The Consequences of Populist Rule on Political Development in Latin America since the 1990’s: the Example of Venezuela
Introduction
If anything has marked Latin America (LA) and the world alike in the past decade it is the fulgurant (re)emergence of populism as a competitive political ideology. Following the 2008 global financial crisis, liberal governments all around the world faced challenges to their legitimacy and had to confront a blatant loss of trust from citizens towards the institutions that govern them. Political and economic crises naturally fuel populist discourses, and “moments of distress”, as argued by Weber, usually foster the rise of charismatic leaders (Weber, [1922] 1968: 1112). When the crisis hit, LA was not unfamiliar with populist governments and had already experienced three ‘waves’ of populist resurgence throughout the 20th century (Roberts, 2007: 3). The first wave occurred between the 1940’s and 1960’s with the notable rise to power of leaders such as Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina, Getúlio Vargas in Brazil or Fidel Castro in Cuba (Kaltwasser, 2014: 497). This wave was ended by the almost global political militarisation of the continent, and populism only resurfaced by the mid-1980’s in a period of economic turmoil in LA. During this second wave, the region witnessed the political successes of populist leaders like Carlos Menem in Argentina, Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil and Alberto Fujimori in Peru (Campos-Herrera & Reguero, 2019: 150). The final wave emerged with the particular elections of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador. Today, in Venezuela, Colombia, Nicaragua, Brazil, Mexico, Cuba and Haiti populism persists or has emerged, leaving the future of the region’s political development uncertain. As it appears, populism in LA doesn’t seem to ever go away; it returns, as Knight puts it, “like the living dead of Latin American politics, to haunt the sentient world, undeterred by the bright dawn of democracy and neoliberalism” (Knight, 1998: 223).
Populism is a nebulous notion whose conceptualisation is often dependent upon the political inclinations of those who define it. Defining populism is very much indeed a matter of perception as the notion itself lies in a ‘moral grey area’ or presents, as de la Torre notes, “promises and perils” (de la Torre, 2014). Nevertheless, despite the ambiguity, populism is in essence based upon two basic criteria: the existence of a solid emotional relationship between a charismatic leader and his/her followers, and “a democratic discourse that relies on the idea of a popular will and a struggle between 'the people' and 'the elite” (Hawkins, 2003: 1138). If for its advocates populism is the “expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004: 543), skepticism towards populism lies in the ideology’s “anti-institutional posture” (Houle & Kenny, 2018: 257), and the tendency of charismatic leaders to hold on to power longer than desirable.
This paper shall argue that the recent wave of populist resurgence in LA has had negative impacts on the region’s political development, and specifically in Venezuela. It seeks to answer the following questions: what is populism? What are the components of political development? And to what extent populism damaged Latin American political development? It will demonstrate through an examination of the Venezuelan case that populist governments pose significant threats to the survival of a nation’s institutions and that they present risks of becoming ‘hybrid regimes’. More specifically, it will examine the impact of populism on the three institutions, that, according to Fukuyama, are the prerequisites of political development: the state, the law and accountability. This research will conclude that populism in LA has jeopardised the balance amongst these three institutions. It will be divided into two parts. A first one will provide a theoretical introspection of the concept of populism and an overview of Fukuyama’s three institutions. A second part will examine the consequences of populism on Venezuela’s political development since the 1990’s.
I- A theoretical introspection of ‘populism’ and its consequences
a) What is populism?
Populism is ‘one of the most elusive concepts in political science’ (Barr, 2009: 29). Since populism is indeed a contested notion whose origins, evolution, definition and consequences vary in function of one’s political inclinations, social status or nationality, it is necessary to specify how the term will be employed in this essay. The greatest challenge in defining ‘populism’, as Roberts argues, lies in its multidimensional aspect. As he writes, populism “encompasses a style of political leadership (...), an appeal to a social constituency (...), and a specified model of economic development” (Roberts, 2002: 3). Populism can also be approached as a historical phenomenon, “a consequence of and necessary stage towards economic and social development” (Cannon, 2013: 13), or as an ideology whose discourse focuses on a struggle between the ‘people’ (el pueblo) and the ‘elite’. In the particular case of LA, one could also distinguish classical populism from neoliberal populism (Weyland, 1999: 379), or left-wing populism from right wing populism.
For the sake of this research’s clarity, however, populism will be mobilised here as a political concept that presents three particular characteristics. First, political populism is caused by crises, either economic, political or social, that threaten the very survival of a nation’s institutions. Cannon writes in this regard: “(...) there is the acceptance of the centrality of crises in the emergence of populism, and the inability of democratic institutions to withstand such crises” (Cannon, 2013: 15). Second, it is characterised by the existence of “a charismatic mode of linkage between voters and politicians” (Hawkins, 2003: 1138). The emergence of a charismatic relationship is usually made possible by these crises during which charismatic individuals enjoy social discontent and anger to present themselves as a political alternative. Consequently, political populism is built upon an anti- institutional and anti-elite discourse that sparks support amongst largely unorganised and often poor masses. The notion of ‘the people’ is thus essential, although it remains a particularly vague idea, and is usually “defined through the discourse of the leader” (Cannon, 2013: 20). As Sel?uk argues, populism consists of a “politico-discursive core which includes speaking like the people, speaking for the people, the politics of antagonism and politics of redemption” (Sel?uk, 2016: 573). Finally, populism triggers, as Cannon notes, an “increased participation of the popular sectors in societies’ structures and institutions” and a “deinstitutionalisation of the state and society” (Cannon, 2013: 25). Like Castanho Silva remarks, most papers that engage with the consequences of populism focus on the institutional level and examine, for example, “how populists in power affect the quality of democracy, notably on respect for the rule of law, balance of powers, free media and free and fair elections” (Castanho Silva, 2017: 26).
The threat that populism poses to political development certainly is what makes it so controversial (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013: 108). On the one hand, by promising (and sometimes succeeding) to raise the living standards of the masses, populists leaders usually increase the level of political participation which, according to some, reinforces democracy and political development more than anything else. On the other hand, although they promote democracy, populist leaders do "not always behave in democratic ways” and can “exhibit autocratic traits and abuse their powers” (Conniff, 2012: 7). Because it is anti-institutional by nature, populism often triggers the erosion of the balance between executive, legislative and judiciary powers as leaders seek to reduce the constrains on their authority. This contrast of consequences constitutes the ‘perils and promises’ of populism. In order to examine the former, however, I shall present a brief overview of the three institutions that define political development threatened by a resurgence of populism.
b) The state, the law and accountability
Political development, according to Fukuyama, is “change overtime in political institutions” (Fukuyama, 2015: 23). When referring to these, Fukuyama includes the “underlying rules by which societies organise themselves that define a political order” (ibid.). His work is inspired in many ways by the studies of Samuel Huntington on political development and decay. Huntington noted that “political development is identified as one aspect of, or as intimately connected with, the broader processes of modernisation in society as a whole” (Huntington, 1965: 386), thus making political development the greatest and most important purpose of any society. Political development, and subsequently processes of institutionalisation, are thus crucial, otherwise “rulers lack the insulation from direct popular pressure that they require in order to govern” (Cammack, 2000: 149). As said earlier, political development is dependent upon the evolution of three particular institutions: the state, the law and mechanisms of accountability. A brief description of these institutions and the threats posed on them by populism thus seem necessary.
First, the state, as Max Weber famously argued, is a “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence within a given territory” (Weber, 1946: 78). In other words, the state, in its most basic conceptualisation, is in charge of guaranteeing public order and political stability. Modern and highly developed states, according to Fukuyama , “make a distinction between the private interests of the rulers and the public interest of the whole community” (Fukuyama, 2015: 23); they are impersonal. Populism poses a threat to this mechanism of ‘impersonalisation’ as populist leaders reject processes of institutionalisation thus increasing the incentives of governing on a patrimonial basis.
Second, the rule of law is a “set of rules of behaviour, reflecting a broad consensus within the society, that is binding on even the most powerful political actors in the society” (Fukuyama, 2015: 24). The rule of law represents the judicial power of a nation and, as Montesquieu argued back in 1748, it must be separated from the executive power and act independently. Most populist leaders make pledges to change their countries’ constitution, the basis of the law, arguing that they don’t reflect the needs and will of the ‘people’. As Houle and Kenny remark, populist leaders either “argue that the law is used to preserve and enhance the wealth and power of the elite” or “that the law is manipulated by outsiders and criminals to the detriment of the people” (Houle & Kenny, 2018: 261). Huq notes that populism thus “presents a legion of new questions about the vitality, feasibility, and future of (...) the ideal of the rule of law, the primacy of judicial review in constitutional enforcement, and the force of individual rights” (Huq, 2018: 1124).
Finally, accountability “means that the government is responsive to the interests of the whole society rather than to just its narrow interest” (Fukuyama, 2015: 24). Today, as Fukuyama writes, “accountability is understood most typically as procedural accountability, that is, periodic free and fair multiparty elections that allow citizens to choose and discipline their rulers” (ibid.). The concentration of power and leader-centred type of governance brought by populism, however, tend to transform the parameters of traditional democracy. Populist leaders often govern under a plebiscitary-kind of democracy, meaning that they don’t feel ‘accountable’ to their people after being elected, and implement what Mazzuca calls “electoral authoritarianism”, “a regime type in which competition for power exists but is systematically biased against the opposition” (Mazzuca, 2014: 90).
In the last 30 years, LA has suffered similar consequences to the quality of its institutions. A second part will thus examine how populism has damaged the region’s political development since the 1990’s, by focusing more particularly on Venezuela’s development trajectory.
II- The consequences of populism on Latin American political development: the Venezuelan case.
Since the 1990’s, a (re)emergence of populism has been linked with the production of a large number “of what some observers call ‘hybrid regimes’ or ‘democracies with adjectives’ (Collier & Levitsky, 1997). Neither full-fledged democracies nor repressive dictatorships, hybrid regimes represent an ‘in-between’ alternative and lie in a sort of grey zone that impedes any kind of effective political development. As I have argued, this phenomenon mainly rests upon the weakening of certain institutions, namely the state, the rule of law and accountability, and has particularly marked Venezuela’s political development since 1998 and the election of the populist and charismatic leader Hugo Chávez in a period of deep economic and political turmoil in the country.
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a) The erosion of the state in Venezuela
A direct and threatening consequence of populism on state-legitimacy is the importance it confers to charismatic leaders. Often elected in times of crisis and loss of trust towards the establishment, charismatic leaders usually enjoy high levels of support that allow them to successfully ‘de- institutionalise’ the political structure they suddenly govern. This, however, can lead to the formation of a ‘patrimonial’-kind of governance made possible by high degrees of power concentration and an usual disintegration of the established party-systems. Latin American neo- patrimonialism, as Bechle argues, rests indeed on three informal institutions: (1) “presidentialism or the systematic concentration of political power in the hands of one individual”; (2) clientelism, “or the award of personal favours”; and (3) nepotism or “use of state resources for political legitimation” (Bechle, 2010: 7). As Gordin notes quite straightforwardly, “few would dispute that clientelist practices and patronage-ridden politics are commonplace in LA” (Gordin, 2002: 513), but amongst the many examples I could have picked, the presidency of the late Hugo Chávez in Venezuela is certainly the most telling. Chávez single-handedly embodied the (re)emergence of populism in LA since the end of the 1990’s and his time in office from 1998 to 2013 was driven to a large extent by his misiones.
As Penfold remarks, “(...) taking advantage of the oil windfall provided by high oil prices at the time, Chávez tapped into resources from Venezuela’s state- owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), to finance social programs that he labeled ‘missions to save the people’” (Penfold, 2007: 64). He adds: “clientelism and poverty in Venezuela were interacting closely in the distribution of resources provided by the misiones” (Penfold, 2007: 80). Consequently, by enjoying a direct access to the resources of his country and by resorting to clientelist mechanisms, Chávez managed to maintain high levels of popularity but jeopardised the very legitimacy of state power in Venezuela.
b) The rule of law undermined: the National Constituent Assembly
Populist leaders claim to embody the people’s will and needs and are thus openly critical of the constitutions and set of laws that have been established prior to their election. Since they perceive and portray previous administrations as either corrupted or ineffective, the rule of law is, according to them, a continuation of such governments. As Lacey argues, there is indeed “a straightforward analytic connection between the populist style of politics and an impatience with the rule of law” (Lacey, 2019: 13). The reason for this, he writes, is “because a populist leader claims, in him- or herself, to express the will of the pure people, and any institutional structure that questions that political expression, tends to place constraints on its execution, or divides the people’s power via checks and balances is liable to come into conflict with the populist leader” (ibid.). A common mechanism put in place by populist leaders is thus the creation of independent and parallel bodies of institutions that provide them with increased power and reduce the constraints posed by judiciary or legislative institutions on their authority. In LA, according to Barrientos, these parallel institutions took the form of ‘constituant assemblies’ (asambleas constituyentes) that have been created, in some way or the other, in 11 of the 18 countries of the region (Barrientos, 2014: 403). In Venezuela, this process was part of Chávez’s electoral campaign promises of 1998 as he pledged to “re-found” the State and its constitution. If reforming the constitution is neither undemocratic nor unconstitutional per se, Chávez conferred supreme power over all the existing institutions of Venezuela to the National Constituent Assembly (ANC), overwhelmingly controlled by members of his party, thus indirectly giving himself almost complete control over his country. As Levitsky and Loxton point out, because he was a political outsider, “Chávez lacked a legislative majority” (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013: 124) when accessing power, and thus decided to sideline the original national assembly. Ultimately, “there was not a single national power, other than President Chávez himself, that had not been appointed by a body that was 93 percent Chavista [ANC]” (Coppedge, 2002: 188).
c) Electoral authoritarianism: the undemocratic drifts of populism in Venezuela
Finally, electoral authoritarianism is, in my view, both the most typical and dangerous trait of an illiberal democracy. As it seems to happen in many countries around the world, and to a notable extent in Latin America, some regimes have “established the institutional facades of democracy” (Schedler, 2006: 1) while showing (or concealing) autocratic traits. Such phenomenon transgresses the very nature of “accountability” that requires free, fair and transparent elections in order for citizens to be able to choose and discipline their rulers. As Schedler argues, under electoral authoritarian rule “elections are broadly inclusive (...), minimally pluralistic, minimally competitive and minimally open”, but “electoral contests are subject to state manipulation so severe, widespread, and systematic that they do not qualify as democratic” (Schedler, 2006: 3). This type of practices are not a direct consequence of populism, but such kinds of regime surely make them more easily applicable. In LA, as noted by Shamis, under populism “the basic traits of the typically strong Latin American presidential system gain extra force, leading to a ‘super- presidency’” (Shamis, 2006: 26) of populist leaders. In Venezuela, Chávez embodied this idea of a “super-president” that, despite promoting democracy and liberal elections, had a control so large over state resources that he was able to indirectly influence the outcome of elections. Chávez supporters constituted, for instance, a large majority of the National Electoral Council, the body in charge of foreseeing elections.
Conclusion
Populism in Latin America is deeply rooted and never seems to disappear altogether. As this essay has demonstrated, populism is a nebulous notion whose definition is not clearly agreed upon. It has shown, however, that populism as a political concept threatens the very survival of three particular institutions essential to the political development of societies: the state, the rule of law and accountability. Then, it has argued that populism’s anti-institutional and anti-constitutional posture has undermined these sets of institutions in Latin America, and especially in Venezuela after 1998, to the point that liberal democracies transitioned to become “hybrid regimes”. The presidency of Hugo Chávez has left indelible marks on Venezuela’s institutional structure and drastically damaged its political development. The question remains however: will Latin American populism remain a threat to the region, or become a corrective for its democracy?
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