IS CLASSICAL MARXISM [ACTUALLY] A CRITIQUE OF RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY?

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PURPOSE: This essay was initially composed as a submission for a Master's Degree in Religious Studies at UoC. As my first study of socioeconomics and political theory, it comprises a fresh framework for reflection on Advanced Theories in the Study of Religion. The work earned a high grade and was marked by a professor specialising in Marxist theory. His feedback, alongside recent world events, came to inspire the following redaction to make the work [more] accessible for a broader audience.

The following essay examines groundbreaking ideas and the seminal contributions of a renowned German-born philosopher, the revolutionary socialist, economist, and political theorist Karl Marx (1818-1883) to answer one question:

Is classical Marxism a critique of religion..?

The author’s analysis of Marx’s key works, including segments of Das Kapital, finds enrichment in an extensive collection of notes, manuscripts, and papers made accessible by a close friend after his death, an eminent ally in the field of political theory, fellow German philosopher and former Young Hegelian Friedrich Engels.?

Contemporary contributions are not within the remit of this essay as a review of classical Marxism, which the author establishes through a presentation of theoretical concepts and practical logic that highlight the true nature of Marx’s fundamental attitudes. Reflection on his prominent influences precedes the conclusion, where critical evaluation responds to the question of religious critique.

INTRODUCTION

Karl Marx was a strong critic of various ideologies, but not all, as we see in classical Marxism, which embraces a diverse range of ideological starting points in various fields, such as science and religion. Said examples comprise a high-value industrial sector of work and two critical subjects in education that enable more than humanity's remarkable survival so much as the possibility of society’s gradual evolution. Herein lies the confusion for many, as religion is ideological, and yet Marx vacillates between - seemingly - contradictory positions on various topics, as the author will demonstrate to offer clarification and work towards answering the overarching question. In addition to Marx's intellectual responses to numerous philosophers, a range of life events comprehensively demonstrate his earlier thought and offer a timeline to track developments in his work.

After departing the company of his foremost intellectual influencers, the Young Hegelians, Marx diverts from any meaningful attempt at religious critique. Their newfound focus saw him strengthen existing arguments and quickly realise a revolutionary treatise that provides ongoing inspiration for state leaders and policymakers, intellectuals, academic researchers, and many others worldwide.?

Classical Marxism embodies a socialist theory that centres on the betterment of human lives in everyday regards. Marx empowers a new philosophy of praxis that prioritises the realisation of essential egalitarian outcomes through a specific type of revolution that serves as a catalyst for a complete restructure of an oppressed society.

In a review of socioeconomic and political factors that determine the elites’ status quo, this essay analyses classical Marxism using the concepts of self-consciousness and alienation, which Marx outlines in the critique of ideological manipulation and societal devolution. The author concludes by reviewing the theory’s impact on various audiences, as well as differing modes of adoption and avenues of intellectual progress.

Althusser, Gramsci, Lenin, and Lukacs are among those who saw the first significant developments in classical Marxism and will be critical review points in this essay. As a precursor, the reader should note that none of said thinkers/scholars sought to leverage the momentum of Marxism as a vehicle for religious critique. While accurate for a season, this reality changed in line with various applications. Marx’s ideas serve as a catalyst for progressive contributions in ideology, hegemony, and the context of social-class struggle.

Classical Marxism offers analytical observations that outline a dialectical vision for sustainable social change. Two examples include a materialist perception of society and [its] history; moreover, Marx’s definition of a social-class struggle between the proletariat (society’s base population personified by an oppressed working class) and the bourgeoisie (an elite capitalist class that controls wealth, politics, state leadership and security, in addition to all means of production through the strategic implementation, management, and development of an overarching superstructure). Bourgeois elites manipulate the proletariat’s ‘conscious perceptions’ to sustain the status quo and manage highly sustainable control systems and power structures.?

Marx’s seminal Das Kapital underpins classical theory by exploring the exploitation of social-class struggles in an industrial context. Marx notes productivity as the defining factor of a functional society in that it enables [all] demographics to balance their social relationships and thus realistically achieve economic stability regardless of ideologies [not] being present across the workforce. For Marx, religion is rooted in the continuance of egalitarian social relationships for those living within a productive society, as is broadly defined in classical theory by those who facilitate production, thus overseeing it, as well as creating and sustaining a market. In a review of what Marx refers to as unpaid labour, there are two co-dependent factors in the equation:?Extract surplus value > Reacquire surplus value.

Elites empower what the author refers to as ‘exploitative symbiosis’ that we observe through the fetishisation of commodities and control over the population’s social interactions (one way to realise cyclical commercial interest and a diversified investment proposal). The production rate must be the principal priority; otherwise, severe social issues will develop and tip the scales, inspiring many systemic issues that underpin what most academics and professionals agree is a "permacrisis" for British society at present, as well as national workforces and public/private sector leadership across the Western hemisphere. While the author does not intend to suggest that the United Kingdom might stand as a testament to what Marx outlines, it does beg the question and perhaps set the stage for future analysis.

Classical Marxism delivers a framework that meets the political objectives of many modern-day egalitarians, hoisting the potential of socialism in line with a materialist analysis of history. Marx suggests the proletariat must supersede the bourgeoisie in a workers' revolution that abolishes private property, expropriates capitalist classes, and, therein, the social class struggle. A Marxian restructuring of society entails collective ownership in all aspects of production and the cessation of all activities to generate private wealth, as this will ultimately serve to re-empower the [removed] elite superstructure, as is defined by the elite's overarching power and control systems. While Marxism proposes an egalitarian framework, it is common and logically preposterous to conclude that the abolishment of a social-class struggle will eradicate inequality overall. This paper turns to Marx’s earlier thought with a thematic review of his foremost intellectual influences, the Young Hegelians.

THE YOUNG HEGELIANS

The Young Hegelians were a group of European intellectuals with a range of notable figures within its ranks, many of whom came to publish important reactionary works relating to the legacy of their idol, the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). The group drew on Hegel’s postulation that the purpose/promise of history was the total negation of everything conducive to the restriction of freedom and irrationality (Engels, 1969, 10-11). On this basis, they formed radical critiques of religion and politics, which are highly visible influences on the formation of Marx’s earlier thought.

Bruno Bauer (1809-1882) was a prominent German theologian, philosopher, and historian who studied directly under Hegel. He attempts to explain the ambiguity of Christianity in the belief that the nearer that religious consciousness gets to [the] truth, the more it is alienated from it. Religious belief takes the truth that is only to be attained in self-consciousness away from self-consciousness and places it against self-consciousness as though it were something alien (McLellan, 1980, 58). The concept of alienation or estrangement is fundamental in Bauer’s thought. The term ‘self-alienation’ was coined by Bauer, although often attributed to Marx due to its everyday use among the group (Ling, 1980, 9). Marx elaborates upon Bauer’s work, claiming that class divisions cause social issues that directly result in said condition. Alienation occurs because, due to the exploitation of workers, they naturally externalise themselves in their work, meaning they objectify the world of labour, which quickly becomes alien and despotic. The effect of said alienation is the illusory consciousness that facilitates delusional [religious] beliefs that rob society of its identity and, thus, its inherent worth in a multitude of contexts.

“...the poorer he becomes [himself] in his inner life… the less he can call his own. It is just the same in religion. The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself” (Bauer cited in McLellan, 1987, 16).

The Young Hegelian Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) was a German philosopher and eminent anthropologist notable for essential works in a critique of religion that came to influence generations of thinking after his death. He was somewhat different in his approach to Hegel, critiquing reductionist approaches that define [wo]man’s essence as self-consciousness; moreover, he was essentially the first to ‘prove’ the connection of philosophical idealism with religion (Engels, 1969, 20-8). In rejection of Hegel’s philosophy, Feuerbach advocates materialism as a critique of religion and other forms of idealism. He emphasises upon [wo]man's individuality and complete biological nature. He defines thought as purely contemplative and reflective processes, which ironically underpins his idealistic ‘understanding of history’ (Engels, 1969, 20-7). Feuerbach claims that Hegel’s position is one of rational mysticism, that no ontological distinction exists between humans and the divine, specifically that said relationship was being conceived upside-down (Ling, 1980, 8). He positions religion as “the dream of humanity” that observes God through projection, which aligns with a definition of the same in clinical psychology, where [a] perceiver objectifies their characteristics, identifying the same - externally - in the classical God of monotheism, which through systematic theology and ecumenical tradition will emerge as abstractions that belong to an illusory realm (Engels, 1969, 21).?

Marx aligns with Feuerbach’s description of [wo]man’s ontological relations and agrees that circumstances are upside down in his early criticism and thought on religion, as well as other ideologies that feature throughout Feuerbach’s address. While a primary influence of early Marxist thought, it is essential to note that this friendship stood the test of time. Marx served as an ongoing source of inspiration for Feuerbach, per said conception of the divine as an illusionary reality. Other significant parallels that bolster Feuerbach as a chief influence[r] of Karl Marx include the latter’s perception of ideologically driven establishmentarianism and his concept of [the] human essence. Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel’s idealism paved the way for Marxist thought and other critical contributions. Marx outlines 11 key areas of focus alongside persons of particular interest in [his] Thesis on Feuerbach, which this essay uses to structure analysis.

Marx accepts Feuerbach's opposition to traditional theologies, claiming that humans create concepts like the imago dei (image of God). A distinctive contribution from Feuerbach argues that worshipping God diverts people from enjoying human powers, which Marx reimagines within the socioeconomic framework of production - pending liberation. While accepting much of Feuerbach’s account, Marx criticises his failure to realise why societies inexorably fall into religious alienation, in addition to elaborating on transcendence. Marx proposes religion is a critical response to alienation in a society’s everyday or material life that people cannot be without until humanity observes global emancipation; at which point, religion will wither as a [redundant] relic of a time gone by, per The Communist Manifesto.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s (1770-1831) philosophy was revolutionary. His many works still inspire the nation’s best and brightest to flock in pursuit of an intellectual legacy like that of an esteemed national treasure. Hegel presents objective idealism in his investigation of laws of the dialectic, which was groundbreaking for European discourse, as can be seen in a plethora of subsequent works. Hegelian examinations of history were a product of the Geist (absolute human consciousness) and paradoxical estrangement from itself. Marx thought that Hegel had found a general law of history in the dialectic, explaining history as a process of alienation, the consequence of economic and materialistic factors. From this, dialectical materialism emerges with an interpretation of history framed by a [social] class struggle rather than a mode of radical national antagonism (Cooper, 1996, 24). Marx writes against Hegelian idealism and employs Feuerbach's focus on materialism, although he avoids criticising Feuerbach for his positively similar abstracted individualism. Unsatisfied with his analysis, Marx returns to the previously critiqued Hegelian approach and adopts both concepts of historical review and humankind (Raines, 2002, 75).?

Marx's principle was to ‘establish a world with heart’ in response to the depiction of religious ideology as ‘the heart of a heartless world’. Using what the author describes as a philosophy of praxis that centres on the problematic nature of illusionary realities, Marx seeks a natural solution by uncovering the aspects which give rise to illusion rather than reforming it as Hegel’s concept of sublation suggests (to negate and preserve inner truth). Classical Marxist thought entails a comprehensive revolution of delusion and anything that suppresses human essence, which he defines as [human] interrelationality. Hegel’s philosophical works are an attempt to summarise the essence of the [entire] history of philosophy; as such, Marx’s critique extends to the philosophy of science.

He concludes that philosophical inquiry cannot answer questions it raises because they become practical and thus inherently unphilosophical by raising them. Marx seeks an earthly or ‘material means’ of revolution that removes metaphysical possibilities. After identifying and demonstrating that Hegel’s conception of the modern state was rooted in bourgeois economics, Marx identifies Hegel’s position(s) on matters of political economics, where he forms an intellectual attack on bourgeois systems as a severe expression of inhumanity, as they facilitate [self]oppression through production that reinforces an elitist superstructure - which owns all production and wealth. It follows that an inherent form of top-down ownership impedes socio-utility among the workforce that leads and oversees production.

Marx undoubtedly built the foundations of his philosophy through interactions with said intellectual group. However, his goal was to remove anything restricting [wo]man's freedom, which forces any form of irrational thought—before Marx’s materialist perspective and empiricism combined with the initial contemplations of - Young Hegelians - Bauer, Feuerbach and Hegel, Classical Marxism first noted religion as the causation of a delusional mindset. In a review of his emerging socioeconomic observations, the shift to pragmatic philosophy, and an active approach to revolution, the author notes a decline in Marx's focus on religion entirely. Ideology remains an issue as it detracts [wo]man from reality; nevertheless, religion was born in a new light, and Marx began to consider it both positive and functional, contrary to his earlier writings.?

Marx’s responses to Bauer aptly demonstrate a disconnect in thought from his Young Hegelian peers, notably dialogue on 'The Jewish Question'. Bauer postulates that Judaism is a barrier to emancipation as a continuum of anti-religious treatise. His work, overall, lent a more significant focus to the Christian state of Germany and political emancipation, positioning religion as a restrictive factor (Raines, 2002, 45). In response, Marx makes a clear distinction between the nature of political and human emancipation, stating that the former did not give rise to anything more than itself; therefore, the latter must be the crux of a worker's revolution. In breaking from the anti-theistic thought of Hegel’s impressive intellectual fanbase, Marx promotes religion's function and explicitly states that political emancipation was compatible with the ongoing existence of religion (Raines, 2002, 49).

Such absolutes present greater depth and justification in the emergence of Classical Marxism; however, the pertinent factor of dialogue on The Jewish Question outlines Marx’s perception of religion as a beneficial societal function. Bauer’s displeasure of religion not being made to serve and benefit the state - as it did the individual - was nearly irrelevant for Marx because, within the society, he could observe and thus built his theory upon, public and private worship operate the same for working-class people in that it facilitates order and a symbiotic existence while offering a framework for sustainable social relationships. Although not a favoured institution, Marx pragmatically accepts religion in the knowledge that a perfect solution seldom exists in an imperfect world.

HUMANITY’S [FIRST] OPIUM CRISIS

Marx’s rhetoric perhaps found inspiration in the First Opium War between Great Britain and China (1839-1842). Before contemporary developments, an atheistic perception of Marxism took shape through a mainstream understanding of a strictly socioeconomic system that starkly contrasts with social idealism and all theocentric/theocratic systems. A ‘God-centric’ system incorporates and thus engages metaphysical aspects (i.e. paradise, nirvana), products of alienation - a specific type of self-alienation, to be exact. Marx critiques: “The negative process by which a subject makes himself other than himself by a constraint which is capable of being removed on the initiative of the subject himself” (Chiodi, 1976, 80). Self-entrapment observes robust and continual reinforcement due to a societal factor of severe dependency. To delude oneself in the observation of false realities, irresponsibly allowing the [self] possession of false consciousness; moreover, relying on this for happiness is an injustice for Marx. Therefore, he came to perceive religion as a “Transformation, indeed a deformation, of reality” (McLellan, 1987, 162). He elaborates that everyday experience determines human consciousness; subsequently, any manipulation of everyday life logically results in a false consciousness: “It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness” (Engels and Marx, 1976, 37).

Extending on psychology and the proletariat’s submissive mentality, Marx notes that false consciousness often emerges due to the traps of “herd consciousness” (Engels and Marx, 1976, 44). He refers to the type of consciousness communities nurture through interpersonal engagement, suggesting this is a product of socio-religious actors and influences of the same origin. On the contrary, Marx reports positive outcomes within said religiosity, albeit an act of self-alienation.?

As an intellectual moralist, Marx found himself on the road to hypocrisy as he idealistically sought to rid society of [all] inequalities, particularly in the (sub)proletariat, where the segments of society who are sick, homeless, and effectively perishing did gain essential value [solely] from religiosity (Raines, 2002, 5). This thought-based conflict succinctly characterises one of many contradictions that Marx wrestles with throughout his work. He did not perceive some rituals, such as select hymns featuring at mass to help actively legitimate oppressive sociopolitical structures with a form of religiously sanctioned propaganda, to be what the classical God of monotheism intends for His beloved children. Moreover, when it is in the hands of the exploited [sub]proletariat, Marx considers religion to be an “Expression of - and protest against - real suffering” (Raines, 2002, 6).

"Religion is the sigh of oppressed creatures, the heart of a heartless world, the spirit of a spiritless condition. It is the opium of the people" (Marx, 1975, 79).

Marx uses metaphorical language about an almost universally applied, no less very effective, medicinal substance while creatively alluding to connotations of addiction. Classical Marxism's principal tagline uses language to represent the alleviation religion offers in the context of class-based exploitation, temporarily disabling the reinforcement of oppressive socioeconomic structures like commodity fetishism and dehumanisation at work. This particular brand of opium is the [only] path of lesser resistance, taken by those subject to tyranny, people(s) who seek a way to bear the continual disorientation of self-alienation. In classical Marxism, religion is thus an ethically viable form of escapism. In principle, however, it is not ideal for Marx as a prerequisite for delusion.

Nevertheless, delusion presents a productive strategy to realise happiness in a world that centres on production under an elite social class unless a workers' revolution empowers the proletariat to overcome bourgeois power structures. Without the potential of any such revolution, Marx would likely view religion with a [more] absolutist critique that centres on his materialist perception of historical recurrence. There would be little to no use for delusion, pending drastic changes to civil liberties.?

Marx develops the idea of objectification as an illusory belief: “The objective essence of religion, particularly Christianity, is nothing but the essence of the human, particularly Christian feeling; the secret of theology, therefore, is anthropology” (Ling, 1980, 8). The abolition of religion as an illusory happiness is the demand for [a] society’s real happiness. Calling on them to give up illusions inherent to their condition is to call upon them to give up what requires illusions (Marx, 1975, 175).?

Marx postulates that people are the creation of organic circumstances and the creators of such circumstance(s). The author describes this as a state of paradoxical symbiosis. People create religion and become dependent on it in an infinite cycle of rebirth reminiscent of classical theologies of reincarnation - suffering shall ensue until society reaches a period of enlightenment. Religion serves as a form of self-consciousness for members of society who have not seen success in discovering their innate self (an unexplained abstraction). However, humans are not abstract beings lingering somewhere external to said earthly context; they are the state, a society that populates and orders the planet it currently inhabits. A combination of state and society produces religion, at least when we accept it as an inverted consciousness because it exists within a form of inescapable dependency. Religion is a generally accepted world theory in its numerous forms: the satisfaction of reason, moral sanction, and [a] universally applicable framework for consolation and justification. Marx describes these as: “The fantastic realisation of the human essence. The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion” (1975, 175).?

The idea that [wo]man makes religion is demonstrative of a more sinister proposal, which is that circumstances and creation are inherently false, a mere product of continual and absolute misdirection, which can only ever logically have one possible facilitator, those who do not belong to the social class observing the respective falsehoods. As such, Marx considers religion a means of producing an alien product devoid of an inherent link to human nature or the working class' lived realities. This outline of such horrific worker conditions across the board indicates a societal dependence on illusionary factors rooted in religion. It is a product of top-down manipulation by the elite to control its baseline resource.

“If in all ideology men and their relations appear upside-down as in a Camera Obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process” (McLellan, 1995, 13).

In conclusion, the discussed class struggle is responsible for mass objectification and an upside-down society. However, religion is merely an opium of the people, a means of ongoing production and survival; it is not the genesis of complex social conundrums or [self] manipulation. As Feuerbach suggests, whether [wo]men are creationists becomes redundant if we reach certain junctures.?

The classical notion of alienation presupposes a human essence from which humanity can be alienated, an original [untainted] way of living from which humans can be removed. Any such non-alienated state of being is unrelated to metaphysical states of existence - it is, in fact, very down to Earth. Engels said it best with a proposed truth built upon logical deduction(s): “The essence of [wo]men is no abstraction… It is the ensemble of social relations (1969, 7).?

Many perceive Marx as a proto-sociologist because his works perceive an inherent linkage between society's material and psychological realities. He defines the human essence by peoples’ socioeconomic relations with others, a productive relationship but an exploitative one stuck in the historical context of a social class struggle. “Man cannot enter into an authentic relationship with himself except on the condition of entering into a particular relationship with others” (Chiodi, 1976, 128). Initially, religion for Marx was the fantasy of alienated humans; however, he repositioned it entirely with a social class-based ideology that would naturally become redundant through the realisation of The Communist Manifesto (1848). Marx’s understanding of religion was initially critical of an absolutist institution but not of faith as a means of social utility.?

Marx’s later meditations consider the class struggle as a precursor, the causality of condemned faith-based structures until the religious institution morphs into a more functionalist machine. As noted, Marx ironically came to define this conundrum with analogous language that centres on dependency - a first cause responsible for society's ongoing delusion and its reinforcement as per strategic elitist agendas. Therefore, religion is not an inherently foolish or valueless pursuit for the proletariat. The situation in which we observe religion in action through the lens of Marxist thought, with severe limitations in a sociopolitical capacity, unquestionably creates complexities, including misrepresentation in the relationship between religion, real individuals, and their society.??

"Religion is symptomatic of the problem with meaning that needs deciphering through deep reflections on genealogy" (McLellan, 1987, 160).

There are problems with Marx’s thesis on religion and sociopolitical alienation. Among various troublesome points is his relativist attitude towards consciousness, as Marx views this as some form of socio-historical relic. If the value of consciousness is relative to each society, then Marx must also be within that which he outlines. The author concurs with many mainstream scholars in suggesting that his ideas cannot reasonably taken as an objective measure of individual or shared realities of human consciousness.?

Marx acknowledges religion can also be a form of protest against alienation and exploitation; however, it does not follow Marxian thought in the implication that there could be good and bad religion(s), morally robust, or corrupt politics (McLellan, 1987, 168). The same lack of clarity and continuity are present in his contemplations of religion over time: “The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of the vale of tears, the halo of which is religion” (Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, 176). This critique of alienation as an epiphenomenon of [actual] social realities, lives that exude abstraction and promote superfluousness, largely hinges on the acceptance of Marx’s definition of human essence, moreover, his evaluation of human relationality in the socio-historical context.

Developments ensued for over 100 years and saw Marxism’s doctrinal emergence as the driver of a mass socio-political movement. His theory saw the introduction of new radical perspectives that would ensure classical Marxist concepts and critiques of religious ideology became subject to distortion due to political factors.

Following his departure from German intellectualism, Marx did not discuss ideology at any notable length; his friend Engels was primarily responsible for the systematisation of Marx’s work. It is important to note that Engels alludes to ideology considerably more than his colleague (McLellan, 1995, 19), and the author notes it is predominantly in the context of history and philosophy rather than attempts toward direct and thus definitive analysis. Marx was arguably minimal in his consideration of ideology compared to many of his peers. It is reasonable to suggest - as many scholars acknowledge - that a large amount of what officially remains the product of Karl Marx is potentially not - entirely - his; instead, more likely, a redaction of Engels', with weak additions that blatantly flag this potential reality. Such includes his inarticulate conception of consciousness and a negative outlook on religion. For Engels, there is a strong link between ideology and ignorance that reflects the influence of rationalism. The ideological thinker’s false consciousness is apparent because the forces that guide them are both unknown and understood at the same time. Henceforth, its nature is ideological, and thinkers can only ever imagine false forces around them (Engels and Marx, 1962, 459).

Engels describes religion as “The erroneous, primitive conception of men about their own nature and external nature surrounding them” (Engels, 1969, 55). He carelessly oversimplifies the nature of ideology and its power as a mode of social mobilisation, clearly with a negatively biased view in that he connects it with thought detached from reality as a testament to a state of ignorance. Engels had the opportunity, means, and motive(s) to edit at least some of Marx’s work prior to its revelation. Subsequently, an important question emerges:

How much of classical Marxism reflects the thought of Karl Marx??

It is conceivable that there are insertions to Marx’s work based on correspondence between him and Engels. This essay now considers the development of classical Marxism from successive scholars, featuring key contributions that cover various contexts, including ideology, hegemony, and [the] social-class struggle.

Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924) showcases a neutral conception of ideology in a famous pamphlet, offering an arguably simpler version of early Marxist thought. There is no midground, merely a choice: bourgeois politics or socialist ideology. We have yet to create a third widely accepted framework from which new socio-political ideologies can form. In the spirit of human progress, this flags for moral corruption, particularly in societies torn apart by class-based antagonisms, as there cannot and logically will not ever be a non-class or post-class ideology that can be implemented at the core of a society, likely not even beyond a small community. Henceforth, to belittle socialist ideologies in any way, to turn them aside in the slightest degree, is to strengthen bourgeois ideology (Lenin, 1963, 156). The two distinct forms of ideology he outlines are not the same as the consciousness of the classes to which it belongs. In ‘What is to be Done?’ Lenin states, “History of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its effort, can develop only trade-union consciousness” (1963, 149). Therefore, socialist ideology is only brought to the working class by some external body, an experienced group aware of the social issues present and the political realities that threaten society - revolutionaries of a sort (1963, 157). If left unchecked, the proletariat becomes subject to bourgeois ideology. Lenin claims that the development of the working class inexorably leads to the subordination of its various segments. The spontaneous working-class movement is trade unionism, from which bourgeois ideology functions to enslave workers to their masters (bourgeoisie).

Mainstream scholars often consider Georg Lukacs (1885-1971), a Hungarian Marxist philosopher, to be the founder of Western Marxism, which determines whether a view is ideological based on the social class who possess it: “The bourgeoisie was quite unable to perfect its fundamental science, its science of classes... The barrier which converts the class consciousness of the bourgeoisie into ‘false consciousness’ is objective: it is the class situation itself” (1971, 5).?The superior position of the proletariat did not make top-down views less ideological so much as it did scientific. Lukacs suggests that the proletariat’s degree of class consciousness is [a] proof of ideological maturity (cited in McLellan, 1995, 23), a consciousness they develop and enrich through ideological expressions that further serve to liberate (1971, 258).

For Lukacs, this ideology was proven valid through its emancipation under religion. He differs from Lenin in his treatment of ideologies, noting that the proletariat's acknowledgement cannot be due to a phenomenon he calls “reification”. Lukacs’ notion is linked to totality in that the division of labour and the commodification of social relationships deliver: “The destruction of every image of the whole” (Engels and Marx, 1962, 459). The specialisation of labour and the atomisation of society meant that people and the world around them became seen as discrete entities with no innate connection (McLellan, 1995, 24). In a reified world, there are no particular subjects or real choices, only those Marx labels as illusionary. Lukacs seeks liberation in the proletariat's adoption of a standpoint that observes the whole and questions if the system is, in fact, immovable. Lukacs notes that capitalism had not yet reached a point where the proletariat could manipulate and destroy reification, thereby initiating a new ideology, social order, and social existence. Religion must only exist to serve society for Lukacs because the adoption of religion was forcible; therefore, the nature of social dependency features corrupt facilitation (echoes Marx on the need for a workers' revolution).

Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) was an Italian Marxist philosopher and politician who came to assume positive/neutral outlooks on Lenin and Lukacs, respectively, nevertheless devoting considerable time to discussions on the concept of ideology, its history, and contemporary influence. Gramsci distinguishes between organic and arbitrary ideologies. Organic types organise human masses and create terrain where [wo]men move and acquire consciousness of their position, collective struggle, and beyond (1971, 337). Gramsci’s paradigm for this broad sense of ideology was religion, which he observes, like ideology, as that which produces: “A unity of faith between a conception of the world and a corresponding norm of conduct” (1971, 326). Gramsci also drew a close connection between ideology and hegemony. The perception of the ruling class, produced by elitist intellectuals, produced an image of that class as the whole of society, as it supposedly represented ‘the structure of feeling’ in which it lived (Williams, 1977, 132).

Gramsci notes that capitalist-driven ideological hegemony functions [only] to repress working-class initiatives, concluding it is “even possible to affirm that present-day Marxism in its essential trait is precisely the historical-political concept of hegemony” (Davidson, 1977, 260). In reflection on how capitalism survives within the framework of Western democracies, Gramsci explains the logical impossibility of proletarian revolution while the bourgeoisie exercises its [own] cultural hegemony.

In order to overcome what Marx called the status quo, working-class people have to produce an alternative and highly competitive hegemony that demonstrates the following:?

An egalitarian solution of mutual interest for each segment of society that is logically better than the established order.?

The former on the basis of egalitarian links with Marx, as does the latter in a positive perception of religion as a “form of protest”, the people’s cry for genuine happiness. Religious ideology for Gramsci is, therefore, a positive social function which can and does serve as a means of developing competing emancipatory hegemonies.?

French Marxist philosopher Louis Pierre Althusser (1918-1990) is consistent with the main empirical observations noted on ideology, particularly Gramsci’s hegemony. However, he differs sharply from Lukacs in that he is an anti-historicist and no less anti-humanist. Althusser has two central positions concerning ideology:

A strongly determinist views of society perceive each member as having a social role rather than an autonomous existence and a strict separation between ideology and science (McLellan, 1995, 28)

Althusser demonstrates disinterest in ideological falsehoods, finding fascination in a review of function or empirical performance. He outlines a quasi-material existence, a product of human minds that define their thoughts and, thus, their actions. Althusser believes this is intrinsic to what he calls an ideological state apparatus, which consists of churches, schools, trade unions, and the like (McLellan, 1995, 28), which is also highly reminiscent of Marx's elitist superstructure.

In ideology, [wo]men indeed express not the relation between themselves and their conditions of existence but the way they live that relation. This presupposes a real and an imaginary lived relation (1969, 233).?

Here, ideology is an illusionsionary natural force that determines how humans realise and invigorate social relationships. Althusser suggests that society possesses a permanent ideology, “Eternal, exactly like the unconscious” (1971, 160). If accurate, said reality actively ensures the formation of a system that unavoidably reinforces class-based domination, in which, as Gramsci highlights, the proletariat will see imprisonment through tyranny rooted in false ideas of cultural hegemony.

CONCLUSION

In contrast to the Young Hegelians, many of Marx's earlier contributions express his attitudes towards religious ideology, be it in response to Bauer’s inadequate - in fact, near irrelevant - attack on religion or Feuerbach’s static engagement of Christianity. Perhaps surprisingly, Marx was a reputed defender of religious ideology and often publicly intolerant of mistreatment by friends and fellow scholars. In his contributions that cover alienation, self-consciousness, and socioeconomics, be it in a materialist philosophical sense or an empirical review of societal relations; one thing is as consistent as it is transparent: Karl Marx sought to establish a theory that was strictly for the [equal] betterment of humanity in what he logically demonstrates as perhaps the most practical method possible. His only definitive, coherent criticism of religion is that it comprises an illusion, regardless of its liberating social function.

Marx’s acceptance of Feuerbach’s contemplations on the established order, notably the rationality of humans who embrace creation theology, aligns and thus gives weight to the author’s conclusion. Even Marx would have to admit that competent state leadership delivers egalitarian systems of service devoid of moral corruption in a diverse range of sociopolitical and sociocultural contexts. Moreover, religion is an essential facilitator of healthy social relationships in these contexts. The organic behaviours of individual people and, thus, society cannot escape their inherent social nature; the quintessential search for humanity - in ourselves and others - makes us more than animals. Within this nature, human beings require interpersonal communication, a system of maintaining connections with others, which society in the current period refers to as social relationships.

For Marx, religion is as practical as it is necessary, much like the application of opium to save lives in countless medical scenarios. Similarly, the principle for prescribing a medicinal drug prevails in contemplation of Risk vs Reward for those suffering. Like Opium, religion delivers short-term outcomes that can be contextually positive for the individual, lifesaving perhaps; however, it does not follow that said means of achieving a better state of existence are literally or metaphorically pure, actual, or danger-free.

Marxist theory was initially a source of hope where the light of revolution was yet to shine; therefore, the seminal contributions reviewed undoubtedly demonstrate religious ideology as an enriching lived reality for the masses, albeit an active state of delusion for those Marx actively seeks to liberate. If an early definition of radical pragmatism were present in socioeconomics - during the nineteenth century - it would be grounded in the thought of Karl Marx.

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