Common Sense in Defense Article 7 The Services and the Budget Wars

The budget wars have begun between the services and their desires for a greater share of the annual defense budget. Recently a senior Army general was cited in the media for stating the need for more vehicles to counter the PRC’s PLA’s (Army) 30,000 vehicles. Another article has an Air Force general officer calling the Army’s program for a precision strike weapon “Stupid” (Insinna, 2021). Then there is the almost daily barrage of media reports indicating a China that is threatening world peace and stability, along with a re-emerging Russia and hostile activities towards Ukraine, and the outliers of a nuclear North Korea and a possible nuclear armed Iran. All of which are reasserting territorial claims, powers of sovereignty, and an unwillingness to bow to America’s wishes. China asserts itself as an “equal” to America in public statements in their media (how much is for internal consumption and how much is for international consumption?). The bottom line for the US Armed Forces is that peer competition is alive and well and in some technological areas those competitors have gained an advantage over America. The true picture of both claims lies somewhere in between. China may have 30,000 vehicles but how many are armored combat vehicles? Where will these vehicles be used? How will China transport these vehicles? Pacific islands are not ideal armored or mechanized forces suitable land areas. The Chinese do not have sufficient amphibious shipping capabilities to deploy or employ all of these vehicles (currently). As for the second statement, perhaps crudely stated by the Air Force general, but certainly true. Why is the Army concerned with a deep strike mission that is a thousand miles from the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) or the Forward Edge of the Battlespace (FEBA)? Certainly, a deep strike theater strategic mission falls into the purview of the Air Force’s mission sets and not the Army’s. Truth in the budget wars is essential for all parties.

While the competition for scarce fiscal resources is intense between the services, the internal competition is as or perhaps more intense. Within the Army this is often referred to as “branch warfare”. This generally is referring to the Army branches such as infantry, armor, artillery, and aviation as the big four consumers of the budget or dollars with the remaining Army branches fighting over the leftovers. Within the Air Force, similar fiscal battles exist between general aviation groups such as fighters, bombers, transport and what is left. In the Navy the fighting goes from surface, submarines, and aviation and the remaining needs. The Space Force is relatively young so branches may not be as important at this point but there is the internal Department of the Air Force fight with the Air Force for those fiscal assets and programs of record (POR’s). The Marines are unique among the services and are basically divided between air or aviation and ground forces for budgeting. The aviation elements are funded by Navy or blue dollars. This is since one of the Title 10 missions of Marine aviation is to augment Naval Aviation as required. Marine fixed wing squadrons routinely deploy as part of the carrier air wing (CAW) onboard navy aircraft carriers. Of course, the budget fighting for the Marines goes internally within the Corps and externally with the Navy staff (the N staff). The Coast Guard must be considered within the mix as some Coast Guard budget lines are paid for from Navy funding lines instead of Department of Homeland Security funding lines as these are Title 10 mission sets.

The competition for fiscal resources can be and should be better controlled by the senior leadership of the Defense Department. Specifically in the form of the Secretary and the Chairman. A simple risk analysis and ranking order by these two individuals is the key. The risks or threats are known and clearly present throughout the world. Ranking ordering has been done quite a few times and of recent has been the PRC (China) and Russia, followed by North Korea and Iran. Terrorism is quickly falling off the US charts of threats for at least media purposes. Every geographical commander has made media statements within the past month indicating China as the primary military threat in that commands’ AOR. The exception of course was the USEUCOM commander but even there the PRC is and has been present in a military form with a recent naval exercise with Russia in the Baltic Sea. An interesting viewpoint as the combatant commanders are clearly stating that China is the primary threat world over. But, less stated by these media posts is that the threat perceived by each of these geographical commanders is a naval threat. Rank ordering of priorities has been accomplished with this simple, understated or even non-stated observation. A historical assist for the case of Europe and USEUCOM, World Wars I and II show that while the European Theater or AOR is a primarily a land and air battle, getting there is a pure naval battle, i.e., the Battle of the Atlantic in both world wars against the German U-boat threat. In the event of hostilities with Russia and her allies in the European AOR, the battle for the Atlantic will be the deciding factor. The Russian submarine force, like the Germans before, is large, well equipped, well trained, and ready to conduct operations in the Atlantic Ocean. The battle will be engaging surface and merchant vessels of the US and NATO against the submarine force of the Russian Federation Navy. Control of the UK-Iceland-Greenland Gap is the key choke point of the war. Success or failure here in the Atlantic is success or failure on the European mainland. The US and NATO forces on the mainland are the holding forces much as they were during the Cold War against Russia. Having sufficient forces in the right locations is key. That sets the priorities for land forces. Having the ability to rapidly reinforce personnel to pre-staged equipment in Europe is important as well and this drives the air war priorities as well as budget priorities. Ranking ordering of the threat and the threat counters is now set by simple historical review and current observations.

One of the important steps in the above has been using “Threats” as the driver of prioritization. In the old days of the Department of Defense Requitements Generation System (RGS), the threat was the driver for any material solutions. There had to exist a threat the material solution either countered or eliminated. But before a material solution could be defined, a DOTML analysis had to be conducted. The abbreviation DOTML stood for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, and Leadership. If a change in D, O, T, or L could counter the threat, then there was no need for a material or M solution. If this was not the case, then a material or M solution was the only course of action to counter the threat. The actual analysis process of getting to this point was rather staggering in terms of time, labor, and funds expenditure. The RGS process was replaced somewhere in the early 2000’s by the current Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS). The theory behind JCIDS was that a needed capability that was not necessarily threat-based was a more appropriate approach to material solutions. The problem with the concept is that the JCIDS process never answers the question of why a service may need a specific capability. It does answer why that service wants a specific capability. But, as we adults must often explain to our children, wants and needs are distinctly different. Given the scarcity of fiscal resources, needs must outweigh wants and the needs are “threat-based” by either countering a threat or destroying or neutralizing a threat. The time has come to revert to the simpler but better focused RGS system and removing the JCS from the process so that the services interface directly within their chains of command and service secretaries to the defense acquisition and test and evaluation processes (refer to article 2 and 4 of this series). The services are more than capable of coordinating mutual needs with each other without a DOD bureaucracy forcing such unnecessary actions, re the F-35 Lightening II fighters and the MV-22 Osprey.

Which service counters the threat is defined by Title 10 USC. Understanding the services’ missions is key to this discussion. Specifically, the mission sets are as follows:

Army - It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war. (10 U.S. Code § 7062 - Policy; composition; organized peace establishment).

Marine Corps - The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.

The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces. (10 U.S. Code § 8063 - United States Marine Corps: composition; functions).

Navy - The Navy, within the Department of the Navy, includes, in general, naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war. (10 U.S. Code § 8062 - United States Navy: composition; functions).

Air Force - In general, the Air Force includes aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. It is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war. (10 U.S. Code § 9062 - Policy; composition; aircraft authorization).

Space Force - The Space Force shall be composed of the following: The Chief of Space Operations. The space forces and such assets as may be organic therein. The Space Force shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide freedom of operation for the United States in, from, and to space and prompt and sustained space operations. It shall be the duty of the Space Force to protect the interests of the United States in space. deter aggression in, from, and to space, and conduct space operations. (10 U.S. Code § 9081 - The United States Space Force).

Coast Guard – The Coast Guard, established January 28, 1915, shall be a military service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States at all times. (14 U.S. Code § 101 - Establishment of Coast Guard). Enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable Federal laws on, under, and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (customs, duties, law enforcement; author added). Engage in maritime air surveillance or interdiction to enforce or assist in the enforcement of the laws of the United States (customs, duties, law enforcement; author added). Administer laws and promulgate and enforce regulations for the promotion of safety of life and property on and under the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, covering all matters not specifically delegated by law to some other executive department ((customs, duties, law enforcement; author added). Develop, establish, maintain, and operate, with due regard to the requirements of national defense, aids to maritime navigation, icebreaking facilities, and rescue facilities for the promotion of safety on, under, and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (a Title 10 USC national defense mission; author added). Pursuant to international agreements, develop, establish, maintain, and operate icebreaking facilities on, under, and over waters other than the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (other duties; author added). Engage in oceanographic research of the high seas and in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (other duties; author added). Maintain a state of readiness to assist in the defense of the United States, including when functioning as a specialized service in the Navy pursuant to section 103 (a Title 10 US national defense mission; author added). (14 U.S. Code § 102 - Primary duties). The US Coast Guard has more legal missions as defined by the US Code than any of the other armed services. Given that the Coast Guard is the smallest service, this is interesting and certainly a budget consideration.

The US Merchant Marine. Ships and the personnel to man and operate the ships are an absolute necessity to get personnel, materials, supplies and equipment to any theater of operations. From a high of over 2400 US flagged vessels at the end of the Second World War to today’s 190+ ship fleet, the US Merchant Marine is under-manned, under equipped, and under-funded. The ships in the National Reserve Fleet of the Maritime Administration (MARAD) and the Military Sealift Command (MSC) are old and worn-out hulls that must be recapitalized. This can only be done with funding and increases in Merchant Mariners. Potential solutions were addressed in article 6 of this series but those solutions are dependent upon fiscal resources.

What is needed is honest, forthright leadership that understands the common good and the common need. The ability to discern needs from wants and the integrity to place needs over wants. This starts with the President of the United States putting forth a clearly stated, easily understood National Strategy that defines what are the goals, objectives, and metrics of determining success or failure of those goals and objectives for the Nation. From this point the Secretary of Defense along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff, and the Service Chiefs must develop a National Defense Strategy that is long-term (20 – 25 years in forecast) that addresses all of the National Strategy’s goals, objectives, and metrics in military and naval terms and how those goals are to be addressed, met, and or achieved by the nation’s armed forces. The hard part of execution in developing service budget proposals to include personnel and material solutions via Programs of Record (POR’s) falls to the service chiefs and the service secretaries. Again, honesty and integrity in determining needs over wants. The ability to make tough decisions guided by the National Defense Strategy and the Title 10 missions of each service must be considered in an era of flat or declining budgets. Consideration must be given to cutting waste, finding additional savings, making wise investment decisions based upon threats, needs, and still meeting current mission requirements. The ultimate oversight must rest squarely on the shoulders of the Chairman, the Secretary, and the President. Personnel cuts are likely, but it is far easier to cut generals and admirals rather than lieutenants and privates or sailors. The former can be made overnight. The latter takes significant time to train, develop and mature into cohesive military and or naval organizations.

Congress has a key and the most important role to play as well. The budget lies within Congress’ purview and unfortunately Congress has often been the problem and not the solution for the Department of Defense and the Defense Authorization and the Defense Appropriations Acts. Adding unrequested or non-defense related items and bureaucratic oversight and reporting adds cost to the American taxpayers. Pork-barreling as standard operating procedure must stop. Again, integrity and an understanding of for the common good is required. The key players must be the Chairmen/women and Ranking Members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees’ Defense Subcommittees. The progressives of the House and Senate are correct that the Department of Defense has too much waste, but a lot of that waste is Congressionally directed.

Author’s note: this is the seventh in a series of articles addressing the defense needs of the United States in an ever-changing world.

Constant P. “CP” Craig. The author is a retired commissioned officer of the United States Marine Corps. He was a designated Naval Aviator. He has held command of a Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Company (now squadron). Upon retirement he spent time as a defense and homeland security contractor supporting the US Army and US Marine Corps in a variety of programmatic support contracts. He also completed contracts supporting FEMA and a number of state and local governments with regards to emergency management and threat/hazard assessment and exercises. He has also held office as an elected official, mayor of a small community. He has recently retired as a professor from a major on-line university where he was a full-time faculty member and lead for the homeland security program of the university. He continues to teach in the field of homeland security as an adjunct faculty member.

Works Cited

Heinl, R. D. (1965). The Marine Officers Guide. In R. D. Heinl, The Marine Officers Guide (pp. 104 - 105). Annapolis , MD: US Naval Institute.

Insinna, V. (2021, April 2). Air. Retrieved April 19, 2021, from Defense News: https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/04/02/air-force-general-says-of-armys-long-range-precision-fires-goal-its-stupid/