Coercion in the Name of Justice: OSLA’s Troubling Transformation

Coercion in the Name of Justice: OSLA’s Troubling Transformation

OSLA, the UN Office of Staff Legal Assistance, once a champion for staff rights, has transformed into an instrument of the administration. Today, it does not just fail to protect UN employees, it unfortunately actively pressures them into unethical agreements that strip them of their rights. Staff members facing disciplinary actions are coerced into signing ‘Letters of Undertaking’ agreements (so called “agreed sanctions”) designed to silence them and prevent future legal action. How did we get here? The answer lies in OSLA’s troubling evolution over the years.

For a long time, up until 2010, UN staff did not have any real professional staff unit to assist with their grievances and appeals. OSLA’s predecessor, the Panel of Counsel, existed but its support was extremely limited and not truly independent.

In 2008, recognizing the huge disparity in legal weight between the ruthless legal machinery of the Secretary-General defending the administration and the often isolated and sinking UN staff, the General Assembly approved Resolution 63/253 on 24 December 2008 to establish the Office of Staff Legal Assistance (OSLA). Its mandate was to provide legal advice and representation to approximately 75,000 staff (and former staff) worldwide.

Established as part of the reform of the internal justice system of the United Nations, OSLA also provides assistance with, and formal representation in, cases before the United Nations Dispute and Appeals Tribunals. In a way, OSLA was created to support the lonely staff member who suddenly finds themselves lost in the myriad of rules, deadlines, processes, and forms to fill. That used to be the case, but not anymore.

Don’t get me wrong. I am an avid supporter of OSLA and am thankful for their work. But something has been shifting in both their undeclared policies and modus operandi over the years, and it is not good.

Two Minor Observations on the Form:

First, just like the Panel of Counsel, OSLA staff are still UN employees, so no matter how hard one tries to dissociate them from the administration, a conflict of interest persists. Although the Secretary-General reiterates the independence of OSLA, true independence is unattainable unless OSLA’s lawyers are external professionals and not UN staff, and unless its funding is entirely separate from the UN payroll. After all, many of these lawyers later apply for positions on the other side: the administration, so they have every incentive not to create hostility with it.

Second, the budget: for years now, OSLA has been staffed with a maximum of 15 professional lawyers who are supposed to assist a workforce of approximately 75,000 staff.

Yes, you read that correctly.

That means there is?one OSLA lawyer for every 5,000 staff members.

This is a shockingly inadequate ratio by any measure.

OSLA has also relied on the Voluntary Supplemental Funding Mechanism, through which staff members could contribute additional resources via a small monthly payroll deduction amounting to 0.05% of net base salary. This mechanism has proven worthless, with staff members dissatisfied with OSLA’s services withdrawing from it altogether.

The Highly Ubiquitous New Modus Operandi of OSLA

Now, we turn to two highly suspicious developments:

1. The Pre-Review Filter:

OSLA has introduced a?pre-review process?to decide whether or not they will represent a staff member. If they determine that a case has a low probability of success at the UNDT or UNAT, they?refuse to represent the staff member.

What does this mean for the staff member?

They are left alone, forced to quickly learn and understand on their own the intricate rules and deadlines governing the appeals process. They must draft their own legal submissions, including references to established jurisprudence, and understand the process of remedies; all while most likely battling an isolating and hostile work environment. Many of these staff are appealing reassignment or termination decisions resulting from years of harassment or abuse of authority. Enduring harassment and abuse is already extremely difficult and draining, often leading to mental health issues.

So what happens when the?only?entity supposedly created by the Secretary-General to support staff in legal battles against the administration simply?abandons them?

What happens when the staff member, for example, is a GS-4 with absolutely no knowledge or expertise in the legal system? Recently, I witnessed a?P-4 staff member rejected by OSLA, forced to navigate the intricate appeals system alone, at great cost to both their mental health and sanity.

Where in the?General Assembly resolution?is it stated that OSLA will only defend cases that have a high probability of success at the Tribunals? Is this not a newly fabricated system designed to?discourage staff from appealing? When OSLA issues a negative assessment, many staff members?give up altogether?on the idea of appealing because they believe OSLA’s assessment cannot be overturned. But this is far from true. Many staff who have?defied OSLA’s logic went on to win at both Tribunals.

The truth is that?no one knows for sure?how the Tribunals will assess and rule on the validity of the Secretary-General’s discretionary authority. Each case is distinct, bringing its own witnesses and evidence. Many cases have turned around at the last minute?during cross-examination, when judges were able to detect the lies and dishonesty of certain witnesses.

We understand perfectly well that OSLA is understaffed, but instead of?funding it properly?to allow for a reasonable ratio of representation, the Secretary-General turns a blind eye. OSLA, in turn,?self-accommodated?by introducing this pre-requisite that abandons the very staff they were meant to assist.

2. Agreed Sanctions or Forced Surrenders? OSLA’s Troubling Role

Even more concerning is OSLA’s active role in negotiating?on behalf of the Secretary-General?an?agreed sanction, or what they call a?"Letter of Undertaking". This is a?highly suspicious and unethical?practice, in which a staff member is coerced into signing an agreement with management under duress, while the UN pretends it was voluntary.

Let’s hear it directly from the staff: below are some of the chilling extracts of negotiations between different OSLA lawyers and the accused staff regarding an agreed sanction and the kind of pressure applied on them:

“I need your final decision immediately: you either accept the terms or reject them. Be aware that there is pushback within the Administration regarding any negotiated sanction, and if I bring this back to them, discussions will collapse entirely.”
“I must emphasize that this is the final offer. You either take it or leave it. There will be no further adjustments or discussions. This the best that I could get. From what I understand, there was considerable reluctance within the Administration to even allow this agreement.”
“If you do not give me a definitive response by the end of today, this entire negotiation will fall apart. There will be no further chances to amend the terms. This is the Administration’s final stance, and I need your answer now.”

Is this what OSLA was established for? To support administration in negotiating a disciplinary sanction and?threatening and coercing?staff into signing an?unethical Letter of Undertaking?

Let’s have a look at what OSLA assists administration in securing. The?infamous template?of the?“Letter of Undertaking”, which essentially?crucifies?the staff member and ensures that the risk of them going after their perpetrators is eliminated. By negotiating this?Machiavellian?Letter of Undertaking on behalf of management, OSLA is effectively playing a?support role to the administration.

“I agree:

  1. ….
  2. Not to take any action to bring proceedings before the United Nations Dispute Tribunal (UNDT) or United Nations Appeals Tribunal (UNAT) or any other body or court in any jurisdiction with respect to any matters arising out of or related in any way whatsoever to the investigatory or disciplinary processes and/or referred to or described in the Allegations of Misconduct.
  3. To keep this Undertaking and the communications regarding this Undertaking confidential.
  4. Not to make any statements, orally or in writing, or release to any third party, any document or statement which in any way refer to actions, inactions, statements or conduct of any kind by me and/or the United Nations in connection with this Undertaking or the underlying matter.
  5. Not to seek or obtain employment with the United Nations or any other organization which is a part of the United Nations System Chief Executive Board.

6.???? IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have voluntarily signed, of my own free will without any duress and after having obtained the advice of legal counsel, this Undertaking on the date indicated below.

Of course, the best part remains the signing off?“of my own free will and without any duress.”

This so-called "agreement" is nothing more than a forced surrender. A staff member facing a powerful administration, with no legal support, is left with no real choice but to sign. The very existence of this document contradicts the principles of fairness and justice that the UN claims to uphold. No contract signed under coercion should be considered legitimate, and no legal entity acting in good faith should facilitate such unethical practices.

OSLA was created to?defend?staff, not to act as an extension of the administration’s disciplinary arm. If OSLA’s main problem is?understaffing, then the solution should be?adequate funding and resources and not abandoning staff who need their help the most, nor coercing them into unethical agreements.

The UN cannot claim to have a credible internal justice system when its very legal support office?filters out cases based on their likelihood of success?and?pressures staff into waiving their rights. The role of OSLA was never meant to be about minimizing cases against the administration: it was meant to be about?justice.

OSLA stands at a crossroads: it can reclaim its original purpose as a defender of staff rights, or it can continue its descent into an arm of the administration, eroding the last shred of faith in the UN’s internal justice system. If the problem is understaffing, then let the solution be more resources instead of a betrayal of the very people OSLA was meant to protect.

OSLA must also remember its original mandate. It was created to assist staff, not to abandon them, not to pressure them, and certainly not to turn against them.

OSLA must recommit to its duty: to stand with staff, to advocate for justice, and to refuse to become a tool of administrative convenience.

The whole AOJ system must be totally independent and must be funded directly by a different channel away from the UN administration. Your description of those cases of staff members having to decide under pressure within a blackmail situation brings back painful memory to me. Some of this ugly and frankly disgusting attitude of management represent nothing but the extreme opposite of the UN declared values. When I resigned my position with UNRWA, i faced an ugly situation imposed by my direct supervisor to whom i was loyal without any limits. He was simply trying to cover his failures and wrongdoings by pushing people out of his way before an OIOS investigation started. I will soon reveal shocking details about that.

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