CMSI Translation #11: “Mid-Life Overhaul and Upgrade of the Type 052C Guided Missile Destroyer”

CMSI Translation #11: “Mid-Life Overhaul and Upgrade of the Type 052C Guided Missile Destroyer”

Ju Lang, “Mid-Life Overhaul and Upgrade of the Type 052C Guided Missile Destroyer,” CMSI Translation?11 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 19 December 2024).

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From CMSI Director CAPT Christopher H. Sharman, USN (Ret.):

Numerically, the PRC has the largest navy in the world with a battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface combatants.

Many of these PLAN ships are approaching the time for their mid-life overhaul – no small task for such a large fleet. How the PRC handles the overhaul of the Type 052C/LUYANG II-class Destroyer is a great case to study. The first and second units of this class ship were launched in 2003 and placed into service in 2005. The service life of a modern PLAN warship is about 35 years (according to the author). This suggests it’s time for the mid-life overhaul of the first batch of the Type 052C Destroyers – and other warships will soon follow.

The commissioning of the Type 052C has special historical significance.?Prior to its commissioning, many PRC authors viewed the PLAN as still being backwards.?Its ships lacked effective air defense and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.?The Type 052C, however, was fitted with an active phased array radar, reduced radar cross-section design, and VLS SAMs – all historic leaps for the PLAN.?The Type 052C marked China’s entry into the world’s mainstream ranks in terms of domestically produced combat ships.

What upgrades will the PLAN focus on for the Type 052C??This CMSI translation pulled from the pages of?Shipborne Weapons?provides some unique insights.?Here are some nuggets:

  • The article addresses previous data processing and signal data issues with the Type 346 phased array radar and previous overheating issues.
  • The article details differences between the 052C and 052D as well as upgrades to the variants.
  • For destroyers 5,000 tons or above built after 2000, the PLAN has scheduled their service life to be 30 to 35 years.
  • The PLAN usually carries out modernization work simultaneously with the ship’s overhaul.?The article discusses challenges with upgrading the 052C.
  • The article details the challenges of the pace of China’s ship production and the expense associated with maintaining this large fleet.

What the PLAN does with the Type 052C may be a harbinger of how it approaches its midlife maintenance and overhaul of its more modern fleet.?The fleet’s rapid growth will present challenges for the PLAN – this article provides insights into how the PLAN will approach these challenges.

This 24-page translation by CMSI’s own Professor Tiffany Tat is a goldmine of information about systems and engineering challenges the PLAN is considering as it looks to begin its mid-life overhaul of its modern fleet. Our thanks to Professor Tat as well as Professor Martinson and Dan Caldwell for their meticulous review of this CMSI translation.

Happy Holidays from the China Maritime Studies Institute!

SELECTED TEXT:

The construction of the Type 052C guided missile destroyer took a long time, and it was experimental in the sense of “taking small steps for rapid progress” (xiao bu kuai pao). In fact, it was also the engineering prototype of the standard fleet destroyer Type 052D. The first and second Type 052C ships were launched in April and October 2003, respectively. They were the most advanced guided missile destroyers of the PLAN at that time, but the subsequent four ships of the same type were launched in October 2010, July 2011, and January and July 2012, respectively.

During the construction of the Type 052C guided missile destroyer, the PLAN not only began to upgrade its old guided missile destroyers, but also prepared to produce the subsequent Type 052D guided missile destroyers. The first Type 052D guided missile destroyer was officially launched in August 2012, only one month after the launching of the sixth Type 052C guided missile destroyer.

There is no doubt that the combat capability of the Type 052C guided missile destroyer is not as good as that of the Type 052D. Therefore, the status of the Type 052C is undoubtedly special, and changes in its technical status during its service have always attracted attention. Recently, someone updated a series of photos of the Jiangnan shipyard on a public Chinese internet platform, showing the work being done there. Three protagonists can be seen in this set of newly taken photos: one is naturally the “Fujian” aircraft carrier, which is still under outfitting and has attracted the most public attention; one is the Type 055 destroyer “Lhasa,” which is moored on the harbor embankment with a yellow membrane on the deck and an operating platform built outside the “Star of the Sea” radar; and the other is the Type 052C missile destroyer “Lanzhou” in the floating dock with its superstructure covered with scaffolding. Judging from the photos, the “Lanzhou” ship in the floating dock is obviously undergoing a large project.

As one of the first batch of Type 052C ships, the Lanzhou has been in service for 17 years since 2005. According to the traditional 15-year maintenance and upgrade rhythm of our military combat ships, although the “Lanzhou” is still a very new ship in people’s minds, it has also reached the middle of its life span, and now it is obviously time for a mid-life overhaul and upgrade. So, what aspects will the mid-life overhaul and upgrade of the “Lanzhou” ship focus on? This is undoubtedly a topic of concern to people.

As China’s comprehensive national strength has improved, China’s maritime strength has gradually grown, and its “maritime power” strategy has steadily advanced, causing strategic concerns for the United States. Although China has always firmly stated that it will take the path of peaceful development, and there is still a large power gap between China and the United States, from the perspective of development trends, the contradiction between China’s “maritime power” strategy and the United States’ “return to sea control” strategy is inevitable, and the compatibility of core interests has declined. The United States regards China as the most pressing long-term strategic threat at sea and is wary of China’s maritime influence expansion into the “Indo-Pacific” region. As a result, the United States’ maritime competition with China is intensifying.

In fact, changes in the international balance of power are one of the main reasons for the adjustment of the United States’ maritime security policy. As China’s comprehensive strength, especially its maritime strength, increases, its national maritime rights and interests have been relatively extended, and its ability to safeguard its own maritime rights and interests and participate in the construction of a maritime security order has been enhanced. This is bound to cause uneasiness and concern in the United States. In order to maintain its maritime hegemony, the United States’ maritime competition with China has become more intense and targeted.

China has become the world’s second largest economy and the world’s largest trading nation. The leap in economic strength is the cornerstone of China’s national strength. China’s strength in the military and political fields is also increasing. Based on this, the United States’ strategic anxiety has intensified. Unlike the Obama administration’s policy of “engagement + competition” toward China, the Trump and Biden administrations’ competitiveness toward China has become increasingly evident. In 2017, the Trump administration formally proposed that “great power competition is the main threat to the United States” and positioned China as the main competitor, emphasizing “whole-of-government” competition with China. During the Biden administration, China is viewed as “the only country in this century that can challenge the United States in all aspects” and [the administration] advocates all-round competition with China.

Focusing on the maritime domain, China’s rapid growth in naval power has become a focus of attention for the U.S. government and military. The relative narrowing of the gap in maritime power between China and the United States has caused the United States to pay more attention to its dominant position in maritime power, and it has taken multiple measures to curb the growth of China’s maritime power. The maritime competition between China and the United States is showing an intensifying trend. In fact, the maritime competition between China and the United States is the first time since World War I that the friction point between an emerging power and an established power has occurred at sea.

First, the United States is surrounded by the sea on three sides. It has used the ocean as a stage to develop a powerful navy and allies, establish maritime hegemony and extend it to the world, and thus, gradually become a world pole. There is no doubt that the United States pursues absolute security and control of the world’s oceans. However, as China’s national strength grows, moving towards the ocean and engaging in strategic management of the sea (jinglue haiyang) is inevitable.

Second, China and the United States do not share a land border; the ocean is the bond that connects the two countries, especially in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, where the interests of the two countries are intricately intertwined and their interactions are frequent. In the Western Pacific region, the balance of power between the Chinese and U.S. militaries has changed significantly, and there is a possibility of forming a situation of equal strength, thus becoming a hot spot of competition.

Third, as major scientific and technological powers and resource-hungry countries, China and the United States both have the ability to develop and utilize the oceans, deep seas, polar regions, and other areas. However, the maritime strategic backgrounds, strategic cultures, and strategic traditions of China and the United States are very different, and the strategic contents are also different. The identities of a maritime hegemonic country and a late-developing maritime country determine that contradictions in the two countries’ maritime strategies are inevitable. Against the background of the narrowing gap in maritime power between China and the United States, the contradictions between the two countries are more prominent.

It is in this context that the mid-life overhaul and upgrade of the “Lanzhou,” the first Type 052C missile destroyer, which is one of the most important of China’s iconic combat ships in its naval modernization process in the past 20 years, naturally attracts attention. … … …

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