Could France be Europe’s proverbial Black Swan?

It is often said that Emmanuel Macron has “uberized” French politics. Ironically, he is now facing the  Gilets Jaunes movement, which seems to have “uberized” the protest landscape.

A year and a half ago, I shared my thoughts regarding the French elections (Why Frexit can’t and won’t happen), advocating against a Frexit risk. My main argument was that Marine Le Pen would be unable, if elected, to secure a parliamentary majority, thus not able to trigger a Frexit and virtually not in a position to enforce her program.

I also warned that even with Frexit being nothing more than a political fiction in 2017, the future for France did not seem excessively bright either.

In my view, it was also clear that, if elected, Emmanuel Macron would have great difficulties in securing a stable majority in Parliament. I anticipated that (quoting) “the situation will leave him hostage to political shifts and changes from opportunistic party leaders”.

Needless to say… I was wrong. After being elected with a comfortable lead on far right Marine Le Pen, Macron turned his political movement En Marche! into a full-fledged political party and, most importantly, secured a stunning lead in Parliament ahead of all other historical parties, forging little or no alliances. That was referred to as the Nouveau Monde, or the dawn of a new world. Everything else was deemed old fashioned, unions and opposition parties alike.

I do admit, the unfolding events surprised me: it seemed unreal that a candidate without a party, with no territorial anchorage and lacking the support of Parliament representatives across the Nation would be able to get hold of power in such a seemingly easy manner. At times, one could even wonder if a magic spell had shone off France’s decades, if not centuries, old way of doing politics. All opposition parties were rendered irrelevant. Even the once powerful Socialist Party had turned into a zombie, while the right wing Les Républicains was lost in the rhetoric void between La République En Marche! and Marine Le Pen. The latter was unable to recover from her disgraceful performance during the debate with candidate Macron. Following the Hollande years, the change seemed welcomed, bringing a rejuvenated image for France worldwide. More importantly in my opinion, Macron election allowed the pro-Europe voice to stay strong in France and beyond.

For months, the fundamentally fragile structure of Macron’s grip on power was forgotten, as many political figures, old and new, veterans and rookies, coming from left, center and right, rallied. When the streak of bad news started in the summer of 2018, some high profile ministers did not hesitate to leave the government, a year after having joined the “cause”… Even before the Gilets Jaunes movement appeared, the drop in the President’s popularity even made such a move plausible for the Prime Minister. Philippe, totally unknown to the public 18 months ago, was cited openly by French media as the next most-likely to grab a chance to escape the Presidents fading star and authority and to assert himself as a credible candidate on the national stage... for the 2021 election.

It is often said that Emmanuel Macron has “uberized” French politics: for the first time a perfect stranger was elected President, with no party, no prior participation to elections and no known political affiliation.

Ironically, he is now facing the Gilets Jaunes movement, which seems to have also “uberized” the protest landscape: for the first time a nation-wide movement is totally independent from unions, is not affiliated to any party, has no identified organisation (which leads to the civil war like riots in the center of Paris) and no leaders to negotiate with…

Such as “old parties” were disoriented by the rise of Macron, unable to find a proper response, such is Macron today, unable to understand and to react to the Gilets Jaunes.

Unfortunately, as I had feared from the beginning, the lack of Macron’s territorial and regional anchoring is materializing as his Achille’s heel.

Under the 5th Republic, the worse case scenario for Macron could be an anticipated dissolution of Parliament and a cohabitation with an opposing Prime Minister. This has happened several times in the last 30 years, and the French institutions have proven quite robust through these phases.

So, why does it all matter?

Let us consider the options which may allow the government to get out of the current crisis, acknowledging that it is impossible to determine which or how many of those will prevail:

- the government backs up on gas tax increase and starts giving into a certain number of other demands from the Gilets Jaune movement,

- a national crisis committee, comprising opposition leaders, is organised, and a global dialogue opens. Any support will come with compromise and any rallying will bear the risk of a future backstabbing,

- Macron breaks under pressure and dissolves the Parliament, calling for new elections, knowing that the likelihood to secure a majority for his party would be extremely thin, if not impossible.

In any of these options, the reform momentum is irremediably broken! That is disastrous.

France has not undergone major reform for decades because Presidents and governments always either avoided unpopular reforms or ended up yielding to the power of the street.

If Macron fails to deliver on the expected changes which underpinned his election, what would be the alternative in 2021?

The European Union, and the Euro, are a political built up, cemented not by any economical rationale, but by the will of European leaders to bring the European people together (critically French and German) and to avoid the resurgence of the ingredients which lead the continent into 3 devastating wars in 70 years (1870, 1914 and 1939). Sadly, this vital element is too often forgotten.

As the “Macron experiment” turns sharply negative, the French opinion will be left with a last resort, untested, choice: bringing anti-Europe parties to power. At a time when Germany’s strong pro-Europe stance is challenged, the greatest risk for Europe in the coming years could come not from Brexit, the populist parties in Italy or in Eastern European peripheral countries, but from the corner stone of the European build-up, France.

This nightmare scenario will not be one that Mr. Draghi (or any successor at the ECB helm) would be able to fix, whatever he might undertake…