Comprehensive Analysis of Chinese Political Newsletters: Propaganda, Influence and Context
DINO GARNER
2X Pulitzer Prize Nominee. Army Ranger. NY Times Bestselling Ghostwriter & Editor. Biophysicist.
Chinese political newsletters, especially those from so-called ordinary citizen-journalists, function as tightly controlled instruments of persuasion. This brief analysis highlights how language, emotional tactics and selective framing are used to reinforce the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) authority and legitimacy.
I include one newsletter, dated March 1, 2025, as an example, this one allegedly written by Jiang Jiang and colleagues. The newsletter is long and probably not too interesting to most of you, so I placed it after my neuropsychanalysis.
Neuropsychanalysis of a typical Chinese newsletter
Propaganda Techniques
The newsletter uses formal, optimistic language—praising the Party’s achievements while downplaying problems. Selective framing showcases economic growth and policy successes, omitting or dismissing controversy. Repeated slogans (e.g., “Socialism with Chinese characteristics,” “Chinese Dream”) reinforce core messages, while an Us-vs.-Them approach portrays external criticism as hostile, boosting nationalism. Notably, troubling facts are often censored or reframed to maintain a narrative of near-perfect governance.
Psychological Influence
Emotional appeals to pride and unity create feelings of national accomplishment, linking the Party with progress and prosperity. Subtle fear-based messaging warns that without CCP leadership, instability looms. Storytelling techniques highlight model citizens or success stories to humanize Party policies, drawing readers into a positive narrative arc. Repetition and a consistent tone amplify these messages, while testimonials (quotes from citizens or officials) offer social proof that the Party’s direction is universally admired.
Cognitive Biases
Common tactics include the bandwagon effect (portraying widespread support to discourage dissent), authority bias (emphasizing top leadership to short-circuit critical thinking), and cherry-picking (highlighting only favorable data). Vague but positive terms (“harmony,” “prosperity”) trigger emotional approval without detail. False dilemmas suggest that Party leadership is the sole alternative to chaos, and ad hominem attacks discredit critics by painting them as malicious. Overgeneralizations and “whataboutism” deflect scrutiny by pointing to foreign flaws rather than addressing domestic issues.
Comparative Perspectives
Within China, this style mirrors official state media, reflecting unified Party guidelines and minimal acknowledgment of opposing views. Compared to democratic contexts—where political communications must address criticisms—Chinese newsletters maintain an unchallenged, celebratory voice. While this approach is subtler than some authoritarian propaganda, it still relies on controlled, one-sided narratives to shape public perception.
Sociopolitical Context
In China’s governance model, media outlets exist to serve the Party’s priorities. Under Xi Jinping, renewed emphasis on Party ideology frames all messaging, embedding official doctrine in discussions of national progress. This is bolstered by censorship that suppresses contradictory facts. Internationally, such newsletters align with broader efforts to enhance China’s global reputation and dismiss Western critiques. Nationalist themes—tying China’s rise to the CCP’s leadership—further promote unity at home and assertiveness abroad.
Impact and Effectiveness
Domestically, these newsletters reinforce existing support among those who rely on state media. Continuous positive spin and the absence of alternative views cultivate trust in Party competence. Some citizens, however, grow skeptical when propaganda clashes with lived reality, creating a degree of cynicism. Internationally, such messaging is less persuasive, often appearing as transparent propaganda. Nonetheless, in a system where alternative narratives are restricted, this newsletter effectively bolsters the CCP’s overarching goal: consolidating public opinion in favor of its leadership and policies.
Finis
The following newsletter was written by Jiang Jiang et al. His bio from the latest newsletter:
Jiang is the founder of Green River Review (GRR). China reporter, research fellow at Xinhua Institute think tank, lecturer at Peking University, Podcaster, YouTuber @chinaday2day. UVA Darden MBA, based in Beijing. Views not representing Xinhua.
China’s "two sessions" 2025: What to expect
This year, the CPPCC National Committee session will commence on Tuesday, March 4, followed by the NPC session on Wednesday, March 5.
?Hello and welcome to the annual "two sessions" time – China's most significant political gatherings of the year.
The "two sessions" refer to the annual session of the National People's Congress (NPC), China's top legislature, and the annual session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) National Committee, China's top political advisory body.
This year, the CPPCC National Committee session will commence on Tuesday, March 4, followed by the NPC session on Wednesday, March 5. Held concurrently in Beijing, the "two sessions" are expected to span approximately one week.
During this critical period, the Chinese premier, top legislator, top political advisor, chief justice, and top procurator will present work reports. Chinese legislators and political advisors will put forth proposals and suggestions aimed at addressing national development priorities.
Ministers from various State Council departments will also engage with the public through interviews and press conferences, clarifying policies and responding to pressing concerns. Last year, for instance, 14 department leaders fielded 28 questions during the ministers' passage, while the NPC held three major press conferences, focusing on diplomacy, the economy, and livelihood issues, respectively.
The "two sessions" serve as a critical window into China’s policy direction for the coming year. The decisions made here will not only shape the lives of 1.4 billion Chinese citizens but also have far-reaching implications for global trends and dynamics.
So, what should you watch for during this year's "two sessions"? Below, I’ve highlighted five key areas that deserve your attention:
GDP growth target
In 2024, the annual government work report set a GDP growth target of "around 5 percent", a goal that was successfully achieved, thanks in large part to a series of milestone macroeconomic measures introduced in September. (China's GDP in 2024 grew by 5 percent compared to 2023.)
Many analysts predict that China will set a similar growth target for 2025. This expectation is reinforced by the fact that in January 2025, 31 Chinese provincial-level regions held their local "two sessions" and announced their respective growth targets for the year. Notably, 30 regions set their growth targets at "around 5 percent" or higher o with the weighted average growth target across all 31 regions reaching 5.3 percent.
GDP growth serves as a cornerstone metric with profound and wide-ranging significance. Whether it’s achieving the goals of stabilizing employment, preventing risks, improving livelihoods, or boosting confidence, or realizing China’s broader vision of basically realizing socialist modernization by 2035, or even gaining strategic leverage in global power dynamics, a certain level of economic growth is essential to support these objectives.
Despite the challenges China's economy has faced in recent years during its structural transformation, the country still contributed nearly 30 percent of global economic growth in 2024, making it the largest source of growth for the world economy. As such, the GDP growth target set in this year’s government work report remains one of the most closely watched figures during the "two sessions."
The GDP growth target is also closely tied to other policy objectives. For instance, the Central Economic Work Conference held in December 2024, which set the tone for this year’s economic development, emphasized the need to "increase residents' income in step with economic growth," reflecting policymakers' determination to better align macroeconomic goals with the lived experiences of residents.
Economic policies
Considering the size of China's economy, a GDP growth target of "around 5 percent" is by no means a low bar. Achieving this target will likely require more direct efforts and targeted policy measures to stimulate economic activity. If the GDP target is set at around 5 percent, the government work report is expected to announce incremental policy measures to ensure the goal is met.
China has already signaled a shift in its macroeconomic stance. At December’s Central Economic Work Conference, policymakers pledged to implement more proactive and impactful macro policies in 2025, notably transitioning the monetary policy from "稳健" (prudent) to "适度宽松" (moderately loose), marking the most significant change in 14 years. Additionally, fiscal policy is described as "更加积极" (more proactive), with the addition of the term "更加" (more) to emphasize its intensified nature.
Han Wenxiu, executive deputy director of the Office of the Central Committee for Financial and Economic Affairs, highlighted that the new policy proposals carry significant weight, with specific measures set to be unveiled during this year’s "two sessions."
In an article published by People’s Daily on December 31, 2024, Han provided insights into China’s economic roadmap. He openly acknowledged the challenges facing the Chinese economy, noting that domestic demand, particularly consumer spending, remained insufficient, and some enterprises faced operational difficulties. Employment pressures persisted and risks in certain sectors continued to be a concern. On the international front, geopolitical conflicts and rising global protectionism added to the complexities faced by China's economy.
Among the nine priorities outlined in the Central Economic Work Conference, boosting consumption came as the first, indicating that China has prioritized domestic demand at the top of its economic agenda. According to the meeting, the large-scale equipment upgrades and consumer goods trade-in programs should be promoted with greater intensity and scope in 2025.
In 2024, China's trade-in programs have boosted sales of bulk durable consumer goods by over 1.3 trillion yuan (about 181 billion U.S. dollars). In the new year, the extent to which the government will further strengthen the trade-in policy are expected to be revealed during the "two sessions."
While concerns over local government debts persist, China moved decisively to contain risks in the area last year, rolling out a series of debt relief measures. Unveiled in November, the debt-relief package reflects a shift in the country's efforts from reactive crisis management to proactive and systemic resolution, and a transition from dual-track oversight of explicit and implicit debts to transparent and standardized management of all debts.
According to Finance Minister Lan Fo'an, in 2025, China will actively use the room for a higher deficit, increase the issuance of local government special-purpose bonds, continue to issue ultra-long special treasury bonds, and increase transfer payments from the central government to local governments.
Additionally, Han noted in his article that "rat-race competition" in some industries has intensified in recent years, leading to falling product prices, operational difficulties for businesses, and industry-wide challenges. To address this issue, the country will promote industry mergers and restructuring, encouraging "race-to-the-top competition" while curbing "race-to-the-bottom" practices. Whether specific measures related to this will be announced during the "two sessions" is another policy area worth watching.
Chinese leaders in two sessions
During the upcoming "two sessions," Chinese leaders will participate in the deliberations of the NPC delegations, and the joint group meetings of the CPPCC National Committee. The speeches delivered by members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee during these group activities often reveal the central leadership's strategic thinking for the year. Their interactions with NPC deputies and CPPCC National Committee members also serve as a window for observing how the central leadership stays informed about grassroots conditions.
Chinese President Xi Jinping, who is also a deputy of the delegation of Jiangsu Province, will take part in a deliberation with his fellow deputies at the third session of the 14th NPC. Based on his participation in recent years, Xi, as chairman of the Central Military Commission, is also expected to attend a meeting of the delegation from the armed forces. In addition, Xi typically meets with national political advisors from various "界别" (sectors), representing different areas of expertise, party affiliations and social groups. (The 14th CPPCC National Committee has organized itself into 34 sectors)
Xi Jinping takes part in a deliberation with his fellow deputies from the delegation of Jiangsu Province at the second session of the 14th National People's Congress (NPC) in Beijing, capital of China, March 5, 2024.
During these meetings, Xi interacted with Chinese national legislators and political advisors. His remarks in these exchanges often reflect what he considers to be the most important issues for China's development. By interacting with representatives from grassroots levels, he gains a deeper understanding of developments in various areas related to his interests. Sometimes, he also introduces new concepts during these occasions.
For instance, at the "two sessions" in 2024, during a meeting with representatives from the armed forces, Xi introduced the concept of "新质战斗力" (new quality combat capabilities), highlighting its significance for China's defense strategy.
In China, after the official readouts of important activities such as Xi's meetings, inspection tours, or overseas visits are released, mainstream media outlets like People's Daily and Xinhua News Agency often publish "side stories" related to these events, which provide more details about the meetings.
For example, after the release of the readout for Xi’s recent meeting with representatives of Chinese private entrepreneurs, Xinhua published a side story that included a remark on the importance of enterprises being focused on their core business made by Xi during the meeting that was not mentioned in the official readout:
“我在福建和浙江工作时，就很认同当地一些民营企业立足实业、聚焦主业、不断做大做强的做法。这两个地方的服装鞋帽企业比较多，现在有的已经引领国际潮流了，很重要的原因就是几十年心无旁骛，一以贯之做这一行，从开始的来料加工到创立自己的品牌，现在成长为世界知名企业。”
Additionally, People's Daily published a similar piece, which included comments from entrepreneurs at the meeting that were not included in the official readout. For instance, Ren Zhengfei, the founder of Huawei, told Xi:
我们曾经“缺芯少魂”的忧虑已经减弱了，“我坚信，一个更伟大的中国将加速崛起。”
During the "two sessions" of recent years, I have always been quick to publish these details, which may easily be overlooked by overseas observers. This year, I will continue to track these aspects and report on them in Beijing Scroll in a timely manner.
Foreign minister's press conference
In previous years, the premier’s press conference following the conclusion of the "two sessions" was typically one of the most anticipated highlights, drawing significant attention from both domestic and international audiences. However, last year, no such press conference was held after the NPC session, and the a spokesperson of the NPCannounced that "barring exceptional circumstances, premier press conferences will not be scheduled during subsequent years of the 14th NPC." (The term of the 14th NPC runs from 2023 to 2027.)
This year, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s press conference will undoubtedly be one of the most closely watched press conferences during the "two sessions." This is especially significant as it comes shortly after the inauguration of the "Trump 2.0" administration in the United States. The themes of the foreign minister’s press conference are usually closely tied to China’s foreign policy and international relations, making it a critical opportunity to observe the latest developments in China’s diplomatic strategy, including its relations with the United States, Europe, Russia, and the Global South.
At last year’s press conference, Wang answered 21 questions from Chinese and international media in approximately 90 minutes.
During a session at the recently-held Munich Security Conference, Wang cited a quote from a popular martial arts novel to illustrate China's position in handling its ties with the United States.
"他强任他强，清风拂山岗；他横任他横，明月照大江。"
Acknowledging the difficulty of translating the quote, Wang, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, demonstrated his sense of humor by recommending that journalists seek assistance from DeepSeek. Xinhua has published an explainer on this quote.
This is not the first time a Chinese saying cited by the Chinese top diplomat has sparked discussions about translation. In a phone call with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio last month, Wang told Rubio to "hao zi wei zhi," a Chinese set phrase commonly used to convey a message of warning.
This year in the press conference, I would not be surprised if Wang Yi once again invokes traditional Chinese proverbs to articulate China’s diplomatic philosophy. If the evolving dynamics of U.S.-Russia relations have left you eager to understand China’s current foreign policy direction, Pekingnology’s coverage of Wang’s recent engagements with important people including Graham Allison, the Harvard professor who coined the term “Thucydides trap”, might offer some valuable insights.
Pekingnology
The U.S. State Department’s Office of the Spokesperson constantly sends out English-language press releases via email en masse. No one in the world apparently does that with regard to China, despite the world’s second-largest economy’s importance. But there is apparently tremendous demand. So I’ll just play that role today, following…
13 days ago · 16 likes · Zichen Wang
DeepSeek and tech innovation
The influence of DeepSeek, China’s generative artificial intelligence (AI) chatbot, extends far beyond its mention in Wang Yi’s speech at the Munich Security Conference. Over the past month, DeepSeek has sent shockwaves through the global AI industry, capital markets, and numerous sectors, thanks to its impressive inference performance, cost-effectiveness, and open-source advantages.
Domestically, companies such as Tencent, Baidu, and BYD have begun integrating DeepSeek's model into their products. Some local governments have also announced collaborations with the DeepSeek AI model to enhance public services, while others have organized training programs to help officials and business professionals better understand the development and applications of DeepSeek and other AI technologies.
Without a doubt, technological innovation will be a key focus during this year’s "two sessions," with the AI industry very likely to take center stage.
In fact, AI has already emerged as one of the hottest topics at many of this year’s provincial-level "two sessions." Journalists from the China Youth Daily used a large model to extract high-frequency terms related to technology policies from the local government work reports of 31 provinces and found that “人工智能” (AI) ranked second, just behind "科技创新“ (technological innovation). Many of the AI-related plans focus on building innovation platforms, promoting deeper industry integration, and improving policy frameworks.
In recent years, China has made significant strides in key technological fields, with a group of six Hangzhou-based startups known as the "Six Little Dragons," including DeepSeek, exemplifying the nation's growing prowess in a surprising momentum. The others are robotics firms Unitree Robotics, video game studio Game Science, brain-machine interface innovator BrainCo, and spatial design firm Manycore.
Such progress has bolstered national confidence and granted the Chinese government greater maneuverability in the face of the U.S. suppression policy. The Economist magazine wrote that the United States tried to prevent China from catching up in the field of AI, and that China's recent progress is "upending the industry and embarrassing American policymakers." The success of the Chinese models, combined with industry-wide changes, could turn the economics of AI on its head.
It’s important to note that the rise of innovations like DeepSeek reflects not just China's commitment to leading in technological advancements, but also its broader strategic focus on talent cultivation, innovation-friendly environments, business environment improvements, and the nurturing of non-public investments. These elements are expected to be underscored in the government’s agenda, and are likely to draw attention during the "two sessions."
Additionally, the NPC and CPPCC sessions provide a crucial platform for lawmakers and political advisors to offer suggestions and foster broad consensus on national development. Some of the deputies and committee members are corporate executives and leading researchers. What AI-related proposals and suggestions they will present this year is certain to be a major point of interest for China watchers.
Finis. Yes, really.