Colombia: impact of the outcome in Venezuela (five scenarios)

I’ve been trying to model the political impact in Colombia of each of the possible outcomes of the Venezuelan elections. I have literally zero inside information, so these ideas might seem naive to anyone who does have it (or thinks they have it).?

Before looking at each scenario we have to start with three factual assumptions:

• President Petro and his government, particularly his Foreign Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo, have avoided as much as possible any comments beyond formal statements declaring respect for whatever the democratic outcome. Whether this is strategy or complicity, only the facts will tell.?
• At the level of rumors at least, there is the idea that the Petro government has been part of secret efforts and negotiations to facilitate a transition in Venezuela.?
• This one is almost trivial: let’s assume that there is, in President Petro and in the Colombian left, an intention to win the 2026 elections. In a not so trivial derivation, we will assume that Foreign Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo will very possibly be a candidate for the Presidency in 2026. I do not believe that the Petro government will try to interfere with the normal conduct of elections in Colombia, nor that it can do so.

Scenario 1: The opposition wins, Maduro accepts victory

This scenario holds even if Maduro's rhetoric is rude or aggressive; what matters is what he finally does.?

Petro and his government would incur the following losses:

• They lose a regional political ally who may be part of a broad project to advance the radical left in the region, a project from which Gustavo Petro seems quite distant but in which he seems to have had some faith in the past.?
• They lose a strategic ally for gas and energy negotiations that have been underway with a level of speed and diligence that is atypical of the Petro government, which therefore indicates some unknown special interest.?
• They lose an ally for President Petro's “total peace” policy. Let us keep in mind that all the leaders of the ELN and the so-called “Segunda Marquetalia” have shelter in Venezuela, where the ELN has become a local organization.
• They lose an ally in various other strategic issues, which could be conjectured to exist, given the intensity of the Petro - Maduro relations (manifested in frequent visits whose agenda is not known).?

Petro and his government would collect the following wins:

• Immediate recognition for their efforts in achieving the transition, which they would be awarded even if their role was not explicitly revealed.?
• A consolidation of Gustavo Petro's democratic credentials.?
• Given the above, the level of anxiety in Colombian public opinion regarding possible anti-democratic intentions of Petro and his political project would be reduced.?
• Therefore, this would mean an improvement in the base level of the future electoral possibilities of his project.
• The mere disappearance of the Venezuelan regime would give the Colombian population a greater level of easiness with respect to the left, which would improve their future political possibilities.?
• Foreign Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo would score a success that would put him with a great advantage in the race for the Presidency of the Republic in 2026.?

The balance is a strong net gain for the President and for his political project. Whatever secret issues this government has going on with the Venezuelan regime, I don't think they are greater than the political gain that the transition would entail.?

Scenario 2: Maduro wins in an unclear election but Petro recognizes his win

If there are enough factual elements to show fraud, suppression, intimidation and violence against voters, this result may not be recognized even by left-wing governments in the region (say, Brazil’s Lula). If Petro still recognizes it, I think the consequences would be:

Petro and his government would incur the following losses:

• President Petro's democratic credentials would be immediately tarnished. The fear that deep down he is a would-be dictator would become widespread.?
• The fear would become widespread that there is some kind of long-term secret grand strategy between the Petro government and the Venezuelan regime.?
• The perception of the President's leadership could suffer, if the impression is that he was fooled by the regime, or that his secret efforts to mediate the transition were ineffective.?
• Foreign Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo would start the race for the presidency with a significant handicap.?

Petro and his government would win:

• The conservation of a regional political ally and the preservation of a long-term strategy if it exists.?
• An ally for issues related to the “total peace” initiative.?
• An ally in other unknown aspects of the agenda that, based on what was explained before, we can assume exist.

The balance is a strong net loss for the President and his project.?

Scenario 3: Maduro wins, the result is doubtful and Petro does not recognize it

This is a simple scenario that almost reproduces the first one. The President would have significant political gains from his stated position and from the feeling that he tried to do something. If he actually publicly rejects the result, existing channels for energy and peace policy issues would cool down.?

The balance is a slight net gain for the President and his project, although not as much as in scenario 1.?

Scenario 4: Maduro wins in a widely recognized clean victory

I consider this scenario very unlikely but we should consider it:

• The effect would be similar to that of scenario 2 but to a lower extent. That is to say, there would be an increase in uneasiness regarding Petro's future intentions; the suspicion that he is in some secret plan with the Venezuelan regime would be revived; his democratic credentials would suffer, but all at a lower level than what we would see in a scenario of Maduro's unrecognized victory.?
• The electoral possibilities of the left would have a slight deterioration in the future, since the suspicion would grow that between the Colombian left and the Maduro regime there exists some secret strategic plan.?

The balance is a slight net loss for the President and his project.

What if Maduro loses, the result is clear, even he himself recognizes it, but then refuses to hand over power??

The scenario is clearly bad for President Petro, but the level of damage would depend on his position on the matter: whether he rejects this action, or whether he condones it or simply remains silent (in which case he would be seen as an accomplice).?

By the way, for the effects that a transition would have on the Colombian economy, I recommend David González Escobar excellent column in El Colombiano today (Sunday).?