CRIMINALITY IN INDIAN POLITICS - WHAT, WHY AND HOW?

24 percent of MPs elected in 2004 faced criminal cases (12 percent faced charges of a serious nature including but not limited to murder, sexual assault... according to data compiled by the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), a good-governance watchdog. This figure grew to 30 percent in 2009 (15 percent serious) and climbed to 34 percent (21 percent serious) in 2014.36. The prevalence of elected leaders who face some kind of criminal scrutiny is not restricted to the national political arena alone. As of early 2014, 31 percent of India’s elected state legislators (members of the legislative assemblies, or MLAs) faced pending criminal cases, with 15 percent falling into the serious category." Of course, a percentage of these will be politically motivated fake charges. Even considering that, the number is too large.

Before going into the article, my heartfelt gratitude to Milan Vaishnav. His book 'WHEN CRIME PAYS' covers the issue of criminality in politics in detail with rich data in a scientific manner and vast anecdotes. Provided me a valuable understanding and perspective on the matter. Most information in this article has been used from the book.

So, what is the reason behind this malaise? Do the parties field criminals and people have no other choice but to vote for some criminal? Or do the people themselves support criminal candidates? As counterintuitive as it sounds, "candidates linked to crime appear to have a hefty electoral advantage. Based on data from the three most recent general elections— in 2004, 2009, and 2014—a candidate with a criminal case was, on average, almost three times as likely to win an election as a candidate who faced no cases. And of those facing cases, the “win rate” of candidates with serious charges, in turn, is marginally higher than those who face only minor charges".

Source : 'When Crime Pays'

Considering the electoral place as a marketplace, where a large number of political parties are fiercely competing to sell their candidates to the electorate, isn't it natural for the parties to supply what is in demand? Parties may have some advantage or preference to criminal candidates as they might be helpful in fund raising, getting "things" done. At the same time, parties also have preferences for clean candidates. They are more likely to be seen as performing better, increase the reputation of the party, appeal to a broad section of people, do not have detractors, do not cause headaches, and get other things done. So, resultantly, parties might not choose criminal candidates, parties do not choose clean candidates, they choose winnable candidates, irrespective of their criminality.

So why do people appear to support criminals? Is it possible that they do not know about the criminal history of the candidates and they vote based on other factors? No. After the Supreme court mandate in 2003, all candidates are required to publicly disclose their criminal records and the details can be accessed easily. Also, there are many instances in which people not only vote despite the criminal background of the candidates but infact they vote due to their criminal background. We might remember the public display of muscle power by some candidates at times.

Needless to say, criminality is neither necessary nor sufficient for electoral victory. But it definitely seems to improve the odds and land victory, provided other boxes are ticked.

So, why do people vote for criminal candidates knowingly? What explains this seemingly strange phenomenon? There are a number of factors due to which a section of voters choose to support criminal candidates and a few factors due to which a section of voters are indifferent to criminal background. The combination of these paves way for the criminal candidates to win.

Firstly, the social tensions or divisions between the communities help the criminal candidates showcase themselves as people with both power and willingness to act and protect the interest of the community from the rival community. People, out of fear of other community and desire to be the dominating community choose to reward criminality with their votes. This can be supported by the fact that when a constituency turns into a reserved constituency, the number of criminal candidates goes down because all the candidates belong to the same community.

Source: When Crime pays

Secondly, the weak state and its inability to transfer its services to all the citizens create a demand-supply gap and people believe that criminal candidates might shake the lazy bureaucracy to deliver services required to them by hook or crook. They might be fine with being affected slightly by criminality since the benefits overweigh the inconveniences.

"Ateeq Ahmed, a Samajwadi Party (SP) legislator, a fierce local power broker with violent illegal activities, won five consecutive state elections from 1989 to 2002. Ahmed’s canny ability to efficiently process requests filed by his constituents—from covering the costs of a funeral to mediating a dispute between neighbors—earned him plaudits from constituents as well as grudging praise from many bureaucrats, whose painfully slow response times stood in unfavorable contrast".

"Bihar’s Mohammed Shahabuddin of the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), had established a parallel administration in Siwan district that functioned virtually independent of the state government. administration. Before opening shops, business owners would seek his blessing and counsel; doctors would routinely receive instructions from the MP about the rates they could charge patients; even the police used to ask permission before moving into areas controlled by the leader. The fear that gripped the minds of many residents when the name Shahabuddin was uttered was often tinged in equal measure with respect—especially when the leader used threats, and on occasion actual force, to whip the lethargic bureaucracy into shape. Before him, “we had only potholes in the name of a road here,” claimed one Siwan resident. “Colleges had closed because there was no money . . . doctors never turned up on time . . . but now everything works”.

Also, there are some factors that make voters indifferent to criminality. One of those things is information asymmetry. As discussed earlier, though there is enough information on the public domain on criminality, people like to take perceptual shortcuts, a concept which means that humans always take the path with the least effort. In this context, when a voter wants to vote for a candidate, he might not want to make efforts to make the decision. Instead, he decides based on what he hears and sees frequently and makes the decision based on that. Since the criminal candidates are likely to spend well, they are likely to be seen and heard by a normal voter much better than a non-criminal candidate. So, the voter makes a decision favorable to the criminal candidate, without considering his criminality. This is also called availability bias, where a person takes an (unideal) decision based on available information rather than important information.

There is no quantification of the effects of the criminlaity of candidates in most people's minds. Though most might agree that criminality is a bad thing, they do not really consider that actively in making the voting decision. Also, the normalization of criminality also occurs. Some people might be of the opinion that everyone does it and that is part of the game. This mindset removes any competitive disadvantage a criminal candidate has over his non-criminal counterpart.

So, where will it stop? What are the solutions to these issues, if at all there are solutions? What is the role of individuals like you and me, civic activists, candidates, parties, election commission, and governments in fighting this issue?

Let us discuss in the next article. Do comment your valuable opinions.