Civilians in Conflict: Are they more at risk?

The civilian experience during conflict is often fraught with more devastation and risk than that of combatants. Civilians,[1] as defined by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, are: “unarmed people who are not active members of the security forces of the state, or members of an organized armed militia or opposition group. Government officials, such as members of parliament, governors, and councillors, are also excluded and are instead seen as representatives of the government of a state.”[2] Attacks that oftentimes result in civilian casualties and injuries can be catastrophic to communities in conflict zones, as they lack strategic protective measures. Due to the devastating nature of conflict, civilians are often displaced and/or forced to leave their homes, thus being subjected to abhorrent living conditions that may further exacerbate existing injuries or leave them vulnerable to disease.

Civilian Casualty & Injury Numbers

           Initially, in order to ascertain comparative normative data on civilian deaths, we must first look at the number of civilian casualties that have resulted from a conflict vs the number of combatant deaths during said conflict. What is the civilian casualty rate over the course of the conflict? How are those numbers calculated? Civilian casualty numbers are often either ambiguous or hyper-inflated due to a number of factors, one of which being the result of dissimilar research methodologies.[3]  Case in point, in trying to estimate a more accurate number of civilian casualties in Darfur, researchers had to compare 63 different mortality surveys that had been distributed.[4] Due in part to most of the survey research conducted in areas of conflict not being gathered by professional survey research analysts, but by journalists or people working for human rights organizations.[5] Data guesstimates can be innocently inflated as a result of this, or the guesstimates could purposely be hyper-inflated in order to achieve a political agenda. This was the case seen in Bosnia during the 1990s, in order to draw more attention to the suffering of the Bosnian people during the Bosnian-Serbian war.[6] Another reason the data may be skewed is that there was never any accurate data to begin with, based on where the area of conflict is located geographically. There exists too the possibility that some civilians fled the area or were kidnapped. The survey questions themselves being presented to the testing population could affect the numbers; for instance, were deaths due to injuries captured? Or even diseases that tend to run rampant in refugee camps?[7] 

           The following statistical data was relatively difficult to retrieve, as most civilian casualties and injuries are being recorded jointly, if at all. The Action On Armed Violence (AOAV) report on civilian fatalities due to explosive weapons shows that “In 2017, of all global incidents in which civilian casualties were recorded (2,856), civilian injuries went unrecorded in 54% of cases. In 2011, that figure was just 18%. And while, in 2018, the percentage fell to 46%, one thing is clear: globally the injured from explosive violence are not making the news.”[8] The UN reported in 2017, in a sample of 6 countries where conflict was present, that there were more than 26,000 civilian injuries or casualties recorded.[9] It is worth noting that in this same UN report, 529 humanitarian workers were either kidnapped, detained, injured, or killed in an area of conflict.[10] Humanitarian workers, doctors, journalists, and other healthcare workers also must be considered within data sets, as these individuals are sometimes forgotten to be civilians as well.

Injuries Sustained By Humanitarian Aid Workers

           While the amount of violence against aid workers is rising, the number of workers also correlates with that rising number, and those civilians who feel the call to humanitarian work face different daily dangers than civilians simply just living within a conflict zone.[11] Aid workers are often targeted by combatants for political reasons or simply because they have much needed supplies. Aid workers must remain neutral within politically charged areas of conflict in order to avoid taking on an activist role and thus making themselves targets. The lack of data mentioned previously for injuries sustained by civilians also encompasses aid workers here as well.[12] While aid workers know that there are certain risks they face to do their jobs, is it really worth it, even if the worker is 100% dedicated to helping civilians in areas of conflict? To quote Haitian epidemiologist Marie-Rosaline Darnycka Bélizaire, who is one of the aid workers combatting Ebola in the DRC, “It’s nothing special […] Everyone here knows it is dangerous, but we’re committed.”[13] It takes a very strong person with good mental health to voluntarily try to help out civilians embroiled within a current conflict area.

Misinformation – One False Move Could Yield Catastrophic Results

           When coalition forces are deployed to a conflict zone, how do they know who is a civilian or combatant? It is noteworthy that in 2008 the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) were to blame for 39% of civilian casualties in Afghanistan. Why? Bad intel was provided by corrupt Afghanis with personal vendettas to settle, which resulted in high numbers of civilian casualties.[14] One would presume that forces would have done more intelligence gathering rather than simply listening to members of a local population in an area known for long-standing disputes. Since the modern-day battlefield is now changing thanks to state-of-the-art technology, one would presume that civilian casualty numbers would be decreasing, as drone strikes could use a more targeted approach?  In looking at the skewed drone strike data from 2017 though,[15] a representative of the Pentagon, Major Audricia Harris, can be quoted as saying, “NGO reports of strikes attributed to the U.S. military, particularly their identification of civilian deaths, may be further complicated by the deliberate spread of misinformation by some actors, including terrorist organizations.”[16] So even with more technologically advanced weaponry, civilian deaths are still occurring. But the question remains, at what rates are civilians dying?

Condolence Payments – More Harm Than Good?

           When one initially hears of condolence payments being issued to the families of civilian victims, the initial reaction is to think of these payments as a compassionate response to a tragic event. Some would argue that this “grand gesture” conveys a sense of empathy. Thomas Gregory, however, states that “condolence payments should not be seen as a humanitarian gesture designed to recognize and respond to the suffering of ordinary civilians, but will argue that condolence payments should be viewed as a weapons system aimed at securing specific military goals.”[17] Essentially, condolence payments serve as a strategic maneuver to win over the “hearts and minds” of the local population in order to avoid retaliatory action.[18] What is most disturbing is there is no set monetary compensation in place so condolence payment amounts are discretionary. For example, one morally questionable situation involved a civilian man being given $145.90 for the unfortunate death of his son, while other families received between $2500-$3500 in condolence payments for deceased loved ones.[19] This practice is absolutely demeaning, and if it is to be continued in conflict zones, then coalition forces need to determine a set amount. At the same time, can a monetary value be tied to the loss of a human life? You cannot bring back the dead, and no amount of money will bring that beloved person back. This is just one of the many examples of why civilians are more at risk, because the archaic view of civilian casualties is that they are one of the unavoidable components of conflict and oftentimes an afterthought.

Civilian Illness in Conflict

           Oftentimes civilians feel like they have no other choice but to flee their homes in order to escape an area of conflict. Every year, these millions of civilians can end up in some form of camp or another, such as: “Internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, refugee camps, detention centres, transit camps, deportation camps, prisons and ghettos.”[20] While their stay is only meant to be a temporary, contained situation, many civilians can end up staying within these camps for years on end.[21] Camps are often overcrowded, making them breeding grounds for disease, especially if there is a shortage of hot water, sanitary means and supplies, or access to healthcare if they become ill as a result of these factors. Mental health of IDPs and refugees is also an at risk factor, as many are unable or not allowed to work and provide for their families, and they face the real and terrible possibility that they may never be able to return home.[22] The mental health of aid workers must also be considered in this situation as well. They too are subjected to the same conditions faced in these situations as well and it is imperative for them to build up a good social network in order to avoid burnout, anxiety, PTSD, or depression.[23]

Disease Transmission

           When there are extreme food shortages, civilians in conflict can face severe starvation and malnutrition, which could result in death. Lack of food and nutrients could also result in stunting, diminish mental development, infertility, noncommunicable diseases, as well as infectious diseases.[24] This threat of infectious disease is especially prevalent  currently in regards to COVID-19 spreading quickly through camps.[25] Herein lies the greatest evidence that civilians are more at risk than combatants because at least in this instance combatants can attempt to try and shelter in place somewhere. Refugees and IDPs have no means to practice social distancing within densely populated camps. They are potentially facing a death sentence with minimal options to avoid danger.

Conclusion

           The multiple factors contributing to the harsh living conditions civilians face during a conflict create a riskier environment for them than combatants. But what can be done to help them? Better technology, better research methodologies, more funding, and a better global understanding of numbers of civilians that are affected by conflict yearly is a starting point. In order to see a reduction in conflicts around the globe, a coalition of nations must pool their resources to fight against combatants and support those that are vulnerable.

Works Cited

Checchi, Francesco. 2010. “Estimating the number of civilian deaths from armed conflicts.” Lancet 375: 255–257.

Cooper, Helene. 2018. “U.S. Strikes Killed Nearly 500 Civilians in 2017, Pentagon Says.” The New York Times, June 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/us/politics/pentagon-civilian-casualties.html.

Dathan, Jennifer. 2019. “The challenges of conflict reporting – when injuries from explosive weapons don’t make the news.” AOAV, July 29, 2019, https://aoav.org.uk/2019/the-challenges-of-conflict-reporting-when-injuries-from-explosive-weapons-dont-make-the-news/.

Ericksson, Cynthia B. et Al. 2012. “Predeployment Mental Health and Trauma Exposure of Expatriate Humanitarian Aid Workers: Risk and Resilience Factors.” Traumatology 19 (1), 41-48.

Fast, Larissa. 2014. “The Dangers They Face: Understanding Violence Against Aid Workers and Agencies.” In Aid in Danger: The Perils and Promise of Humanitarianism, 68. University of Pennsylvania Press.

Gregory, Thomas. “The Costs of War: Condolence Payments and the Politics of KillingCivilians.” Review of International Studies, 46, no.1 (2020): 156-76. Doi: 10.1017/S026021051900038X.

Howard, Marjorie. 2015. “Counting Casualties.” TuftsNow, March 30, 2015, https://now.tufts.edu/articles/counting-casualties.

International Rescue Committee. 2020. “New IRC analysis reveals risk that coronavirus transmission rates in Moria, Al Hol and Cox’s Bazar refugee camps could outpace those seen on the Diamond Princess cruise ship.” Accessed May 4, 2020. https://www.rescue.org/press-release/new-irc-analysis-reveals-risk-coronavirus-transmission-rates-moria-al-hol-and-coxs.

Maxmen, Amy. 2019. “Battling Ebola in a war zone.” Springer Nature Limited, volume 570. Accessed May 2, 2020. PDF.

Nelson, Cassandra. 2014. “Life as a refugee: Spend the day with Nour.” Mercy Corps, March 14, 2014. https://www.mercycorps.org/blog/day-life-refugee.

Open Society Foundations. 2016. “The Strategic Costs of Civilian Harm.” June 2016, accessed May 1, 2020. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/uploads/1168173f-13f9-4abf-9808-8a5ec0a9e4e2/strategic-costs-civilian-harm-20160622.pdf.

Seybolt, Taylor B., Jay D. Aronson, and Baruch Fischhoff. 2013. Counting Civilian Casualties: An Introduction to Recording and Estimating Nonmilitary Deaths in Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press.

Turner, Simon. 2015. “What Is a Refugee Camp? Explorations of the Limits and Effects of the Camp.” Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 29, No. 2. (Oxford University Press) 139.

UN Humanitarian. 2018. “Civilians in war zones.” OCHA: volume 257. Accessed May 3, 2020. https://unocha.exposure.co/civilians-in-war-zones.

Uppsala Universitet. “Definitions.” Accessed May 1, 2020. https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/.

World Health Organization. 2020. “Q&A : Malnutrition and emergencies.” Accessed May 5, 2020. https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/q-a-malnutrition-and-emergencies

[1] The author determined to go with this definition for the purpose of this paper, rather than the International Humanitarian Law definition, as this one is more expansive.

[2] “Definitions,” University of Uppsala, accessed May 1, 2020,

 https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/.

[3] Taylor B. Seybolt, Jay D. Aronson, and Baruch Fischhoff. Counting Civilian Casualties: An Introduction to Recording and Estimating Nonmilitary Deaths in Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), Introduction.

[4] Francesco Checchi, “Estimating the number of civilian deaths from armed conflicts,” Lancet 375 (2010): 255–257.

[5] Taylor B. Seybolt, Jay D. Aronson, and Baruch Fischhoff. Counting Civilian Casualties: An Introduction to Recording and Estimating Nonmilitary Deaths in Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), Introduction.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Marjorie Howard, “Counting Casualties,” TuftsNow, March 30, 2015,

https://now.tufts.edu/articles/counting-casualties.

[8] Jennifer Dathan, “The challenges of conflict reporting – when injuries from explosive weapons don’t make the news,” AOAV, July 29, 2019, https://aoav.org.uk/2019/the-challenges-of-conflict-reporting-when-injuries-from-explosive-weapons-dont-make-the-news/.

[9] UN Humanitarian, “Civilians in war zones,” OCHA: Volume 257 (May 22, 2018): https://unocha.exposure.co/civilians-in-war-zones.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Larissa Fast, “The Dangers They Face: Understanding Violence Against Aid Workers and Agencies,” in Aid in Danger: The Perils and Promise of Humanitarianism, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 68.

[12] Ibid, 73-76.

[13] Amy Maxmen, “Battling Ebola in a war zone,” Springer Nature Limited, Volume 570 (2019).

[14] “The Strategic Costs of Civilian Harm,” Open Society Foundations, June 2016, accessed May 1, 2020, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/uploads/1168173f-13f9-4abf-9808-8a5ec0a9e4e2/strategic-costs-civilian-harm-20160622.pdf.

[15] This is cited as skewed because who knows what the accurate number really is, since this information has purportedly been deemed classified still.

[16] Helene Cooper, “U.S. Strikes Killed Nearly 500 Civilians in 2017, Pentagon Say,.” The New York Times, June 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/us/politics/pentagon-civilian-casualties.html.

[17] Thomas Gregory, “The Costs of War: Condolence Payments and the Politics of Killing Civilians.” Review of International Studies, 46, no.1 (2020): 156-76. Doi: 10.1017/S026021051900038X, Page 156. 

[18] Ibid, 159.

[19] Ibid, 158.

[20] Simon Turner, 2015. “What Is a Refugee Camp? Explorations of the Limits and Effects of the Camp,” Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2015): 139.

[21] Ibid, 142.

[22] Cassandra Nelson, “Life as a refugee: Spend the day with Nour,” Mercy Corps,  March 14, 2014, https://www.mercycorps.org/blog/day-life-refugee.

[23] Cynthia B. Ericksson, et Al, “Predeployment Mental Health and Trauma Exposure of Expatriate Humanitarian Aid Workers: Risk and Resilience Factors,” Traumatology 19 (1), (2012): 41-48.

[24] “Q&A : Malnutrition and emergencies,” World Health Organization, 2020,

https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/q-a-malnutrition-and-emergencies.

[25] “New IRC analysis reveals risk that coronavirus transmission rates in Moria, Al Hol and Cox’s Bazar refugee camps could outpace those seen on the Diamond Princess cruise ship,” International Rescue Committee, April 1, 2020, https://www.rescue.org/press-release/new-irc-analysis-reveals-risk-coronavirus-transmission-rates-moria-al-hol-and-coxs.