The Conor Kennedy Bookshelf: Illuminating China’s Maritime Militia, Amphibious + Ro-Ro Vessels, Marine Corps & Belt + Road
Andrew Erickson
Professor of Strategy (tenured full professor) at Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute
Conor M. Kennedy?is a research associate at the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI). At CMSI, his research focuses on Chinese military development and maritime strategy. He has also furnished dozens of annotated translations to support the work of analysts and decision-makers. Kennedy?received his B.A. in Political Science and Chinese language from the University of Massachusetts – Amherst and his M.A. from the Johns Hopkins University – Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies, with two years’ residence in China.?Immediately prior to joining CMSI,?in 2013–14, Kennedy was a National Security Education Program David L. Boren Fellow to China.
PUBLICATIONS:
Conor M. Kennedy, “RO-RO Ferries and the Expansion of the PLA’s Landing Ship Fleet,” Center for International Maritime Security, 27 March 2023.
The role of civilian roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) ferries in a PLA invasion of Taiwan deserves its growing notoriety. With port access secured or coupled with developing logistics over the shore capabilities, RO-RO ferries could deliver significant volumes of forces across the Taiwan Strait, offsetting shortfalls in the PLA’s organic sea lift.1?Some analysts have even described mobilized civilian assets like RO-ROs as a “central feature of [the PLA’s] preferred approach” to a cross-strait invasion.2
But the PLA appears intent on assigning RO-RO ferries to another mission: launching amphibious combat forces directly onto beaches from offshore. The PLA has long lacked sufficient landing ships to deliver its full complement of amphibious assault forces, from both army and Navy Marine Corps forces, in the initial assault landing on Taiwan. Rather than building numerous grey-hulled traditional landing ships, the addition of RO-RO ferries into a combined landing ship fleet could quickly close this gap.
To make this possible, the PLA has been modifying RO-RO ferries with new stern ramps enabling in-water operations to launch and recover amphibious combat vehicles. The first publicly demonstrated use of the new ramps occurred in 2019 during an exercise involving the 15,560-ton RO-RO ferry?Bang Chui Dao, owned and operated by COSCO Shipping Ferry Company and a regular vessel supporting military transportation training exercises. Other ferries have received similar modifications, giving the PLA a significant boost in the total volume of amphibious lift the PLA could muster in a cross-strait amphibious landing.3?This expansion in PLA amphibious capabilities has generated very little attention by the international media despite its clear purpose. … … …
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Conor M. Kennedy and COL Scott E. Stephan, “The PLA is Contemplating the Meaning of Force Design,” U.S. Naval Institute?Proceedings?149.4 (April 2023).
The operational concepts and organizational changes associated with?Force Design 2030?have sparked heated debate inside and outside the Marine Corps since?The 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance?was published in 2019. These initiatives are meant to better prepare it to participate in a naval campaign against China. Adversary perceptions are critical elements of deterrence and warfighting, so understanding Chinese and Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) evaluations of these operational concepts and force design programs is essential to gauging the initiatives’ success. This requires learning how the PLA expects the Marine Corps to fight, how it views existing and emerging capabilities, and, ultimately, how these assessments might inform its own operational planning and force design.
Assessing these issues is complicated by language barriers and classification levels in both China and the United States. But much can be learned from unclassified, public material published by Chinese defense sources. These writings and perspectives can give feedback to U.S. leaders charged with planning and implementing sweeping changes to force design and operating concepts. Several perspectives within Chinese writings—and some of the lessons they take away from their close observation of the Marine Corps’ development—can inform that planning. … … …
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COL Scott E. Stephan and Conor M. Kennedy, “How Well Does Your Adversary Know You?”?Marine Corps Gazette?107.3 (March 2023): 61–65.
The Marine Corps has made headlines over the past few years due to the development of operational concepts designed to provide expeditionary, stand-in forces and the transformative changes proposed and pursued under?Force Design 2030. The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Eric Smith, recently addressed the impact of 3d Marine Littoral Regiment by stating, “Adversaries do not like this concept at all.”1 Is this assertion true? How would we know?
Assessing People’s Republic of China (PRC) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) positions is complicated by language barriers and classification levels in both countries. Few Marines or sailors speak or read Chinese, and it is difficult to access U.S. intelligence community products. The good news is that there is a great deal that can be learned from unclassified, public material published by PRC defense sources.
This article has three purposes. First, to highlight PRC and PLA commentary on Marine Corps operational concepts and Force Design initiatives. To do so, the first section presents a sample of recent unclassified PRC-based Chinese-language sources. Second, the article will identify creditable unclassified English-language sources Marines and sailors can tap into to follow the conversation. Lastly, it seeks to inspire follow-on conversations about China studies in general, and the PLA specifically, in forums such as the?Marine Corps Gazette?that reach a wide audience. While there are limitations on the information, analysis, and?conversations that can be presented in unclassified settings, Marines and sailors can learn a great deal by accessing publicly available Chinese-language sources and English-language analyses of the PRC and PLA. … … …
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Conor M. Kennedy, “Getting There: Chinese Military and Civilian Sea Lift in a Cross-Strait Invasion,” in Joel Wuthnow, et al.,?Crossing the Strait – China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan?(Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2022), 223–252.
In mid-October 2020, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) held amphibious exercises off Fujian and Guangdong provinces involving multiple arms of the 73 Group Army. Video coverage of the event showed an impressive number of capabilities clearly intended as a message for Taiwan.1 The exercise was also of practical significance: despite advancements in fixed- and rotary-wing transport aircraft, sealift remains the primary means for transporting heavy equipment, as well as personnel, fuel, and cargo, across the Taiwan Strait. This primacy reflects both the proximity of the mainland to Taiwan and the large capacity of ships.
Due to the hostile combat environment, initial assault waves by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on Taiwan would be embarked primarily on PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Army (PLAA) amphibious ships. The amphibious assault would comprise the PLAA’s amphibious combined arms brigades and units from the PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC). However, a current weakness of a cross-strait invasion is the lack of a sufficient number of PLA landing ships. As this chapter discusses, new and old PLAN and PLAA platforms still make up the core amphibious lift capabilities for the landing force, but PLAN construction has largely focused on developing large ocean-going amphibious ships.
As a potential workaround, a PLA study on reactivating mothballed PLAN landing ships for entry into PLAA watercraft units raised the possibility of a short-term surge in amphibious lift capacity.2 Even with this solution, however, the likely attrition in the amphibious fleet during the opening salvos of the conflict would mean the PLA drawing on China’s civilian merchant fleet to get follow-on forces ashore. The PRC has the legal authority to assume control over its large civilian shipping fleets and to mobilize them for military use. Recent developments—such as implementing national defense requirements in merchant fleet construction and modification, organization, and military training, along with other logistics solutions—indicate that the PLA is actively working to resolve problems within the merchant fleet to make up for shortcomings in organic PLA sealift. The PLA is also making efforts to ensure successful debarkation operations in a variety of situations, such as exploring the use of artificial harbors to help establish landing bases. Also, large numbers of China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia forces are avail- able to supplement PLA transportation operations in a cross-strait landing.
This chapter explores such problems and developments in amphibious lift in three main sections. The first assesses PLAN and PLAA organic amphibious lift capacity. The second discusses the role of the civilian merchant fleet in transporting PLA forces across the strait and explains two scenarios on the debarkation of those forces. The third briefly examines how the CCG and the maritime militia fleets might support amphibious landing operations in a Taiwan invasion. Each section draws from Chinese-language and PLA-affiliated sources to inform its analysis. … … …
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Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia in the Bohai Gulf and Yellow Sea,” in Andrew S. Erickson, ed.,?Maritime Gray Zone Operations: Challenges and Countermeasures in the Indo-Pacific?(New York, NY: Routledge?Cass Series: Naval Policy & History,?2022), 77–99.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has long relied on a deep reserve of militia forces to support government and military objectives in both war and peace time. At sea, from shortly after the founding of the PRC in 1949 until even after the Cold War’s end four decades later, Beijing relied on militia forces (typically drawing on fishing fleets or other civilian mariners) to compensate for its lack of maritime power, especially naval and constabulary forces. However, after decades of investment and rapid development, the PRC now has the world’s largest Navy and Coast Guard.1 It has also retained and continues to develop the world’s largest Maritime Militia force constructed out of its vast fishing and merchant fleets. The exact size of the Maritime Militia is still unknown to foreigners and will almost certainly remain that way to preserve a key advantage, deception.
Maritime Militia development in China assumed new significance after the national strategy to become a maritime power was declared after the 18th Party Congress in November 2012. This objective is comprehensive and includes development of all elements of Chinese maritime power.2 Recent People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reforms also shifted the focus of reserve militia force construction toward the sea and high-tech sectors. General land-based militia forces and the overall number of personnel are undergoing significant reductions, whereas the construction of Maritime Militia and more sophisticated types of militia units better suited to supporting modern PLA operations are currently promoted.3 The result has been the growth of Maritime Militia forces nationwide.
Maritime Militia force development also included greater roles in the protection of PRC maritime rights and interests. Maritime rights protection is now a key focus in militia development to assert PRC presence and control in its maritime disputes. This focus was further invigorated by the highest levels of national leadership in 2013 with Xi Jinping’s visit to the little-known fishing village of Tanmen in Hainan Province shortly after coming to power.4 Xi’s visit on the first anniversary of China’s capture of Scarborough Reef from the Philippines in 2012, with the help of the village’s Maritime Militia, made it clear that the Maritime Militia will continue to be a key component in protecting maritime rights and interests. Xi is reported to have issued multiple directives on maritime rights protection and Maritime Militia construction since he assumed power.5 This demonstrates strong recognition of the success these forces had in protecting and advancing PRC claims without sparking a regional conflict.
The militia has a prominent role in protecting maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea due to sovereignty and territorial disputes between China and other regional claimants. Numerous operations and achievements by Maritime Militia forces in the South China Sea have been well-documented and acknowledged by international observers.6 Maritime Militia forces in the Bohai Gulf and Yellow Sea receive significantly less attention. However, Maritime Militia force development in this region appears to be equally as robust as in the rest of China’s coastal provinces. As a key responsibility of PLA provincial military districts, militia construction in northern coastal provinces has also shifted focus toward the sea.
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of Maritime Militia forces that could be mobilized in the Yellow Sea, how they are organized, and how the PLA envisions their use. The decentralized nature of militia development nationwide provides abundant authoritative open sources that elucidate this still insufficiently studied force. Surveying sources from various local governments, media news services, and PLA writings reveals the scale, organization, and development of Maritime Militia forces in Chinese provinces along the Bohai Gulf and Yellow Sea. Details on specific units, training, and other factors also demonstrate what capabilities may be available when mobilized, and can establish a baseline of Maritime Militia forces that commanders may draw upon in a gray zone scenario. This will be crucial to gauge potential responses by China in gray zone disputes in the region. … … …
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Conor M. Kennedy and Ryan D. Martinson, “Using the Enemy to Train the Troops—Bejing’s New Approach to Prepare its Navy for War,” Jamestown?China Brief?22.6 (25 March 2022).?
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has quietly changed the way it interacts with U.S. military forces in the Western Pacific. Instead of just tracking and monitoring U.S. ships and aircraft, demanding they leave sensitive areas, the PLA has embraced an approach that favors hostile encounters as preparation for future conflict with the United States. In PLA parlance, it is “using the enemy to train the troops”—nadi lianbing?(拿敌练兵).
This is not a new approach. The term?nadi lianbing?has appeared in PLA sources since 2014. However, recent statements by the Ministry of National Defense (MoD) indicate that it has become enshrined as doctrine. At the MoD’s press conference on January 22, Senior Colonel Wu Qian highlighted the key aims of PLA training. The first is to “vigorously promote the deep coupling of operations and training.” Specifically, forces operating on the “front line in the military struggle” should “use the enemy to train the troops” (PRC Ministry of Defense, January 27).
For the PLA, the front line in the peacetime “military struggle” is located along China’s maritime periphery: the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea, and Philippine Sea. As a result, it is the air, surface, and undersea forces of the PLA Navy (PLAN) that are chiefly tasked with implementing this new approach. What does?nadi lianbing?mean for the PLAN, and what are the implications for PLAN-U.S. Navy interactions at sea? … … …
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Michael Dahm and Conor M. Kennedy, “Civilian Shipping: Ferrying the People’s Liberation Army Ashore,” Center for International Maritime Security, 9 September 2021.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been increasing its ability to use civilian roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) ferries to move troops and equipment ashore in amphibious landing operations. In August 2020, the PLA conducted a cross-sea mobility evolution using RO-RO ferries. Exercise Eastern Transportation-Projection 2020A (东部运投—2020A) was unique in that it discharged military vehicles from RO-RO ferries directly onto a beach using a modular floating pier. Commercial satellite imagery of a PLA amphibious exercise area in late-summer 2021 revealed that the PLA may have developed an improved floating pier system to support amphibious operations. These capabilities, components of what the U.S. Navy calls “joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS),” allows the PLA to use civilian vessels to move large amounts of military equipment into unimproved amphibious landing areas without port infrastructure. A Chinese mobile pier system like those observed in these exercises may have particular application for the PLA in an invasion of Taiwan.
The PLA has been using civilian transportation capabilities for military mobility for many years, moving military forces and equipment up and down the Chinese coast. RO-RO ferries provide significant capacity to move armor and other rolling stock. Recent PLA innovations are enabling greater roles for civilian ferries to move forces ashore. For example, some Chinese civilian ferries have been retrofitted with capabilities to deploy amphibious armored vehicles at-sea, essentially making them auxiliary amphibious landing ships. This is likely meant to compensate for the apparent shortage in PLA amphibious lift required to conduct a cross-strait landing. The PLA appear to be learning from their American counterparts with solutions for moving forces and supplies ashore in the absence of port infrastructure. This article explores a novel floating pier system that may provide a solution to some of the PLA’s amphibious lift shortcomings.
What the Chinese call an “offshore mobile debarkation platform” (海上机动卸载平台) was spotted in commercial satellite imagery along the fishing wharves of the Lanshan District in Rizhao City, China in September 2020. A PLA 2007 patent application for a similar system indicates sections include “square” or intermediate pontoon modules (方形模块), bow-stern modules (首尾模块), ramp modules (坡道模块), powered modules (推进模块), cargo ferries (货运渡船) and lighters (驳船) as well as warping tugs (绞滩拖船) to maneuver the different sections. The floating pier system was developed by engineers at the PLA Military Transportation University in Tianjin. … … …
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Conor Kennedy, “Ramping the Strait: Quick and Dirty Solutions to Boost Amphibious Lift,” Jamestown?China Brief?21.14 (16 July 2021).
The threat of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) using military force to coerce or perhaps launch an amphibious invasion of Taiwan has received significant attention in the past year. Meanwhile, the recent commissioning of the PLA Navy’s first Type-075 amphibious assault ship has further highlighted China’s developing amphibious capabilities (South China Morning Post, May 9). At the same time, the apparent shortage of amphibious lift required to execute large-scale landing operations leaves many wondering whether China is serious about its threats against Taiwan. The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2020 China Military Power Report notes the PLA’s focus on ocean-going amphibious platforms rather than a large fleet of traditional landing ships and craft suggests that a direct beach-assault operation is less likely at the moment (Office of the Secretary of Defense, September 1, 2020).
But the PLA may have other plans for transporting troops and equipment across the Strait: the growing capabilities of its merchant roll on-roll off (RO-RO) ships (CMSI, December 6, 2019). These are vessels equipped with built-in ramps that enable wheeled and tracked cargo to load and offload under their own power. Such ships have the potential to deliver a significant volume of force, providing access to port terminals or other lighterage is available. They do not, however, provide solutions for launching waves of amphibious assault forces, for which dedicated landing ships are still lacking. Among the numerous critical components necessary for a successful cross-Strait landing, a failure to secure landing areas for follow-on forces in the initial assault would bring the entire endeavor to a screeching halt, likely inflicting severe costs on the part of the aggressor and resulting in a withdrawal.
For China’s RO-RO ships to support an amphibious assault scenario, their ramps would need to be capable of in-water operations to launch amphibious combat vehicles. This capability appears to have been publicly demonstrated in the summer of 2020 by the PRC-flagged vessel?Bang Chui Dao?(棒棰岛), a 15,560-ton RO-RO owned and operated by COSCO Shipping Ferry Company (COSCO Shipping Ferry, accessed June 24). This article describes a new ramp system observed on this ship during a recent exercise and discusses its implications for PLA amphibious capabilities in a cross-Strait landing.
New Ramp System Demonstrated in Amphibious Landing Exercises
During the peak of summer training in 2020, the 1st Marine Brigade of the PLA Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC) mustered all personnel and equipment (全员, 全装,?quan yuan, quan zhuang) for day and night landing exercises in amphibious training areas off the coast of Guangdong Province. These exercises featured night-time mobilization and assembly, embarkation, obstacle clearance, amphibious assault landings, and artillery and air defense training (js7tv.cn, August 2, 2020). They also included the use of a new ship to carry these forces to their training area.
On July 10, the?Bang Chui Dao, which usually runs ferry routes across the Yellow Sea and Bohai Gulf, arrived in Zhanjiang (湛江) to join the PLANMC exercise. It took on 1st Brigade troops, trucks, and Type-05 amphibious armored vehicles at the Southern Theater Navy’s 6th Landing Ship Flotilla loading dock (CCTV, August 3, 2020). According to automatic identification system (AIS) transmission data of the vessel’s movements, the ship departed Zhanjiang just before 10:00 AM local time and arrived off Tangxia (塘霞), an amphibious training area in Dianbai County (电白区), at almost 4:00 PM. AIS data indicates that it likely began launching vehicles 4 to 5 kilometers (2.5 to 3.1 miles) offshore without dropping anchor. Video of a vehicle launching shows the ship was likely running slow into the wind to maintain a lee astern; it appears to have maintained bare steerage while drifting to the southeast at half a knot until offloading was completed and then departed for nearby Shuidong Harbor at around 4:48 PM.[1]?After being moored dockside overnight and well into the next day, the ship then left for the Shuidong anchorage on the evening of July 11. It returned to Zhanjiang in the afternoon of July 12, presumably to offload PLANMC forces. Although it is unclear how many PLAN landing ships took part, at least one Type-073A landing ship likely participated (CCTV, August 3, 2020). … … …
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Conor M. Kennedy,?The New Chinese Marine Corps: A “Strategic Dagger” in a Cross-Strait Invasion,?China Maritime Report?15 (Newport, RI: Naval War College?China Maritime Studies Institute, October 2021).
This report discusses the recent expansion/reform of the Chinese Marine Corps in the context of a Taiwan invasion scenario.
Summary
Since 2017, the People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC) has undergone significant expansion, growing from two brigades to eight. The major impetus behind these efforts is a desire to build the service arm into an expeditionary force capable of operating in most environments at short notice. However, PLANMC reform has also bolstered its ability to contribute to major campaigns along China’s periphery, including a Taiwan invasion scenario. This report examines the PLANMC’s role in a cross-strait amphibious campaign and analyzes how new additions to the force could be used against Taiwan. It explores what roles the PLANMC would likely play in the three major phases of a Taiwan invasion: preliminary operations; assembly, embarkation, and transit; and assault landing and establishment of a beachhead. It also examines new capabilities designed for operations beyond the initial beach assault. This report argues the PLANMC is not being configured for a traditional landing operation, but rather is focusing development toward new operational concepts that could provide unique capabilities in support of the larger campaign.
Introduction
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has two main amphibious ground combat forces, amphibious combined arms brigades in the army and the marine corps within the navy. For many years, the marine corps remained quite limited. Initially a single brigade and later expanded to two brigades, it could not contribute much to a large-scale landing campaign across the Taiwan Strait. PLA reforms in 2017 have transformed the People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC). The force has tripled in size, garnering significant attention from Chinese and outside observers. The PLAN has also built a number of large amphibious ships to carry these forces.
While the PLANMC’s latest developments indicate the force is preparing for more diverse missions, including greater roles in overseas operations, the service arm’s chief mission remains amphibious warfare. This has important implications for Taiwanese security. Advances in its ability to conduct modern amphibious combat operations may both enhance its effectiveness in traditional beach landings and introduce new capabilities in support of the overall joint campaign against Taiwan. This report examines the PLANMC’s role in a cross-strait amphibious campaign and analyzes how new additions to the force could be used against Taiwan.
This report contains three main sections. The first section discusses the service arm’s transformation and future orientation. The second section examines progress in brigade development to gauge readiness and available capabilities for landing operations. The third section analyzes the PLANMC’s likely roles in the different phases of a Taiwan invasion campaign (i.e., a “joint island landing campaign”) and explores its current ability to perform these roles. … … …
Conclusion
The PLANMC does not appear to be optimizing itself for a traditional amphibious landing against Taiwan. The force is smaller than the PLA group armies trained and equipped for a cross-strait invasion. With multiple types of battalions in each brigade, it is not configured for large-scale opposed landing operations. Compared to the PLAA’s aviation brigades, the single marine corps aviation brigade, lack of close air support, and the still unconfirmed number of air assault battalions provide very limited vertical envelopment capabilities. More importantly, the expanding missions of the PLANMC are focused overseas. As such, the PLANMC on its own will not be the force that breaks Taiwan.
Nonetheless, the PLANMC will play its part if a cross-strait invasion is launched and various force improvements will benefit its utility in the JILC. Headquarters is leading an effort to revamp the abilities of battalion commanders and staff, hoping it can improve coordination of battalion operations. New training programs are increasing the abilities of the force to transport over long distances and operate in various environments, including urban areas. Innovations in transport using RO-RO ships may allow additional amphibious lift for PLANMC forces, providing solutions for an enduring challenge for the overall JILC. The newly created brigades will eventually bring additional capabilities to the equation.
With the above limitations in mind, PLANMC scheme of maneuver ashore might be focused on smaller-scale landing operations combining ship-to-shore and ship-to-objective maneuver and special operations throughout the depth of amphibious objective areas in support of the larger campaign. Operations could focus on rapid multi-dimensional landings and maneuver to control vital objectives and conduct frontal and rear attacks against defenders.109 The PLANMC is also uniquely positioned to provide ample amphibious reconnaissance and special operations forces for preliminary operations.
Senior PRC and PLAN leadership have publicly attached great importance to the PLANMC. The first commandant of the force stated it would “strive to become a strategic dagger that General Secretary Xi and the Central Military Commission can trust and upon which they can rely heavily.”110 With significant support for their development, the PLANMC will be expected to fulfill a greater role in future operations, including a large-scale amphibious landing against Taiwan.
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Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Appendix II—China’s Maritime Militia: An Important Force Multiplier,” in Michael McDevitt,?China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power: Theory, Practice, and Implications?(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2020), 207–29.
People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is a state-organized, -developed, and -controlled force operating under a direct military chain of command to conduct Chinese state–sponsored activities.1 The PAFMM is locally organized and resourced but answers to the very top of China’s military bureaucracy: the commander in chief, Xi Jinping. While the PAFMM has been part of China’s militia system for decades, it is receiving greater emphasis today, because of its value in furthering China’s near-seas “rights and interests.”
Traditionally, the PAFMM has been a military force raised from civilian marine industry workers (e.g., fishermen). Personnel keep their “day jobs” but are organized and trained in exchange for benefits and can be called up as needed. Recently, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA— in this context, the military generally) has been adding a more professionalized, militarized vanguard to the PAFMM, recruiting former servicemen (by offering them high salaries) and launching formidable purpose-built vessels. This vanguard has no apparent interest in fishing.
This chapter focuses on the current organization and employment of Chinese maritime-militia organizations. It first puts this force into historical context by surveying the PAFMM’s background and its changing role in China’s armed forces. Next, it examines the PAFMM’s current contributions toward China’s goal of becoming a great maritime power, in both old and new mission areas. The remaining sections will address specific maritime-militia modes of command and control, intelligence gathering, organization and training and will suggest possible scenarios and implications.
Decades-Long History
China’s militia system originated before the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power, but the system of recruiting numerous state- supported maritime militias from coastal populations was not fully implemented until the communists began to exercise greater control of the coastline in the 1950s. This segment of China’s population had been relatively isolated from the turmoil of the Civil War; these regions had been under either Japanese or Republic of China (ROC) control in the decades before CCP rule was established. The CCP targeted the fishing communities by creating fishing collectives and work units, enacting strict organizational and social controls, and conducting political education. Factors motivating and shaping this transformation included:
The PAFMM has played significant roles in manifold military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years:
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Isaac B. Kardon,?Conor M. Kennedy, and?Peter A. Dutton,?Gwadar: China’s Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan,?China Maritime Report?7 (Newport, RI: Naval War College?China Maritime Studies Institute, August 2020).
China Maritime Report?No. 7 offers a detailed examination of China’s infrastructure project in the port of Gwadar, Pakistan.?Written by Dr. Peter Dutton, Dr. Isaac Kardon, and Mr. Conor Kennedy, this report is the second in a series of studies looking at China’s interest in Indian Ocean ports and its “strategic strongpoints” there (战略支点). People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials, military officers, and civilian analysts use the strategic strongpoint concept to describe certain strategically valuable foreign ports with terminals and commercial zones owned and operated by Chinese firms.
Gwadar is an inchoate “strategic strongpoint” in Pakistan that may one day serve as a major platform for China’s economic, diplomatic, and military interactions across the northern Indian Ocean region. As of August 2020, it is not a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base, but rather an underdeveloped and underutilized commercial multipurpose port built and operated by Chinese companies in service of broader PRC foreign and domestic policy objectives. Foremost among PRC objectives for Gwadar are (1) to enable direct transport between China and the Indian Ocean, and (2) to anchor an effort to stabilize western China by shoring up insecurity on its periphery. To understand these objectives, this case study first analyzes the characteristics and functions of the port, then evaluates plans for hinterland transport infrastructure connecting it to markets and resources. We then examine the linkage between development in Pakistan and security in Xinjiang. Finally, we consider the military potential of the Gwadar site, evaluating why it has not been utilized by the PLA then examining a range of uses that the port complex may provide for Chinese naval operations.
Key Findings
领英推荐
Series Overview
This China Maritime Report on Gwadar is the second in a series of case studies on China’s Indian Ocean “strategic strongpoints” (战略支点). People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials, military officers, and civilian analysts use the strategic strongpoint concept to describe certain strategically valuable foreign ports with terminals and commercial zones owned and operated by Chinese firms. Each case study analyzes a different port on the Indian Ocean, selected to capture geographic, commercial, and strategic variation. Each employs the same analytic method, drawing on Chinese official sources, scholarship, and industry reporting to present a descriptive account of the port, its transport infrastructure, the markets and resources it accesses, and its naval and military utility.
The case studies illuminate the various functions of overseas strategic strongpoint ports in China’s Indian Ocean strategy. While the ports and associated infrastructure projects vary across key characteristics, all ports share certain distinctive qualities: (1) strategic location, positioned astride major sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and/or near vital maritime chokepoints; (2) high-level coordination among Chinese party-state officials, state-owned enterprises, and private firms; (3) comprehensive commercial scope, including Chinese-led development of associated rail, road, and pipeline infrastructure and efforts to promote trade, financing, industry, resource extraction, and inland markets; and (4) potential or actual military utilization, with dual-use functions that can enable both economic and military activities.
Ports are a key enabler for China’s economic, political, and potentially military expansion across the globe. As China’s overseas economic activity grows, so too have demands on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to secure PRC citizens, investments, and supply lines abroad. Official PLA missions now include “safeguarding the security of China’s overseas interests,” but “deficiencies in overseas operations and support” persist. Yet with the notable exception of the sole overseas PLA Navy (PLAN) base at Djibouti, all of the facilities examined in this series are ostensibly commercial. Notably, the establishment of the Djibouti base followed many years of Chinese investment at the adjacent commercial port and sustained attention into resources and markets inland.
We should not assume that Djibouti is a model for other future bases. Instead, China’s strategic strongpoint model should be understood as an evolving alternative to the familiar model of formal overseas basing. With strongpoints, trade, investment, and diplomacy with the host country remain the principal functions. However, the strongpoint creates conditions of possibility for the PLAN to establish a network of supply, logistics, and intelligence hubs. We are already observing this nascent network in operation across the Indian Ocean, and this series seeks to understand its key nodes.
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Peter A. Dutton,?Isaac B. Kardon, and?Conor M. Kennedy,?Djibouti: China’s First Overseas Strategic Strongpoint,?China Maritime Report?6 (Newport, RI: Naval War College?China Maritime Studies Institute, April 2020).
China’s first overseas strategic strongpoint at Djibouti is a secure commercial foothold on the African continent and a military platform for expanding PLA operations in the Indian Ocean and beyond.
This China Maritime Report on Djibouti is the first in a series of case studies on China’s “overseas strategic strongpoints” (海外战略支点). The strategic strongpoint concept has no formal definition, but is used by People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials and analysts to describe foreign ports with special strategic and economic value that host terminals and commercial zones operated by Chinese firms.
Series Introduction?
This China Maritime Report on Djibouti is the first in a series of case studies on China’s “overseas strategic strongpoints” (海外战略支点). The strategic strongpoint concept has no formal definition, but is used by People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials and analysts to describe foreign ports with special strategic and economic value that host terminals and commercial zones operated by Chinese firms. Each case study examines the characteristics and functions of port projects developed and operated by Chinese companies across the Indian Ocean region. The distinctive features of these projects are: (1) their strategic locations, positioned astride major sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and clustered near vital maritime chokepoints; (2) the comprehensive nature of Chinese investments and operations, involving coordination among state-owned enterprises and private firms to construct not only the port, but rail, road, and pipeline infrastructure, and further, to promote finance, trade, industry, and resource extraction in inland markets; and (3) their fused civilian and military functions, serving as platforms for economic, military, and diplomatic interactions.
Strategic strongpoints advance a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership objective to become a “strong maritime power” (海洋强国)—which requires, inter alia, the development of a strong marine economy and the capability to protect “Chinese rights and interests” in the maritime domain. With the notable exception of the sole overseas People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base at Djibouti, all of the facilities examined in this series are ostensibly commercial. Even the Chinese presence in Djibouti has some major commercial motivations (addressed in detail in this study). However, China’s strategic strongpoint model integrates China’s various commercial and strategic interests, facilitating Chinese trade and investment with the host country while also helping the PLA establish a network of supply, logistics, and intelligence hubs across the Indian Ocean and beyond.
Report Summary?
This report analyzes PRC economic and military interests and activities in Djibouti. The small, east African nation is the site of the PLA’s first overseas military base, but also serves as a major commercial hub for Chinese firms—especially in the transport and logistics industry. We explain the synthesis of China’s commercial and strategic goals in Djibouti through detailed examination of the development and operations of commercial ports and related infrastructure. Employing the “Shekou Model” of comprehensive port zone development, Chinese firms have flocked to Djibouti with the intention of transforming it into a gateway to the markets and resources of Africa—especially landlocked Ethiopia—and a transport hub for trade between Europe and Asia. With diplomatic and financial support from Beijing, PRC firms have established a China-friendly business ecosystem and a political environment that proved conducive to the establishment of a permanent military presence. The Gulf of Aden anti-piracy mission that justified the original PLA deployment in the region is now only one of several missions assigned to Chinese armed forces at Djibouti, a contingent that includes marines and special forces. The PLA is broadly responsible for the security of China’s “overseas interests,” for which Djibouti provides essential logistical support. China’s first overseas strategic strongpoint at Djibouti is a secure commercial foothold on the African continent and a military platform for expanding PLA operations in the Indian Ocean and beyond.
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Conor M. Kennedy,?Civil Transport in PLA Power Projection,?China Maritime Report?4 (Newport, RI: Naval War College?China Maritime Studies Institute, December 2019).
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has ambitious goals for its power projection capabilities. Aside from preparing for the possibility of using force to resolve Beijing’s territorial claims in East Asia, it is also charged with protecting China’s expanding “overseas interests.” These national objectives require the PLA to be able to project significant combat power beyond China’s borders. To meet these needs, the PLA is building organic logistics support capabilities such as large naval auxiliaries and transport aircraft. But it is also turning to civilian enterprises to supply its transportation needs. Since 2012, the PLA has taken major steps to improve its ability to leverage civilian carriers as part of the strategic projection support forces in support of military operations. It has developed strategic projection support ship fleets, comprising civilian-operated roll-on/roll-off, container, tanker, and semi-submersible ships. It has also integrated civilian aviation enterprises into strategic projection support aircraft fleets. To facilitate the staging of military forces for projection beyond China’s borders, the PLA has improved its ability to use China’s modern rail networks and trucking fleet. The PLA has also developed its first strategic projection base, a specialized center of logistics expertise intended to serve PLA power projection requirements through civil-military fusion. To be sure, China’s strategic projection support forces must overcome several challenges before they can fully meet the needs of the PLA. In some cases, training is lax and national defense standards are outdated, or not fully implemented. The PLA itself, which is currently in the midst of a major reform, must also improve its ability to integrate civilian carriers into its combat and support operations. However, the PLA is already taking steps to overcome these challenges, and the PLA logistics community is energetically developing new approaches to better leverage China’s enormous civil transportation sector to meet Beijing’s current and future power projection requirements.
Introduction
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone significant transformation over the past several years through reforms enacted by Chairman Xi Jinping. Accompanying major changes in senior leadership, organization, and force structure are growing efforts by the PLA to boost its power projection capabilities. Much analysis of Chinese military development tends to focus on the emblematic platforms of long-range power projection: large warships and military aircraft.1
But the PLA also relies on civilian carriers—ships, airplanes, trains, and trucks—to support its power projection needs. Since the 18th Party Congress (November 2012), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has taken major steps to improve its ability to leverage civilian carriers to serve the Chinese military. This is an important, but understudied, aspect of China’s military development.
This report seeks to help close this gap in the literature. It examines efforts by the PLA to strengthen what it calls “new-type strategic projection forces.”2 Aside from the PLA’s own organic lift capabilities, this includes civilian transport systems and platforms that could be leveraged in a crisis or conflict. Much of this effort has been aimed at improving the PLA’s ability to project power over water and across long distances—to the frontiers of Chinese-claimed territory in maritime East Asia, and to countries and oceans around the world where Chinese “overseas interests” are concentrated. These developments therefore have huge implications for the U.S. and its allies and partners in this period of growing great power competition.
This report comprises four main parts. Part 1 introduces the PLA concept of strategic projection and the drivers behind the PLA’s recent prioritization of strategic power projection force development. Part 2 outlines the legal and organizational foundations for PLA employment of civilian carriers for military purposes. Part 3—the bulk of the report—describes force development in strategic sea lift, strategic airlift, rail and road projection, and strategic projection bases, focusing heavily on support capabilities derived from civilian carriers. The report concludes with a discussion of challenges the PLA must overcome before it can fully leverage civilian carriers to achieve the power projection capabilities it desires.
China’s Strategic Power Projection Needs
The PLA defines “strategic power projection” (战略投送) as “actions to comprehensively use a variety of transportation forces to insert forces into an area of operations or crisis in order to achieve specific strategic objectives.”3 These transportation forces include organic PLA transportation supporting forces, such as PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Y-20 transport aircraft or the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) Type-071 Landing Platform Dock (LPD) vessels. They also comprise national civilian transportation resources—the focus of this report.
Strategic projection capabilities are vital to the success of any likely military scenario involving China. In East Asia, the PLA must be prepared to project power over water in order to seize and defend disputed islands, including Taiwan. To achieve these aims, the PLA could be asked to fight what it calls an “informatized limited war” (信息化局部战争—sometimes translated as “informatized local war”).4 It must also be prepared for a range of other combat operations along its periphery, including an intervention in North Korea.
But China’s interests are not confined to maritime East Asia. The need to defend China’s expanding “overseas interests” (海外利益) is often cited as a key driver behind efforts to augment the PLA’s ability to project power over long distances.5 China’s overseas interests include the security of Chinese citizens and property in foreign lands and the security of sea lines of communication.6 Indeed, experts in the PLA are increasingly advocating for the improvement of “cross-border, transoceanic long-range projection capabilities” (跨境越洋远程投送能力).7
Power projection capabilities also serve valuable strategic purposes even when they are not used. Demonstrating the ability to project power beyond China’s borders helps influence the strategic calculus of foreign decision makers. It is therefore integral to deterrence, crisis control, and war prevention, and maintenance of the initiative in almost any scenario.8
China’s strategic projection needs are not static. Indeed, they seem to be increasing on the basis of an explicit timeline. This timeline was outlined by the chief of staff of the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) Transport and Projection Bureau Liu Jiasheng in a February 2019 article.9 Liu describes three phases:
To improve strategic projection capabilities, the PLA is constructing its own strategic lift forces, including heavy lift aircraft, military helicopters, large transport ships, amphibious ships, and replenishment ships.11 The PLA began developing its organic strategic lift capabilities relatively late compared to other great powers. Chinese military leaders believe the PLA has a long way to go before it can meet its strategic projection requirements.
To support strategic projection, the PLA is also striving to enhance civil-military fusion in the nation’s maturing transportation infrastructure. The role of civilian carriers in strategic projection operations has become a major area of development in the military. In large part, this is driven by a desire to compensate for shortcomings in the PLA’s own organic lift capabilities. Civilian transportation carriers organized for military transportation support are considered part of the PLA’s strategic projection support forces (战略投送支援力量). … … …
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Conor M. Kennedy, “Strategic Strong Points and Chinese Naval Strategy,” Jamestown?China Brief?19.6 (22 March 2019).
On August 1, 2017, China opened its first overseas military base, in the East African nation of Djibouti. This was a landmark event that raised a whole host of questions for Indo-Pacific states: Is Djibouti the first of other bases to come? If so, how many? Where will China build them? How will they be used? Where do they fit into Chinese military strategy? Chinese policymakers and analysts are pondering these same questions. However, they are employing concepts unique to Chinese strategic discourse, and it is essential to grasp these concepts in order to understand how Beijing intends to project military power abroad.
For the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the term “overseas military base” (haiwai junshi jidi, 海外军事基地) carries significant historical baggage: foreign imperialists built them on the soil of other countries in order to colonize and exploit them. On the other hand, Chinese policymakers have come to recognize the value of maintaining locations overseas where the Chinese military—above all, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)—can concentrate resources needed to support operations abroad. To distinguish Chinese actions from the predatory deeds of Western and Japanese imperialists, Chinese military thinkers have adopted a specialized term: the “strategic strong point” (zhanlüe zhidian, 战略支点).?[1]?A careful analysis of the Chinese use of this concept offers valuable insights into Beijing’s strategic intentions outside of East Asia.
Understanding the “Strategic Strong Point” Concept
The term “strategic strong point” has different meanings, depending on the context in which it is used. In some cases it refers to a quasi-alliance relationship; in other cases, it is used in the context of overseas ports (Journal of Strategy and Decision-Making, No. 2, 2017). The 2013?Science of Military Strategy?describes them as locations that “provide support for overseas military operations or act as a forward base for deploying military forces overseas” (Military Science Publishing, December 2013). The PLAN’s new facility in Djibouti has been called China’s first “overseas strategic strong point” (World Affairs, July 26, 2017).
The term is not just applied to Chinese bases: U.S. bases in the Pacific and Indian Oceans are also sometimes described as strategic strong points, and Chinese observers have spent considerable time examining these bases in order to inform their own thinking on developing overseas strategic strong points. Between 2016 and 2017, the PLAN’s official magazine?Navy Today?ran a series of articles, each one discussing the features and strategic roles of individual U.S. bases. One refers to Pearl Harbor as a “strategic strong point in America’s forward defense,” without which its defensive lines would be limited to the homeland (Navy Today, June 24 2016). Two others describe the roles of Diego Garcia and Guam as strategic strong points critical to Washington’s global strategy.?[2]
However, Chinese experts are quick to point out that China’s strategic strong points are fundamentally different from those of other states. They state that China’s strategic strong points offer benefits to host states and provide them with public security goods. Moreover, these sites will not be used to conduct offensive operations, as is the case with the overseas bases of other states.?[3]
The Need for Strategic Strong Points
Strategic strong points will improve the Chinese military’s ability to operate overseas. Currently, the PLAN conducts the vast majority of the PRC’s military missions abroad. The PLAN serves two primary functions: protecting China’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and safeguarding China’s overseas interests. Both require forward presence in strategically important areas of the Indo-Pacific. According to the?Science of Military Strategy, an expansion of the geographic scope of naval operations requires the establishment of replenishment points and “various forms of limited force presence” (Science of Military Strategy, December 2013).
Strategic strong points fulfill these demands. An engineer at the Academy of Military Science’s Institute of Logistics explains that overseas strategic strong points will support the military’s long-range projection capabilities by effectively shortening resupply intervals and expanding the range of support for Chinese forces operating abroad (National Defense, December 2017). However, replenishment ships alone cannot meet the Navy’s needs. As the deputy chief of the PLAN Operations Department wrote in 2010, personnel relief, equipment servicing, and the uncertainties of foreign berthing facilities were limiting factors in the long-term regularization of overseas operations. Chinese facilities in overseas ports are the next step in building an “overseas support system.”?[4]
PLAN Commander Adm. Wu Shengli talked about the importance of strategic strong points in December 2016, during an event commemorating the eighth anniversary of China’s anti-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa. Wu Shengli pointed out that “overseas strategic strong point construction has provided a new support for escort operations… We must give full play to the supporting role of the overseas support system to carry out larger scale missions in broader areas and to shape the situation.”?[5]
Establishing several strategic strong points near crisis regions is integral to ensuring the sustained and effective use of forces in these roles.?[6]?When incidents and crises erupted in the past, efforts to protect China’s overseas interests were highly reactive. Strategic strong points allow China to gradually shift its posture to stabilize and control situations before they become crises. They might even play a role in stabilizing local governments and economies, and in ensuring civil order (International Herald Tribune, October 13 2015).
Accurate and timely intelligence is vital to effective operations, and PLA thinkers believe that strategic strong points will serve intelligence support functions.?[7]?Two authors from the PLA Equipment Academy write about the PLAN’s development of a “sea & space battlefield versatile situation picture” that integrates various intelligence sources to provide real-time visualized information support for the PLAN’s overseas actions. This system, they state, will support the PLAN’s defensive strategy in its strategic strong points, maritime passages, and core interest areas (Journal of Equipment Academy, April 2017). … … …
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Conor M. Kennedy, “Gray Forces in Blue Territory: The Grammar of Chinese Maritime Militia Gray Zone Operations,” in?Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson, eds.,?China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations?(Annapolis, MD:?Naval Institute Press, 2019), 168–85.
As China’s third sea force, the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is a key instrument Chinese leaders use to defend and advance the country’s maritime claims. Evolving from a tool of necessity when the Chinese navy was weak to a tool of choice for China’s more recent assertive posture, the maritime militia has been involved in multiple incidents at sea. However, to date there has been no systematic effort to define the range of dispute-related operations it performs.
This chapter attempts to fill that gap. Part one of the chapter outlines the considerations guiding Beijing’s use of militia in its dispute strategy. China could simply rely on its powerful navy and coast guard to pursue its claims. For political and operational reasons, however, the militia has important roles to play. Part two examines the specific types of gray zone operations the militia conducts. These include presence; harassment and sabotage; escort; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. It discusses the functions and tactics that characterize each type of operation and highlights known cases in which these operations have been performed.
Gray Zone Advantages
In peacetime, the maritime militia serves Chinese dispute strategy. China is a party to three broad categories of disputes: over territorial features, over the shape and extent of zones of jurisdiction, and over coastal state authorities to regulate foreign activities—above all, military activities—in its jurisdictional waters. The first two categories involve China’s neighbors: Japan and Taiwan in the East China Sea, and the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Indonesia in the South China Sea. The third category primarily involves the United States. The PAFMM plays important roles in defending and advancing China’s position in all three types of disputes. Their actions are often framed as efforts to “safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests.”
The vast majority of China’s maritime militiamen are part-time personnel: commercial mariners, often fishermen, who can be mobilized as paramilitary personnel to serve the state functions for which they train and are compensated. Despite serving under the command authority of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and sometimes also the China Coast Guard (CCG), the PAFMM is generally unarmed when conducting peacetime rights protection operations, and its members frequently operate in civilian guise. This dual identity—as civilians in day jobs and as soldiers when activated for national tasking—makes them uniquely suited to serve key functions in China’s dispute strategy. Beginning in Sansha City in 2015, an even more professional, militarized full-time maritime militia contingent has emerged with easily identified vessels optimized for nonlethal coercion.
Use of militia forces is guided both by political and operational considerations. Politically, militia forces can vigorously pursue China’s claims without opening the country to criticism for gunboat diplomacy or justifying foreign escalation (or intervention). When not in uniform, their activities can be framed as private actions. This perceived deniability, however implausible, makes them ideal instruments for pursuing national aims in the gray zone between war and peace. Senior Colonel Chen Qingsong, the head of the Zhanjiang City Xiashan District’s People’s Armed Forces Department (PAFD), describes the role of the PAFMM as a means of preventing war: “In peace [the maritime militia] not only play a role in declaring sovereignty, fighting harassment by foreign enemies, and rights protection security; they also serve as a buffer for war (战争缓冲器) to create a peaceful, ordered, and stable maritime security environment. [They are] an effective means for ensuring implementation of the national strategy of strategically managing the ocean.”
While in many ways inferior to China’s other two sea services (the navy and coast guard), the maritime militia also offers unique operational capabilities. Militia forces tend to operate smaller and more maneuverable vessels, which are better equipped for plying shallow waters and engaging small foreign vessels. Moreover, with their blue hulls far more numerous than China’s gray- and white-hulled assets, militia forces can cover much broader swaths of ocean, enhancing presence and bolstering maritime domain awareness. … … …
EARLIER PUBLICATIONS:
Conor M. Kennedy, “The Struggle for Blue Territory: Chinese Maritime Militia Grey-Zone Operations,”?The RUSI Journal?163.5 (October/November 2018): 8–19.
Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson,?China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA, China Maritime Report 1 (Newport, RI: Naval War College?China Maritime Studies Institute, March 2017).
Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: All Hands on Deck for Sovereignty, Pt. 3,” Center for International Maritime Security?(CIMSEC), 26 April 2017.
Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: Development Challenges and Opportunities, Pt. 2,”?Center for International Maritime Security?(CIMSEC),?10 April 2017.
Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: China Builds a Standing Vanguard, Pt. 1,”?Center for International Maritime Security?(CIMSEC),?26 March 2017.
Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Riding a New Wave of Professionalization and Militarization: Sansha City’s Maritime Militia,”?Center for International Maritime Security?(CIMSEC),?1 September 2016.
Andrew S. Erickson?and?Conor M. Kennedy, “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia before They’re Used Again,”?The National Interest, 6 July 2016.
Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy,?“Chapter 5: China’s Maritime Militia,”?in?Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN?(ret.),?ed.,?Becoming a Great “Maritime?Power”: A Chinese Dream?(Arlington, VA:?CNA Corporation, June 2016), 62–83.
Andrew S. Erickson?and?Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia: What It Is and How to Deal With It,”?Foreign Affairs, 23 June 2016.
Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “From Frontier to Frontline: Tanmen Maritime Militia’s Leading Role—Part 2,” Center for International Maritime Security?(CIMSEC), 17 May 2016.
Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Model Maritime Militia: Tanmen’s Leading Role in the April 2012 Scarborough Shoal Incident,” Center for International Maritime Security?(CIMSEC), 21 April 2016.
Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia,” CNA Corporation, 7 March 2016.
Andrew S. Erickson?and Conor M. Kennedy, “Trailblazers in Warfighting: The Maritime Militia of Danzhou,”?Center for International Maritime Security?(CIMSEC),?1 February 2016.
Andrew S. Erickson?and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Daring Vanguard: Introducing?Sanya City’s Maritime Militia,”?Center for International Maritime Security?(CIMSEC),?5 November 2015.
Andrew S. Erickson?and Conor M. Kennedy, “Irregular Forces at Sea: ‘Not Merely Fishermen—Shedding Light on China’s Maritime Militia’,”?Center for International Maritime Security?(CIMSEC),?2 November 2015.
Andrew S. Erickson?and?Conor M. Kennedy, “Directing China’s ‘Little Blue Men’: Uncovering the Maritime Militia Command Structure,”?Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies,?9 September 2015.
Andrew S. Erickson?and?Conor M. Kennedy, “Tanmen Militia: China’s ‘Maritime Rights Protection’ Vanguard,”?The National Interest, 6 May 2015.
Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Meet the Chinese Maritime Militia Waging a ‘People’s War at Sea’,” China Real Time Report (中国实时报),?Wall Street Journal,?31 March 2015.
Deputy Director, Naval Command College
1 年This is excellent!!
Director @ China Maritime (CMSI) | Indo-Pacific Strategist l Associate Professor I Veteran
1 年Connor (and the CMSI Team) are national treasures.