Civil Servants vs. Special Advisers: Shifting Dynamics in Indian Governance

In recent years, India has witnessed a growing trend of appointing special advisers, particularly in areas of public policy-making, instead of relying solely on traditional civil servants. This shift has generated significant debate regarding its impact on governance and its implications for the country’s administrative framework.

One of the key reasons behind this increasing reliance on special advisers is the need for expertise in highly specialized fields. As governance becomes more complex and issues like climate change, cybersecurity, and financial inclusion take center stage, the conventional skills of civil servants—while critical—often prove insufficient to address these challenges. Civil servants are generalists trained to manage various administrative duties but may not possess the technical knowledge or deep domain expertise required in these emerging areas. On the other hand, special advisers often bring a wealth of experience from academia, think tanks, or industry, enabling the government to craft more informed and effective policies. For example, appointing domain experts in ministries dealing with information technology or climate change has allowed the government to tackle issues with a degree of specialization that the regular bureaucracy may not offer.

Moreover, the fast-paced nature of contemporary policy-making has also contributed to the growing dependence on special advisers. Civil servants operate within a rigid bureaucratic structure, sometimes slowing decision-making processes. Special advisers, usually appointed on a contract basis and not bound by the same procedural constraints, can offer quicker inputs and are perceived to be more agile in responding to new challenges. This can be particularly beneficial when governments need to react swiftly to crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, where timely and expert-driven decisions are crucial.

However, this increased reliance on special advisers also raises concerns about accountability and undermining the traditional civil service structure. Civil servants are bound by well-established rules, regulations, and codes of conduct, which ensure transparency and accountability. They are also subject to long-term career trajectories emphasizing institutional memory and policy implementation continuity. Special advisers, in contrast, may not always be held to the same standards, given their temporary and non-permanent nature. This could lead to challenges in ensuring their actions align with long-term national interests rather than short-term political agendas.

Furthermore, the growing prominence of special advisers risks marginalizing the role of civil servants in policy-making. With their extensive knowledge of administrative systems and on-the-ground realities, civil servants bring a crucial perspective to governance. If their role is diminished, there is a danger of creating a disconnect between policy formulation and implementation. Policies designed by external advisers may lack the practical feasibility experienced civil servants can ensure, leading to ineffective or poorly executed initiatives.

In conclusion, while using special advisers in India’s policy-making process can bring in much-needed expertise and flexibility, it is essential to balance this with the strengths of the civil service. Ensuring that special advisers and civil servants work in tandem, with clear roles and accountability, can foster more effective governance without undermining the foundational principles of the administrative framework.