A Circuitous Path to Drone Safety

The Facts

The current press frenzy over “rogue drones” is only eclipsed by Orson Welles 1938 broadcast of “War of the Worlds” that caused a national panic. The subject of UAS safety and enforcement has been addressed by consecutive administrations and the aviation community over the last decade. In 2018, the Congressional FAA Reauthorization Act created testing and reporting mandates, and in 2019 the Aviation Industry created the Blue Ribbon Task Force on UAS Mitigation at Airports. In 2020 the Attorney General and FAA provided guidance and the “Drone Response Playbook for Public Safety.” In 2021 the FAA commissioned Woolpert consultants, through the National Safe Skies Alliance, “Airport Response to Unmanned Aircraft Systems” and required all Part 139 (passenger) airports to have Airport Response Plans that including law enforcement integration. The capstone event was the 2022 White House Domestic Counter-UAS National Action Plan, referred to the 117th Congress for enactment. This enacting legislation died in the 117th Congress and was reintroduced in the 118th Congress in 2023.

Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer recently declared he was sponsoring legislation to give state and local agencies authority to address drone abuses. Sorry Senator … that’s too little, too late. in May of 2023, Senate Bill 1631, “Safeguarding the Homeland from the Threats Posed by Unmanned Aircraft Systems Act of 2023,” was read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The accompanying bill in the House, H.R. 4333, also entitled “Safeguarding the Homeland from the Threats Posed by Unmanned Aircraft Systems Act of 2023,” was introduced in June 2023, to the House Judiciary: Transportation and Infrastructure: Homeland Security; Energy and Commerce. Since then, the bill has been through the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, Subcommittee on Aviation, the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence, the committee on the Judiciary, in addition to the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, Homeland Security, and Energy and Commerce. The bill remains in the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology since June 29, 2023. Otto Von Bismark was right in saying “Laws are like sausages …”

These bills enhance the authority granted to the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice with respect to UAS. In part, these bills (and four others) define the scope, jurisdiction, and elements of a national UAS response and enforcement infrastructure that includes state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement agencies. Let us briefly reflect on the elements that most affect public safety response. The entirety of these bills can be accessed at https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/1631/text and https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/4333/text, respectively.

Although this legislation is a great step forward (albeit well overdue), it is not a panacea. In both bills, Congress directs the Director of Homeland Security or the Attorney General, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Transportation, through the FAA, to on or after 180 days of the enactment of the bills, “may designate a combined total of not more than 12 State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies for participation in the pilot program, and may designate 12 additional State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies each year thereafter, provided that not more than 60 State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies in total may be designated during the 5-year period of the pilot program.” Really? Which 60 of our 1,000 SLTT agencies are going to be authorized to include UAS response, enforcement, and reporting into their policies and procedures? Five years of pilot programs to deploy national solutions … with all authorities expiring in six years?

Responders from those twelve initial agencies, as well as the 48 others over five years, would be trained, certified, and empowered with “ … all personnel undertaking any actions listed under this subsection are properly trained in accordance with the criteria that the Secretary and Attorney General shall collectively establish, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, the Chair of the Federal Communications Commission, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, and the Administrator of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration …”

The legislation goes on to authorize approved drone detection systems at any airport or critical infrastructure sites. Finally, the bills clarify the enforcement powers as:

“(A) During the operation of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft, detect, identify, monitor, and track the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft, without prior consent, including by means of intercept or other access of a wire communication, an oral communication, or an electronic communication used to control the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.”

“(B) Warn the operator of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft, including by passive or active, and direct or indirect, physical, electronic, radio, and electromagnetic means.”

“(C) Disrupt control of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft, without prior consent of the operator of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft, including by disabling the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft by intercepting, interfering, or causing interference with wire, oral, electronic, or radio communications used to control the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.”

“(D) Seize or exercise control of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.”

“(E) Seize or otherwise confiscate the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.”

“(F) Use reasonable force, if necessary, to disable, damage, or destroy the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.”

Although there are many aspects of these bills not covered, the preceding is intended to address the most important elements for an integrated federal-SLTT approach.

This Author’s Commentary

We have been engaged in researching the impacts of UAS on SLTT law enforcement, and public safety in general, for almost a decade. In 2019, at the Air Force Techstars Accelerator we commercialized that research into universal dual use (military and civilian) protocols and a multi-tier software solution to integrate air traffic control, C-UAS detection system signal data, 911 public safety answering points (PSAP’s)/ base defense operations centers (BDOC’s), and field SLTT law enforcement and security force responders. Also in 2019, the FAA Office of Airport Safety and Standards determined our solution was a law enforcement solution, not subject to the FAA’s prohibition on unauthorized C-UAS detection at airports.

In 2020, we engaged with the SAE G10T Laser Safety Hazards Committee to add cockpit laser illuminations to our mission. At that point we realized a singular focus on “drones” was not the most effective approach for law enforcement. At that point we redefined our mission as Low Altitude Airspace Response, Enforcement/Forensics, and [prosecution ready] Incident Reporting. From those experiences, our thoughts on the future of a national low altitude airspace safety effort includes:

? Acknowledging that this is not a federal problem. It is a federal legislative and regulatory issue, but a state and local law enforcement problem. Drones, the instrument of “airborne offenses” may be in federally controlled airspace, but almost all of the “violators” (operators) are on the ground and since 2016, the FAA has promoted state and local law enforcement to provide first response. If the 17,000 Commissioners, Police Chiefs, and Sheriffs are expected to be the force multiplier for federal agencies, they need to be engaged in the planning and policy development process through their professional organizations.

? If low altitude airspace safety is really a national priority, solutions need to be tested and deployed much faster than five years. The much more complex process of testing UAS countermeasures at five US airports, which was mandated in 2018, may have taken a few years to get started, but we understand the actual tests were completed in less than a year (unconfirmed). The clearly outlined authorities and requirements in this legislation is sufficient for SLTT agencies to develop the appropriate policies and procedures.

? The federal regulatory agencies need to set the legal parameters, but enforcement priorities, policies, and accreditation standards need to be established through the standard law enforcement agency procedures. Since bank robbery became a federal crime in 1934, local agencies and the FBI have done quite well without “federal policies” guiding local response and engagement. In the case of airspace violations SLTT agencies can already engage the operator, conduct the investigation, and submit the data to the FAA’s Law Enforcement Assistance Program (LEAP) office for prosecution. We don’t need legislation and pilot programs to develop a standardized local incident report that incorporates the FAA’s need for Congressional reporting data and the investigative data needed for adjudication.

? C-UAS detection and law enforcement responses are two separate, but integrated functions. C-UAS systems have significantly progressed, but are still highly proprietary. For effective enforcement, the real-time output needs be standardized with the Global Justice Extensible Markup Language (XML) Data Model (Global JXDM),which is an XML standard designed specifically for criminal Justice information exchanges. The probability of overlapping C-UAS detection events are increasing as airports, military bases, sports and entertainment venues, correctional facilities, and DHS-designated critical infrastructure sites deploy any number of proprietary solutions. Those overlapping detection signals need to be processed at the law enforcement response level, with AI/ML algorithms that aggregate duplicate detection signals, validate with LAANC and Remote ID, and determine the appropriate PSAP and responding agencies. The validated event needs to be introduced into legacy and Next Generation 911 system’s for triage, validation, and responding unit assignment.

? State, local, tribal, territorial, and campus law enforcement, as well as CONUS, Alaska, and Hawai’i military security forces, are essential to a comprehensive low altitude airspace response and enforcement model. FAA law enforcement special agents are extremely limited and occupied with investigating reported violations beyond UAS incidents. There are about 720,000 SLTT law enforcement officers (LEO’s) and over a million total, including federal and special agencies. Those officers, deputies, troopers, and agents serve in 17,895 law enforcement agencies. For planning purposes, we estimate about 500,000 LEO’s are assigned to field operations, traffic, and other “responder” categories. It is those responders who will serve as a force multiplier for the FAA and DHS.

Pilot projects aside, the overwhelming challenge is the training, certification, and empowerment of a hundred thousand 911 telecommunicators and a half million responders. Traditional training practices, such as classroom and train-the-trainer would likely be overwhelmed, requiring novel applications of online training and certification and AI/ML-enabled investigative applications and forensic capture. Embedded “Smart investigations” will minimize training and provide consistency in data capture.

? What is this national enforcement system going to cost, and who should be paying for it? Based on ROM pricing provided to a federal government agency, we estimate the yearly cost of a national low altitude airspace incident response, enforcement, and incident reporting system (not including C-UAS detection systems) is about $100mm. In comparison, the DOT National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 2024 budget of $1.3 billion provides more than $374mm in yearly state and territorial traffic safety grants. That doesn’t include millions in NHTSA research and other related expenditures. We believe a national UAS safety system can be deployed at a third of what is being spent by NHTSA on local traffic safety.

What does a national low altitude airspace response and enforcement system look like? First, we have “protected entities,” “response entities,” and “supporting providers.” Protected entities include airports, military airbases, government facilities, entertainment and sports venues, correctional facilities, energy facilities, critical infrastructure sites, and the public in general. It seems reasonable that the protected entities meet their share of the cost. The response entities, predominantly our 17,000 SLTT law enforcement agencies, including military security forces and other special agency responders, should logically be subsidized proportionally for increased calls-for-service costs. Supporting providers are generally C-UAS detection companies who contract with protected entities to provide the detection and related services. It is reasonable that those protection contracts include an apportioned amounts of the cost.

Conclusions

An effective low altitude airspace enforcement system is just as important as effective traffic enforcement on Interstate 5 or Interstate 95, and everything in between. Perhaps oversimplified, low altitude airspace safety and enforcement is arguably nothing more than three dimensional traffic safety. Imagine the impacts on interstate commerce if regulatory and enforcement weren’t unified, or completely absent. From 1899 when poor old Henry Bliss got smacked by a New York electric cab and became America’s first traffic fatality, it took 40 years to integrate our national highway traffic safety system. We don’t have 40 years, or for that matter four years, to get the low altitude airspace infrastructure in place.

From a law enforcement perspective, the FAA’s nearly decade-long request for an initial response from SLTT law enforcement is becoming more difficult. The traditional four or five mile radius of restricted airspace for airports, which was readily enforceable by law enforcement, is now based on FAA facility maps with over 13,600 grids that designate flight altitudes of 0’ through 400’. Even with Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC), enforcement by field law enforcement has been made implausible.

Finally, any national solution depends upon the 17,000 SLTT law enforcement agencies and their more than 500,000 first responders. Gaining the cooperation of the nation’s chiefs of police, sheriffs, and commissioners is not trivial. Professional organizations such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), National Sheriffs Association (NSA), FBI National Academy Associates, and industry organizations such as DRONE RESPONDERS, representing 10,000 public safety UAS users, and AUVSI, need to be engaged in policy and operational planning.

The Author

John D. Abbey is a retired Chief of Police from Silicon Valley, after 20 years in Southern California Policing. John is a graduate of the FBI National Academy, the California Executive Command College, and the Presidential/ Key Executive MBA program at Pepperdine University. John is an FBI-trained Law Enforcement Futurist and veteran of two decades of major crime investigations including narcotics, robbery/homicide, and special investigations. In the private sector, John has founded three startups, and has advised and partnered with Motorola, Andersen Consulting/Accenture, many public safety technology providers, and over 150 agencies.

To participate in SafeFlight’s ongoing research, John’s contact is [email protected].

? SafeFlight Corporation 2024