A triangular Collision in the Suez Canal.

Everyday many ships pass the Suez Canal bound north towards the meditteranean or south towards the Red Sea. On the 15th July 2018, the clouds cleared up by noon and the sun was shining bright. It was a warm day and the winds blowing from the norht west freshened towards evening. There were 8 ships in the convoy that were going south. The engines on Aeneas, at the head of the convoy, failed sometime before the sun set. She anchored in the canal and the ships following her stopped and moored to the banks of the canal. If you were on one of these ships on that day, you would have seen why we have the mooring boats and the suez crew everytime we transit. While some ships managed to moor, Panama Alexander couldn't and she collided with the vessel ahead of her, the Sakizaya Kalon. And both of them together went and hit the Osios David. These vessels formed a remarkable triangle across the canal for a short while.

I came across a post on LinkedIn that had me intrigued. I searched online and found the judgement here:

There is a lot more in the judgement and I must admit I have read through first part and then skimmed through most. But a few things intringued me which I thought I would write down to understand better. This was the first time that the proceedings were online with three Masters giving evidence from a vessel at sea, another vessel in port, and the third sitting in a hotel room.

Voyage Data Recorders, the orange coloured 'black boxes' and the information they provide appears to have changed the way the courts look at evidences and apportion blame. Earlier, the shape of collision was reconstructed based on logbooks maintained by officers. Allowing for errors, these logbooks gave a reasonable reconstruction. But it was always challenged and each side could reasonably argue to make their reconstructions representative of the truth. It was not difficult to create a plot that showed you in a better light. Courts almost never gave a 100% apportionment of blame to a vessel in a collision incident. However, VDRs changed this and again allowing for reasonable errors, mostly in time, a voyage could be reconstructed from the data from all of the involved vessels to get the same voyage just prior to a collision. ( In the case of the Sanchi and CF Crystal collision, the VDR data was collected from a third vessel as one of the involved vessels could not provide the same). The logbook entries remain important. The court is relying on logbook entries for many events that are not clear in the VDR. They are also able to make a judgement call on the validity of these entries when they corroborate them with the VDR. It becomes imperative that the log entries we make are honest entries of what happened without an effort to make it appear good or right.

The data present in the VDR also allows the court to judge the validity of statements made by the Masters and in effect even judge their honesty and ability to recall. In this incident too, allowing for human fallibilities in recollection, the court felt that one of the masters was sticking to his written statement and trying to protect his actions and decisions and not to present the truth. The court does not seem to have taken this well. saying that he was reluctant to accept what was clear from the VDR audio record. In cases where we are called upon to recall the events in court, while we will have to follow our lawyers advice, it maye prudent to try and honestly recall the truth rather than try to stick by what we think will save us. The VDR will give them the truth, if we don't. ECDIS screenshots helped illustrate the position of the vessels in the lead up to the collision and after. 

I've always heard that we shouldnt be using AIS for collison avoidance. However, there is a curious mention in the judgement that alludes to using AIS information which is said to be enhance safe navigation by providing real time information on the speeds of the other vessels. The court notes that anyone observing the speed of Mary Lisa which was behind the AENAS would have noticed it dropping from 3.0 knots to 0.8 knots in 15 minutes and that would have allowed them to reasonably assume that she had dropped anchor. This is ofcourse in addition to the information provided by the RADAR and the ECDIS.

The course observed that the navigation of the vessel was goverend by COLREGS and also by the SCA rules and there was no conflict between the two rules. However, there are no rules int he SCA saying what is to be done in case a vessel had an engine failure. The court assumes that the requirement to carry a mooring boat and the presence of bollards at regular intervals on the banks meant that the SCA considered there would be instances when the vessels may have to moor. There is a requirement in the rules that vessels should stop whenever the passage ahead isn't clear. However, the court observed that this is in the section which concerned vessels "proceeding to the canal" and therefore did not consider the submission by one of the parties as this because it did not refer to vessel proceeding "in" the canal. 

The Suez Canal Authority had not broadcast any clear instructions to the vessels on what actions had to be taken. The confusion among the pilots on various vessels that followed was evident in the VDR. Many assumed they wouldn't have to moor and could pass and therefore delayed their decision to moor. Some took time making the decision and couldn't find the ideal place to moor.

When the engines on the AENAS failed, information was passed on from pilot to pilot on VHF and on phone. This was chinese whisper in Arabic. And the first language of the masters on the vessels involved wasn't Arabic or even English. Clear broadcast from the SCA could have helped the vessels in the convoy decide. While the court apportioned 100% of the blame on Panamax Alexander, would I be wrong in assuming that there was some that could be apportioned to the authority?

The judgement says that the Rule 9 applied in narrow channels for vessels passing eachother and for this case, Rule 5, Rule 6 and Rule 7 applied. If there was a risk of collision, then Rule 8 would require them to take action in accordance with good seamanship. The court could not get one of the masters to define what good seamanship under these conditons was. The judgement also goes on to define good seamanship in the judgement. It primarily concerns the distance to be maintained between the two vessels taking into consideration also that they were the last vessels in the convoy - this could be by slowing down, stopping or mooring. They could always catch up once the canal clears up. There is enough in the judgement to try and understand what courts would be looking for when talking about good seamanship.

While I continue to read the rest of the judgement, what I have read already has been intrigued. It tells me that VDR along with ECDIS screenshots has changed the way judgements are made. That it is very important to maintain logbooks accurately. And present evidence honestly to present the truth and not with an intent to only protect our actions. AIS is considered reliable source of information. We need to better understand 'seamanship' under different circumstances we encounter while onboard.