Common Sense in Defense Article 11 The Services Organizing and Equipping for the Fight, the Navy

Common Sense in Defense Article 11 The Services Organizing and Equipping for the Fight, the Navy

In previous articles, the service budget issues were addressed and how that budget structure results in force structure, installations, and equipping of the force. All of which is supposed to be predicated upon the National Strategy and the National Defense Strategy. This article is a continuation to that discussion focusing on the United States Navy and is the eleventh in the series of continuing discussions.

The US Navy is in an unenviable position today. Being challenged for naval supremacy in virtually every ocean by old and new naval foes such as the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Russian Federation Navy, and the navies of other minor players such as North Korea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Cuba, and more. The last time the United States faced a two-ocean war was World War II. From the stunning tactical defeat of Pearl Harbor to the end of the war, the US Navy grew to a fleet of over 3,600 named vessels and several thousand more of numbered only vessels (Silverstone, 1965). During the Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, the Cold War, Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; the US Navy stood as the largest and most capable Navy in the world. Until today. The PRC’s PLAN is now the largest navy in the world with augmentation by the PRC’s newly formed Marines, Coast Guard, and long-standing naval militia forces. What happened and why? As the US closed public shipyards (US government/Navy owned), shrank the fleet by building larger and more capable vessels requiring fewer ships, depleted or in some cases eliminated supporting merchant vessels; the PRC was building a world-class blue water navy that was capable of operating world-wide. The PRC has operated ships in the Baltic, the Indian Ocean, the north Pacific, the South Pacific, and even the Artic Ocean. In fact, the PRC is working hard to expand its fleet of ice breakers. When combined with Russian Federation assets, the two nations have more heavy open ocean icebreaking capability than the United States, Canada, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland combined (Russia 46 plus 11 under construction and 4 more planned, the PRC 3 plus one under construction (USCG Office of Waterways and Ocean Policy (CG-WWM), 2020). The last five nations not only make up 5/6ths of the Artic Nations but are also NATO allies. This has become a national security threat. The current naval threat is significantly different than the old Soviet-era threat in several ways. First is that the PRC is building a mirror image navy of the US Navy with a very capable spread of ships to include aircraft carriers (the newest of which is suspected of being nuclear powered, catapult launching, angled flight deck, arrested landing), large amphibious ships of the LHA/LHD and LPD types, advanced destroyers, frigates, and nuclear and conventional submarines. The PLAN is now capable of the full spectrum of naval missions (amphibious assault, anti-air, anti-ship, anti-submarine, convoy escort, humanitarian aid, raids, etc.). Combined with the world’s largest Coast Guard, the PRC has become not only a major naval power but the pacing naval power to which the US Navy is compared. But, unlike the Soviets the PRC has not only built a world-class blue water fleet but understands the importance of maintaining that fleet. A look at press release pictures of Chinese vessels shows immaculate ships that are free from rust and corrosion. This takes a lot of maintenance effort at the unit and shipyard levels. Cold War pictures of Soviet vessels often showed ships that were floating rust buckets. A review of current media pictures of US Navy ships and vessels are reminiscent of those Cold War Soviet pictures. The US Navy ships are looking poorly.

The US Navy is at a very bad juncture of time, place, and fiscal resource requirements. With a naval build requiring a virtual 100% recapitalization of the fleet. This includes new aircraft carriers of the Ford class, new fleet ballistic missile submarines of the Columbia class, new attach submarines to replace the improved Virginia class (the SSNX), the Constellation frigates, and numerous unmanned vehicles of the surface, subsurface, and airborne varieties, new amphibious types of both large and small varieties. Coupled with an added mission of national missile defense from both shore and sea. Program costs are exceeding budget and schedule. All of this coupled with flat or decreasing defense budgets and an administration and congress that seemingly do not want to expand the defense budget. What is the Navy to do? The vision of a five hundred or even a 350-ship Navy has evaporated. The Navy’s leadership has decided to embark on a program of early retirement of cruisers and other types such as the first four LCS’s and other ships to pay for new technologies and vessels. On the surface a reasonable move. But, as LTG Thomas Spoehr points out in his paper, Want to Shed Older Weapons? You Need a Solid Plan (Spoehr, 2021), not the right way to go about business. While the older LCS’s might not be missed, the firepower and multi-mission capabilities of the cruisers will be. Instead of reducing hull numbers and fighting capabilities, a better approach might be to re-evaluate the Navy’s Shore Establishment and reduce headquarters and support staffing and functions to save budget and personnel. The need for the capabilities and perhaps the increased fire power and magazines of the cruisers is something worth keeping. To continue to make matters worse, Secretary of the Navy Thomas Harker directs the Navy staff to “pick one” in a memorandum released on June 4, 2021 (Eckstein, 2021). Mr. Secretary, with all due respect Sir, you are the Secretary of the Navy (acting but still with the authority and responsibility of the Office). Make a command decision, do not lay the requirement on your admirals. Perhaps the new Secretary will make this decision as a former Naval officer and destroyer commander. As is the popular phrase today: keeping it 100. The Navy has sufficient FA-18E & D generation 4.5 fighters and sufficient F35C’s on order when combined with Marine F35C’s and B’s to meet both air defense and offensive air needs. Attack submarines are sufficient with the Virginia payload extension to meet future needs. Instead of a new nuclear attack submarine, perhaps a non-nuclear Air Independent Propulsion System submarine in greater quantities in an off the shelf buy would be a suitable alternative. No major redesigns required. The Japanese build such a submarine and have exported it. Would save a lot of money, give a needed attack submarine at a cheaper price, and the Japanese would love the income, even if the submarines were built in US yards. What is needed are destroyers and here is why: mission creep beyond traditional US Navy missions and into the mission areas of at least one other service in addition to the full spectrum of surface combatant missions. That mission area is National Missile Defense and Theater Missile Defense. Led with the Aegis ashore system but also with the use of Aegis-equipped and modified destroyers to intercept ballistic missiles. Transfer the ashore system to the US Space Force as this is very much in the Space Force’s Title 10 mission statement. The use of Aegis afloat to intercept inbound ballistic missiles towards US states and territories is problematic for the Navy. The recent failed test of an intercept off the coast of Hawaii is an example and brings to question if the system (or systems) were disrupted or interfered with in some manner by a near-by Russian Navy intelligence collection ship. As may be the case with this failed test. The real answer to that question will most likely never be made public but it is an indicator of an issue. More importantly for the Navy, diverting scarce assets such as destroyers to this mission means that the destroyer cannot be doing its primary mission sets (anti-surface, anti-air, anti-submarine) because the anti-ballistic missile mission is a “National Strategic” mission and has highest priority. This use of destroyers is liken to the use of radar equipped ships during the Okinawa campaign of World War II to detect inbound waves of Kamikaze aircraft to attack the fleet anchorages. There is a reversal of roles in that the WWII model used the radars of the ship to detect the inbound threat and the current model would be used to “shoot down” the threat. The weak link in the current model is the reliance upon external queuing of inbound threats and the need for external command and control. As the test off Hawaii shows, that may very well be the issue. The other concern is that these “picket” ships must be arrayed in such a manner that the ship can make intercepts based upon probable flight trajectories of threat missile systems. If we know that information, then surely the enemy (no matter who that might be) has the same information. These picket ships are now at risk of being intercepted and possibly destroyed by any number of other means. Mines laid by submarine is a stealthy choice with little to no attribution, detection, or cost. Given the scarcity of ship assets, this might be a mission set to avoid unless additional platforms are added to the defense budget. Recommendation is to transfer the Aegis ashore mission to the US Space Force and to use that mission set to cover the US territories, and coastal states as opposed to using the Aegis-equipped destroyer force to accomplish this mission. Destroyers and cruisers can perform anti-air, anti-ship, and anti-submarine operations plus with advanced cruise missile technology, offense land attack missions. A large surface combatant with multi-mission capabilities is needed.

Naval mines are cheap and plentiful around the world. Easy to plant, hard to detect and very effective and deadly (as in the example in the preceding paragraphs). Numerous examples may be found throughout history to include Operations Desert Shield and Storm. Missing in action for the Navy is a robust mine warfare community. The mine countermeasures fleet (MCM’s) is being retired, where are the replacements? The MH-53E is long in the tooth and no replacements in sight. The MH-60 S & R communities do mine warfare on a part-time basis but what does that do to other mission areas for these platforms? The Fire Scout MQ-8 series unmanned aerial system also does mine warfare on a part time basis. Same issue, what other missions do not get accomplished? The LCS community must have a mine warfare package installed to do the counter/anti-mine mission. When, where, and how does that mission package happen and at what expense to other missions? A rather large and expensive mine sweeper. The creation of mine countermeasures companies using small boats and unmanned underwater systems is reasonable, but these assets are not open ocean or contested ocean assets. Nor can these be used in a convoy escort role. This is a serious capabilities shortfall best addressed by a dedicated Mine Countermeasures (MCM) platform that can integrate all of the desired capabilities and assets currently in use plus future capabilities. It is a mission critical shortfall that must be rectified within the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) soonest.

A discussion on how and why the Navy reached this point is needed. Much like the Army today, the Navy over the past 30 years was looking for relevancy in all the wrong places. Which is why the current Littoral Combat Ship types were created to give a brown water capability to the littorals of the world. The missed point is that you have transit the blue waters of the world to get to the brown water littorals of the world. On paper a great idea to be able to plug and play with mission packages to suit a current mission demand. But the assumptions were the deadly flaw in the concept. The concept requires the ship to be ported, that the port has the appropriate mission package. Not always the case, logistics is the Achilles Heel in the equation. The second element is, what happens if the mission set changes while at sea? The LCS must go back to the right port to get a mission package that may or may not be available. Now what? The LCS classes are too lightly armed and armored to be of much use in the high-threat naval environment and are not equipped sufficiently to conduct operations in contested waters. What do the LCS classes do? Show the flag well, go fast (40+ knots), have a low signatures cross-section but not much else. What might the LCS’s do? Fit in well with the Marine Corps’ concept of small maritime raids as both a fast transport for the Marines with organic fires support and manned and unmanned rotary-wing base, as well as command and control support for missions. Rethink the missions of the LCS class. Perhaps there is a better fit. If not, then retire the type as the Constellation frigates hit the fleet. In the meantime, rename the type as what it really is and that is corvette. Suitable for patrol and other support missions. Side note: a good command opportunity for standout junior officers (JO’s). Sea time and command time is the best way to build seasoned, experienced, and highly qualified senior naval officers.

Unmanned systems of all types are a great force multiplier but there is a hidden weak leak and that is there must be a Human-In-The-Loop (HITL) at some, or all the points as even autonomous systems are dependent upon some form of communications, configuration, command and control, and of course maintenance. If an unmanned system is out there operating on its own without the HITL, then the system is suspectable to interception, destruction, meaconing, intrusion, hacking, or the worst-case scenario turned upon its operator. All are issues that must be considered. Even with artificial intelligence (AI), machines can be manipulated, and that outcome may not be what is expected, desired, or wanted. As discussed in the second article of this series, the threat may eliminate the ability to conduct command and control communications. An over-reliance on technology is a weak link in the system or systems and alternatives must be included in any environment.

A personal experience example to illustrate this point. During the early 1990’s, the author was assigned by Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) and Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT) to be a subject matter expert (SME) to the US Atlantic Command for an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) ACTD with US Atlantic Command as the sponsoring Combatant Command and the Joint Staff, J2 representing the Joint Staff centered upon the then new technology known as the Predator Unmanned Aerial System (UAS). The author was commanding officer of the 2nd Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Company, 2nd Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (SRIG), II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT). At the initial briefing of the ACTD at LantCOM headquarters, I was directed by the Lant J3 to ask questions at will of the DARPA and contractor providing the Predator system. The question asked was concerning the uplink of commands and the downlink of data. The contractor responded that the uplink and downlink were commercial satellite links using standard commercial satellites and provider communications algorithms. An immediate red flag for the SME. When questioned about the security of this arrangement, the contractor and DARPA representatives stated that each commercial satellite provider carefully guarded their algorithms from disclosure and therefore no additional safeguards were needed. My concerns were expressed in writing to all parties in my after-action report (AAR). All parties ignored this warning and the ACTD was conducted. As history now shows, both the Air Force and the CIA purchased the Predator system. There were combat losses. The system was also purchased by the US Border Patrol. The Border Patrol had reason to suspect that their Predators had or were being compromised. The Border Patrol contracted with the University of Texas to allow students to attempt to take control of an airborne Predator. The undergraduate students and their professor successfully did so. Public information to confirm or deny the loss of DOD/USAF and CIA Predator’s is not available, it is reasonable to assume that sophisticated advisories and those considered less sophisticated were able to do the same resulting in losses of at least several Predators and other UAS’s. Technology is a wonderful thing; over-reliance can be disastrous. This is also a learning point for commanders, using the old-fashioned methods of navigation and communications can save the ship. As an old cruiser commanding officer (CO) and friend related to a group of classmates, in both of his cruiser commands and a destroyer command, he personally practiced old fashioned plotting and navigating and competed with the quartermasters on watch to see whom would have the most accurate fix. Two birds with one stone: leadership by example, expecting nothing more than he himself would do and practicing backup methods to ensure currency, verify and validate positioning information. Due to several mishaps at sea, the Navy is taking this issue of backup methods seriously and understands that underway time and qualifications are critical to the Navy and its personnel. Something that the Navy is clearly doing right. But it will take time and that may be in short supply.

The Navy is also working closely with its naval partners, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard to evolve naval strategy. A good foot forward effort on the parts of each service. The Navy has also included the Air Force and Space Force in exercises and concept analysis. Also, a good step forward. But the Navy has lost track of the fact that the Pacific is not its only operational area of concern. The fourth Battle of the Atlantic is already underway. As were the battles of World War I, World War II, and the Cold War, the current battle centers on the anti-submarine threat to shipping, naval forces, and with the Cold War, submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM’s). The Atlantic is a different war than the Pacific as the current commander of the US 2nd Fleet has been quoted in several open-source media expressing his concern over the growing Russian threat. The choke points are the critical pieces of success or failure and must be controlled by the US Navy and allied naval forces, no matter the ocean.

Aircraft carriers continue to be a hot topic. Some “experts” contend that the aircraft carrier is of no value and a sitting target for the threat. Other naval experts contend that the carrier is survivable and critical in any naval campaign. The number of carriers is always a hot topic issue for Congress as aircraft carriers, the embarked air wing, escorts, and personnel are very expensive. In a recent testimony to Congress by the Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, that the current number of aircraft carriers is sufficient to meet the operational demands of the Combatant Commanders. That number is 11 aircraft carriers of the Nimitz and Ford classes. What was not addressed by Secretary Austin is availability, which is necessary for shipyard maintenance (two carriers are generally undergoing complex refuel and overhaul and two are under-going a restricted availability for maintenance). This also does not account for the lengthy time required to get both the carrier’s crew and the embarked air wing back to full operational capability and the time required to get the carrier task force (all of the accompanying ships) back to an operational and therefore deployable state. This equates to five to six carriers available to deploy or actually deployed at any given time. A historical perspective from WWII is needed. At the outbreak of WWII, there were four aircraft carriers in the Pacific and two located in the Atlantic. By the end of the war, four had been sunk by enemy action. The carrier fleet had expanded to four types to include fast carriers (CV’s), light carriers (CVL’s), escort carriers (CVE’s), and training carriers (IX’s) for a total of 35 commissioned CV’s, 11 CVL’s, 92 CVE’s, and 2 IX’s with additional hulls of the CV’s, CVL’s and CVE’s under contract for construction but cancelled by war’s end (Silverstone, 1965). A historical side note is that several of the CVE’s had all-Marine air groups embarked to support Marine landings in the Pacific. The CVE’s were used extensively in the Atlantic to provide convoys with anti-submarine air patrols during the Atlantic crossings. The discussion on light carriers (CVL’s) has received considerable attention in recent articles and publications on naval affairs such as the Naval Institute’s Proceedings. Many of the world’s navies, such as the UK’s Royal Navy, Japan’s Maritime Self-defense Force, the Italian Navy, the Spanish Navy, and others are using large deck ski-jump equipped vessels (Royal Navy (with an embarked US Marine Corps F35 squadron (VMFA-211) on the HMS Queen Elizabeth’s maiden operational deployment), Indian Navy, China’s PLAN, the Russian Navy) or large deck amphibious ships to support the concept of light carriers. Even the US Navy has employed the current LHA America (LHA 8) as a light aircraft carrier. The concept has validity. But, at what cost to the amphibious mission set?

Which brings the discussion to the amphibious warfare or Gator Navy mission set. The current mixture is based upon the large deck aviation ships of the LHD and LHA classes, the San Antonio LPD17 class, the Whidbey Island LSD’s with subtypes. Future plans call for the replacement of the LHD’s with LHA’s and the replacement of the LSD’s with LPD-17 Flight II sub-class, plus the addition of the Light Amphibious Warfare (LAW) class of 28 – 30 vessels. The last is intended to provide approximately a company-size lift capability plus support equipment for a direct beach landing. This would approximate the size and capability of the DeSoto County class of Landing Ship Tank (LST) of the 1960’s, 70’s, and 80’s era. An interesting concept but these light vessels will require considerable support and escort for mission execution due to their limited size. But the concept does move away from larger vessels that concentrate the landing force on just a few platforms. This step could aid in survivability of the landing force through dispersion of assets. An important consideration in any future naval campaign in the Pacific. However, the concept needs more exploration based upon known intelligence estimates of likely threat actions (specifically the PRC’s PLAN).

The logistics fleet is a weak link in any national or maritime strategy and should be carefully evaluated in the current National Defense Review process. “A new study by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments finds that the Navy needs to spend $47.8 billion over the next 30 years beyond what it has currently laid into its plans in order to build a logistics fleet that could refuel and resupply the Navy and Marine Corps in a fight. The study notes that, while the Navy’s current plans could support the fleet into the future in a peacetime environment, the Navy may need nearly 100 additional logistics ships of various types if it wants to win a fight against China in particular.” (Eckstein, Study Says Navy Logistics Fleet Would Fall Short in High-End Fight, 2019). A solution set must be determined, which may include increased cooperation with the Maritime Administration (MARAD) and allies. But a solution must be found.

As global warming continues to change the oceans of the world, naval operations shall also expand. This expansion brings into demand the need for ships capable of supporting operations in the latitude extremes of the Atlantic, Artic, Indian, Pacific, and Southern Oceans. This mission requirement shall require support from the US Coast Guard. The current Coast Guard fleet is limited to one heavy icebreaker (Polar Star) and one medium ice breaker (Healy) with a planned fleet expansion to six heavy/medium ice breakers. There are two additional ice breakers that are not owned by the Coast Guard (Aiviq and Nathaniel B. Palmer – both privately owned by a US company). Polar capable icebreakers are important to the success of naval missions in both polar regions. A must have capability. Icebreakers must have basic self-defense capabilities that are currently not envisioned in the Coast Guard’s Program of Record (POM) for the Polar Security Cutter program. This capability is a Navy-funded capability and should be added to that program.

Requirement prioritization and alternatives is key but must be based not so much upon desired capabilities but the expected threat. To this end the recommended programs of record for the Navy should be:

1.    Invest heavily in infrastructure and the necessary civilian work force. Ships require routine maintenance and emergency repairs from battle damage and other systems casualties.

2.    New logistics ships and an expanded fleet of logistics support vessels to include ammunition ships, refueling ships, dry cargo ships, and other ancillary vessels.

3.    Destroyers to fill the naval missions of ASW, AAW, ASVW, amphibious assault/naval gunfire support, and convoy escort.

4.    A dedicated mine countermeasures force with mine sweeper ships that are capable of transiting with naval task forces as well as being forward deployed.

5.    A carrier-borne long range anti-submarine aircraft. The potential solution here is to return the stockpile of S-3 Viking aircraft to the fleet with an upgrade of the ASW and Surface weapons suites as the S3 fleet has excess airframes in long term storage with sufficient airframe life.

6.    Coast Guard icebreaker/Polar Security Cutter POR expansion and incorporation of defensive armament and other interoperability requirements with current Navy standards and projected future improvements.

7.    Expand the F35C buy to replace aging FA-18E and F models. While the F35C is not a perfect weapon system, it is fielded and will be improved over time. Of course, the drawback is that the aircraft is single engine, and no one wants to really be dependent upon a single engine with extended overwater flights. But it is a fifth-generation aircraft capable of offensive air and fleet defense missions.

8.    Columbia SSBN program. The current fleet of SSBN’s needs replacement is not in question. As has been shown in numerous DOD studies the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad is very survivable and a national strategic security requirement.

9.    Nuclear attack submarines. Three alternatives to this issue. Continue production of the improved Virginia payload class. Revise and improve the Seawolf class and enter into production beyond the current three vessels in the class. And third, investigate the purchase of AIP conventional submarines from a foreign source, modified to US Navy standards, and built under contract in US yards.

10. The Constellation frigate program. A solid anti-submarine, convoy escort, anti-air, and anti-surface vessel that may also hold solutions to sea-based early warning and interception of anti-ship missiles that have hypersonic capabilities.

The above actions are the starting point. New programs of record are difficult to start in the current political and economic environment, but a priority listing based upon perceived threats and evolving situation is necessary. This should be in support of the long-awaited National Defense Strategy.

A point about uniforms: it is always an interesting experience to go to a base where there are Navy personnel stationed (Fort Leonard Wood, MO as a prime example) and see all of the different uniforms being worn by Sailors of all ranks. Looking at current photographs of sailors on ship, again, all of the differing uniforms is amazing. It is also a very significant waste of taxpayer money and an unnecessary demand upon Sailors to support so many differing uniforms. Suggest that Navy leadership take a page from the US Coast Guard or even the French Navy uniform play books. Both have one standard uniform for personnel engaged in work environments. For the Coast Guard a simple blue dungaree or utility uniform (in fact very reminiscent of the old Marine Corps utilities). The French Navy and the British Royal Navy have rather unique working uniforms with reflective strips. Good for shipboard safety and in the event of man overboard. What sailors do not need is a camouflaged uniform on ship or in garrison. The exceptions are the SEALS, Sea Bees, riverine, special operations boat or small craft operators, and those Sailors assigned to Fleet Marine Forces as the work and potential combat environment would be supported by wearing such uniforms. Air Crews do have a need for a different uniform, the flight suit. Get rid of that non-naval navy blue trouser and khaki shirt uniform. It looks like a cheap knock-off attempt at the Marines’ dress blue C and D uniforms and really does not do well as a work uniform nor does it follow naval tradition where chiefs and officers wore khaki. Go to an all-season uniform much like the navies of other nations wear and return to a traditional navy look. Save the taxpayer and Sailors some money here.

Constant P. “CP” Craig. The author is a retired commissioned officer of the United States Marine Corps. He was a designated Naval Aviator. He has held command of a Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Company (now squadron). Upon retirement he spent time as a defense and homeland security contractor supporting the US Army and US Marine Corps in a variety of programmatic support contracts. He also completed contracts supporting FEMA and several state and local governments with regards to emergency management and threat/hazard assessment and exercises. He has also held office as an elected official, mayor of a small community. He has recently retired as a professor from a major on-line university where he was a full-time faculty member and lead for the homeland security program of the university. He continues to teach in the field of homeland security as an adjunct faculty member.

Works Cited

Eckstein, M. (2019, May 17). Study Says Navy Logistics Fleet Would Fall Short in High-End Fight. Retrieved June 15, 2021, from USNI News: https://news.usni.org/2019/05/17/study-says-navy-logistics-fleet-would-fall-short-in-high-end-fight

Eckstein, M. (2021, June 8). Breaking News: Memo reveals US Navy must pick between future destroyer, fighter or sub for FY23 plan. Retrieved June 9, 2021, from Defense News: https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/08/memo-navy-will-have-to-pick-between-its-future-destroyer-fighter-and-sub-in-fiscal-2023-planning/

Silverstone, P. H. (1965). US Warships of World War II. New York, New York, USA: DoubleDay & Company. Retrieved June 1, 2021

Spoehr, T. W. (2021, February 21). Want to Shed Older Weapons? You Need a Solid Plan. Retrieved March 22, 2021, from Defense One: https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/02/older-weapons-pentagon/172104/

USCG Office of Waterways and Ocean Policy (CG-WWM). (2020, June 8). MAJOR ICEBREAKERS OF THE WORLD. Retrieved June 15, 2021, from USCG Office of Waterways and Policy: https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/Office%20of%20Waterways%20and%20Ocean%20Policy/20170501%20major%20icebreaker%20chart.pdf?ver=2017-06-08-091723-907