Common Sense in Defense Article 9 The Services Organizing and Equipping for the Fight, the Coast Guard
In previous articles, the service budget issues were addressed and how that budget structure results in force structure, installations, and equipping of the force. All of which is supposed to be predicated upon the National Strategy and the National Defense Strategy. This article is a continuation to that discussion focusing on the United States Coast Guard.
The United States Coast Guard carries out three basic roles: Maritime Safety, Maritime Security, and Maritime Stewardship. The Coast Guard is one of eight uniformed services (Army, Marines, Navy, Air Force, Space Force, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Commissioned Corps, Public Health Service (PHS) Commissioned Corps, and the Coast Guard), one of five naval services (Navy, Marines, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Commissioned Corps, Public Health Service (PHS) Commissioned Corps, and the Coast Guard), and one of six armed services (Army, Marines, Navy, Air Force, Space Force, and the Coast Guard). The Coast Guard is the oldest continuous seagoing service with roots back to the US Cutter Revenue Service established in 1790. The Coast Guard has eleven (11) statutory missions assigned, more than any other armed service and prior to the creation of the US Space Force was the smallest of the armed services. The eleven statutory missions as defined by law are divided into homeland security missions and non-homeland security missions. Non-homeland security missions include: Marine safety, search and rescue, aids to navigation, living marine resources (fisheries law enforcement), marine environmental protection, and ice operations; Homeland security missions include: Ports, waterways, and coastal security (PWCS); drug interdiction; migrant interdiction; defense readiness; and other law enforcement. This authority and assigned missions are covered under Titles 6, 10, 14, 18, 32, 33, 42, 46, and 50 of the United States Code (USC). The Coast Guard is unique as an armed service as it has specific law enforcement authority under these titles and although not limited by the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (18 USC), later amendments to the Act included in 10 USC does limit the type of law enforcement activities and assistance provided to civilian law enforcement agencies.
The most difficult challenge for the US Coast Guard is its budgetary process which is about 83% from the discretionary funding ($12.33 B total budget/$10.24B discretionary funding FY21 (USCG FY2021 Budget Fact Sheet, 2020). The Coast Guard is the only armed service whose budget does not fall within the National Defense Authorization or Appropriations Acts. This process has significant negative impact on the Coast Guard’s readiness and personnel, particularly when Congress fails to pass appropriations legislation forcing a government shutdown. The women and men of the Coast Guard still work without pay even when the government shuts down as the Coast Guard is deemed essential. The courageous women and men of the Coast Guard deserve better from Congress and the American people. The Coast Guard’s annual budget, authorization, and appropriations should be placed within the Defense Authorization and Defense Appropriations Acts to ensure funding of the Coast Guard, its missions, and personnel are not negatively impacted as has been the case over the past 14+ years.
Given the above situation, Congress should consider transfer of the United States Coast Guard from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to the Department of the Navy as service department of the Department of Defense. This action would modify 6USC, 10USC, 14USC, and 32 USC. The Commandant of the Coast Guard should be made a full voting member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support this move. In previous articles, it was noted that the Commandant is the only service chief with direct operational control of assigned forces. This should not change. Although the Coast Guard has personnel and operating assets deployed world-wide in direct support of the current geographical combatant commands and several of the functional combatant commands. As recommended in previous articles, the current command structure should be changed by eliminating all but two of the geographical commands and assuming a task force oriented command structure on a when required basis.
Integration with the other naval services has been high on the priorities list for the Coast Guard and has relatively successful to include future warfare concepts integration. This has been very well addressed in numerous publications released by the Commandant along with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. But the Coast Guard has several key areas of concern that Congress must address with regards to budget. Primary concern must be personnel to man and operate Coast Guard assets. Without the properly trained personnel, the systems matter not.
Systems acquisition for the Coast Guard has been well underway with a complete recapitalization of command-and-control systems as well as cutters and fixed-wing aircraft. The National Security Cutter, the Off-shore Patrol Cutter, and the Fast Response Cutter programs are well underway, and the programs appear to be highly successful. But there are glaring holes in the Coast Guard’s acquisition programs that must be addressed. Chief among these is the Polar Security Cutter (or open ocean ice breaker) program. Currently a requirement exists for six of these vessels with a decision to be made on the mix of heavy and medium to replace the two heavy ice breakers (Polar Star and Polar Sea, one of which is not operational and a used as a spare parts bin for the other) and the one medium ice breaker (Healy), which is larger than the Polar Star/Sea vessels. The reality is that a single common platform is a more economical choice and as larger is better when it comes to open ocean ice breakers, that would appear to be the logical choice. But is six enough given the four-ocean requirement for ice breakers? That is a question for further cost benefit analysis. The obvious answer to a reasonably informed person would be no, six heavy ice breakers are not sufficient to meet national security needs in the event of a war encompassing the Pacific, Artic, and Atlantic Oceans.
The recapitalization of the rotary-wing fleet is significant issue for the Coast Guard. The MH-65C Dolphin fleet is very old, worn out, and with very expensive maintenance costs as the airframe and parts are no longer being manufactured. A side issue with this airframe is that it is foreign manufactured (French). Currently the Dolphin is the only dedicated cutter deployed asset for the Coast Guard. This is being remedied to some degree by the Coast Guard acquiring excess Navy H-60’s as these aircraft have blade-folding and fuselage folding mechanisms that allow for handling and storage on cutters with hanger facilities (Kime, 2021). There is an ongoing effort to convert the MH-60T’s to have blade and fuselage fold capabilities like Navy MH-60 R and S models. Converting all Coast Guard H-60’s to this standard and withdrawing the MH-65C’s is a solid economy action that provides the Coast Guard with a more capable airframe and commonality with the other services as the Navy, Army, and Air Force all operate H-60 variants. Note that the Marines also operate a variant of the H-60 (VH-60) but these are unique airframes scheduled to be withdrawn from service shortly.
When the Coast Guard retired the HH-3F Pelican helicopter the Coast Guard lost a unique capability that the HH-60 Jayhawk did not fully replace. Several key capabilities included a much larger cargo/cabin area, a rear loading ramp that allowed large, outsized cargo to be directly loaded and even air dropped, a cabin area that allowed crew to stand, a water landing capability, and a greater lift capability. The Jayhawk did provide more modern systems and a higher transit speed capability. These requirements still exist. Although not intended to be a Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) document and provide a material solution to a requirement, this document does identify the fact that there are several material solutions that are currently deployed with other international coast guards and other US armed forces that do address this need and are American made.
Consideration must be given to equipping all Coast Guard aircraft with defensive armament systems to provide warning and defensive capabilities consistent and compatible with naval services aircraft.
A note to Coast Guard leadership: remember the lessons of the past. The MH-65 Dolphin program had teething problems because of the attempt to place American engines into a foreign aircraft design. This also ran into congressional pushback because of the foreign buy. The then new technology of the Fenestron tailrotor design created issues that took time and effort to overcome with training and maintenance and therefore money that could have been used elsewhere. Now the issue is one of spare parts availability. The lessons learned should be to buy American, leverage the economies of scale by purchasing platforms used by the other services, and gaining congressional support for programs of record. The latter situation may be improved by a transfer of the Coast Guard to the Department of Defense. These concepts can also be leveraged in the Polar Security Cutter program.
Author’s note: this is the ninth in a series of articles addressing the defense needs of the United States in an ever-changing world.
Constant P. “CP” Craig. The author is a retired commissioned officer of the United States Marine Corps. He was a designated Naval Aviator. He has held command of a Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Company (now squadron). Upon retirement he spent time as a defense and homeland security contractor supporting the US Army and US Marine Corps in a variety of programmatic support contracts. He also completed contracts supporting FEMA and several state and local governments with regards to emergency management and threat/hazard assessment and exercises. He has also held office as an elected official, mayor of a small community. He has recently retired as a professor from a major on-line university where he was a full-time faculty member and lead for the homeland security program of the university. He continues to teach in the field of homeland security as an adjunct faculty member.
Works Cited
Kime, P. (2021, May 5). Coast Guard Grounds Some Search-and-Rescue Helicopters As It Struggles to Find Spare Parts. Retrieved May 14, 2021, from Military.Com: https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/05/05/coast-guard-grounds-some-search-and-rescue-helicopters-it-struggles-find-spare-parts.html
USCG FY2021 Budget Fact Sheet. (2020, February 10). Retrieved May 11, 2021, from USCG: https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/documents/budget/FY2021_Fact_Sheet.pdf?ver=2020-02-18-102402-127×tamp=1582039471374