Cryptocurrency-based Terrorist Financing: Investigating and Prosecuting Cases under International Criminal Court

by Ioanna Kalogiannidou

1. ABSTRACT

The rise of cryptocurrencies has opened avenues for terrorist organizations to exploit digital assets to finance their activities. This paper delves into the challenges posed by cryptocurrencies' decentralized and anonymous nature to traditional counter-terrorism financing strategies. By examining the context of international criminal law, this research aims to analyze cryptocurrencies' role in terrorist financing. The study investigates the legal hurdles faced by investigators and prosecutors, focusing on gathering evidence, establishing liability, jurisdictional complexities, anonymity concerns, and the burden of proving intent. Furthermore, the paper provides an in-depth analysis of notable cases involving terrorism financing through cryptocurrencies, examining the intricacies of investigation, prosecution, and adjudication within the framework of international criminal law. This research contributes to a comprehensive understanding of the emerging field of cryptocurrency-based terrorist financing and offers insights to strengthen the legal responses to combat this illicit activity.

2. INTRODUCTION

Cryptocurrencies have ushered in a transformative era in the financial landscape, enabling innovative opportunities while presenting unique challenges. Amidst these advancements, a disconcerting trend has emerged: the exploitation of cryptocurrencies by terrorist organizations for financing their nefarious activities. The decentralized and anonymous nature of these digital assets provides a fertile ground for covert fund transfers across borders, evading traditional regulatory frameworks and surveillance mechanisms. Consequently, investigating and prosecuting cryptocurrency-based terrorist financing cases has become an intricate endeavor, necessitating novel approaches within the realm of international criminal law.

This paper aims to comprehensively explore the intricate relationship between cryptocurrencies and terrorist financing, with a particular focus on the prosecution of such cases under the purview of international criminal law. By undertaking a multifaceted examination, this study seeks to shed light on the legal challenges faced by investigators and prosecutors, analyze pertinent case studies, and propose effective strategies to combat this emerging threat.

Chapter I provides an in-depth overview of the methods, the modus operandi, employed by terrorist organizations to exploit cryptocurrencies for financing purposes.?

Chapter II delves into the complexities of prosecuting terrorist financing within the framework of international criminal law. It explores the challenges of defining terrorism and proposes different concepts as potential solutions to enhance the effectiveness of prosecuting terrorist financing.

Chapter III analyses the Hamas case and attempts to answer the following question: Could Hamas be prosecuted as participants in war crimes under the ICC??

3. CHAPTER I: Cryptocurrencies in Terrorist Financing?

Since the emergence of Bitcoin in 2009, cryptocurrencies have garnered significant attention as a form of internet-native money, promising to create financial systems that are more free, fair, and transparent. However, the use of cryptocurrencies by terrorist organizations has emerged as a pressing concern for regulators and policymakers globally. While visionaries see potential for positive change, terrorist groups have also recognized the opportunities offered by cryptocurrencies in their fundraising and financing operations, prompting the need for tighter oversight of these digital currencies that operate outside the control of any government.

1.1 Terrorist Adoption of Cryptocurrencies

?Terrorist groups have swiftly adopted cryptocurrencies to raise funds more efficiently than ever before. They have demonstrated the ability to collect substantial crypto donations in short periods, significantly reducing the time required for fundraising compared to traditional methods. Notable cases, such as the accusation of two Iranians using Bitcoin in a digital extortion campaign, highlight the evolving tactics employed by terrorists in leveraging cryptocurrencies for their illicit activities. Social media platforms, particularly Telegram, have seen a rise in jihadi organizations soliciting cryptocurrency donations from their followers.

1.2 Case Study: Hamas and Bitcoin?

The case of Hamas provides a compelling example of how terrorist organizations have utilized cryptocurrencies for fundraising purposes. As a designated terrorist organization, Hamas collected funds through a website that generated a unique Bitcoin address for each donor, effectively anonymizing the transactions. This marked the first verified instance of a terrorist organization utilizing such technology to solicit and receive funds. The campaign attracted significant attention and raised substantial funds within a relatively short period. Notably, the organization also provided instructions on how to donate anonymously, indicating their adaptability to technological advancements and their willingness to exploit the features of cryptocurrencies for their benefit.

1.3 Funding Constraints and Alternative Methods?

To comprehend the potential for terrorist use of cryptocurrencies, it is crucial to examine how terrorist organizations typically acquire and manage funds. These organizations rely on diverse funding sources, including state sponsorship, charitable donations, illegal activities, and legal means. However, traditional funding methods may face constraints due to legal and financial risks, leading these groups to explore alternative methods like cryptocurrencies. The decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies, coupled with the ability to receive funds anonymously, presents attractive opportunities for terrorist financing.

1.4 Challenges and Opportunities in Management and Transfer?

Once funds are acquired, terrorist organizations must manage and transfer them effectively. The enforcement of anti-money laundering regulations has diminished their reliance on formal banking systems. Informal transfer systems and false trade invoicing, commonly used by terrorist groups, have also been scrutinized by authorities. Cryptocurrencies offer attributes such as anonymity, security, and usability that align with the needs of effective money transfer. However, the current limitations in transaction volume, technological sophistication, and usability pose challenges for terrorist organizations looking to adopt cryptocurrencies for management and transfer. The scalability and usability of cryptocurrencies for large-scale operations remain areas of concern for terrorist financing.

1.5 Spending and Limitations?

Terrorist groups allocate funds for various purposes, including operating costs and violent activities. Different groups have distinct budgeting strategies based on their needs and goals. Distinguishing between legitimate activities and those indirectly contributing to violence can be challenging. While cryptocurrencies may have the potential for direct operational costs in overseas attacks, their limited acceptability and usability in the regions where terrorist groups operate present constraints. Vendors and members often expect cash payments in stable or local currencies, making it difficult for terrorists to use cryptocurrencies for most expenses. The lack of infrastructure and widespread acceptance of cryptocurrencies in certain areas limits their practicality for day-to-day transactions by terrorist organizations.

1.6 Future Implications

While some experts argue that concerns about cryptocurrencies being a significant enabler of terrorist groups are exaggerated, they acknowledge that lone-wolf actors and loosely associated groups may attempt or are already attempting to use these systems.

Launching a terrorist attack can cost as little as a few thousand dollars. Cryptocurrencies provide an almost instant means of raising funds through scams, attacks on businesses, or manipulation of financial markets. State-sponsored hackers with substantial resources have even greater potential earnings.

Additionally, terrorism experts who claim that cryptocurrencies do not currently play a major role in terrorist financing also recognize that the technology and the groups involved are not static. This dynamic nature could alter future dynamics, making successful use of these technologies easier or more difficult. The utilization of such systems by terrorist organizations depends on the availability of technology and the needs and abilities of these groups.

Nevertheless, the ongoing advancements in cryptocurrency technologies will likely have a significant long-term impact on terrorist financing. It does not necessarily require intentional adoption by terrorist organizations but can arise as a byproduct of changes in banking practices. For instance, the trend towards decentralized finance through cryptocurrencies could jeopardize the unique financial data accessible to the U.S. Treasury for tracking illicit money flows within the international financial system. By embracing cryptocurrencies like Ripple, which operates outside the traditional financial system, secure international fund transfers could occur without relying on the current centralized system.

1.7. Conclusion

While current cryptocurrencies may not entirely meet the specific requirements of terrorist groups, they can still be used for certain financial activities. However, the emergence of a widely adopted cryptocurrency that offers improved anonymity, security, and minimal regulation could increase its utility for terrorist organizations. Effective regulation, oversight, and international cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies are crucial in preventing terrorists from exploiting cryptocurrencies to fund their operations. The subsequent chapters will delve further into the challenges, implications, and strategies for combating terrorist use of cryptocurrencies.

4. CHAPTER II:? Prosecuting Terrorist Financing under International Criminal Law

2.1 Introduction?

In this chapter, we delve into the complexities surrounding the prosecution of terrorist financing under international criminal law. We analyze the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its establishment, explore the criteria for prosecution, examine the crimes falling under the ICC's jurisdiction, and address the challenges associated with defining terrorism within the international community. Additionally, we propose the concept of universal jurisdiction as a potential solution to enhance the effectiveness of prosecuting terrorist financing.

2.2 The Rome Statute and the Establishment of the ICC – Criteria for Prosecution & Jurisdiction

The ICC was established through the Rome Statute, which came into force on July 1, 2002. The Statute outlined various aspects such as jurisdiction, admissibility, applicable law, the Court's composition and administration, investigation and prosecution procedures, trial processes, penalties, appeals and revisions, international cooperation, judicial assistance, enforcement, assembly of state parties, and financing.

The ICC must meet certain criteria to initiate a prosecution. The accused individual must be a national of a state that is a signatory to the Rome Statute, the alleged crime must have taken place within a state party to the ICC, or the case must be referred to the ICC by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the interest of international peace and security. Furthermore, if the domestic courts are inactive, unwilling, or unable to investigate and prosecute the crimes. The alleged crimes must also fall within the Court's subject matter jurisdiction and have occurred after July 1, 2002, or after the state party accepted the Court's jurisdiction.

The ICC primarily focuses on three core crimes with universal jurisdiction: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. These crimes are defined within the Rome Statute and encompass acts committed during armed conflicts, and committed during peacetime under specific circumstances. However, the Rome Statute lacks a precise definition for the crime of aggression, which falls under the Court's jurisdiction but requires further development and agreement among states parties.

The ICC can receive cases through various means. States can voluntarily refer a situation to the ICC or do so upon the request of another state. The UNSC also has the power to refer cases to the Court when threats to international peace and security are identified. Additionally, the ICC Prosecutor holds proprio motu's power, enabling independent investigation initiation. However, the Prosecutor must seek authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber for an investigation to proceed.

Admissibility is a critical aspect of ICC proceedings, consisting of two components: complementarity and gravity. Complementarity ensures the Court only intervenes when a country is unwilling or unable to handle the case effectively. This principle respects the primary jurisdiction of domestic courts and acts as a safeguard against unnecessary ICC intervention in cases that can be adequately prosecuted at the national level. The gravity component limits the Court's capacity to prosecute by prioritizing cases involving senior leaders or those most responsible for the crimes.

2.3 Challenges in Prosecuting Terrorist Financing under the ICC?

Prosecuting terrorist financing under the ICC faces several challenges. Firstly, there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism within the international community, which complicates the identification and prosecution of individuals involved in financing terrorist activities. The absence of a clear and comprehensive definition hampers the effectiveness of the legal framework and leaves room for interpretation and potential loopholes.

Secondly, proving the specific intent and connection between the accused and the financed terrorist acts poses evidentiary challenges. Establishing the link between financial transactions and the commission of terrorist acts requires thorough investigations, financial intelligence, and cooperation among law enforcement agencies from different jurisdictions.

Moreover, the ICC's limited resources and capacity present practical challenges in investigating and prosecuting complex cases of terrorist financing. The Court's focus on other core crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, means that allocating resources for prosecuting terrorist financing may be constrained.

2.4 Finding Consensus on the Definition of Terrorism?

A lack of consensus of terrorism poses challenges but does not prevent the International Criminal Court (ICC) from exercising jurisdiction over terrorists. However, it does create loopholes in the existing framework. While the Rome Statute, which established the ICC, does not explicitly include terrorism as a crime under its jurisdiction, there have been discussions on including it within the Court's mandate.

When the Rome Statute was being drafted, there were calls from various countries to include terrorism within the Court's jurisdiction. However, concerns about the highly politicized nature of terrorism and potential challenges in prosecuting such crimes led to its exclusion. The fear of a politicized Court, as seen with the inclusion of the Crime of Aggression, further complicated the inclusion of terrorism.

Alternative proposals emerged during the Rome Conference, suggesting that terrorism could be included within the definition of "Crimes Against Humanity." Countries such as Algeria, India, Sri Lanka, and Turkey proposed this approach. According to this perspective, any act of terrorism that meets the criteria of widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population without requiring a nexus with a war could be classified as a crime against humanity. This interpretation would encompass acts of terrorism and ensure that individuals committing such crimes fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.

To reach a consensus on the definition of terrorism, the international community could consider examining the conglomerate of counter-terrorism conventions and instruments. Despite the lack of a universally accepted definition, almost every state recognizes and punishes acts of terrorism. Therefore, looking at existing counter-terrorism conventions and considering significant events and instruments related to terrorism could provide a basis for consensus.

2.5 Prosecution Alternatives under the ICC?

The ICC offers several avenues for prosecuting terrorist financing. One approach is to establish a new crime specifically targeting terrorist financing within the Rome Statute, the founding instrument of the ICC. This would require amending the Statute to include a provision that explicitly addresses the crime of terrorist financing and outlines the necessary conditions for the Court's jurisdiction.

Another alternative is to interpret existing crimes under the ICC's jurisdiction, such as crimes against humanity or war crimes, to encompass acts of terrorist financing. While these crimes were not originally designed to address financial support for terrorism, a contextual interpretation of the Statute could extend their application to include the prosecution of individuals involved in financing terrorist activities.

Furthermore, the ICC can consider utilizing its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, which falls within the Court's purview but requires further development and agreement among state parties. If consensus is reached on including terrorist financing as a form of aggression, the ICC could exercise jurisdiction over cases involving the financial support of terrorist acts that meet the criteria of aggression.

2.6 Universal Jurisdiction as a Solution?

To overcome the challenges associated with prosecuting terrorist financing under the ICC, the concept of universal jurisdiction can be explored as a potential solution. Universal jurisdiction allows any state to prosecute individuals for crimes committed outside their territory, regardless of the nationality of the accused or the victims. Embracing universal jurisdiction would enable states to collectively address the issue of prosecuting terrorist financing and hold perpetrators accountable, even in the absence of an international consensus on the definition of terrorism.

By adopting universal jurisdiction, states can exercise their authority to investigate and prosecute cases of terrorist financing that have transnational dimensions. This approach would allow for greater flexibility and responsiveness in addressing these crimes, particularly in cases where the ICC's jurisdiction may be limited or when the Court's resources are already stretched thin.

2.7? Conclusion

In conclusion, prosecuting terrorist financing poses significant challenges within the international criminal law framework, particularly under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The absence of a universally accepted definition of terrorism hampers the identification and prosecution of individuals involved in financing terrorist activities. Additionally, proving the specific intent and connection between the accused and the financed terrorist acts presents evidentiary difficulties. The ICC's limited resources and focus on other core crimes further constrain its capacity to effectively investigate and prosecute complex cases of terrorist financing.

To overcome these challenges, exploring the concept of universal jurisdiction emerges as a potential solution. Embracing universal jurisdiction would allow states to collectively address the issue of prosecuting terrorist financing, regardless of an international consensus on the definition of terrorism. By adopting this approach, states can exercise their authority to investigate and prosecute cases with transnational dimensions, enhancing flexibility and responsiveness in combating these crimes.

Furthermore, to address the gaps in the existing legal framework, alternatives for prosecuting terrorist financing under the ICC should be considered. This may involve amending the Rome Statute to include a provision explicitly addressing the crime of terrorist financing or interpreting existing crimes under the ICC's jurisdiction to encompass acts of terrorist financing.

Collaboration between the ICC, regional courts, domestic jurisdictions, financial institutions and law enforcement agencies is essential in promoting global justice and security in the face of transnational or international terrorism and its financing. The international community should strive to find consensus on the definition of terrorism, considering existing counter-terrorism conventions and significant events related to terrorism.

5. CHAPTER III : Could Hamas be prosecutes as participants in war crimes under the ICC??

3.1 Introduction- Hamas and Cryptocurrency Terrorism Financing

As mentioned above, the case of Hamas presents a significant and complex example of how terrorist organizations have exploited cryptocurrencies for the purpose of fundraising. By leveraging a website that generated unique Bitcoin addresses for individual donors, Hamas managed to obscure the origins of their transactions, making it difficult to trace the money trail. This case marks a notable instance of a terrorist group utilizing advanced technology to solicit and receive funds. The fundraising campaign gained widespread attention and generated substantial financial resources within a relatively short timeframe. Furthermore, Hamas provided instructions on how to donate anonymously, showcasing their ability to adapt to technological advancements and exploit the characteristics of cryptocurrencies to their advantage.

This chapter examines the case of Hamas's involvement in cryptocurrency terrorism financing and explores the potential avenues for prosecution in the International Criminal Court (ICC). With ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda's announcement of opening an investigation into war crimes in the Situation in Palestine, it is crucial to analyze how cryptocurrency financing by Hamas could be classified and prosecuted under the ICC's jurisdiction.

More specifically, it delves into the provisions of Article 25 of the Rome Statute and evaluates whether the terrorism financing case of Hamas falls within its scope. Specifically, we will focus on three subparagraphs of Article 25(3): (i) Article 25(3)(b), which addresses ordering, soliciting, or inducing the commission of a crime; (ii) Article 25(3)(d), which pertains to individuals who contribute to the commission of a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose; and (iii) Article 25(3)(e), which could potentially be used to prosecute propagandists involved in supporting genocidal acts.

3.3 Potential Prosecution in the International Criminal Court (ICC) under Article 25?

A. Article 25(3)(b): Ordering, Soliciting, or Inducing the Commission of a Crime Article 25(3)(b) of the Rome Statute establishes criminal responsibility for individuals who order, solicit, or induce the commission of a crime that is either attempted or actually occurs. This provision encompasses various forms of participation, including ordering as a mode of liability, which is closely associated with superior responsibility under Article 28. Ordering involves a positive act from an individual exerting authority in a superior-subordinate relationship, while inducement or solicitation entails influencing, persuading, or coercing another person to commit a crime.

Hamas, as a non-state armed group, operates within a hierarchical structure encompassing both military and civilian components. However, establishing a clear superior-subordinate relationship within this structure can be challenging for prosecution under the superior responsibility doctrine. Therefore, it may be more practical to pursue charges of inducement or solicitation under Article 25(3)(b) as these do not necessitate proving a superior-subordinate relationship.

In the case of Hamas's terrorism financing, it is crucial to demonstrate that individuals associated with the group actively engaged in conduct that directly influenced or contributed to the commission or attempted commission of the crime. This can involve actions such as ordering or instructing individuals to contribute funds to Hamas through cryptocurrencies, soliciting donations from supporters, or inducing individuals to participate in the fundraising campaign.

To establish liability under Article 25(3)(b), it is essential to provide evidence showing a direct connection between the alleged conduct and the commission or attempted commission of the crime. While no specific litigation on these elements exists at the International Criminal Court (ICC) concerning cryptocurrency terrorism financing cases, international jurisprudence regarding "instigating" can be used as a reference.

Instigating refers to the act of inciting or prompting another person to commit an offense. In the context of the Hamas case, it would be necessary to demonstrate that the instigation substantially contributed to the conduct of individuals who made financial contributions to Hamas through cryptocurrencies.?

By examining the facts and evidence related to the Hamas case, including the methods used to promote and facilitate cryptocurrency donations, the involvement of key individuals within the organization, and the impact of their actions on the fundraising campaign, it becomes possible to build a case based on Article 25(3)(b). The aim would be to establish that the ordering, solicitation, or induction of cryptocurrency donations by Hamas officials and affiliates directly contributed to the commission of the terrorism financing crime.

B. Article 25(3)(d) addresses the contribution to the commission of a crime by a group and applies to two relevant scenarios in the context of Hamas's terrorism financing. Firstly, it can be invoked for individuals who are not direct perpetrators of the crimes but cannot be prosecuted as co-perpetrators under Article 25(3)(a). Co-perpetration requires the accused to exercise control over the crime, which may be challenging to establish in cases involving a non-state actor like Hamas, where numerous ideologically driven individuals participate in fundraising activities. Therefore, Article 25(3)(d) allows for the prosecution of individuals who contribute to the commission of crimes by a group with a common purpose, even if they do not have direct control over the crimes themselves.

In the context of the Hamas case and its terrorism financing activities, Article 25(3)(d) becomes relevant for individuals or entities involved in facilitating the financial operations related to the cryptocurrency fundraising campaign. This provision enables the prosecution of those who knowingly assist the activities of a terrorist group, even if they are not directly responsible for the financial transactions themselves.

For instance, financiers or intermediaries who knowingly facilitate the transfer of funds to Hamas through cryptocurrencies can potentially be held accountable under this provision. Their involvement in enabling the movement of funds, even without direct control over the transactions, contributes to the commission of the crimes committed by the group.

Furthermore, individuals or entities providing logistical support, such as hosting websites, creating platforms for donations, or assisting with money laundering processes, also fall within the scope of Article 25(3)(d). These actors play a crucial role in aiding the commission of crimes by the group by providing the necessary infrastructure and support to facilitate fundraising activities.

By applying Article 25(3)(d) to the Hamas case, prosecutors can hold accountable not only the direct perpetrators but also those who contribute to the commission of crimes through their facilitation and support roles. This provision allows for a comprehensive approach to addressing terrorism financing by targeting individuals and entities involved in various aspects of the financial operations, from fund transfer facilitation to logistical support.

To establish liability under Article 25(3)(d), it is essential to demonstrate that these individuals knowingly contributed to the commission of crimes by Hamas through their actions. This can be achieved by presenting evidence that establishes their awareness of the group's terrorist activities and their active assistance in enabling or supporting the financial operations associated with the cryptocurrency fundraising campaign.

C. Article 25(3)(e): Prosecuting Propagandists Involved in Supporting Genocidal Acts While not directly applicable to the terrorism financing case of Hamas, it is important to acknowledge the broader scope of Article 25 and its potential application to other cases involving the incitement of mass atrocities. Article 25(3)(e) addresses propagandists involved in the commission of genocidal acts. This provision allows for the prosecution of individuals who directly and publicly incite the commission of genocide.

Although Hamas's cryptocurrency fundraising campaign does not involve genocidal acts, the broader context of Article 25(3)(e) highlights the significance of addressing propagandists who support terrorist organizations through various means, including online platforms. Propagandists play a crucial role in radicalizing individuals, promoting extremist ideologies, and mobilizing financial support for terrorist groups. Consequently, while not directly relevant to the Hamas case, Article 25(3)(e) serves as a reminder of the importance of countering the spread of extremist propaganda and prosecuting those involved in inciting mass atrocities.

3.4 Conclusion

The provisions of Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute offer potential grounds for prosecuting individuals involved in the terrorism financing case of Hamas through cryptocurrencies. Article 25(3)(b) can be invoked to prosecute those who ordered, solicited, or induced the commission of crimes, particularly by demonstrating their role in the inducement or solicitation of financial support for the group. Article 25(3)(d) is even more relevant for individuals within and outside of Hamas who knowingly contribute to the commission of crimes by providing support, facilitation, or assistance in financial operations. While not directly applicable to the Hamas case, Article 25(3)(e) reminds us of the broader scope of criminal responsibility in addressing propagandists involved in supporting genocidal acts. The specific applicability of these provisions would depend on the evidence and circumstances presented in court, considering the unique nature of the case involving cryptocurrencies and terrorism financing.

6. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the rise of cryptocurrency-related terrorist financing presents a significant challenge to global security, requiring a united and concerted effort by the international community. The evolving landscape of international justice, exemplified by institutions like the International Criminal Court (ICC), has underscored the need for accountability in crimes of international concern. While the ICC operates alongside national jurisdictions, the urgent need for judicial redress in cases of cryptocurrency-enabled terrorism demands that all possible avenues be explored.

While practical considerations and potential politicization of the Court must be acknowledged, they should not impede the pursuit of justice. The difficulties in securing evidence and cooperation from relevant jurisdictions, especially in cases involving cryptocurrency transactions that transcend borders, are inherent challenges faced by any international criminal institution. However, it is vital for the ICC to overcome these obstacles and actively seek accountability for terrorist financing facilitated by cryptocurrencies.

Within the framework of the Rome Statute, provisions can be leveraged to address jurisdictional limitations, define justiciable subject matter, and adapt modes of liability to better fit the crimes associated with cryptocurrency-enabled terrorist financing. By navigating these challenges, the ICC can bolster its position as a crucial actor in the international community, ensuring that those who engage in terrorist financing using cryptocurrencies are held accountable for their actions.

Moreover, the principle of universal jurisdiction should be embraced to enhance the prosecution of individuals involved in cryptocurrency-related terrorist financing. Universal jurisdiction enables states to collectively address the issue, regardless of the existence of an international consensus on the definition of terrorism. This approach necessitates collaboration, cooperation, and information sharing among states, financial institutions, law enforcement agencies, and international bodies to effectively combat terrorist financing facilitated by cryptocurrencies.

By remaining committed to pursuing justice in cases of cryptocurrency-related terrorist financing, the ICC and the international community reaffirm their determination to safeguard global peace and security. It is imperative that the ICC continues to evolve, adapt, and work in tandem with other actors to confront the ever-evolving threats posed by cryptocurrency-enabled terrorism. Through cooperative efforts and a proactive approach, we can effectively counter the exploitation of cryptocurrencies by terrorist organizations and uphold the principles of international justice in the digital age.

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