Clearance to descend below non-published MSA flying IMC an off-airway descent expecting visual approach and no radar contact ident.

This is just one among many others tales ''behind the scene'' heard most of time off-route and mostly commom in the hangar's backstage. This one particularly caught my eye due to first, the occurance (circumstance), second, the pilot who experienced such situation (We are not talking about a just rated pilot), third, the importance of decision making and, as described in the text, the accident chain link broken at this moment.

By the way, it was in one of those remote airport in Indonesia surrounded by mountains where an A300 operated by Garuda hs collided during an approach procedure categorized as CFIT, if I am not wrong had happened in Medan Airport mid 90's.

Not as experienced as Mr. Ivan and neither an LJ36 operator, but still caught by his report maybe due to my previous position working with safety for a major airline from middle-east and my recent undergraduate thesis after my CPL grant, I then, assumed that this is one of the experience we have to move forward, which certainly will make the difference. Furthermore, for those ones interesting in an unutterable book with a 'biography' model looks like here goes: An aviator's Journey - Tales of a Corporate Pilot by Ivan Luciani.

With the credits and your prior concession, Mr. Ivan Luciani. Thanks for the book, all shared contents and the willingness to help many others.

''OPERATING LEARJET BUSINESS JETS IN Southeast Asia for several years in the mid 1990s was very challenging and very demanding, but also very satisfying. We were among the first business jet operators in the region and had to break a lot of ground introducing business aviation to a region where most people had never seen a business jet. I gained a great deal of experience, and believe I contributed in some small way to the implementation of safe operating practices in a region where serious deficiencies existed at the time. Except for a few trips most trips I flew were uneventful. What follows is a brief description of one of those few that was NOT uneventful. It’s one that I will never forget for it could have ended in catastrophe had I made a different decision.

We were scheduled to fly several passengers to an Indonesian Air Force base on the eastern part of the island of Java in N850GA, a Learjet 36. We first would have to land in Jakarta’s Halim airport in order to clear customs and immigration as well as to refuel. The trip from Seletar to Halim was uneventful and, once arrival procedures were completed, we were airborne again within 45 minutes. The route of flight from Jakarta to the Air Force base was across the scenic island of Java and over a number of active volcanoes. After takeoff we contacted Jakarta Departure Control and were promptly identified on radar and cleared to climb to a cruise altitude of FL330 (33,000 feet). Shortly after leveling off at our cleared cruise altitude, and in communication with an air traffic controller from Jakarta Control, we requested deviation from our cleared route of flight in order to avoid convective activity and its associated turbulence. Our request to deviate around weather was granted and we found ourselves some 20 miles north of the airway as we circumnavigated some rather mean looking thunderstorms. At the Top of Descent (TOD) point, and still off the airway due to the weather deviation, we requested descent clearance. We were subsequently cleared to descend to FL210 (21,000 feet) and instructed to contact the Air Force base controller for further instructions. Once in radio contact with this new controller we were asked to report ready for further descent. I made a mental note that there was no mention of us being identified and in radar contact. As we leveled off at FL210 I could see a layer of solid clouds below us covering all quadrants. When we requested further descend the controller instructed, “Descend 3,000 feet, direct to the airport, expect a visual approach to runway 05.” I watched as my First Officer promptly dialed down the Altitude Selector to 3,000 feet while he keyed the microphone to acknowledge the controller’s instructions. As we continued our descend and approached the solid layer of clouds a red flag in my head told me to stop the descend and reassess our position in relation to the airport and the terrain below. Because we were off the airway we no longer had a published minimum safe descent altitude. Instead, all we had was a figure that indicated the highest terrain altitude somewhere within a large quadrant of airspace, as depicted on the enroute chart. I stopped descending just above the undercast layer of clouds as I considered that we were not in radar contact, we were off the airway, there was mountainous terrain below and around us, and we couldn’t see the obstacles. Having previously reviewed the enroute weather chart I knew that there were scattered clouds forecast to the north of the airport and that would allow us to maintain visual separation from clouds and the terrain. So I made the decision to level off and maintain altitude, slow down to 200 knots, and proceed to an area approximately 50 miles north of the airport. We informed the controller of our plans and he asked us to advise when ready for further descend. As we approached that area to the north of the airport the weather cleared and we could now see the terrain below, so we continued to descend as we turned towards the airport. While we executed a visual approach to runway 05 I looked towards the area where we had initially been coming from when I decided to stop the descent. What I saw shook me up. Between the airport and our off-the-airway position, as the controller instructed us to descend to 3,000 feet, there was a 7,000-foot mountain with its summit partially obscured by clouds. After landing we taxied to our parking stand, opened the main cabin door, and the passengers got off the plane. When Ideplaned I noticed that my legs were shaking. I then spent the next few minutes explaining to my First Officer what had happened. It was now clear to him that had we blindly accepted the controller’s instructions to descend to 3,000 feet in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) while being off the airway and not in radar contact we would have slammed into that 7,000-foot mountain in what is called a Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) accident. I suspect thatwhen the controller cleared us to descend to 3,000 feet, proceed direct to the airport, and to expect a visual approach to runway 05 he must have assumed that we were in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC). Such an assumption had been incorrect and the consequences of that error could have been catastrophic.

There is a term used in aviation called Situational Awareness (SA), which is defined as having an accurate mental picture of what is happening around you, and in particular, where you are at all times in relation to obstacles and terrain. That day we had a partial loss of SA and, in the process, added one more link to the error chain that, if not broken, could have led to a CFIT accident. We broke a link in the chain and prevented the accident when the controller’s well-intended instructions to proceed direct to the airport and to descend to 3,000 feet were not immediately followed. The reason why my legs were shaking after landing was because I knew what would have happened if we had failed to realize that something was amiss. We were very fortunate and gained a great deal of experience that day, experience which I have strived to share with many others so that they won’t find themselves in a situation in which there is a mountain between the aircraft and the airport.''

Source: '' An aviatior's Journey - Tales of a corporate Pilot ''