Common Sense in Defense Article 13 The Services Organizing and Equipping for the Fight, the Air Force

In previous articles, the service budget issues were addressed and how that budget structure results in force structure, installations, and equipping of the force. All of which is supposed to be predicated upon the National Strategy and the National Defense Strategy. This article is a continuation to that discussion focusing on the United States Air Force and is the thirteenth in the series of continuing discussions.

The current transition of the Department of the Air Force into two separate and distinct armed services (Air Force and Space Force) appears to be, at least in the public eye, going smoothly. There are remaining issues to be worked out such as a Reserve Component (RC) for the Space Force and the mixture of that RC between Space Force Reserve and perhaps a Space Guard (hopefully not a consideration). Then there is the question of will the Space Force be the only armed service without a dedicated aircraft capability and rated pilots and crew members or will the Space Force rely upon the Air Force for necessary aviation requirements. Will the military astronaut corps be the Space Force’s domain with rated astronauts, or will military astronauts continue to come from the Department of Defense (DOD) services? The answers are all to be determined.

The Air Force has numerous success stories for the moment but there are challenges that must be addressed. The success stories must include the numerous aircraft procurement programs of record that are successful such as the F35A Lightening II, the C130J Super Hercules, the CV22C Osprey, the B21 Raider, the T6 Texan II, the Next Generation Trainer T-X, the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter, the F15EX Eagle II 4.5 generation multi-role fighter, the C40B & C Clipper, and numerous unmanned aerial systems. This is a healthy list of programs of record using any standard of metrics and is something that the Air Force staff, and acquisition program offices can and should be exceptionally proud of.

What has not been overly successful, is of concern, and/or requires attention. These programs include the KC46 Pegasus tanker, the strategic airlift (C-5M Super Galaxy and C17 Globemaster III) programs, a replacement or upgrade program for the A10 Thunderbolt II (Warthog) close air support (CAS) ground attack program, and the MH-139 Grey Wolf replacement for the almost 50-year-old UH-1N Twin Huey.

The primary item of concern is the KC46 program as this program is intended to replace 50+ year old fleet of KC135 Stratotankers (approximately 398 airframes). Not addressed is the need to replace the 40+ year old fleet of KC-10 Extender aircraft (approximately 59 airframes). This is a total tanker force of 457 airframes. The KC46 program is intended to acquire a total of 179 airframes. Assuming that the KC10 will not be replaced by the KC46, this leaves the Air Force (to include the Reserve Components of the Air Force Reserve and Air Guard) with a shortage of 219 airframes. The argument that the KC46 has more fuel for offloading does not address the real need for the total number of available tankers. A significant shortcoming in airframes that must be addressed. Total number of airframes to offload fuel is the more important number than the total fuel available for offload. There is also concern that the tanker aircraft have installed and ready to use the drogue and probe refueling hose capability in addition to the US Air Force’s flying boom method as the other US services (Navy, Marines, Army, and Air Force special mission aircraft such as helicopters and CV-22 Ospreys) and all US allies use the former method of aerial refueling. This should not be a mission kit for installation on an “as required” basis but instead should be an integral sub-system of each airframe. This would negate the need for aircraft mission configuration or reconfiguration and would allow Air Force tankers to conduct other refueling missions of non-USAF aircraft when necessary to include inflight diversions.

Well over 50 years after introduction, the C5 Galaxy continues to be upgraded and improved with the current fleet being the C5M Super Galaxy. The current plan called for retiring older C5’s at the rate of one per every ten C17 Globemaster’s acquired. Production has ceased for the C17, and the airframe is approaching 30 years of service. It is time to initiate a replacement or an improvement of the C17 and to return to service of deadline C5’s as well. The strategic airlift capability cannot and should not be neglected. The capabilities provided to all US services and allies is too important to neglect, even with our allies operating variants of the C17. The shortcoming is that the C17 cannot carry the loads that the C5M Super Galaxy can over the unrefueled distances that the C5 is capable of. The discussion on aerial refueling tanker airframes is key component of this discussion as addressed in the preceding paragraph. A brief comparison is provided below:

C5M Super Galaxy

C17 Globemaster III

Max Payload wt.

281,000 lbs

170,900 lbs

# 463L pallets

36

18

Max payload range

2,300 NMI

1,980 NMI

Restricted weight range

4,800 NMI

2,420 NMI

(US Air Force, 2006), (C17 Globemaster III Fact Sheet, 2018)

As the above illustrates, the C5M Super Galaxy is significantly more capable across the spectrum for strategic airlift. Given the relatively recent upgrades and improvement programs, the C5 should be able to continue flight operations for a number of years to come. A cheaper alternative to a new design, may very well be a new upgrade program that returns the C5 fleet to a 70-aircraft fleet. A similar program should also be executed for the C17.

The A10 Thunderbolt II or Warthog is an aircraft that the Air Force has been trying to retire since the 1990’s. Senator Sam Nunn (D, GA), as the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, became engaged with the issue of retiring the A-10 Warthog by threatening to transfer the A-10 to the Army and include all of the personnel and infrastructure needed to support the aircraft during the 1990 period. Senator Nunn’s threat was sufficient to cause Air Force officials to back down. Every year since (or at least so it seems), the senior leadership of the Air Force has tried to retire more A-10’s. Congress has been very reluctant to do so (several members of Congress are former members of the Air Force and at least one senator was a combat decorated A-10 pilot, Senator Martha McSally (D, AZ). Even today the Air Force Chief of Staff (General CQ Brown) wishes to retire some or all of the A-10s to allow for increased procurement of other new programs (notably the NGAD fighter). The latter is supposed to incorporate a limited ground attack capability. Interestingly, the statements released to the media by the Air Force quoting the Chief of Staff General Brown did not specifically address the close air support (CAS) mission requirements as the NGAD will have a limited ground attack capability but that did not state the CAS mission specifically. As discussed in article 11 of this series, there are several agreements that followed the National Security Act of 1947 that specifically directed the Air Force to provide fixed wing aircraft capable of conducting the CAS mission in support of US Army combat formations. A reality check for Air Force leadership is needed. While the Air Force claims that the F-15X Eagle II, the F-15E Strike Eagle, and the F16 Falcon are CAS capable. A true statement but none are optimized for the CAS mission. Instead, these airframes are optimized for the interdiction or deep strike mission (as the F-15E’s name implies Strike Eagle). And, as the Air Force has demonstrated since Operation Desert Storm, this is precisely how the Air Force employs these airframes. None of the current airframes or the NGAD aircraft provide the capabilities that the A10 Warthog does to support Army or other ground forces with CAS. This includes the ability to base and operate from austere forward operating bases (FOB’s), extensive, varied, and multiple ordinance loads (to include a 30mm tank busting cannon), on-station time of 4+ hours unrefueled, ruggedness and survivability characteristics to protect the airframe and crew, and proven combat capabilities in the CAS mission within the high threat environment of man-portable (manpad) Surface to Air Missiles (SAM) and light, medium, and heavy anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). The reality is that the Air Force has not designed or built an aircraft such as the A10 since the 1970’s for one simple reason: institutional culture. The Air Force culture recognizes three basic fixed wing aircraft types – Fighters (the largest community), Cargo, and Bombers. All of the aircraft type designations of the Air Force fall into these primary categories with the exception of the A-10. Even the unit designations for A10 equipped squadrons and wings are fighter squadrons and wings. For example: the 354th Fighter Squadron of the 355th Wing, Davis – Monthan Air Force Base, AZ. While long in the tooth and needing vital upgrades and sustainment improvements, the A-10 is still one of the best CAS aircraft ever developed and deployed. It just is not used optimally by the Air Force. Recommendation for Congress, the DOD, and the Air Force is to retain the A-10 fleet. Initiate a program to upgrade and improve the aircraft with increased survivability components for aircraft and aircrew, improved targeting sensors and the ability to share targeting and situational awareness data and information, improved reliability of systems, and improved systems to reduce pilot workload. During this upgrade and improvement period, consideration should be given to producing up to two ten-plane squadrons of two-seat A-10’s designed and specifically intended to conduct day and night CAS and Forward Air Control (Airborne) (FAC(A)) missions. Consideration to accomplish this was actually completed in the mid to late 1970’s with Republic producing at least one two-seat OA-10. This is a mission that the Air Force had conducted extensively during the Vietnam War using a variety of aircraft. Eventually the Air Force settled upon the OV-10A Bronco that the US Marine Corps used for this mission as well as Counter Insurgency or COIN missions and was used as a testbed in the current Afghanistan war effort. The Air Force OV-10’s Broncos were stationed at Patrick Air Force Base (AFB) (now Patrick Space Force Base), FL. When the Air Force retired the OV-10 Bronco, specially modified A-10 Warthogs were converted for the FAC(A) mission and stationed at Patrick AFB, FL. That mission and the aircraft have since been retired. Just because the aircraft have been retired does not mean that the mission has gone away. In fact, given the situations in Europe and on the Korean Peninsula, one might argue that the mission has remained, and its urgency intensified. This is a glaring mission capability gap and shortfall that must be addressed, by the Congress if necessary. In the current military and geopolitical situation, retiring a capability in anticipation of future technology is simply not good business for anyone.

The MH-139 Grey Wolf replacement program for the venerable UH-1N is an interesting program that seems to be on hold due to technical difficulties in achieving Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airframe certification. The aircraft is intended to replace the Twin Huey in the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) support program. The technical certification issues are relatively mundane and will most likely be resolved shortly by the Grey Wolf’s manufacturer and the Air Force. The real question is if these aircraft and units remain Air Force or become Space Force assets as the ICBM mission is a Space Force offensive mission set, as advocated in Article 6 of this series. This issue along with the issue of rated pilots in the Space Force shall require determination and answering by the Congress. If indeed the Space Force is given rated pilots, aircrew, and aircraft; a program that is like the current relationship between Naval Aviation and Marine Corps Aviation would be the logical choice of implementation. The Navy pays for the aircraft, systems, and operations and maintenance of the aircraft. The Marines provide personnel and facilities. The Navy provides support such as operating guidance, maintenance regulations, and safety regulations to the Marine Aviation units. Works well for the Navy and Marines and there is an inherent interoperability gained. If the Grey Wolf’s remain under Air Force control, then an Administrative Control (ADCON) with the Air Force and an Operational Control (OPCON) with supported Space Force formations would be a logical choice of implementation. Either solution set is both supportable and affordable.

To afford future systems the Air Force would be in a significantly better position by looking for cost savings in other ways than by retiring valuable airframes and mission capabilities just to seek new technologies. Perhaps the best method would be to evaluate command structures, reducing overall general officer-led formations and returning rated pilots and aircrew to operating squadrons. Reducing the support establishment of the Air Force with the same goals of cost savings and returning personnel to the operating squadrons. Reshaping Air Force Special Operations Command by down-sizing and stopping the wasteful Overwatch Aircraft program. Six squadrons are significantly more airframes and personnel than is needed for this limited utility mission that does not fit well into the current peer or near peer threats in the IndoPac and European environments. This is especially true as these aircraft are not survivable in the IAD environment or an environment where a significant air threat exists. Furthermore, these aircraft have very limited range and are of little to no use in the vast expanses of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and adjacent waters. This argument was addressed in Article 6 of this series calling on Congress to rein the Special Operations Command in and to eliminate the Command as a Combatant Command. The spending and demands on the services are excessive, especially on the Air Force.

A word on uniforms. The Air Force has become very similar to the Army in that the Air Force cannot seem to find a uniform or uniforms that fit the desired image. Camouflage uniforms is a major source of wasteful spending for all the armed services but especially the Air Force. As an example, the pale green tiger stripes and green boots. Worthless as camouflage and excessively expensive. First and foremost, except for security forces, personnel assigned to US Army maneuver forces, and special forces operators, there are no personnel in the Air Force that need or would benefit from having a camouflage field uniform. A simple olive drab two-piece field uniform or coveralls for those personnel involved in manual labor activities such as aircraft maintenance is suitable. Limit this to a sewn US Air Force tab, name tab, rank insignia, and perhaps an organizational patch (morale booster). Cheap to buy, maintain and replace for all Air Force personnel. Sewn on items as opposed to pin on to minimize objects that may fall off and become Foreign Object Damage (FOD) materials. Change the term “Combat” or Airman Battle Uniform (ABU) to “field” or “work” uniform. For those previously mentioned specialties requiring a “Combat” uniform, use the standard US Army issued field uniforms, this is where ABU should be used as airfield operations generally is not “Battle”. Air Force service uniforms are generally very military in appearance and airman look good in those, the exception of the “Coat and Trousers/Skirt” option. The coat (or blouse as it is referred to generally within military circles) looks like a poorly fitted civilian suit. What is missing are the breast patch pockets and waist pockets with associated buttons. It is a three-button suit coat as opposed to the standard four-button military uniform. Several years ago, an idea was being floated to introduce a new service uniform referred to as the “Hap Arnold Heritage” uniform. This uniform had a lighter shade of blue (tracing it colors back to the original coloring of US Air Force uniforms and aligning with the traditional blues used by Air Forces world-wide) and added a waist belt with M-buckle. This would be very similar to the current US Army Greens uniform based upon the famed World War II Pinks and Greens. The Hap Arnold uniform had same color blouse and trousers though. This would be a great choice of uniforms for the Air Force in terms of history, appearance, and professionalism and pride in service. The additional plus is that it looks like a military uniform instead of a poorly fitted suit coat.

Works Cited

C17 Globemaster III Fact Sheet. (2018, May 14). Retrieved July 18, 2021, from US Air Force Official Website: https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/1529726/c-17-globemaster-iii/

US Air Force. (2006, May 15). C5M Super Galaxy Fact Sheet. Retrieved July 18, 2021, from US Air Force News and Information: https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104492/c-5-abc-galaxy-c-5m-super-galaxy/%20/lang/en/

Constant P. “CP” Craig. The author is a retired commissioned officer of the United States Marine Corps. He was a designated Naval Aviator and Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI). He has held command of a Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Company (now squadron). Upon retirement he spent time as a defense and homeland security contractor supporting the US Army and US Marine Corps in a variety of programmatic support contracts. He also completed contracts supporting FEMA and several state and local governments with regards to emergency management and threat/hazard assessment and exercises. He has also held office as an elected official, mayor of a small community. He has recently retired as a professor from a major on-line university where he was a full-time faculty member and lead for the homeland security program of the university. He continues to teach in the field of homeland security as an adjunct faculty member.