CONDONATION OF DELAY BY GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC BODIES

The recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court, a bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari, in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal, has come straight from the shoulder. The Court has unequivocally reiterated that government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condoning delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

Through this piece, we throw light on the judicial trend of how the courts have over time dealt with the condonation of delay concerning the State. The Government is the biggest litigant in the country. For the past several years, the judiciary has been grappling with the problem of extensive litigation in which the government is involved. Every case filed, irrespective of merits, adds to the judicial burden, costing the exchequer and increasing the pendency of cases. Government-related litigation is plagued with red-tapism, institutional or bureaucratic procedures, delays in correspondence, habitual indifference of government officials or government pleaders, considering the impersonal nature of the cases, etc. These issues primarily occasion delays in the filing of cases by the State. In some cases, the delay caused is significant and can even range up to 30-35 years.

It would not be wrong to say that over time, State functionaries have been harboring a wrong notion that in seeking condonation of delay, the State can claim preferential or special treatment as opposed to private litigants, considering the practical realities of governmental functioning and peculiar handicaps afflicting the system of the State. The State has been relying on the difference in nature of functioning between a State and a private litigant which, in their view, justifies the concept of ‘sufficient cause’. The ones who endorse this view believe that if these peculiar characteristics and features are eschewed from consideration and the Court proceeds to apply the same yardstick to the State (as it applies in the case of private litigants), it would amount to adopting a pedantic or mechanical approach, and would lead to miscarriage of justice. It would, in essence, be a case of not adopting the classification where there is a need for one, a facet of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107

The Supreme Court laid the following principles that are supposed to be kept in mind while granting condonation if delay:

• Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal, late.
• Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
• "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay?
• The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
• When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
• There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk.
• it must be grasped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

In Ram Lal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd, AIR 1962 SC 361 SC held that two important considerations have to be borne in mind while considering the condonation of delay:

? 1- The expiration of the period of limitation gives rise to the legal rights in favor of the decree-holder to treat the decree passed in their favor as binding between the parties. The legal right which is accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be lightly disturbed.

? 2- If sufficient cause for the execution of delay is shown, then the discretion is given to the court to condone the delay and admit the appeal. Even if sufficient cause has been shown, the party is not entitled to the condonation of delay is question as a matter of right. Proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent in the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction.

? Therefore there is no exhaustive list of grounds on which the delay can be condoned. It has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case.