Critical Review of Divine Hiddenness and Human Philosophy by Schellenberg
In J.L. Schellenberg’s article Divine Hiddenness and Human Philosophy, the author concludes that the existence of “reasonable nonbelief” is incompatible with the existence of a perfectly loving God. Schellenberg argues that if God exists and is perfectly loving, He will ensure that all human beings have access to knowledge of His existence, especially those who seek Him in earnest. The fact that there are people who sincerely search for God but do not find convincing evidence of His existence, Schellenberg argues, suggests that God either does not exist or is not perfectly loving, challenging traditional theism.
Schellenberg’s main argument hinges on two key assumptions: (1) A perfectly loving God would want to enter a personal relationship with all human beings, and (2) if such a God existed, He would ensure that those open to a relationship with Him are aware of His existence. Schellenberg reasons that because there are individuals who sincerely search for God and remain nonbelievers (which he calls “reasonable nonbelief”), the existence of this God is highly improbable.
Do the Arguments Support the Conclusion?
I believe that Schellenberg’s conclusion logically follows from his premises. His argument is structured around the idea that a loving God would not remain hidden from those who seek Him, and the existence of reasonable nonbelievers seems to provide evidence against such a God. This conclusion is grounded in a philosophical analysis of love, human freedom, and divine omnipotence, which leads Schellenberg to claim that the hiddenness of God is a problem for theists (Schellenberg, 2006).
Yet, there are potential criticisms of this argument. For instance, some theists argue that God may remain hidden to preserve human free will or to enable “soul-making” — the process by which individuals develop morally and spiritually in a world where God’s presence is not overwhelmingly prominent (Hick, 2007). According to this view, the hiddenness of God might be necessary for human development, and divine love might manifest in ways that are not immediately apparent.
Critiquing the Assumptions
If one agrees with Schellenberg’s argument but not with his conclusion, it might be because of a disagreement with one of his assumptions. One possible point of contention could be the assumption that a perfectly loving God would ensure everyone knows of His existence. Some theists might argue that God’s love is not necessarily expressed through constant or direct revelation. Instead, divine love could be compatible with a more subtle or mysterious presence, allowing individuals to freely believe or disbelieve based on indirect evidence or personal experiences (Swinburne, 1991).
Critics might argue that God’s purpose in creating humans is not simply to ensure that they know He exists but to allow them the freedom to develop morally and spiritually, which might require periods of divine hiddenness. The “soul-making” theodicy suggests that belief in God, in the face of hiddenness, can contribute to personal growth and moral development (Hick, 2007). According to this argument, Schellenberg’s assumption that divine hiddenness undermines God’s love could be seen as too simplistic, as it overlooks the broader purposes that a loving God might have.
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Can the Argument Still Work?
In response to such criticism, Schellenberg might argue that reasonable nonbelief still presents a significant challenge to theism because some individuals would not develop morally or spiritually due to God’s hiddenness. He might also say that even if free will or moral development are valued, a perfectly loving God would at least ensure that sincere seekers do not remain in a state of doubt or confusion about His existence. In other words, divine hiddenness might be excessive in cases where it leads to extended periods of nonbelief rather than short-term doubt meant to foster spiritual growth.
Conclusion
Schellenberg’s argument that divine hiddenness is incompatible with the existence of a perfectly loving God is well-supported by his analysis of reasonable nonbelief. While some theistic responses, such as free will and soul-making theodicies, offer plausible counters, they may not fully address the problem of prolonged nonbelief among sincere seekers. Whether one agrees with Schellenberg’s conclusion may depend on one’s willingness to accept his assumption that a perfectly loving God would never allow for prolonged hiddenness.
References
Hick, J. (2007). Evil and the God of Love: With a Foreword by Marilyn McCord Adams. Palgrave Macmillan. https://books.google.co.mz/books?id=u-8YAQAAMAAJ
Schellenberg, J. L. (2006). Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason. Cornell University Press. https://books.google.co.mz/books?id=oMCyinXuQ0AC
Swinburne, R. (1991). The Existence of God. Clarendon Press. https://books.google.co.mz/books?id=uMzYAAAAMAAJ