Conducting Effective Pipeline Evacuations
If you ask pipeline workers their most important duty, many will say it is to maintain the integrity of the pipeline system. Despite this belief, their most critical responsibility is safeguarding the public. Pipeline workers think of firefighters and police officers as emergency responders, which they are; however, pipeline workers themselves are often the public’s first line of defense regarding pipeline hazards. The public safety concept may be a mindset shift for some. Still, operator emergency response plans state that they expect their employees to place safety and the protection of life above all else in potential pipeline emergencies.
This writing will detail how pipeline operators and individual workers should quickly work to protect life first and then repair the pipeline during an emergency.
Gas Emergency Case Study
Learning from past incidents is an effective way to identify failures and consider where those involved could have done better as we plan how to act in similar future circumstances. For more information, this case study can be accessed through a link in a footnote. On February 19, 2013, the incident began as what many would consider a potentially hazardous, although routine, situation: a two-inch polyethylene distribution main damaged by third-party excavation. It ended with a terrible explosion, many seriously injured people—including operator employees—a fatality, and millions of dollars in damage.
Let’s go through an approximate timeline of events:
4:55 p.m. The local gas company received notification of a hit gas line.
4:56 p.m. A gas company employee was dispatched to the site.
4:58 p.m. A gas company duty supervisor was notified of the hit line.
5:16 p.m. The gas company's first responding employee arrived at the site, and a gas company service technician was dispatched.
5:19 p.m. The gas company’s first responder observed hissing and bubbling in the excavation from leaking gas and requested additional personnel. The area was under wall-to-wall pavement.
5:25 p.m. The gas company’s first responder again calls dispatch to request additional personnel.
5:31 p.m. The first service technician and the repair crew foreman arrive at the site.
5:40 p.m. The repair crew foreman photographs the scene.
5:48 p.m. The first arriving service technician and first responding employee checked the indoor atmosphere of the restaurant, which was within feet of the hit main. They find 2-3% gas-in-air, causing the combustible gas indicator (CGI) to alarm audibly. The service technician’s CGI then goes into a low-battery condition. The service technician tells the restaurant manager to evacuate as he leaves to obtain new batteries.
5:51 p.m. The first service technician calls the duty supervisor to report his findings and that he’s told the restaurant manager to evacuate.
5:52 p.m. A second service technician enters the restaurant with a CGI finding 3.5-4% gas-in-air, causing his CGI to alarm audibly. The service technician also tells the restaurant manager to evacuate.
5:57 p.m. A backhoe was removing pavement over the area of the suspected hit main.
6:02 p.m. An explosion occurs in the restaurant.
The timeline shows the gas company was informed of a hit main at 4:55 p.m., making it reasonable to assume the line was struck at least a few minutes earlier. How much earlier is unknown but relevant when gas is potentially leaking under pavement near building foundation walls. The gas company quickly dispatched a first responder and notified the duty supervisor. So far, so good. Upon arrival, the gas company's first responder immediately requested additional personnel. Things began to go awry at 5:19 p.m., three minutes after the first responder arrived. As soon as the gas company's first responder observed indications of blowing gas under wall-to-wall pavement near the restaurant’s foundation, the situation's urgency should have escalated significantly. Along with requesting additional gas company resources, the first responder should have called for fire department assistance. Soon after, the gas company's first responder should have checked for accumulating gas with a CGI inside the nearby restaurant.
The inside of the restaurant wasn’t checked until a service technician did so at 5:48 p.m., a full twenty-nine minutes after the gas company’s first responder observed blowing gas under the pavement. If the hazardous atmosphere inside the restaurant had been discovered earlier and an immediate evacuation initiated, the gas at the meter could have been turned off, eliminating some ignition sources. People in the restaurant may have been evacuated to a place of safety. These actions may have prevented the explosion or significantly reduced the possibility that anyone would be inside the building if the explosion did still occur. Unfortunately, people remained inside the restaurant for forty-six minutes while gas company personnel were on-site, from the first responder’s arrival at 5:16 p.m. to when the explosion occurred at 6:02 p.m.
When the two gas service technicians communicated the need to evacuate to the restaurant manager at 5:48 and 5:52 p.m., the manager perceived a lack of a sense of urgency, which caused people to linger inside the building and not immediately and rapidly exit as one might expect they would if they understood the building was in imminent danger of igniting in fire or exploding.
Incident Command During Incident Response
In the case study, none of the on-site gas company employees functioned as if they were “in command” or in charge of the incident or the actions of other responding employees. They all worked independently to accomplish their separate duties. For instance, the first responder was tasked with conducting an outside leak investigation and determining whether a repair crew was needed. The service technicians were conducting inside leak investigations. The repair crew focused on venting the underground leak, safely excavating, and repairing the main. Everyone involved had pieces of information about the situation, but none, except for possibly the first responder knew the whole picture. The lack of leadership and communication amongst teams meant the approach to the response was handled as several independent areas of responsibility without the benefit of a single command structure with clear communication and coordination.
On the other hand, fire and police departments utilize the Incident Command System (ICS) for incident response. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) initially developed ICS in the 1970s in response to California wildfires. ICS became the national standard for incident response as part of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, when responding agencies were hampered by poor coordination and inadequate communication. NIMS is now the standard for emergency management by all public agencies in the United States for planned and emergency events.
The diagram illustrates how ICS is structured for significant incidents. In more minor, fast-moving incidents, such as in the case study, ICS can be effectively used by designating the first responding employee as Incident Commander (IC.) The IC should be the source of communication and coordination between all arriving employees and the main office. Employees on-site should report their findings and any new developments to the IC. The IC should make decisions about public safety, resource allocation, gas leak investigative methods, and repair efforts. Instead of several employees working in parallel to accomplish certain tasks, incident response using ICS is an organized team effort built upon accountability and effective communication.
Some crucial components of ICS are that it is scalable and that individuals can change roles within ICS as the emergency expands and contracts. When specific ICS roles shown on the diagram aren’t needed, such as finance or logistics, those roles don’t need to be filled. In the case study, the first responding employee should have functioned as IC unless or until relieved. In many companies, an arriving supervisor may relieve the first responder as the emergency expands. When work is winding down, the supervisor functioning as IC may designate another employee as IC and depart.
To be effective emergency responders, pipeline workers must be familiar with and use ICS during incident responses. Even when only one employee responds to a leak report or a minor incident, the responding employee should function as IC. This mindset may seem unnecessary; however, a responding employee taking “ownership” of the incident as IC and understanding they are accountable for the operator’s incident response in its entirety ensures that all aspects of the response are addressed.
Assessing Potential Pipeline Emergencies
The case study shows that quickly assessing a potential emergency is critical to protecting the public. We’ve seen that immediately taking readings inside buildings near an underground gas leak—especially when wall-to-wall pavement is involved—is crucial to determine if a hazard exists inside buildings. Gas workers must not initiate pipeline leak repair activities until public safety is ensured. Waiting to begin repairs may be difficult for some. Even if there are ten gas company employees with multiple specialties from various departments on-site, all ten should work as a team to check buildings for accumulated gas, remove manhole covers to vent leaking gas, eliminate potential ignition sources, set up a restricted zone to block vehicular and pedestrian traffic, and assist with relocating people to safety before beginning repair activities. These necessary response actions are how workers accomplish the operator’s highest priority: protecting life.
The HELP process developed by AEGIS Insurance Services is a straightforward method to rapidly guide responding pipeline workers in assessing the emergency and making correct decisions. If you’re not familiar with HELP, it’s simple.
Communicating the Evacuation
In the case study, we learned that the service technicians communicated the evacuation but failed to convey an appropriate sense of urgency. Let’s think about that. Have you been trained to communicate an evacuation? Do you have the legal authority to force someone to leave? How would you handle someone who will not follow your evacuation instructions?
Let’s start with pipeline worker training to communicate an evacuation. The US Army has an axiom: "Train as you fight. Fight as you train.” This means your training must be realistic to be effective. If I tell someone what to do but don’t show them how to do it, they might fail in a fast-moving emergency. The military uses real firearms and grenades under controlled conditions during training, the same weapons soldiers would use in a life-or-death combat situation. Pipeline workers must think and train similarly, as they too can quickly find themselves in a life-or-death situation.
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Another version of the Army adage customized for the pipeline industry might be, “Train as you work. Work as you train.” In an evacuation, you will have to raise your voice. You may need to shout. You’ll have to tell people to get out now. You’ll need to tell them what the danger is. You must convince them to leave immediately. For example, the outcome of the restaurant evacuation in the case study might have been different if the workers had communicated the evacuation to everyone in the restaurant in this way: (Shouting) “Let me have your attention! I’m from the gas company! Gas is leaking into this building! Get up and leave now! Don’t take anything with you! You’re in danger! There could be a fire or explosion! LEAVE NOW! LEAVE NOW! LEAVE NOW!”
We might expect that with this loud, clear, and direct communication, most people would get up and leave. That’s what we want. Quietly telling the manager to close down the restaurant won’t cut it. First, the manager doesn’t have access to the hazard information you do on your CGI. The manager may not know if an emergency is imminent or if you’re relaying an overly cautious message required by your company. Second, to the manager, closing down the restaurant may mean initiating a two-hour process of putting things away, counting the day’s receipts, restocking, and cleaning the kitchen. Don’t take the chance that your message may be misunderstood. Be clear and loud.
Next, do you have the legal authority to order someone to leave a restaurant, store, office, or their home? The short answer is that you have a legal obligation to do so. As a pipeline worker, you have specialized knowledge that others don’t. You understand natural gas properties and how to interpret a CGI’s readings. You’ve also been trained in potential ignition sources, such as static electricity, electrical switches, pilot lights, doorbells, and garage door openers. With your expert knowledge and as a pipeline operator's representative, you not only can conduct an evacuation, you must do so when warranted.
Regarding legal authority, imagine you’re driving down a road or highway, and you come over the top of a hill or from around a blind curve, and you see someone changing a flat tire on the side of the road or even partially in the roadway. You know the person’s life is in danger, while the person in danger may not know the hazard. What will you do, drive on, and hope for the best? No, most of us will turn around and park before the curve or hill ahead of the disabled car, turn on our flashing hazard lights to alert oncoming traffic to the situation, and possibly even stand on the side of the road and motion other drivers to slow down, or stop. Unless you’re a police officer, technically, you lack legal authority to park on the road and direct or stop traffic. Still, most would do it because a person is in a hazardous situation and requires help. This situation is similar to a restaurant patron enjoying dinner, oblivious to leaking gas, which poses a severe hazard as it migrates into the restaurant.
Finally, how should you address recalcitrant individuals who refuse to evacuate? Start by being clear, loud, and direct, as stated earlier. If that fails, and you haven’t already, quickly call 911 and request police and fire department assistance. From time to time, pipeline workers have to deal with skeptical members of the public who refuse to evacuate. Their reluctance usually ends quickly upon the arrival of the first fire engine. When firefighters respond to emergencies, they focus on safety and are unconcerned at that time with public relations. Firefighters will typically ask once, then forcibly remove the person to safety. Pipeline workers prefer that everyone leave on their own because they’ve made the potential hazard abundantly clear to them, but if they refuse to go, call the public safety professionals, who will take it from there.
One thing you must not do is to give up on reluctant evacuees. Don’t shrug your shoulders and say, “I explained the situation, and they won’t leave. Oh well. Whatever happens now is on them.” You must remove people to safety in a pipeline emergency, even if they are uncooperative, and even if you must request police and fire department assistance to remove them. Protecting life in an emergency is your highest duty and obligation. Never, ever give up on evacuees.
Conducting the Evacuation
Many operations and maintenance procedures state when an evacuation should be conducted, but not many training programs teach workers how to do it. If your company has guidelines and evacuation training, that’s great! Pay close attention to this training, as you may not need to use it frequently, but your actions must be instinctive when you do.
Many members of the public don’t know what the term ‘upwind’ means, how to visualize various distances, or which way you want them to move when you use cardinal directions like north, south, east, or west. Understanding these limitations, telling an evacuee to move 100 yards upwind or north may not be helpful. A better instruction would be to point in the direction you want the evacuee to go and direct them to a landmark to move to. For example, “Go that way (pointing) and wait by the red brick house until I come and get you.” The last part is essential, too. As a society, we are accustomed to movie explosions that happen as soon as the characters are out of the danger zone. The area could be hazardous for two hours or more in a pipeline emergency. If you don’t tell people how long to wait in the safe area, some will inevitably return a few minutes later when they assume the danger has passed.
If you don’t tell people where to go once you’ve initiated an evacuation, don’t be surprised if you exit and see them standing a few feet in front of the building. This discovery may be frustrating as you know the evacuees are still in danger, but pipeline workers must recognize that they are the experts. The public doesn’t know what to do in an emergency unless pipeline workers tell them.
You may have heard of the Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG), a US government publication that provides details for first responders to many hazardous materials emergencies. The part of the ERG of most interest to natural gas workers is dealing with natural gas evacuations. ERG Guide 115 states that an immediate precautionary measure for all natural gas evacuations is 100 meters, equivalent to 330 feet. The evacuation distance for large leaks is at least 800 meters or one-half mile. In neighborhoods where houses are close together, 330 feet could be three or four houses. In suburban areas with larger yards, 330 feet might be two houses. It’s beneficial to plan your instructions before the emergency. As you arrive at a potential pipeline emergency in a suburban area, be ready to evacuate people at least two houses away. If you’re unsure about the distance, estimate it higher.
It’s always better to move people too far than not far enough.
Remain Vigilant Through Ongoing Practice
If your company hasn’t trained you in conducting evacuations, now is an excellent time to suggest they do or even take the initiative by simulating evacuations to train yourself. Each person who may conduct evacuations should practice it regularly. To gain experience and to sharpen your skills, your company might ask you to enter a service center meeting room or a company office where people are gathered and announce, “I’m conducting an evacuation drill. I’m simulating gas readings on a CGI.” Then, go into how you’ll actually communicate the evacuation, including moving evacuees to a safe area. Your co-workers will likely be even more difficult and intractable than members of the public as they give you a hard time, allowing you to practice your technique for dealing with these situations.
After you do this a few times, you’ll become more comfortable and confident in conducting evacuations. One catch to this type of exercise is that you’ll need to play along when your co-workers practice their evacuation skills when you’re taking a break in the office. These drills should be practiced so frequently that conducting evacuations becomes second nature.
Summary
We bring you this case study not to deride the gas operator involved or the employees who participated in this incident but rather to study and learn from their actions to conduct a gas leak investigation, repair a gas main, and initiate an evacuation in rapidly evolving, real-world conditions. All the gas workers involved undoubtedly gave their best efforts with the training and equipment they had been provided.
The most crucial and challenging duty of pipeline workers is ensuring public safety. Considering how you’ll handle evacuations well before arriving at an emergency is helpful. A few tips for keeping people safe are:
1.??????? Use the AEGIS HELP process during every emergency response,
2.??????? Call 911 at the first indication that the emergency may endanger people,
3.??????? Frequently practice conducting and communicating evacuations,
4.??????? “Train as you work. Work as you train” and,
5.??????? Always remember, “If in doubt, get people out.”
Stay Safe.
To view a recording of a free webinar on this topic and to download EWN resource materials, go to: https://www.energyworldnet.com/webinars/conducting-effective-pipeline-emergency-evacuations
Links:
MPSC Staff Gas Incident Report GS-2013-0400: https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov/Document/Display/288514