Common Sense in Defense Article 6 Organization: The Unified Command Plan

There are currently eleven Unified Commands also referred to as Combatant Commands. These are broken down into two categories, Geographical Commands and Functional Commands. The Geographical Commands are: US Africa Command (USAFRICACOM), US Central Command (USCENTCOM), US European Command (USEUCOM), US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACCOM), US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), and US Space Command (USSPACECOM). The Functional Commands are: US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). Each of these Unified Commands have both subordinate commands and component or service commands comprised of the individual armed services. Strategic Command and Transportation Command do not have a US Marine Corps component command. Interestingly four of the geographic commands have headquarters located in areas other than the designated Area of Operations (AOR) for that geographical command. These being: African Command (headquartered at Kelly Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany), US Central Command (headquartered at MacDill AFB, Tampa, FL), and Southern Command (headquartered at Doral (near Miami), FL. One could also consider US Space Command as not being within its geographic AOR as the AOR is defined by the Unified Command Plan as being “all operations 100 kilometers above mean sea level. The provisional headquarters is located at Peterson AFB, CO. In reality the Space Command is a functional command with a direct combat mission (offensive and defensive) as opposed to a geographic command. A very similar situation as can be found with Special Operations Command. Both Commands have independent missions and have missions that are in support of the geographic combatant commands.

The unified commands are created and or disbanded as the Unified Command Plan is reviewed and revised (generally after each new president assumes office). Since the Carter administration, the presidents have been in competition to create a new “Command” within the UCP. The last was in the Trump administration with the re-designation of Cyber Command to full command status instead of as a major subordinate command of Strategic Command. President Trump trumped his predecessors (no pun intended) by having legislation that created the US Space Force. A feat not accomplished since the Truman administration and the US Air Force as part of the National Security Act of 1947. The one unified command that was not created by presidential action is the Special Operations Command. This command was created by the Congress with pass of 10 USC §167 on October 18, 1986. Given duties, powers, authority, unique chain of command, budget, and monetary processes, along with other elements; it may be argued that the US Special Operations Command was in fact the sixth armed service. The Goldwater-Nichols Act made some additional impact on the relationships of the unified command commanders as were reporting to the President through the Secretary of Defense. Placing the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) in the operational chain of command as established by law for the first time.

Unfortunately, the above proves the simple fact that bureaucracies tend to grow when unchecked or abated. A look at the Defense Establishment table of organization as presented in the 3rd edition of the Marine Officers Guide (Heinl, 1965), shows only two Combatant or Unified Commands, the US European Command (USEUCOM) and the US Pacific Command (USPACCOM). The bureaucracy continues to grow. The purpose of the geographical commands was to provide a Unified Command approach to strategic theater military operations in any given AOR. As understood, the concept was that with presence within any given AOR, the unified commander would be able to create personal and professional relationships with allies within that AOR, establish strong military and naval ties, ensure a US military presence, and support US interests. While adhering to the principle of warfare of unity of command, what is lost is the concepts of simplicity of command and span of control. Given the fact that four of the four of the seven geographical commands do not have a physical presence in their specified AOR, this argument does not seem to be valid.

A good leader and manager must ask the difficult questions. In this case what is the value of the geographical unified commands? Is there a value-added statement that can be factually supported with empirical data that really does matter? Is there a return on investment with regards to accomplishing the primary assigned mission within the AOR of any of the unified commands? Are there results driven outcomes for any of the geographical commands? Why do these commands have positions such as “science advisors” or personnel that address material solutions within the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materials, Personnel, Fiscal (DOTMLPF) domains? This is a services chief and SecDef domain. Each unified command has on average ten general or flag rank officers on staff plus the designated service or component commanders that are all general or flag rank officers. In the case of US Special Operations Command, there are an additional seven general or flag rank led sub-unified commands that are under operational control (OPCON) of a geographical command but under administrative control (ADCON) of USSOCOM. Then there are the four service component commanders and their deputies. The Army has two four stars committed to the special operations arena. More than any of the other services. Special operations make up less than 1% of the total military force and operations requirement but has 20+ generals or admirals assigned to the command. Is that really cost effective or efficient? Most likely not if using any the previously discussed questions as a means of measurement.

Bluntly speaking the Unified Commands are generally an expensive failure and an exercise in bureaucracy. All told multi-billions in wasted annual budgets, unnecessary general and flag officers, detailing of numerous senior officers that could fill empty billets within their services, excessive civil servants of all grades, and the uncounted armies of contractors. An alternative is to understand that America’s primary national and national security interests lie in two very specific areas of the world – Europe and the Indo-Pacific region. Returning to the early 1960’s era of two unified geographical commands would help reduce the unnecessary command and therefore overhead structure and return focus to the primary areas of concern. While returning critically needed funding to the services along with personnel to fully man combat power units. Specifically, the United States European Command (USEUCOM) and the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) as the sole geographical commands. The Atlantic domain and naval warfare required to get to the European AOR is already being addressed by organization and assigned commands of the US Navy, specifically in the form of the 2nd Fleet. Dissolution of the remaining geographic commands and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), a functional command, is not only important but essential in period of fiscal austerity. The USSOCOM is the only combatant command that would require congressional action given the fact that Congress created SOCOM. Unfortunately, SOCOM has become a center of elitism gone wild. With special operators killing each other as was the case of two Navy SEALs and two Marine Raiders killing an Army Special Forces Soldier. Or the numerous other publicly known cases of special operators violating law, regulation, and common decency. Which is why the Commander US Special Operations Command has directed new training aimed at ethics and morals. Closing the barn door after the horse gets out. Proper screening at the beginning to include physical, mental, and moral standards before money and training time is expended on an individual. Not to mention the numerous books, articles, and editorial opinions published within recent memory by several special operators. America’s silent warriors are anything but silent. Return the special operations community to the services and the service chiefs.

A special case is present in the US Northern Command or NORTHCOM. The NORTHCOM organization includes the North American Air Defense Command or NORAD. The NORAD organization is established by treaty between the United States and Canada and is jointly manned and operated by the United States and Canada. It has an essential function and provides the early warning mechanisms and force structure to respond to intrusions into US and Canadian airspace by foreign aircraft as well as the Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) for each nation. The western approaches of NORAD have been getting considerable aircraft operations and alerts from Russian long range aviation bombers, tankers, fighters, and electronic warfare aircraft over the last several years. A vital activity that is treaty based and should be retained although its senior command, NORTHCOM, should be eliminated. In essence, NORAD becomes a coalition designated Specified Command.

Other arising crises would be assigned through the existing chain of command to a specific service for forming an appropriate task force for the situation. One must consider that the Navy Marine team already fields seven combined arms Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) that are combined with Navy Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) that deployed world-wide and are within several days steaming time to any crisis. Further, the Marines have the NATO Airlifted Marine Brigade (NALMEB) with prepositioned stocks in Norway to cover the north flank of NATO. The Marines also have the Maritime Prepositioned Force with brigade level equipment ready to deploy and marrying with a Marine Brigade anywhere in the world. The Army Air Force team is ready to deploy an airborne brigade team on 72 hours’ notice with a battalion on 24 hours’ notice. Contingencies can be addressed by task forces much in the way this has been handled since the end of World War II. Think about the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The Navy immediately responded with a naval blockade of Cuba. The Army and Marines mobilized forces and prepared for combat action, as the Air Force and specifically the Strategic Air Command provided nuclear strike capabilities against the Soviet Union and strategic reconnaissance flights over Cuba.

The functional commands have a differing mission and needs but some should also be considered for elimination along with the previously addressed SOCOM. Cyber Command should be eliminated as a Unified Command and be assigned as a specified command within a service. Most likely and appropriate service would be the US Space Force. This would give the Space Force an offensive mission. Cyber warfare is a critical and emerging form of warfare. But cyber and computers don’t directly locate, close with and destroy the enemy by fire, maneuver, or close combat. Nor does it require the dedication of resources and assets from the other services. This is an appropriate mission for the newly minted Space Force. If an in-theater requirement is identified to support a crisis operation, Space Force can and should be tasked with providing appropriately equipped units to execute the mission.

The US Strategic Command appears to add an unneeded layer of control over the nation’s strategic forces as only the commander-in-chief has authority to authorize launch of nuclear weapons. The services are the experts in operating and controlling their specific delivery vehicles and weapons. In the case of the Navy the Sea Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) force. For the Air Force, this would mean that manned bombers and the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). The Navy has a service component command, Joint Forces Maritime Component Command (JFMCC), that does the SLBM force management mission set for USSTRATCOM. The Air Force has two distinct commands addressing the nuclear mission. That being Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) for the manned bomber fleet and ICBMs and the JFCC – Integrated Missile Defense (IMD). Prior to the creation of STRATCOM in 1992, the Navy and the Air Force maintained this capability within the purview of the individual service. It would be logical to remove unnecessary command structure from the nuclear strike equation and return to simplicity. Perhaps for the Air Force reactivating the Strategic Air Command for the manned bomber force as a specified command as it was prior to deactivation in 1992. Given the space operations of ICBMs, the natural choice would be to assign the ICBM mission to the US Space Force. This action would give the Space Force another direct-action mission (see the discussion on Cyber Command). Transferring the IMD mission to the Space Force would also be a logical mission fit for Space Force. The Navy has a slice of this as well with the Navy AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program. The seaborne porting should clearly remain with the Navy providing forward deployed forces with a BMD capability, but the ashore elements should be transferred to the Space Force as an operating system.

The US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). The old adage is amateurs talk tactics; professionals talk logistics holds true in this discussion. There is value added with this command as it is essential to coordinate movement of goods, personnel, and equipment world-wide. The structure of the organization is well developed and works in very efficient and effective manner. One could say despite being military and or a bureaucracy. There are significant challenges to the maritime component of this organization that Congress must act upon to ensure that there is adequate sealift available to the United States Merchant Fleet (American flagged merchant vessels) in the advent of a national crisis as outlined in article 2 of this series. It is highly recommended that Congress considers special tax incentives, payments, insurance and other considerations to both American owned shipping companies and ship builders to build cargo ships of sufficient capacity to meet the demand for cargo vessels. It would be wise to move the Maritime Administration (MARAD) from the Department of Transportation to the Department of Defense and specifically as a functional component of TRANSCOM. The MARAD and US Coast Guard play a significant role in the function and operations of the 22 designated Strategic Seaports around the United States. Because of this unique relationship and other US Code (USC) laws governing ports, port security, merchant mariner licensure, merchant vessel registration and operations responsibilities and duties; the United States Coast Guard should be added as an operational and service component of the TRANSCOM.

These actions created a manageable Unified Command structure that does not excessively consume personnel, funding, real estate, or other scarce resources. But does meet mission requirements, is expandable and adaptable to evolving events. This structure becomes a military version of the Incident Command System (ICS) as used in the emergency management community for years. Historically, the ICS originated in the fire services but was based upon military task force organizational experiences and originated from the now defunct Civil Defense Administration of the DOD.

Author’s note: this is the sixth in a series of articles addressing the defense needs of the United States in an ever-changing world.

Constant P. “CP” Craig. The author is a retired commissioned officer of the United States Marine Corps. He was a designated Naval Aviator. He has held command of a Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Company (now squadron). Upon retirement he spent time as a defense and homeland security contractor supporting the US Army and US Marine Corps in a variety of programmatic support contracts. He also completed contracts supporting FEMA and a number of state and local governments with regards to emergency management and threat/hazard assessment and exercises. He has also held office as an elected official, mayor of a small community. He has recently retired as a professor from a major on-line university where he was a full-time faculty member and lead for the homeland security program of the university. He continues to teach in the field of homeland security as an adjunct faculty member.

Works Cited

Heinl, R. D. (1965). The Marine Officers Guide. In R. D. Heinl, The Marine Officers Guide (pp. 104 - 105). Annapolis , MD: US Naval Institute.