Comparing Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers' approaches to understanding the Mind and consciousness.

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Title: Comparing Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers' approaches to understanding the Mind and consciousness.

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While both are highly influential philosophers of mind, their views differ significantly in conceptualising consciousness and its relationship to the brain.

Daniel Dennett’s View on the Mind:

“Consciousness is not a single wonderful separable thing that the brain does, but a huge complex of many different informational capacities that must be put together in a coordinated fashion.”

(From “Consciousness Explained”)

1. Consciousness as an Illusion (or Emergent Function):

Dennett views consciousness as a natural, emergent product of brain processes.

In Consciousness Explained, he argues for the “multiple drafts” model, where consciousness is not a centralized experience (no “Cartesian Theater”) but a series of competing and distributed processes in the brain.

For Dennett, the brain creates the illusion of a unified self and subjective experience, but this can be fully explained in terms of physical and functional processes.

2. No “Hard Problem”:

Dennett denies the existence of a “hard problem” of consciousness (the question of why subjective experiences or qualia exist).

He argues that qualia, as traditionally understood, are a myth and that subjective experience can be explained in functionalist terms, such as information processing and behavioral responses.

3. Functionalism:

Dennett is a functionalist, meaning he sees mental states (like beliefs, desires, and consciousness) as defined by their roles or functions in a system, not by any intrinsic properties.

David Chalmers’ View on the Mind

1. Consciousness as Fundamental:

“Consciousness is an undeniable fact about the world. There is something it is like to be me and something it is like to be you. The problem is, we don’t know why.”

(From “The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory”)

Chalmers, in contrast, argues that physical processes cannot fully explain consciousness. He introduced the concept of the “hard problem of consciousness”, which focuses on explaining why and how subjective experiences (qualia) arise from physical brain activity.

For Chalmers, the “easy problems” of consciousness (e.g., explaining perception, attention, and behaviour) are solvable within current scientific paradigms, but the “hard problem” requires a fundamentally new understanding of reality.

2. Dual-Aspect or Property Dualism:

Chalmers often leans toward property dualism, suggesting that consciousness is a fundamental feature of the universe, akin to mass or charge. This view implies that consciousness is an irreducible property alongside physical properties.

He speculates about panpsychism, the idea that consciousness might be a fundamental aspect of all matter.

3. Focus on Qualia:

Chalmers takes qualia—the raw, subjective experiences (e.g., the redness of red)—as real and central to understanding the mind. He argues that physicalist accounts fail to explain their existence.

Comparison summary

? Dennett focuses on explaining consciousness entirely within the framework of physical processes and rejects the notion of irreducible subjective experience. He views the traditional questions about consciousness as misguided or based on misunderstandings.

? Chalmers, on the other hand, sees the subjective experience as a profound mystery that physicalism cannot solve alone. He calls for a paradigm shift incorporating consciousness as a fundamental universe aspect.

In essence, Dennett and Chalmers represent opposing ends of the philosophical spectrum: Dennett is a reductionist who seeks to “explain away” consciousness, while Chalmers emphasizes its mysterious and irreducible nature.

See… https://medium.com/.../daniel-dennett-and-david-chalmers...

Image credit: see link

***** My point of view

I am more with Chalmers.

Why?

If we take a position of materialism (per Dennett and Eliminate mind as purely an illusion), we assert a metaphysical position.

A Dual Aspect of Monism’s position neither asserts the materialist nor idealist perspectives but rather asserts the two legitimate perspectives of Mind/Consciousness as a Kantian “thing-in-itself.”

Is that fair?

In Physics, the standard position for Quantum Theory is “Complementarity,” i.e., a thing that, before an observer/measurement, can be represented as BOTH particle/realism and superposition/idealism. So science accepts the proposition as an acceptable one.

Both mind/consciousness and quantum physics share a common logical factor that I have described elsewhere as the “inside/outside problem.”

See… https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/insideoutside-problem-martin-ciupa-bqqce/

This argument accepts that it’s an irresolvable problem for an observer (that’s “outside”) to measure/observe itself without changing the system. Scientists can’t be separate from the science they study (they are entangled in that sense).

See… Jung and Pauli on Dual Aspect Monism: https://philpapers.org/rec/ATMDM

So, I assert logically that you can not deny the Dual Aspect Monist position as an option (that, like QM, may experimentally show both aspects) while arguing that Eliminative Materialism is a metaphysical position.

Do we see experimental results if mindfulness impacts biological cognitive processes? Advocates of mindful meditation say yes, we do.

See… https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4879109

And… https://www.dhirubhai.net/posts/martin-ciupa-76418b17_mindful-meditation-and-the-mind-as-an-emergent-activity-7273456257234051072-k2Co?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop

“These findings suggest that mindfulness meditation can positively impact student learning outcomes and well-being in higher education settings.”