefore, notwithstanding the relative unity of Iraqis during its eight-year old war with Iran, Iraqi nationalism may not be as compelling a precept as experienced in some more cohesive communities. This has also been evident since 2003, when the dictates of a heavily centralized military command structure forcing compliance and suppressing divisions was replaced with a new-found freedom by the indigenous people to openly locate communal gaps and express differences. These divisions have contributed to the violence that has gripped the country to varying degrees ever since. In short, there may be strong intra-communal bonds amongst the various Iraqi sects working against any inter-communal cohesion that could be the source of Iraqi nationalism.

The second correlate points to the rational nature of the liberal discourse in the West. In very general terms, rationalism could in the context of this work be interpreted as the prevalence of rationally defined ways and means, goals and interests over other dicta such as ideology i.e. ideology would be subjected to rationality and not vice versa. In its extreme version, subscribed by Hobbes and hard core realists, it is rationality that makes up (and not discovers) morality as a means to fulfill desires and avoid aversions.[xx] Authenticity, therefore, in this discourse rests with desires and aversions. Morality takes the back seat and when opportunity presents itself for political action to further interests at a cost to morality, there is little that can be expected in terms of moral observance. The main political actor in International Relations, the sovereign state, follows the same path and its rational character, an accepted norm in international life, is the driving force in pursuit of perceived national interests even at the cost to the perceived interests of other political communities. In liberalism in the West, therefore, interests reign supreme in politics, which may explain why the newly revolutionary liberal government in France in late 18th Century commissioned one of its top generals to invade and occupy a country as far as Egypt with plans to go further towards India. How were such military actions consistent with the liberal nature of liberalism in France? The answer lies in the rational character of Western liberal discourse, which renders Western liberalism indifferent and even adversarial to moral principles in its foreign relations if they appear in conflict with their perceived interests.

Secularism, the third correlate of the liberal discourse as noted above refers to the separation of religious establishment from the institutions of the state and not, as commonly and mistakenly feared by some religious zealots in the Muslim World, the separation of religion from politics. In the secular West, religious leaders are revered by the society and can express their political views but in the main do not enter politics.[xxi] Secularism, therefore, is not an anti-religious principle that aims to stifle the faith of the people out of existence, but rather a maxim that opens up space for rationality, another principle of the liberal discourse, to guide the temporal business of the society. In today’s international relations, the affairs of the state, at-least in the liberal West, are dictated by rationality that since the time of the French Revolution, if not before, has managed to legitimize a formal separation of political machinery of the community from organized religion. The secular tradition in the West, therefore, sanctions the utilization of rationality.

In a deeper insight the secular and rational traits of liberalism are the cornerstones of some of the most basic human rights. It is a secular and rational appreciation of equal personhood of all human beings that gives rise to the right of life and liberty.[xxii] Otherwise, such rights can be subsumed by religious beliefs projected and codified in the rules of jurisprudence. To be rational, thus, one has to be secular first and in order to attain secularism, there must inevitably be a separation of political establishment from religious hierarchies.

The last correlate of liberalism to be discussed here is individualism. This refers to the very basic rights of the individual as distinct and opposed to those of the state. It denotes the good of the individual in terms of its moral weight against the good of the state or the nation.[xxiii] John Locke’ views, much heeded by the Founding Fathers of the American Constitution, are noteworthy in this regard. As narrated by McClelland:

As a mechanism, the state [in Locke’s view], like any other mechanism, is there for a purpose, and the position of men in the State of Nature can easily tell us what that purpose is. Men in the State of Nature expect to enjoy the exercise of their Natural Rights, and men come into Civil Society to enjoy them more securely. It is part of God’s purpose for men that they should enjoy these rights, and so no Natural Right can be permanently alienated. Government exists to protect Natural Rights and should confine itself to that function. It follows that any government which threatens the Natural Rights to life, liberty and estate (Locke’s word for property) is a government in the process of forfeiting its title to govern.[xxiv]

In his elaboration on liberalism, Michael Doyle outlines three sets of rights for individuals that would form “the foundation of an ideal version of Liberalism.”[xxv] They are ‘positive freedoms’, ‘negative freedoms’ and the right for democratic participation and representation. The first set refers to such social rights as equality of opportunity in education and economic rights such as health care and employment, which are “necessary for effective self-expression and participation.” ‘Negative freedoms’ refer to freedom from arbitrary authority including free press and free speech,[xxvi] equality before the law, right to property, freedom of conscience and the like. The last set of rights, according to Doyle, is necessary to guarantee the other two. He writes:

To ensure that morally autonomous individuals remain free in those areas of social action where public authority is needed, public legislation has to express the will of the citizens making laws for their own community.[xxvii]

In the individualist outlook of the liberal discourse in the West, there is priority of ‘rights’ over ‘duties’, where no degree of authority by religious authorities or the state can trample upon or withdraw such rights from the individual. They would include all basic human rights as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This can be observed even in the Hobbesian Levithan, which was an attempt to guarantee the most possible satisfaction of desires; in that sense Hobbes was a radical individualist and an extreme modernist, where individuals are rational egoists at-least in that they rationally calculate the satisfaction of their passions and desires. All individual’s social responsibility is codified in the law of the land beyond which he/she bears no duty towards the community.

Therefore these four traits of nationalism, rationalism, secularism and individualism stand as strong pillars upon which Western liberal discourse is founded. To introduce liberal democracy may accordingly require the presence of these important precepts beforehand. The question now is to what extent did Iraqi socio-political tradition embody these characteristics for Western-style democracy to have a reasonable chance of success there? To answer that question we shall outline two of the most prominent aspects of the Iraqi polity and assess their in/compatibility with the pillars of Western liberalism.

The first trait is tribalism, where people are socially grouped into different communities, called tribes, with certain rules and norms governing their conduct. The tribal leader, called Sheikh, has traditionally been the most powerful and the most prestigious man in his tribe.[xxviii] In tribal Arabia, as in many tribes in Iraq, loyalty to the tribe was part of the Arab code of virtue called murawwah.[xxix] The significance of tribal loyalty can be noted in Saddam preferring, political intrigue permitting, to have his closest aides from his home clan of Takrit.[xxx] In the 1990s, Saddam Hussein, a dictator renowned for concentration of power in his own hands (but eager to secure tribal support) gave up two of the important monopolies of the state, adjudication and control of means of violence, to tribal leaders, thus reflecting the importance of tribalism in Iraq and rewarding the tradition in the process. This led in some instances to townsmen, removed from countryside for generations, seeking to rediscover old, or even forge new tribal identities.[xxxi] One scholar notes:

On a more general level across Iraq, these tactics reflected the favour shown by Saddam Husain to the hierarchies of tribal sheikhs, inducing them to cooperate with the regime and to ‘deliver’ the loyalty or at least the acquiescence of their fellow tribesmen to the head of state. Officially, this led to edicts in the 1990s which recognized the authority of tribal sheikhs to settle disputes and to regulate affairs amongst their tribesmen and with other tribes, bringing back a form of separate jurisdiction for the ‘tribal areas’ (situated in many cases within the towns of Iraq) that recalled the days of the monarchy. Unofficially, Saddam Husain favoured the most co-operative of the tribal sheikhs, granting them land rights, promoting their tribesmen and allowing them to arm their followers.[xxxii]

The traditional code of murawwah, referred to above, was somewhat represented in the tribal system in Iraq. “Bravery in battle, patience in misfortune, persistence in revenge (the only justice possible at a time when no government existed – in pre-Islamic Arabia), protection of the weak, defiance towards the strong, hospitality to the visitor (even a total stranger), generosity to the poor, loyalty to the tribe, and fidelity in keeping promises” formed the core of murawwah.[xxxiii] Traditionally the tribal system in Iraq also valued certain similar norms: possession of land by force, authority by instilling fear, which, paradoxically, brought respect, honour, loyalty and lineage.[xxxiv] Most, if not all, of those precepts are unmodern or even anti-modern. State, itself, as a modern formation of community, was to the tribal man a usurper and exploiter and as the defining feature of advancing civilization stood in contrast to tribal solidarity as an organizing principle.[xxxv] This conflict was most evident when tribal claims to land were disregarded unless supported by title deeds issued by state authorities. There was thus a battle between modernity and tribalism without a clear winner. Iraq was an imperfectly modernized country, where according to Ali Al-Wardi, the pervasive dichotomy between the city with urban civilized values and the steppes representing the prevalence of nomadic tribal values was evident.[xxxvi] The same author believes that under circumstances of invasion, Iraq would shed its civilized veneer and resort to tribal nomadic values.[xxxvii] All this makes tribal system a shadow state in Iraq.

Perhaps the instance of bey’a and its analogy with modern voting system would serve to exemplify the conflict between tribal traditions and modernity. The concept of bey’a refers to the consent of all tribal members with their leader usually through a handshake, which would indicate allegiance to the person of the leader and not his/her ideas. Therefore in bey’a people identify with personalities rather than with policies. That was the main reason for the wars known as ridda that took place after the death of Mohammad between his successor Abubakr and some tribes, who saw no grounds for continuing their fidelity to Islam. For many of them, it was the person of Mohammad, whose leadership they had consented to through bey’a, that gave meaning and substance to their loyalty and not a system of ideas and beliefs called Islam. The contrast with modern practice of voting is twofold. First there is usually, but not always, the personal contact (the shake-hand) in bey’a that consummates the consent of the ruled; whereas in the Western style democracy personal contact is unnecessary, impractical and insignificant. Secondly and more importantly comes the identification with personalities and not policies. In bey’a change of policies of the leader would not necessarily constitute grounds for a breach of loyalty by the members of the community whereas change of leadership, however identical their policies with previous leaders, would. In liberal democracy it is almost the opposite. As long as policies remain the same the support of followers can usually be counted on even if leaders change; and accordingly leaders who change course of policies are likely to lose their following too. This difference in social behavior, identification with personalities or policies, is an instance of the cultural gap that may separate the Western liberal society from communities with other traditions.

The tribal nature of Iraqi society was perhaps one factor contributing to the military rule that had always gripped the country up to 2003. In the absence of what one could in modern terms label as a nation dictatorship was perceivably an easier (but as ever despicable) method of governance. This was perhaps the lesson to be drawn by some from the uprising of the Iraqis against Britain in 1920; however, that “could not withstand the withering contempt from the messianic advocates of full-blown democracy as a precondition for the broader changes to be effected in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East.”[xxxviii] In 2003, before the invasion began the Iraqi society was divisive, vengeful, had deeply-felt grievances and bottled-up ethnic and sectarian passions.[xxxix]

The second important trait of the Iraqi society, in this regard, is religiosity. The latter refers to ideologised and/or ritualized religion, where almost all aspects of life come under the influence of religion. This is strongest amongst the Shi’as in the south of the country and weakest (almost-non-existent in cases) amongst the Kurds of Iraq living in the north. The Shi’as in the south are also believed to be less tribal than some other parts of the country like the north-west.[xl] Even though Iran is the only country in the world that espouses Shi’a Islam as the state religion, it is Iraq that hosts the oldest and most prestigious seminary (hawza) in Shi’ism in Najaf (one thousand-year old). Moreover, Iraq is home to the shrine of many Shi’a Saints including Imam Hossein, the anniversary of whose martyrdom in Karbala, Iraq, in 680 AD, marks the largest annual religious occasion in Shi’ism. This religiosity is, however, not immune to the sectarian divide in the country either. On the anniversary of A’shoura, the martyrdom of Imam Hossein, there have in the past few years been attacks by Sunni fundamentalists against those participating in the religious festivals. Sunni radicals have been exhorted to kill ‘satanic Ayatollahs’ (referring to Shi’a religious leaders).[xli] Religiosity, therefore, appears to be an exacerbating factor in sectarian divisions in Iraq.

In order to illustrate the power of the institution of Shi’ism, the denomination of the majority in Iraq, the occasion of Tobacco Boycott would serve well. In 1890, the feeble Qajar dynasty in Iran granted all rights for the production, sale and the export of Tobacco, for fifty years, to Major G. F. Talbot of Great Britain. In protest, the leading Shi’a cleric at the time, the Chancellor of the Najaf seminary in Iraq, Mirza Hassan Shirazi,[xlii] issued a religious fatwa declaring the use of tobacco haram (forbidden). Reportedly even the then Queen of Persia refused to smoke tobacco after the fatwa, admonishing her husband, the king, with the statement that ‘the same man who had wed them (legitimized their relationship) had now delegitimized smoking tobacco.’ Under huge public pressure and the prospect of almost the complete near-collapse of the industry the king withdrew the concession in 1892.[xliii] Thus for the first time the institution of religion in Shi’ism successfully competed with the state and forced its retreat.

The State, supposed to have no equal internally and no superior externally, found, to its dismay, that the Shi’a institution was more than its equal in the country.[xliv]

The political impact of Shi’ism can perhaps be traced back to 1501, the year of the establishment of the Safavid Empire in Iran when the sect became the official religion of the state. Ever since, with some exceptions, the role of religion in the state and the influence of ulema (clerics) have been evident. This has been achieved partly through ritualisation of religion:

Perhaps the greatest asset for the institution of Shi’ism has been its ability to ritualize most, if not all, aspects of faith thus allowing a greater impact upon and deeper influence on its followers. Islamic lunar calendar abounds in religious festivals for Shi’as where the faithful are regularly reminded and called to perform rituals associated with them. The elaborate network of mosques…often provides the focal point for the gathering of the zealots during these festivals, where the clergy can communicate socio-political messages normally mediated through a sentimental and powerful narration of Shi’a grievances in the earlier part of Islamic history (rozeh).[xlv]

In Iraq, specifically, the chancellor of the Najaf seminary, has traditionally been the highest source of emulation and the most revered cleric in Shi’ism throughout the world. Today, in 2011, this belongs to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, an Iranian ethnically, who has demonstrated his influence time and again in developments in Iraq.[xlvi] Moqtada Sadr, the young seminarian student, though politically and financially supported by others, stands poor in comparison. It ought to be noted that Ayatollah Sistani does not subscribe to political Islam even though Shi’a fundamentalists have continually tried to promote radicalism among the Shi’as of Iraq.[xlvii]

Taking on board the influence of religion in Iraq, one is hard-pressed to find any foundational basis upon which secularism, a prerequisite to other traits of a liberal discourse, could stand. Together with tribalism, religiosity is a barrier to the foundational pillars of Western liberalism: nationalism, rationalism, secularism and individualism. Accordingly, attempting to introduce a Western-style democracy in Iraq with little or no regard to the traditions of the country meant at best wasting resources in a project that was a near-impossible and at worst risking cultural disharmony with devastating consequences.

Do the above mean that the people of Iraq are not ready for freedom? Do the arguments advanced in these pages indicate that Iraqis are not mature enough to freely elect their own government and run their own country? What can we learn from the points noted and what do they tell us about Western liberal discourse in communities emancipated from dictatorships?

In response to these questions the most important observation is that freedom as one of the most fundamental traits of humanity, theologically attested to in Islam as narrated in the story of Creation of Adam and Eve, is the inalienable rights of all human beings. No degree of philosophizing and no amount of trying to interject arguments on cultural relativism can detract from the important and pivotal role that freedom does and ought to play in the life of humankind. Stifling freedom in the name of religion, state or other ideas must be condemned unequivocally and without qualification wherever, whenever and however it occurs. Accordingly nothing in this work should be interpreted as a justification for dictatorship and totalitarianism.

Having said the above what ought to be noted in this regard is the not-openly claimed monopoly of liberal peace discourse on peace in global politics and International Relations.[xlviii] Richmond observes:

Interpreted through an understanding of peace, since the end of the Cold War, these debates have effectively concurred that the liberal peace, as defined by democratization, the rule of law, human rights, development, in a globalised economic setting, guided by liberal hegemons, satisfies the core concerns of these theoretical debates [in International Relations].[xlix]

Conclusively, what has to be conceded is twofold: first is full public political participation and a representative and accountable government in liberated post-conflict communities; second, equally important, however, is respect for local traditions and culture that are the means through which the new-found freedom has to be articulated and institutionalised. That means that Western-style democracy representing people with specific history and culture and suited to particular ways of expression in the West would not necessarily work the same way in all settings for all peoples. No doubt, the substance of the liberal discourse, quest for freedom, is a common value to all humanity regardless of variations in culture, history and religion. But the manner in which freedom is practiced in communities can vary in accordance and with respect to local settings. Just as blood, which is a necessary component of physical life for all, varies in type between people and those receiving blood must ensure it is compatible with their own, freedom can have different styles of expression. Essential to intellectual and spiritual survival, expression of freedom varies in type and this difference ought to be respected and not taken to mean that freedom itself is less desired or less appreciated by any group or community.

Accordingly due regard for political philosophy in the case of Iraq could have possibly contributed to a reduced level of violence in that country in the post-2003 era.

[i] Subsequently there were two more major Islamist terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, in 2004 and 2005 respectively.

[ii] See Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, “The ‘Bush Doctrine’: Can Preventive War be Justified?”, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 844.

[iii] Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War Losing the Peace, New Haven and London: Yale University press, 2007, p. 28.

[iv] Saddam used poison gas against Iranian soldiers in its war with Iran on several occasions and also on Iraqi Kurds in Halabja on 16 March, 1988.

[v] For a detailed account of the background to this conflict see amongst others Ohaegbulam, F. Ogboaja, A Culture of Deference, New York: Peter Lang, 2007, pp. 104-5.

[vi] Condoleezza Rice, The Promise of Democratic Peace: Why Promoting Freedom is the Only Realistic Path to Security, The Washington Post, Sunday, December 11, 2005.

[vii] There was reportedly an assassination attempt by Saddam’s operatives on former President Bush (senior) in 1993. For details and US response see David Von Drehle and R. Jeffrey Smith, US Strikes for Plot to Kill Bush, Washington Post, Sunday, June 27, 1993, p. A01. Whether or not this could have been a factor, however minor, in the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 has not been ascertained.

[viii] See on this a very interesting article: Shahrbanou Tajbakhsh & Michael Schoistwohl, “Playing with Fire? The International Community’s Democratization Experiment in Afghanistan”, International Peacekeeping, Volume 15, Number 2, 2008, pp. 252-67.

[ix] See Sara Baxter, America ponders cutting Iraq in three, The Sunday Times, 8October 2006.

[x] See Irvin M. Wall, “The French-American War over Iraq”, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume X, Issue 2, Spring 2004, pp. 123-39.

[xi] One point should be borne in mind regarding the debt that Iraq had to France and other countries. At the time of US military action against Iraq in 2003 the country owed some $120 billion, $40 billions of which was to the Paris Club, a 19-nation group that defines itself, on its website, as “an informal group of official creditors whose role is to find coordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by debtor nations."

[xii] See “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities”, National Intelligence Estimate, National Intelligence Council, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, United States of America, November 2007, p. 6.

[xiii] The sensitivity of some Arab countries in this regard could be seen in that a summit of the Arab League on regional political and economic reform in Tunis in March 2004 was abandoned because several members did not wish the word ‘democracy’ to be used in reform proposals. See https://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/after_saddam_popup/html/2.stm (The site was last visited on 12 June 2011).

[xiv] See in this regard Ali A. Allawi...op. cit. p. 15.

[xv] Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997, P. 206.

[xvi] Ali Rahnema, An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography of Ali Shari’ati, London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000, p. 94.

[xvii] Ali A. Allawi...op. cit. p. 15.

[xviii] ibid.

[xix] Quoted in Ali A. Allawi...op. cit. P. 15.

[xx] See Tom Campbell, Seven Theories of Human Society, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981, p. 79.

[xxi] In one of the most secular Western countries, the United Kingdom, for example, the first function of the Queen, the Head of State, is to protect the Faith (Protestant, Church of England). Many political parties in the West are named after religious affiliation e.g. Christian Democrats in Germany.

[xxii] Michael W. Doyle…op. cit. p. 217.

[xxiii] ibid. P. 209.

[xxiv] J.S. McClelland, A History of Western Political Thought, London & New York: Routledge, 1996, pp. 235-6.

[xxv] Michael Doyle...op. cit. p. 207.

[xxvi] One seasoned journalist in a Middle Eastern country had once observed satirically that there was absolute freedom of speech in his country. But there was, however, no freedom after the speech.

[xxvii] Michael Doyle...op. cit. p. 207.

[xxviii] Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 16.

[xxix] Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. and Lawrence Davidson, A Concise History of the Middle East, MA; Westview Press, 8th ed., 2006, p. 24.

[xxx] Charles Tripp...op. cit. p. 260.

[xxxi] Ibid. p. 261.

[xxxii] Ibid. p. 260.

[xxxiii] Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. and Lawrence Davidson...op. cit. p. 24.

[xxxiv] For a recent-written source on Iraqi tribal life see Sam G. Stolzoff, The Iraqi Tribal System, Minneapolis, MN: Two Harbors Press, 2009.

[xxxv] Ali A. Allawi...op. cit. p. 14.

[xxxvi] See ibid. pp. 13-4.

[xxxvii] See ibid. p. 13.

[xxxviii] See ibid. p. 15.

[xxxix] See ibid. P. 16.

[xl] Ibid. p. 14.

[xli] See S.M. Farid Mirbagheri, “Shi’ism and its Impact on Iran’s Politics: A Theoretical Perspective”, in Farid Mirbagheri (ed.) Islam and the Middle East: An Insight into Theory and Praxis, Nicosia: University of Nicosia Press, 2009, p. 40.

[xlii] Titles such as Grand Ayatollah were not in use then.

[xliii] As a result of cancelling the concession, Iran was forced to pay 500,000 Pound Sterling in compensation.

[xliv] S. M. Farid Mirbagheri, “Shi’ism and its impact on Iran’s politics...op. cit. p. 46.

[xlv] Ibid. pp. 46-7.

[xlvi] For one source on this issue see Johanna Mcgeary, Ayatollah Sistani: Iraq’s Shadow Ruler, Time Magazine, 18 October 2004.

[xlvii] In this respect see Paul Vallely, Grand Ayatollah Sistani: The Real Face of Power in Iraq, 6 March 2004, posted at GateOfKnowledge.com on 17 May 2010, https://blog.gateofknowledge.com/grand-ayatollah-ali-sistani-the-real-face-of-power-in-iraq/ (The site was last visited on 27 May 2011).

[xlviii] For those outside of the discipline, it is noted that International Relations with initials capitalised refers to the academic field of study.

[xlix] Oliver P. Richmond, Peace in International Relations, London and New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 74.