The Clarity of the China-Russia-Iran Trilateral and the Ambiguity of US Security Policies

Some believe that Iran’s influence will decrease due to the restrictions that could come with the anticipated nuclear deal with the Western powers – the US, Britain, France, and Germany – and Russia and China. However, the proponents of this view seem to have forgotten the huge implications of Iran’s membership of the China-Russia-Iran trilateral, albeit as its weakest link. Indeed, there is another school of thought that holds a dissenting view, believing that lifting the sanctions on Iran pursuant to the revival of the JCPOA, will release a financial windfall that will fuel Iran’s projects and ambitions. Furthermore, Iran’s membership of a military, political, and economic quasi alliance alongside major powers China and Russia will turn Iran into a regional hegemon more determined and violent in its quest to impose its system and ideology as part of the Persian Crescent project, especially in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Gulf, and beyond.

Over the outgoing week, all the players involved have stepped up the rhetoric surrounding their strategic positioning. On the US side, civilian and military officials revealed new security policies in the Middle East, in a comprehensive approach that confirmed US troops would remain in the region with adjustments to their areas of deployment. The US affirmed its commitment to the principles of determination, commitment, and cooperation reassuring its allies in the region, and affirming its ability to project power rapidly beyond its bases in the region to confront Iranian threats using ‘smart’ methods.

For its part, the Iranian leadership resorted to more than one method to assert its position in the strategic equations, flexing its military muscles on the field, and engaging strategically with major powers in a message of deterrence addressed to the US and the region’s leaders. Thus, the phone conversation between Russian President Putin and Iranian President Raisi carried a deliberate message that the two countries are discussing signing a comprehensive agreement similar to the 25-year pact signed between Iran and China, to complete a strategic Chinese-Russian-Iranian trilateral that could be further developed depending on how the relationship with the US and Middle Eastern powers – from Israel to the Arab Gulf states – would progress.

The agreement between Iran and Russia is not expected to be at the same scale as the Chinese-Iranian pact, yet it has interesting and specific implications, for example for Syria. The Russian and Iranian presidents agreed to step up their efforts to complete the deal possibly before the year ends. According to insiders familiar with the work of the drafting committees, the treaty would last at least ten years, and cover military, energy, and political cooperation where the two sides guarantee each other’s interests in multiple regions and issues.

Iran would be a large beneficiary and may even find itself in a very enviable position. Indeed, while the pact with China has had precious military and oil benefits for both sides, a comprehensive agreement with Russia would have the added value of Russia’s deep political involvement in the Middle East that could come in handy in Iran’s regional projects. If the Persian Crescent project is being implemented on the ground, the Syrian component of it definitely requires fundamental Russian-Iranian cooperation. In Syria, the Kremlin possesses the keys to Syria’s leadership through President Assad, while Iran possesses the keys to controlling Syria’s territory. One question is, who in Syria leads and who follows, Russia or Iran? As a result of the major agreements such as the one being drafted between Russia and Iran, part of the answer will lie in the shared objectives and partnership on the battlefield.

In Syria, this partnership intersects with the need to reshuffle the deck, amid a change in US policy, Israeli policies on Iran, and Arab openness to the possibility of welcoming Syria back to the Arab League. According to those pushing for the latter, there are two objectives for this openness: Countering Iran’s overwhelming influence in Syria to maintain Syria’s Arab identity away from the Persian lap; and capitalizing on Iran’s inability to finance the reconstruction of Syria, a necessary condition for its stability, to make Arab inroads into the country, weakening Iran’s expansion and the Persian Crescent strategy.

According to reports, Russia may implicitly not mind the reduction of Iranian influence in Syria. However, this will not be translated into a divorce with Iran. What matters for Moscow in the equation of reducing Iran’s influence versus reducing Assad’s influence, is Assad. As long as Moscow is not forced to make up its mind now, it is willing to play all musical notes in its Syrian symphony, be it Israeli, Iranian, or even American. If the Biden administration finds itself in need for a peaceful withdrawal from Syria without appearing to be handing over the country to Russia, the Kremlin is thus willing to ‘sympathize’ and facilitate this silently, and not gleefully, recalling the chaos of its withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Another question that arises in the context of the objectives of the China-Russia-Iran geopolitical trilateral, concerns Israel and the strategic equation between it and Iran in light of the agreements or pacts made between the parties to the trilateral. In other words, can China and Russia reserve the right to develop Iran’s military capabilities, as per their agreements, to the point that it could give Iran a military edge over Israel?

China and Russia’s relations with Israel do not suggest this is on the mind of their leaders. But the two giants could decide that reserving this right is necessary in the equation of their relations with the US, which under the Biden administration may appear less committed to Israel’s military edge – yet has kept this commitment in the grand US military strategy.

This outgoing week, the Biden administration will have launched its comprehensive approach to security policy in the Middle East, during Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s speech at the Manama Dialogue in Bahrain. The speech echoes remarks by US Central Command commander Frank McKenzie, at the National Council for US Arab Relations (NCUSAR). The Biden administration recently confirmed it did not intend to end “our permanent military presence in the region [that] has been guaranteed for more than 70 years, and this basic reality will not change”, while the Pentagon stressed that Iran’s continued threats require vigilance, and that protecting straits and waterways is imperative with continued destabilizing forces.

The US security rhetoric issued by several officials this outgoing week sets the stage for an important round of the nuclear talks with Iran on 29 November in Vienna. The rhetoric has summoned phrases such as “ongoing vigilance through presence and cooperation with regional partners”, singling out IRGC threats to the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and activation of its proxies to threaten the Gulf and the Middle East.

At the time of writing, Sec. Austin would not have delivered his speech in Manama yet, however, the main features of the address meant to announce the US security policy have been revealed in a chat with the press prior to the event. He said that the security policy in the Middle East is based on “determination, commitment, and cooperation”, revealing that the US will maintain tens of thousands of troops in its military bases in the region, and that troops will remain in Iraq and Syria, perhaps in a new form.

The Biden administration wants to adjust the map of deployment of US troops in the region, which it says are able to rapidly deploy and project power. It wants to reassure allies in the region that its focus on the confrontation with China does not preclude it from maintaining forces in the Middle East.

The Biden administration argues that a ‘smart’ way should be found to confront Iran’s continued security threats, but hesitates when the principle of deterrence is invoked despite its affirmation that it still applies to Iran. The Biden administration, according to the Pentagon official, believes that there is no military solution to the threats from Iran and its proxies. This is the fundamental contradiction between the Biden approach and the approach of his predecessor Trump, who held Iran responsible for attacks by its proxies and pledged to respond directly against Iran. Biden’s team do not want to use military language, whether to deter or to respond.

The psychological factor in the strategic positioning taking place is not to be dismissed, especially in the phase of improving negotiating hands and demands, or the ceiling of military threats prior to the resumption of the nuclear talks in Vienna. The Biden administration has launched a reassurance offensive targeting its partners in the Gulf, and perhaps a beautification campaign for what it intends to offer to Iran as part of the nuclear deal/lifting the sanctions. In Vienna, after all, it will be out of the question to raise the issue of Iran’s regional activities, based on the US and European surrender to this Iranian condition backed by China and Russia.

The Biden administration has chosen to send a regional message to the Gulf countries to complement the diplomatic credentials chosen by Biden as the main headline of his leadership. He wants neither escalation nor confrontation. For his part, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei wants to take advantage of this opportunity to forge strategic alliances that outlast any US administration, on the basis of “take more then demand more”, empowered by Iran’s membership of the emerging anti-American trilateral.?