Crossing the ostensive definition to plurality (relying on the passivity of words and onomatopoeia)

Introduction

The ostensive definition is our conventional understanding of how meanings and words are constructed. Imagine I ask you, "What is a table?" You point to a table and say, "This is the table." Or “This is a table”. Exactly which of the table features did you consider when you mentioned that table? (Color, shape, material, ingredients?) If there is something that is different in color, shape, material, and ingredients from what you mentioned (the table), then it is not the table? Is it possible that one table is wooden and has four legs and a square shape and the other table is metal and round and has three legs? Or a table hanging in the sky at all. Now think about the question: "What exactly do we mean when we point to the table?"

Pay attention to the points before answering this question:

1.???Lack of theoretical articulation: You do not know exactly what materials can be used to define a table. That means you cannot make a list for me that has all the appearance of "desk" (not a desk) written on it. A list that I can use to distinguish the table from the non-table.

2.???As a result, the only thing that exists are multiple tables. If something is to help us understand the meaning of the word "table", it must be found among the tables that are visible in the world.

3.???We now know that there are countless tables in the world. Finally, there is the question of whether it is possible to fully understand the meaning of "table". Can I claim to know what a table is and can I distinguish a "table" from a "non-table"?

Language is a social and active thing. As a member of language users, I am learning how to use language in various forms. For this reason, vocabulary is a tool that the user of the language uses and gradually acquires a certain skill to use.

Corollary: When I point to a table, you will never know what I mean. Maybe something that looks exactly like a table is actually a semi-finished room that you make for your dog. But because of the apparent similarities with the table, we mistakenly point to it and say, "It's a table." Someone here tells us, "This is not a table. It is a dog house that has not been fully built yet." But now another question: "What convinces you that it is a dog house? Its appearance? I do not think so, because its appearance is more like a table than a" dog house ".

Now you might connect the legs of an old dining table using large boards and build a dog house. This means that this table is no longer used for you. That's why you use it for another purpose. As soon as you change the use of that object, its name also changes. So now we can think about the question that "What convinces you that it is a dog house?".

Language is a social and active thing. As a member of language users, I learn how to use language in different forms. Hence, they are tools that the user uses the language and gradually acquires a certain skill to use them.

Ostensive definition, Meaning and use

Wittgenstein says I go to the store and say give me 5 red apples. Does the shopkeeper have a table that understands what 5 means? Or what about apples? And what do these mean? He can only figure out how to act based on the table he may have. He then says: "It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words."(PI, 2)

In fact, what the common view Augustine advocates tells us is how we should use words. So, the meaning of words or signs can be different from how they are used. We expect when we are asked, "What does room mean?" Give answer A and when we are asked "how do they use room?" Answer B. While we act in the same way in both cases.

QUESTION: How do they use "room"?

Answer: If something has features (four walls, ceiling, flat floor, residential), it is room.

Q: What does "room" mean?

Answer: Something that has features (four walls, ceiling, flat floor, residential).

Let's see that both answers are the same. Now imagine a third person asking "What is the definition of room?" You will try to define "room" for him by showing him the rooms. Although the act of Definition is a common linguistic activity (as we shall see), can you still claim to have been able to teach him the meaning of "room"? You may try hard and show him many rooms, but a few years later, people will use the "room" for virtual chat rooms that have no physical environment. Or there may even be tables you have never seen. Or Indians may use the "room" briefly for the classroom, which is not common among English speakers. So, it seems that the definition of a word or sign is much more difficult than asking: "How is this word or sign used?". But there is a fundamental similarity between the two, and that is that both are socially constructed.

Our common idea about language reflects the general idea that: every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands. (PI,1) According to this view, each word represents an object, in our linguistic world.

Followers of traditional metaphysics may speak of essentialism. That is, the assumption of general concepts, for which there are facts in the real world. General concepts do not mean a similarity between the instances for which a word - such as "table" - is used. Rather, when we speak of general concepts, we generally mean a set of "pre-existing patterns" whose instances are based on these patterns. But really, what reason do we have for these patterns (PEP)? However, we are not currently trying to reject PEP.

Because this requires that Wittgenstein's idea be fully explained. In short, our subject is to understand the need to go beyond the ostensive definition. The above definition is based on the basic premise that words and signs should be defined by reference to their uses. While this is dealing with the use of words and signs, I have not yet provided an explanation of "meaning". If I think I can define it by pointing to a table, I'm actually referring to PEP, whereas I have shown only one example of a table.(That is, one of the objective things I call the "table"). Not that I have made a linguistic connection between naming and meaning, or that I have discovered rules by which I can distinguish the table from the non-table.

Answer an error about onomatopoeia

When I ask the fruit seller to give me 5 apples, how does he understand me? The meaning he understands from what I say depends on the circumstances in which I use "I want 5 apples" and how he understands what I mean. In other words, we have passed from Monotony to Plurality, where the meaning of everything is no longer self-evident. "I" is no longer a language observer. Rather, "I" can be a participant who can produce the meaning of words.

When I refer to something, I try to define it, that is, I have admitted that there are elements in that thing that can define that thing. When I ask you about "Table A", you will refer to Table A. By doing this, you will show me all its appearance features, and I will discover what it is by seeing that object.

But if I ask you what "table" means, it's different. If you refer to Table A to answer my question, you have only defined Table A. If you show me table B and table C in addition to table A, you have defined only table A, B, C. Wouldn't it be better if I asked you, "What is a table called?" This will give you the impression that "table" is a completely lifeless word in itself. All that exists is table A, b, c….etc. In fact, there are only objects that I see.

I'm trying to clarify the issue and I do not want to impose a point of view on you. You might take this very seriously and say, "Words are conventional." I also accept this. But in the philosophy of language, we examine the components of language separately from its instances so that objects cannot interfere with the results they may obtain. When we consider words and signs separately from practical matters, we mean that we have acknowledged that a connection must be made between "words and signs" and "objects and practical things". Creating a connection between them (words and objects) - which leads to the emergence of language as a practical and social thing - requires one of the following situations:

1. Activity of both - which will cause connection and coordination between words and objects

2. The activity of one and the inactivity of the other - which will lead to the absorption of the latter by the former –

When we choose "apple" for a particular object, there must either be something in the word that brings itself closer to that object or fact, or it must be completely passive in order to be adopted as a name for that object. Maybe the "apple" is passive. But if you consider onomatopoeia, the situation will be different. Take the word knock, for example. The letters that make up the word represent the sound created by "knocking on a door or a stick." So, the word is not phonologically passive and approaches something practical.

The naming process may be justified in linguistics in this way, but these justifications are not enough for the philosopher of language. He will ask about knock: When we knock on the door, - because of the sound that is produced - is this the only word that will be made? More importantly, the philosopher of language asks: "How does the meaning given to be derived from knock?" If you say that word to someone who did not know it before, will he understand? It is possible that at first the word was used only in one atmosphere - for example, knocking on wood - and later found other meanings. The origin of this word is not very important for the philosopher of language. Although knowing the root of a word can help us understand its meaning, the word we use only makes us aware of the meanings we have encountered so far. For this reason, the more you use the words in different atmospheres, the more accurate your meaning will be.

onomatopoeia are produced by the combination of specific sounds and specific conditions and emotions. (For example, boom, which means fireworks and explosions) Although there is a clear connection between this word, its sound and its external reality, but can we claim that "someone who is not familiar with this word can also know its use or meaning by hearing this word"? This means: even words derived from elements in reality can not establish an intrinsic connection with their external reality. In other words, sounds can not make us aware of a reality we have not encountered before. Suppose you do not know the use of "Wriph". Someone will teach you how to pronounce it. But you will never know that this word is an onomatopoeia that is used to "fasten a shoelace" and is made from the sound that a shoelace creates. So, phonemes (or sounds) cannot show the intrinsic connection of a word with its meaning (or use). Because they can represent other things or take on other meanings. On the other hand, we can not understand the meaning of these words without observing their uses. This means that words are generally passive. Even the onomatopoeia.

Reality in itself is outside the realm of language. It is language users who will have language activities to explain reality.

Conclusion

In the above definition, then, the empirical subject itself - or the language user - will play a role in creating the meanings of the words. Because the atmosphere is the user of language. Everything that exists is only in the facts. Language is a valid crown that can convey a conventional view of reality. So, pointing to specific facts is not enough to define words. We should not think that pointing can clarify the meaning of a word. Rather, everything that exists is the same as external facts. We do not pointing anything to simplify the definition process. For this reason, the cultural and scientific developments of human societies make the burden of words heavier or lighter. Therefore, the ostensive definition will also be fluid, and the method of defining words and signs is not merely referring to their objective facts. Rather, what determines what we should "refer to" is plurality. That is, the active role of language users.

References

PI, Ludwig Wittgenstein, philosophical investigations, P.M.S. Hacker, Blackwell Publishers (1986)