Churchill on Iran (Middle-Aged Churchill, 1914-1929) - Part 3

The Situation

As of Summer 2019, it would be accurate to characterize the situation in the Persian Gulf as extremely volatile. At the core is the strenuous relationship between Iran and a host of countries, some regional (Saudi Arabia) and others simply present in the region for economic and/or security purposes (the USA and UK). Much is being written on a daily basis about the sources of the recent conflagration and prospects for escalation between Iran and Western powers, possibly inflamed in part due to social media-based exchanges between US President Trump and Iranian officials. What would be Winston Churchill’s perspective on the current situation? Before we address this question, let’s examine the background and current situation in greater depth.

In contrast to North Korea, Iran’s ideology is not Communist in nature but rather based on a revisionist, fundamentalist interpretation of the Shia branch of Islam. The prevalent and publicized Iranian ideology (as put forward by the Ayatollah, the religious and most senior leader of the nation), is that of a strict denunciation of the West and its principles, primarily the United States and Israel as the Great Satan and the Zionist occupier (respectively), who are to be abolished as part of a global Islamic revolution. While leadership is split between the supreme religious leadership and the secular government, the ultimate policy is determined and shaped by the reigning Islamic council, then interpreted and executed by the government.

Unlike the people of North Korea, the Iranian people have enjoyed extensive exposure to the West, including the internet and western media, with the broad ability (for those trusted by the state and largely men) to travel and modestly experience the Western culture, before returning to an Islamic theocracy.

Since the early 2000’s it is commonly accepted that Iran has been aiming to develop nuclear capabilities (an activity that started years prior). This is part of a strategic plan to solidify their power in the region as an Islamic nation. Unlike Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States, Iran states that it does not aim to bear the torch of Islamic puritanism while simultaneously acquiescing to the American or Western powers, and holds itself to be the one true discipline of the Prophet Mohammad. In Iran’s eyes, a nuclear arsenal will provide far greater deterrence from Western occupation and plans to overthrow a threatening, unfriendly nation, such as in the case of Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, since the start of the 21st Century.

Theories that consider an integral part of Iran’s practical (as opposed to theoretical, ideological) agenda to include the annihilation of Israel and other regional threats may be misplaced. The Iranian regime seeks to strengthen its regional position and influence, not to commit ideological driven national suicide. An Iranian nuclear arsenal, if acquired, will not compete with that of others such as the US or even Israel. Its importance is its role as a strategic deterrent and not as an offensive weapon to be used except out of desperation. Outwardly from Iran’s perspective, these nuclear plans are positioned as non-military capabilities, for power generation and medical needs. Iran does not explicitly acknowledge any military nuclear applications, while the US has been the primary architect of efforts to prevent Iran from achieving sufficient enrichment capabilities (higher than those needed for energy generation) and accumulation of nuclear material, to allow for weapon development. 

The US does not stand alone in this effort, with Israel at its side, as well as a host of other Western countries such as the UK. In 2015 President Obama’s administration led the negotiation of the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal) under which Iran agreed to temporary limitations on enrichment abilities and accumulation of nuclear material, in exchange for a substantial, albeit temporary, reduction in economic sanctions, providing a great boon to the Iranian economy after many years of severe depression. The JCPOA was heralded at the time as an important diplomatic and security achievement, that placed effective (even if temporary) limitations on Iran’s nuclear aspirations, in exchange for economic relief, establishing that non-military options were, in fact, viable in dealing with such a nation.

In May of 2018, President Trump withdrew the USA from the JCPOA. While European allies remained committed to the agreement, in the eyes of the Iranian leadership, the essence of the agreement was nullified with American withdrawal, which brought with it the reinstitution of sanctions. Due to severe financial implications on its national economy, Iran has since notified parties it will resume enrichment of nuclear material, outside of the JCPOA limits, as a means of pressuring parties to alleviate sanctions. 

As of summer 2019, the hypothetical timelines expressed are that Iran may be in a position to build a nuclear weapon in a matter of a year. The precision of information and analysis is commonly agreed upon as critical to successful decision making. In this important matter we are faced with a timeline that is so short and an outcome so important that in parallel with efforts to substantiate the nuclear timeline analysis, the time for decisive action may be upon leaders. Iranian possession of a nuclear bomb will instantly provide it with a deterrent from occupation and overthrow, cementing its strength as a regional power. The implication of this is that if such a situation is deemed unacceptable, immediate decisions and actions are needed.

Meanwhile, as recently as July 2019 we witness an escalation of words and actions between the USA, UK, other Western countries, and Iran. These range from bellicose verbal threats, the sinking of commercial vessels, the downing of drones near the straits of Hormuz, to the capture of British warships. Iran has carefully escalated its tactical military engagements with Western and other nations in proximity to its southern maritime borders, as a demonstration of its ability to influence global economic stability, as an application of pressure on Western, non-American parties to reduce the overbearing US-led sanctions. 

How would Churchill view the alternatives for handling the Iranian situation?

The next part of this analysis then proceeds through the life of Churchill and finds him in the late 1920’s, early 1930’s, as a middle-aged man in his 40’s and 50’s. An experienced politician at this point who served as a minister of His Majesty's Government during the Great War (First Lord of the Admiralty, the Head of the British Navy) as well as a commanding officer fighting in battles across the Ottoman Empire (as a Major and then Lieutenant-Colonel), Minister of Munitions, Secretary of State for War, Secretary of State for Air, Secretary of State for the Colonies, then Chancellor of the Exchequer. Pre-WWII Churchill was a highly experienced politician whose tremendous breadth and depth will inform his perspective on Iran. 

Churchill was at that point in his life in his 40’s and mid-50’s, an experienced politician who held critical posts prior to, during and subsequent to WWI, enduring battles firsthand in the battlefields of the Ottoman Empire in Western Turkey. As a politician, Churchill witnessed the rearmament of Germany in the years after WWI and the Treaty of Versailles, before Hitler’s rise, and took an active role in strengthening the UK in the arms-race that saw Britain and Germany enhance their Navy, Army and Air Force capabilities. For purposes of the analysis, it is assumed that these experiences serve to inform his perspective only, and are not real-time influencers. As such, Churchill would not be constrained by the current military capacity of the United Kingdom, nor any electorate considerations.

The Churchill of this period retained much of the social, moral and psychological attributes of his younger self. Churchill was comfortable surrounding himself with other string minded individuals and did not seek shallow company in order to feel intellectually superior. People such as Frederick Lindemann, Brendan Bracken, Eddie Marsh demonstrate his continuous desire to find understanding through knowledge acquisition. Whether in a small forum as well as parliamentary and public debates, the highly eloquent and opinionated Churchill would engage voraciously, seeking the outcome of debate to resonate aloud. A quality we must account for in his style though is the preconceived understanding with which he engaged in topics. An intellectual on many subjects, Churchill would seldom arrive unprepared on a given topic. As dogmatic as he appeared, his decision-making process was far from rigid and, as mentioned he would engage others with all his energy in order for clarity and if merited, a new position to emerge. 

Further evidenced by current events and with the perspective of Iran over the past 30 years, Churchill would view Iran as an immediate and long term threat to regional stability, due primarily to the extreme religious and aggressively offensive nature of the country. He would see them as a direct threat to Iraq and Saudi Arabia, both predominantly Suni led nations with extensive belligerent histories with Iran (Iraq and Iran fought an 8-year war in the 1980s). Churchill would consider them indirect threats to Lebanon, Syria, Afghanistan, Israel and Yemen, amongst others. 

As such, he would adopt a stance focused on the eradication of their offensive capabilities, while providing assurances for their regional defense. In his eyes, while the Nuclear threat is more devastating in its destructive capacity, Iran’s non-nuclear maritime as well as a ballistic missile and proxy warfare capabilities via Hamas and Hezbollah are a far more severe immediate threat to others in the region and to global economic activity.

Churchill would seek to build a coalition of parties against Iran, while recognizing the need for timely, even unilateral action, without broad support. The battle, so to speak, would not be due to religious or even moral differences. Churchill would see the potential for drastic escalation of hostilities and a conventional war with Iran and its neighbors (geographical and resident). This, a result of strengthened offensive capabilities of Iran and their overt belligerency, due in part to economic hardship, but also ideological extremism, and the inability of other parties to moderate this behavior with economic sanctions alone. 

Churchill would aim to take action to mitigate the ascension of Iran to the status of a regional nuclear and reigning conventional powerhouse, even at the risk of a full conventional regional war, to mitigate the need for Western and friendly regional powers to counter a strategically stronger Iran. The goal would not be to impose a western, liberal style democracy in place of an Islamic theocracy (overthrowing the current regime), but rather to alter the balance of power that has in the past, currently affects, and will most likely continue to influence regional economic and political stability. The timeliness of proposed military action is to prevent Iran from strengthening its current capabilities with the strategic availability of nuclear and advanced conventional offensive weapons, thus presenting a fait accompli to regional and global parties, forced to deal with Iran at a different level.

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