COVID—19(84): Defense Trade Policy Considerations in a Post-Coronavirus World

“The government doesn’t want any system of transmitting information to remain unbroken, unless it’s under its own control.”

                                                                       --Isaac Asimov, Tales of the Black Widowers

The coronavirus pandemic has brought the world to a standstill in a way that has not been experienced in generations. The last time a global plague reached a comparable level of alarm was 100 years ago during the 1918 Spanish Influenza, and the world operated considerably differently than how it does today. One of the many discrepancies was the way in which governments interacted with their people both during and after the outbreak. The governmental response to COVID-19 in many nations has raised eyebrows and questions, and this sense of concern that many citizens are feeling both in the United States and internationally should lead to additional questions, and possibly even policy changes, in the defense trade market. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, cases of possible civil rights overreach have occurred in countries with a variety of governmental structures and cultures; some of whom are close partners and allies of the United States, and receive a substantial amount of defense hardware and security cooperation assistance.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for instance, has authorized the country’s intelligence agency to use “a vast and previously undisclosed trove of cellphone data to retrace the movements of people who have contracted the coronavirus and identify others who should be quarantined because their passed crossed” (1). On the surface, this helps contain the spread of the virus by sending a text message to individuals who have come in contact with an infected person, and directing them to isolate themselves immediately. This begs the question, however: What actions might the Israeli government take to ensure those people quarantine?

They will certainly be able to tell if the person does or does not adhere to their direction. Furthermore, this direction also raises concerns about why the inventory of data was undisclosed in the first place, and how far the monitoring extends. Netanyahu also took advantage of this opportunity to close the courts investigating him for bribery, fraud, and breach of trust and to delay his trail by at least two months. Critics of that decision have questioned whether the shutdown was a necessary measure to combat the spread of the coronavirus (2).

In Hungary, a state that has had a pseudo-democratic structure for years, a new law was passed that gives Prime Minister Viktor Orban the ability to sidestep Parliament and suspend existing laws. Prime Minister Orban is now the only person who can end the declared state of emergency in the country and return to relative normalcy. There are few, if any, provisions in place to ensure these measures do not extend beyond the spread of the virus (3).

Even key partners in combating Chinese expansion, like the Philippines, have taken actions that raise concerns. The Philippine Congress passed laws that gave President Rodrigo Duterte emergency powers to “reapportion the executive department’s budget under the legislation which will also punish people for disobeying quarantine orders and spreading ‘false information’ about the outbreak…” (4). The first draft of the legislation included a provision to allow Duterte to take over private companies if the pandemic worsens, but this measure was blocked. More safeguards are in place to prevent abuse of the powers than in the case of Hungary but the punishments for disobeying government orders and what qualifies as “false information”, however, remain unclear.

Firmly democratic countries are no exception to the extensive emergency policies either. The United Kingdom rushed a bill through Parliament that allows ministries to detain and isolate people without a time limit, ban protests, and shut down entry points such as ports and airports, all with little oversight (5). Even the United States government itself should be cautious of the steps that will be taken to prevent the spread of the virus. It remains to be seen what additional methods the U.S. will implement, but government officials are in discussion with technology companies like Google and Apple on how to monitor the location and social interactions of potentially infected citizens (6).

These are just some of the examples of actions taken by a variety of allies, and of legislative structures that could be considered an overreach on both civil and privacy rights. Other notable partners that have enacted preventative emergency powers related to data surveillance are South Korea, Germany, Italy, and Singapore. A great resource for more information on all governmental COVID-related orders is the International Center For Not For Profit Law’s COVID-19 Civic Freedom Tracker. 

It is important to understand that a global pandemic is not going to lead to business as usual, and most would agree that some form of preventative action is necessary. Nevertheless, these measures should be taken into consideration on a case-by-case basis, especially as the U.S. government looks to continue defense-related transactions after the panic surrounding the virus subsides. The extended temporary authorities and surveillance methods may point to larger intent on the part of some government officials in positions of power. This intent must be examined in earnest before we continue to conduct the defense trade policies in place before the outbreak.

Unmanned drones are now being used both in the U.S. and abroad to disinfect and disperse large gatherings of people in public spaces. Without specific limitations on what can and should be done to roll back temporary authorities after the pandemic ceases, should we be concerned that these emergency powers could become commonplace? One day, the coronavirus will just be a footnote of history, but what will its legacy be? Could these powers lead to abuse for malevolent Orwellian purposes in the future?

This article should not be taken out of context—I am personally involved in the defense trade market as a consultant, and I am not advocating for limiting our sales to allies and partners going forward. The number one priority has always been the national security of the United States and the partners with whom we do business. An important aspect of achieving that goal is by providing allies with the necessary equipment and training to deter and eliminate our collective enemies. But part of that priority also includes a resolve to keep these articles out of the hands of officials who could potentially use them against their own people or the United States; a resolve that those of us involved in this field have pledged to do in the first place.

Moving the proverbial goalpost little by little is something authorities have done in the past to increase control over a population, consolidate power, and eventually—in cases when insurrection becomes possible—commit atrocities. Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, UN Special Rapporteur on the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, summarized it best when she said, “‘States and security sector institutions will find emergency powers attractive because they offer shortcuts,’ [and] such powers will therefore tend to ‘persist and become permanent’” (7). If the destructive nature of American defense articles are sold to the wrong leaders who have malicious intent behind enacting these emergency powers, the unfortunate events of history will inevitably repeat themselves as they often do.

Endnotes

1. Halbfinger, David M, et al. “To Track Coronavirus, Israel Moves to Tap Secret Trove of Cellphone Data.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 16 Mar. 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/world/middleeast/israel-coronavirus-cellphone-tracking.html.

2. Halbfinger, David M, and Isabel Kershner. “Netanyahu's Bold Moves: Fighting a Virus or Risking Democracy?” The New York Times, The New York Times, 18 Mar. 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18/world/middleeast/israel-virus-netanyahu.html.

3. Gebrekidan, Selam. “For Autocrats, and Others, Coronavirus Is a Chance to Grab Even More Power.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 30 Mar. 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/world/europe/coronavirus-governments-power.html.

4. “Philippine Congress Approves National Emergency Declaration.” South China Morning Post, Associated Press, 24 Mar. 2020, www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3076790/philippine-congress-approves-national-emergency.

5. “For Autocrats, and Others, Coronavirus Is a Chance to Grab Even More Power.” 

6. Singer, Natasha, and Choe Sang-Hun. “As Coronavirus Surveillance Escalates, Personal Privacy Plummets.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 23 Mar. 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/technology/coronavirus-surveillance-tracking-privacy.html.

7. “Coronavirus & Civic Space.” International Center For Not For Profit Law, International Center For Not For Profit Law, www.icnl.org/coronavirus-response.