“The Climate Change Conspiracy” – Tracing the ideological foundations of #climatechangedenialism

This is the seventh perspective on the #climatedilemma derived from a workshop conducted by #TheDive.com in March 2020 in Berlin. If you are interested also in the six other perspectives which we reviewed at this workshop, you can find them here:

I. “It`s a fact” - The Scientific Perspective on #Climatechange

(https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/fight-flight-freeze-eight-perspectives-tim-riedel/)

II. “It scares me” – Between #climatefear and #climatehysteria (https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/ii-scares-me-between-climatefear-climatehysteria-tim-riedel/)

III. “Time to act” – Here is what we need to reverse #climatechange

(https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/iii-time-act-here-what-we-need-do-reverse-tim-riedel/) 

IV. “It`s too late” – The #climateapocalypse is coming anyway

(https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/iv-its-too-late-climateapocalypse-coming-anyway-tim-riedel/)

V. “We are having the wrong conversation” – The solution is beyond #climateactivism

(https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/we-having-wrong-conversation-solution-climatechange-beyond-tim-riedel/?published=t)

VI. “It`s the economy, stupid!” - The business case and the “free-rider dilemma” in #climateprotection

(https://www.dhirubhai.net/pulse/its-economy-stupid-business-case-free-rider-dilemma-tim-riedel/?published=t)

In this perspective, I will look at the ideological element in dealing with the #climatecrisis.

As we have seen from the six perspectives so far, the scientific and also the business arguments speak clearly in favor of fast and serious #climateaction. The paths to avoid or at least to mitigate #globalheating are all laid out, the solutions are more or less there, affordable and ready to use. Apart from preventing the #climatecatastrophe, the #climatefriendly alternatives also promise better air, soils and water, less damage overall to ecosystems and biodiversity, higher food quality, improved health, a more equal distribution of wealth, and more resilient communities. So why are they not pursued?

The answer to this question rests in ideological and strategic political alliances which are complex to trace and so far only scarcely researched. However, if we want to successfully influence political, business and personal decisions in the direction of #climateprotection, we have to better understand where resistance comes from, and what it is based on.

The following review draws on a variety of publications, such as a 2019 study by the German adelphi consultancy called “Convenient Truths - Mapping climate agendas of right-wing populist parties in Europe”, the book #fakefacts by Katharina Nocun and Pia Lamberty, publications by the UK based NGO #ClimateOutreach, and articles by authors like Aaron McCright and Riley Dunlap, Lorraine Whitmarsh and Adam Corner, Matthew Lockwood, Larissa Deppisch, Bernhard Forchtner, Martin Hultman of the “Centre for Studies of Climate Change Denialism” (#CEFORCED), #CharlesEisenstein, or #CorneliaKoppetsch.

> What is their claim?

There are basically four different streams of reasoning why not to fight the #climatecrisis:

1) Not believing that a substantial degree of climate change exists

2) Not believing that climate change is being caused by human activity

3) Believing that we still have a lot of time

4) Believing that we have to act, but not agreeing with the proposed set of measures and policies.

Source: Doran, Peter; Zimmerman, Maggie; ?Examining the Scientific Consensus on Climate Change”; Eos, Vol. 90, No. 3, 2009, answering the question if Climate Change is happening and caused significantly by human activities, with “General Public” data being based on the U.S..

As we can see from the chart above, refusing to take climate action for reasons 1 and 2 does not really make a lot of sense, with more than 97% of all actively publishing climatologists agreeing that there is a substantial degree of climate change and that it is being caused by human activity. Another study by James Powell in 2012 found that between 1991 and 2012 even less, only 24 out 13,950 (0.2%) of peer reviewed scientific articles “clearly reject human-caused global warming or endorse a cause other than CO2 emissions for observed warming.”

But who researched that? Science did. And this is the core challenge we are facing: if people don`t believe in the impartiality of the scientific system, then it does not matter whether 30%, 70%, 99.8% or 120% of all scientists agree with a specific data point. The relevant topic to discuss then is not data, research, or facts, but belief systems, and where they are coming from.

In a poll by the U.S. American Political Magazine “Politico” in December 2018 only 43% of all respondents in the U.S. said that they trust scientists “a great deal”, when it comes to #climatechange. 31% did do “somewhat”, 12% “not very much” and 6% not at all. There is little divergence in these views depending on age and gender. But sorted by political preference, only 26% of all Republicans said that they trust scientists “a great deal”, 40% “somewhat”, 19% “not very much” and 8% not at all. On the contrary, 62% of all Democrats trust scientists “a great deal”, 23% “somewhat”, 6% “not very much” and 4% not at all. Belief in the scientific system, accordingly, is – at least in the U.S. - to a significant degree based on the political agenda you follow.

In this line, only 21% of Trump voters are afraid of climate change, compared to 61% of the others. And only 34% of Republicans believe that climate change is caused by human activity, while 78% of Democrats do so. 

If we look at this picture for Europe, we see a similar divide. When analyzing the voting behavior on 22 climate proposals between 2009 and 2018, we can observe that climate concern is by far the lowest at the right end of the party spectrum. However, both mainstream Conservatives and Liberals have voted far more climate friendly on a European level than most of these parties are doing in their respective home countries.

Source: adelphi consult, “Convenient Truths, Mapping climate agendas of right-wing populist parties in Europe”, Stella Schaller and Alexander Carius, 2019, with the political right wing being mapped on the left side of this chart, and vice versa

Looking at the voting behavior on climate and energy proposals only of the right-wing populist parties, however, the picture is more varied. Some parties like the German AfD, the Dutch PVV or the British UKIP have voted straight against climate proposals, while other parties supported more mixed or even predominantly pro climate protection bills.

Analyzing their programs more in depth, accordingly, the above mentioned study by adelphi consult (published in 2019) does not portray a homogeneous picture: “Seven out of 21 right-wing populist parties deny the scientific consensus on climate change and its causes. The most explicit climate science deniers are the German AfD and British UKIP, which go so far as to spread false information through press releases by drawing on ‘alternative sources’ that are rarely scientifcally credible. However, the majority of our sample (11 parties) is classified as disenaged or having inconsistent, sometimes ambiguous views, without openly rejecting climate science. This second group of parties includes, for instance, the French National Rally (“Rassemblement National”), Italian Lega as well as Polish PiS. Three parties affirm the scientific consensus, namely the Hungarian Fidesz, the Finns Party and Lithuanian Order and Justice.”

So while there is a positive correlation between right wing populism and climate change denial, it would be too stereotypical to say that this is true in every country and for the same reasons. In India and Brazil, to name two further examples from international politics, the framing of a right wing populist agenda and the position towards climate change is also mixed, with Narendra Modi somewhat engaging to fight the climate crisis, and Jair Bolsonaro completely rejecting the scientific consensus on climate change, having appointed a Foreign Minster who calls #globalwarming a “plot by cultural Marxists”.

Summarizing these findings from the U.S., Europe, India and Brazil, and looking at the forecast of further right wing populist growth in Europe in the chart above, three conclusions can be derived:

I. With their growing political presence, right wing populist parties pose a rising threat to an effective mitigation of the #climatecrisis,

II. In addition to their direct voting power, a more influential populist right also indirectly affects the public discourse and the political agenda of mainstream conservatives towards more climate change skepticism,

III. Since not every conservative mindset and not even every populist right voter totally rejects to take climate action, and – if they do – they don`t reject it for the same reasons, it makes sense to analyze their way of thinking in more depth, so that a more effective pro-climate communication strategy can be developed.

In order to approach such a strategy, three important questions need to be answered:

1. What is causing the science and climate skepticism among right wing populist parties?

2. Which alternative framings can be used on the content side in order to convince right wing populist and other conservative voters of the advantages of climate protection?

3. What strategies can be effective to address the root causes of climate skepticism, so that voters of populist parties can be won for a climate friendly political agenda also on the basis of their underlying motives?

1. What is causing the science and climate skepticism among populist parties?

Adherents of right wing populist parties are often labeled as those “left behind” in the process of globalization. Refusing to support climate action, accordingly, is then attributed to those voters fearing that they will lose their jobs and have to pay higher taxes, gas prices and electricity bills because of the energy transition.

However, while there is certainly also a socio-economic aspect involved and education plays a role, when we look into the U.S. election results, the main differentiator between Trump- and non-Trump voters was color, with gender, education or income playing only a minor role.

Source: CNN – Post Election Poll of the US election results in 2016, https://edition.cnn.com/election/2016/results/exit-polls

As Mathew Lockwood puts it: while the socioeconomic “structuralist account might explain why populist voters and parties dislike some climate policies, it does not by itself offer a compelling explanation of why they embrace a wider scepticism about and hostility to climate science. For this, I would argue that we must also look at the ideological content of populism for such an explanation.” In his analysis, he suggests three potential motives for this ideological divide:

a) an increasing suspicion towards a supranational, cosmopolitical agenda,

b) a growing gap towards the ‘political elites’ and the rising complexity of decision-making,

c) the repeated experience of special interest groups and “nefarious minorities” pursuing their personal targets while pretending to follow the public good.

Climate skepticism, in this line of thought, is not really related to climate science. It is the reaction to a sense of losing out vis à vis a globalized world which threatens the personal status and identity.

Other writers point in the same direction. Dunlap / McCright (2011) state that “conservative white males are significantly more likely than are other Americans to endorse climate denialist views”, and that their denial serves mainly “identity-protective” and “system-justifying” purposes. Jylh? / Helmer (2020) assessed that “the strongest predictor of climate change denial was an index capturing exclusionary and anti-egalitarian preferences (opposition to, e.g., multiculturalism and feminism), followed by traditional values and Social Dominance Orientation [an adherence to group based hierarchies]. Or as Cornelia Koppetsch (2020) phrases it:

“We are talking about different previously more or less established segments of society who are disappointed with globalization and the rise of cosmopolitan elites, and who feel that their entitlements and privileges, which they had taken for granted, are jeopardized. The new right-wing parties thus mobilize a coalition of losers by symbolically promising to restore the old social order.” “They operate so successfully since they do not focus on a single theme, such as 'social justice', but act polythematically by linking previously unconnected social problem areas and crisis phenomena (such as the world financial crisis, the 'refugee crisis', the corruption of the elites, emotional alienation), to which they now offer their core projects of re-nationalisation, re-sovereignty and re-communityisation as an answer.”

Climate change denial then merely serves as a vehicle for anti-modernist, anti-establishment and anti-scientific sentiments, which in return reinforce the belief that the whole issue of climate change is just another invention by the establishment to deprive the (in their self-perspective) jeopardized segments of society (predominantly white male conservatives) of their heritage. Being “left behind”, in this sense, is a feeling, not a fact.

This conclusion is supported by Larissa Deppisch, who analyzed the German extreme right AfD-electorate. In her summary, the frustration mainly stems from a “perceived deprivation” of status and identity, rather than from a real disadvantage in terms of the personal financial situation. As a result, she believes that if we want to better understand and battle right wing populist and nationalist agendas, we have to employ a more socio-psychological toolbox rather than real economic benefits. According to her, in order to win back the right, we need to better tackle and accomodate emotions like fear, jealousy, neglect, powerlessness, loss of control, inferiority and shame. 

The ideological coalition between right wing populists and climate change deniers is accelerated further with targeted funding by the fossil industry, as Martin Hultman describes it: “An overlap in funding and financing might not be as visible. But it is there. Funding from extractive industries also goes into right-wing think tanks, which are creating this type of distrust of climate science, which then also fuels this type of right-wing nationalist climate change denial.” Extensive climate skeptical media coverage by right wing news companies (e.g. Fox News Network) round out this picture, as a report on Fox News found that “of the 247 segments between January and June 2019, 212 or 86% were dismissive of the climate crisis, cast warming and its consequences in doubt or employed fear mongering when discussing climate solutions.” (https://www.citizen.org/article/foxic-fox-news-networks-dangerous-climate-denial-2019/?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=52dbcd4f-2756-4284-973a-7fe06c039cd5)

In summary, the level of climate change denial by followers of populist parties “demonstrates the shocking extent of public alienation from institutions of authority.” (Charles Eisenstein). It displays the diminishing belief within societies that the further globalization of economies will be to the benefit of societies, and that those in charge are actually pursuing the public good. It can be understood as a sign of outrage by segments of society who feel that their entitlements are in danger. In short: Climate change denial is not about climate change.

This, in turn, offers a completely new set of opportunities on how to communicate towards climate change deniers within populist parties and their electorate.

2. Which alternative framings could be used on the content side to convince right wing populist and other conservative voters of the advantages of climate protection?

So how can we win the Populist Right and other conservatives for climate protection in terms of content and arguments?

Expecting that they may 1) not acknowledge the existence, or at least not the urgency of #globalheating, 2) place no trust in science, 3) strive for a weak state, 4) not believe in supranational institutions like the EU or the UN, 5) be fearful of enormous costs which will result in higher taxes, 6) suspect a quasi-socialist wealth redistribution, 7) believe that climate action is economically suicidal until the rest of the world is also fully committed as well, 8) think that climate change was made up as a cover up to bring more climate refugees to their countries, 9) see the oil-, coal-, and gas-business as part of the national identity, 10) denounce environmental legislation as a quasi-marxist tool to confine personal and entrepreneurial freedoms, 11) insist to protect the competitiveness of national industries by keeping energy prices low, 12) want to keep everything “as it used to be”, 13) receive funding from the fossil- and agrobusiness, or 14) claim that wind turbines and solar panels destroy traditional cultural landscapes and scenery, expecting all these arguments, what can we say?

Keeping in mind that we are on ideological terrain, no discussion about facts and figures makes sense. It just doesn`t. Warning about the threat of climate tipping points, appealing to global climate justice, downplaying the economic importance of the national fossil or heavy industries, or advocating international emission trading schemes will also most likely not do the trick.

Instead, we have to find out what our conversation partners or audiences care about. We then have a great array of arguments available to choose from in order to make a climate friendly agenda attractive also to a right wing populist or conservative mindset, as suggested by the adelphi study, an article by Whitmarsh / Corner and the Climate Outreach publications:

1) Regional income generation through decentral renewable energy, 2) improving energy independence from abroad, 3) gaining national technological leadership and economic competitiveness, 4) themes of “green patriotism” like preserving nature, woods, native animals and plants, 5) improving the quality of life, 6) reducing waste, 7) restoring community, or 8) breaking the power of multinational electricity and fossil corporations. Rather than emphasizing the alarming threats to our wellbeing, the complexity of the challenge, and the pressing need to change our lifestyles, it is more promising to focus on themes like 9) continuity and safety, 10) the simplicity of “a good life”, 11) local and practical concerns and solutions, 12) nostalgia, 13) balance, and 14) the shared desire to create a better future for our children.

Right Wing Populists and other conservatives often care about the environment, as can be seen from the voting behavior of the European extreme right on other environmental – non climate – policy proposals in the past in the chart above.

In addition, and this brings us to the third question, it helps to improve the quality of our conversation to listen to the arguments of our counterparts, and to ask them further about their specific worries and concerns as well as about their targets and aspirations.

And it further adds to the balance of the discussion to admit that our climate activist positions are based on ideology, too. Our ideologies (e.g. our view is rational, the scientific facts are true, climate risks are real, Greenhouse Gases are the main problem, politics / markets can fix it, a multilateral agreement is the best framework for a solution, the sacrifices involved are without alternative, we are all equal, the state should take care of it, etc…) may be less obvious to detect and shared by more people, and we may have more data points to support them. But our view is just as subjective as theirs, based on implicit beliefs, assumptions and narratives, possibly flawed. It would make us more convincing if we were as self-critical with the bases of our own opinion as we want our political adversaries to be with theirs. As the adelphi report puts it: “Taking concerns seriously and acknowledging the grain of truth contained within populist narratives – from corruption to the repercussions of neoliberalism – is an important step to regain trust.”

3. What strategies can be effective to address the root causes of climate skepticism, so that voters of populist parties can be won for a climate friendly political agenda on their underlying motives?

However… When we are dealing with right wing populists, their views on the climate crisis tend to defy facts, they are shortsighted, frequently ignorant and simplistic. They often lean towards crude conspiracy narratives. Their inferiority complex and/or paranoia usually drive them to a xenophobic, sexist, chauvinist and often racist and violent attitude.

This is not an academic issue to write theoretical papers about. It describes my personal reaction when I see them act or talk. I find them inhumane and appalling. They reject everything I value, they ruin our planet for profit or for hatred, and they destroy the future of my children without even feeling ashamed about it. They make me short of breath, desperate and upset. I do feel morally and intellectually superior. But at the same time it renders me helpless and fearful when I see how many of them there are and how much destructive power they have.

But how successful can I be in reaching common ground towards climate protection with the populist right, when I speak and act from this position? And how do they see me? In their eyes, I probably come across as arrogant, na?ve, and out of this world. Possibly condescending, pushy, aggressive even. Most likely disconnected with reality, and also ignorant, disinterested in their problems, since they are not my problems.

There is very little we will achieve together towards meaningful climate action as long as we don`t bridge this gap.

So we have to look behind their words to see what they are striving for, the positive impetus, the neediness in their arguments, even if it is very difficult for us. Only then can we come up with answers and proposals that have any meaning to them. Only then can we build any kind of understanding and trust. That does not mean that we should accept the content of what they say. But we may be able to react in a more productive manner, less focused on “making our point”, and more oriented towards gaining trust and moving forward into the right direction.

If we look at the more personal level of their claims, we can see that they are eager for acknowledgement and recognition, for certainty and stability, for belonging and control. We can answer these yearnings by listening to their distress, by enquiring for their ideas to solve it, and by sketching out visions of a better, brighter, more equal and more sustainable future, for us, for them, for their peer groups, and why not for our nation as well. For every nation.

If we instead stress the risks of a climate disaster, highlight the dangers we are in, emphasize the urgency for change and the importance of federal and global policies created by international elites, if we withdraw ourselves from any kind of personal connectedness and label their resistance as uneducated and immature, then we are doing exactly the opposite of what we should. We are stirring nothing but resistance.

> What is their call for action?

The call for action of this perspective, therefore, is threefold:

1) Let`s focus on arguments which appeal to our audience rather than to us. As the saying goes: “The bait must be attractive to the fish, not to the fisher”.

2) Let`s conduct our discussions with the populist right in the sphere where they mostly belong: that of emotions, not of facts.

3) Let`s turn the downward communicative spiral around. Instead of trying to beat them more effectively than they beat us, let`s start building trust and understanding.

Pointing into this direction, the above mentioned adelphi study phrases it that way:

“Disillusionment creates a vacuum that is filled by appeals to fear and opportunism. The populist tide is a signal that we need success narratives which convey trust in political change. … Communication on climate change and policy needs to find a new aesthetic and a new optimistic myth that connects to lived social realities. Appealing to positive emotions and hope through stories of change will be key for redefining solidarity and gathering popular support for a just transition.”

Nobody should expect that this redirection in our communicative strategy will produce miracles overnight. In a political setting as we witness it in the U.S. and many other areas, with a political divide so deep and self-reproducing that there seems to be very little source of mutual understanding left, the others won`t change easily just by us adjusting our communication. However, after reviewing the ideological grounding of climate change denialism in this article, it is quite obvious that – and why – the currently dominating communicative approach has failed. If we maintain it, more failure is certain.

 In order to adjust our communicative strategy, I would like to offer an approach developed by Otto Scharmer and the Presencing Institute called the “Theory U”. As you can see on the chart below, the negative U moves from a closed mind (denial) via a closed heart (hatred) towards a closed will (fear), thereby generating manipulation, abuse, and ultimately destruction.

We can overcome and turn around this self-reinforcing negative dynamic with a positive “U-Curve”, helping us to bring the mutually best possible future into existence:

“As the [lower half of the] diagram illustrates, we move down one side of the U (connecting us to the world that is outside of our institutional bubble) to the bottom of the U (connecting us to the world that emerges from within) and up the other side of the U (bringing forth the new into the world).

On that journey, at the bottom of the U, lies an inner gate that requires us to drop everything that isn’t essential. This process of letting-go (of our old ego and self) and letting-come (our highest future possibility: our Self) establishes a subtle connection to a deeper source of knowing. The essence of presencing is that these two selves—our current self and our best future Self—meet at the bottom of the U and begin to listen and resonate with each other.

Once a group crosses this subtle threshold, nothing remains the same. Individual members and the group as a whole begin to operate with a heightened level of energy and sense of future possibility. Often they then begin to function as an intentional vehicle for an emerging future.” (https://www.presencing.org/aboutus/theory-u)

Translated into a real-life and everyday situation, this means: instead of hitting each other with arguments (denial), accusations (hatred) and threats (fear), we have to connect (see), listen emphathically (sense) and reach a moment of plain togetherness (presence). From this point forward we can start building up meaningful solutions and climate action along the lines which we both care about. We don`t need to agree with their ideology in order to do so. We can say that we are not OK with their conclusions. But that should not be the end of the discussion, but the beginning of looking for better ways how we can both get closer to what we actually want.

This may then result in more solar panels and a wind turbine, or in reducing waste and saving heat costs, in organizing car and ride sharings, in inviting the local politician for a Q&A session on regional economic development, in a used clothes exchange, an urban gardening project, in protecting a forest or cleaning a park, in improving the living conditions of animals, restoring the local river, or whatever.

Winning the populist right for our target of protecting the planet and creating a better world along this path will certainly not be easy. Believing that it is possible may sound awfully na?ve. But can we achieve it any other way?

> What is their underlying assumption?

There are three underlying assumptions in this perspective.

I. We are not as far apart as it seems

Surely, the political solutions proposed by the populist right are fundamentally different from those by most climate activists. But in their origin they, like us, have the feeling that something in society is not working and needs to be fixed. They, like us, struggle with their daily lives and the challenge to earn enough money and do something fulfilling at the same time. They, like us, feel that wealth and power are not fairly distributed. They, like us, believe political decision making is too detached from the needs of the people. They, like us, have fears about the future which they are trying to cope with. They, like us, care about something. They, like us, want a better world for their children. They, like us, prefer to live on a healthy planet. We basically want the same. The rest is ideology and a legacy of mutual and intentional misunderstanding, which can be overcome.

 II. We are in a fundamental crisis of meaning

The severe ideological divide on climate protection points to a deeper disintegration of our core narrative – and to a new paradigm emerging. Charles Eisenstein calls it the myth of separation and of the human ascent:

“Because we are (in this myth) separate from other people and from nature, we must dominate our competitors and master nature. Progress, therefore, consists in increasing our capacity to control the Other. The myth recounts human history as an ascent from one triumph to the next, from fire to domestication to industry to information technology, genetic engineering, and social science, promising a coming paradise of control. That same myth motivates the conquest and ruin of nature, organizing society to turn the entire planet into money.” (https://charleseisenstein.org/essays/the-conspiracy-myth/)

It is no surprise that right wing populism and climate change denialism rage the worst in countries like the U.S., Brazil or – to a lesser extent as well - Australia, where the “BBB coalition” (bulls, bullets, bible) forms the backbone of power, representing a colonial story of violently subduing native land and people in the name of White, Male and Religious supremacy. Global Heating stands in the way of this story, and that is why it must be so passionately opposed.

As human beings, regardless of the color of our skin or our political leaning, we have been shaped by this narrative and we play our role in it. If we want to overcome the climate crisis, we have to overcome this story.

 III. If we fight them, we fight ourselves

Eisenstein offers the “story of interbeing” as a new framework of meaning. In this concept, we realize that we are connected not only with the earth, but also with each other, regardless of how far we may be apart geographically or politically. So by fighting the other side, trying to control or suppress their power, we are not only playing by the rules of the old paradigm. We are actually fighting ourselves.

The new story emerging can thus act as a guideline for a new communication strategy towards climate protection: listening to where the other is coming from, searching for common ground and shared visions, experiencing our connectedness with the planet and with each other, jointly looking for escape routes out of the destructive nature of existing routines. Some adjustments to the current financial, political and regulatory setup of our societies would certainly help in this quest; but we don`t need to wait for that to happen in order to start our own realignment. Since we are connected, we will make a difference.

> What is their positive and encouraging impetus?

Having understood where the populist right is coming from, now it at least makes sense. It is still sad that they have chosen their denialist path, and it will surely be a challenge to influence them to the better. But at least there is a logic to it that we can work with.

In addition, it is helpful to understand that we are in essence on the same side, and that we have been shaped by the same narrative: Trying to control the other, using power to pave our way, emphasizing the separation between us, campaigning for technocratic solutions to the problem which will not alter the underlying theme of domination and alienation from the planet and from each other.

The new narrative as an answer may be a “small step narrative”, but I can start within a sphere that I can influence: myself.

> What is their frustration potential, how do they draw from our sources of energy?

Firstly, this is no “quick fix” solution. If we want to save the world by changing how we interact with others, we have a very long way to go. The dominating myth of separation and control has had thousands of years to gradually build up, how can we dare say that we can change it within a generation? But then, every crisis is a chance, every fight an opportunity. The climate crisis may be deep enough to make us transform. In every argument, once we acknowledge that the others, that`s us, then the others will recognize that, too. So from one we will get to two, from two to four, from four to eight, and we will reach billions in no time.

Secondly, what will we do if the others act violently, disgustingly, or in public, or if they are manipulating the frame of reference, so that what they do and say cannot go undisputed? Aren`t there moments where we have to fight back? This is a line that can only be drawn individually and for each situation differently. Of course, self-defense is legitimate, and so is strategy. But we have to be sure about our targets: Are we acting in order to build a better world, or are we acting to defend ourselves because we are feeling hurt and fearful? Are we acting in a useful manner in order to reach our targets, or is our behavior protective to ourselves, but harmful to what we are striving for? If the latter, is there a way how we can we be protective to ourselves and useful to our targets? Are we setting a pattern, or are the patterns setting us?

So this perspective is scary to a point, since it feels very new. Will I be big enough to do this? But it is not frustrating. It`s huge, since just pointing at the others will have no positive effect. On the other hand it`s small, since by changing ourselves, we will change the world.

So we know what`s wrong. We know how to change it. Sounds like a plan.