Could Iran Nuclear ‘Snapback’ Seal the Regime’s Fate?
An Alternative Viewpoint on How to Handle Tehran’s Nuclear Ambitions
UNITED NATIONS — In a high-stakes meeting on December 18, 2024 (27 Azar 1403 in the Iranian calendar), the U.N. Security Council convened to discuss Iran’s noncompliance with the 2015 nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Diplomats from Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States issued blunt warnings: after years of alleged violations, the patience of the global community is wearing thin.
The conversation quickly turned to the potential activation of the agreement’s “Snapback mechanism,” a provision that could swiftly reimpose sanctions suspended under the JCPOA. Germany’s representative accused Tehran of disregarding its commitments; Britain described Iran’s “dangerous games” as destabilizing; France noted that Tehran had “discarded all transparency measures” in its nuclear program; and the U.S. highlighted continued alarm over Iran’s nuclear activities.
An Unsettling Response from Tehran - In a move that startled observers, Iran’s envoy to the United Nations responded with a dramatic—some said desperate—threat: any attempt to trigger the snapback mechanism would be met with a “decisive response” from Tehran. Almost simultaneously, however, Iran’s own government spokesperson, President Pezeshkian, begged for renewed negotiations, suggesting that the regime’s sabre-rattling was more smoke than fire.
“We are pursuing a diplomatic solution,” the spokesperson declared in Tehran, laying bare the tension inside Iran’s corridors of power. On one side, hawkish factions warn the West of retaliation for snapback sanctions; on the other, more pragmatic factions fear the crippling impact those very sanctions could inflict on a beleaguered economy. Observers call these rival sides the regime’s “sanctions profiteers” and “sanctions reducers,” each vying for influence under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Why Snapback Matters - The snapback mechanism—sometimes derided by Iranian hardliners as a “blank cartridge”—allows signatories to the JCPOA to rapidly reimpose international sanctions if Iran is found to be violating its obligations. It was designed to ensure that any breach would face swift repercussions, leaving Tehran little room to maneuver or prolong negotiations.
Today, several factors heighten the prospect of snapback’s activation:
Should the mechanism be triggered, it could unleash a wave of sanctions that further isolates Iran from the global economy—exactly the outcome Khamenei appears desperate to avoid.
Maryam Rajavi’s Call in Washington While world powers debated potential punitive measures, an online gathering hosted by the U.S. Congress featured a different perspective. Maryam Rajavi, President-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), addressed members of Congress and policy experts in December, emphasizing that snapback alone might not be enough to halt Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.
“We strongly call for the rapid activation of the Snapback mechanism under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231,” Mrs. Rajavi stated. “Yet the only lasting way to prevent this terrorist regime from obtaining a nuclear bomb is to ensure its overthrow by the Iranian people and their organized Resistance.”
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Her remarks highlighted an alternative viewpoint on how to handle Tehran’s nuclear ambitions: that diplomacy and sanctions, while essential, cannot provide permanent safeguards if the regime retains its grip on power. Pointing to Iran’s internal unrest—marked by frequent protests, strikes, and a widespread desire for political change—Rajavi argued that a democratic transition would be the surest guarantee against nuclear proliferation.
Fear and Factional Infighting in Tehran - For Khamenei, the thought of snapback sanctions adds to a mounting sense of alarm. Iran’s economy is already under strain from existing sanctions. Further restrictions could:
Back in Tehran, the government’s contradictory rhetoric underscores an inner conflict. During the Security Council session, Iranian representatives threatened to retaliate if snapback is triggered. Mere hours later, senior officials clamored for diplomatic talks. Such disconnect, reflects the regime’s paralyzing fear that it cannot manage another wave of crippling sanctions—especially if the population’s discontent intensifies.
A Regime on the Brink - The looming Snapback option has proven to be more than a mere “blank cartridge.” To many Iranians, who routinely protest in the streets over economic hardship, corruption, and political repression, the prospect of tougher international scrutiny and sanctions means the regime’s margin for maneuver is shrinking fast.
Meanwhile, voices like Maryam Rajavi and her supporters inside Iran champion a longer-term solution: Regime Change from within, aimed at establishing a secular, democratic government that would end Iran’s nuclear provocations once and for all. Whether or not world powers embrace that strategy, the immediate next step may well be decided in the halls of the United Nations—where a more impatient global community appears poised to pull the snapback trigger.
Conclusion As Khamenei and his inner circle straddles the line between threats and pleas for negotiations, the international community edges closer to restoring sanctions that were lifted under the JCPOA. The stakes are high: a renewed sanctions regime could further cripple Iran’s economy and tighten the noose around Khamenei’s neck, but might still stop short of ending the regime’s nuclear ambitions.
Maryam Rajavi’s intervention at the U.S. Congress suggests that diplomacy and economic pressure—while powerful—may only be partial remedies. For now, the snapback mechanism hovers like a sword of Damocles over Tehran. Whether it falls—and whether it might spark deeper upheaval inside Iran—may be decided in the coming weeks as the world’s patience for broken nuclear commitments appears to be running out.
Acknowledgment: The facts and firsthand reports referenced in this article are compiled by the PMOI/MEK, the Iranian opposition network inside Iran, and are made available through Mojahedin.org and the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). Additional insights and statements from Mrs. Maryam Rajavi can be found at Maryam-Rajavi.com.
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