Crime (Organized and Professional): The Impact and Influences it has on Security Risk Management

Crime, criminals, criminology and criminogenic factors remains a daily concern for public and private security risk management practitioners and professionals.

However, what constitutes crime, how it forms, actors, communities and justice all modify and influence the end state classification of a series of events, which is finally labeled as crime.

Particularly crime that involves more than one actor or a professional criminal actor/s which may be broadly characterised as organized and professional crime.

Which raises the question of what informs public/private security risk management practices... what do you and your organisation know about organised and professional crime?

Crime is often defined by events or those who get caught, not the entire phenomena of crime, which remains highly subjective and contextual. That is, crime alters from location-to-location and over time.

As a result, crime prevention for last months statistics may not be effective nor warranted crime prevention for today and the coming weeks.

There is a gap in reporting, stats and awareness... not threats and risks.

Moreover, criminal and their direct/indirect cohort don't fill in surveys or declare occupational success and earnings...typically.

Therefore, what individuals and organisations know about crime, criminals, organised/professional groups remains largely hypothetical, with occasional confirmation bias.

As a result, what metrics are measured or used to justify or modify security risk management postures and practices?

More importantly, what information, knowledge, research or facts inform the daily, monthly and yearly crime prevention initiatives and resourcing of public/private security risk management practices and strategies?

Comparison of crime statistics between two location remains fundamentally flawed

An official example of how crime statistics are collected, reported and classified.

How crime statistics creation, publication and classification works in reality

Posing a practical, ethnical, economic and risk question for all... what specific organised and professional crime are you and your organisation protecting from or invoking in the name of security risk management?

Therefore, the most questionable security risk management and crime prevention approaches are those based on little to no supporting facts, hypothetical adversaries, universal fear of insecurity and media worthy reports of criminals, criminal acts and crime.

Professionals, like trades people, measure twice and cut once.

That is, considerable intelligence, analysis, research and evidence collection support security risk management practices and informs change, investment, prioritisation and risk.

A simple evidence and measurement check typically reveals which is which.

In sum, despite the persistent, persuasive and typically invisible threat posed by organised and professional crime, far too many security risk management pursuits, practices and investments are based on little specific intelligence, evidence of criminalistic intent, identifiable adversarial actors or inaccurate, outdated assumptions of security threats and risks, including ecological fallacies.

Tony Ridley, MSc CSyP MSyI M.ISRM

Security, Risk & Management Sciences