Christianity in Africa: What's the Scorecard?

Introduction

Paradoxically, a number of published indices of social wellbeing, for example, relating to conflict, corruption and human development, appear to be quite significantly, inversely correlated with the extent of Christianisation of sub-Saharan Africa. However, deeper exploration raises questions about whether?correlation?is necessarily synonymous with?causation. Many influences are at play in creating prevalent social conditions in Africa, including colonial legacy, the ways in which Christianity was introduced by Western missionaries, culture, depth of heart transformation towards God and others, and the impact of different styles of Christianity on practical aspects of development.

Arguably, global measures of social impact also disguise a more nuanced understanding of ways in which Christianity has brought hope and positive change to individuals, groups and communities in sub-Saharan Africa.

This essay seeks to explore, at a more granular level, the influence of Christianity on life in sub-Saharan Africa and to make an assessment of the ‘scorecard’ of achievement.

Christianisation and indicators of social conditions and public life

Published data from the Pew Research Center indicates that in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, high proportions of the population identify as Christian.[1]?At first glance, it might be expected that Christian values lived out in so many lives would lead to positive measures of social wellbeing in those countries. However, in practice, this appears far from the case - indeed there is some degree of apparently?inverse?relationship. This essay, first of all, briefly examines three indicators – relating to corruption, conflict and human development - and their relationship with the extent of Christianisation of sub-Saharan African countries.

The Corruption Perception Index 2018 ranks 180 countries by various measures of corruption. Thirty-seven of 49 sub-Saharan African countries are ranked in the bottom 100. Twenty-two lie in the bottom 50. Yet 22 of the 37 countries ranked in the bottom 100 report Christian adherence at over 50% of the population.[2],[3]

For balance, it must be said that a small number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa are experiencing a different picture. In particular, the Seychelles, Botswana, Cape Verde and Rwanda are all ranked among the top 50?least corrupt?countries, with Namibia in 52nd?position. All of these countries report high Christian population percentages, in the 70s and upwards.[4],[5]

The Global Peace Index 2019 ranks 163 countries by measures of ‘peacefulness’. In this case, 33 of 49 sub-Saharan African countries are ranked in the bottom 100, and 18 in the bottom 50. Twenty of the 33 countries ranked in the bottom 100 have populations reported at over 50% Christian.[6],[7]

The Human Development Index (HDI), a “summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living”?[8], ranks 189 countries globally. This analysis makes for further problematic reading, with 38 of 48 sub-Saharan African countries ranked in the bottom 50. Of these low-ranking 38 countries, 22 have populations reported at over 50% Christian.[9],[10]

Whilst drawing attention to some significant negative data on conditions in Africa, it must be said that much writing also points to positive impacts of Christianity on African life. From the widespread development of schools and improved healthcare[11], to civic education in the slums of Nairobi[12], to literacy, teaching and learning in Sierra Leone[13], to peacebuilding in Sudan[14], Uganda[15]?and Burundi[16], to Archbishop Desmond Tutu and others’ world-renowned struggle against apartheid in South Africa[17], examples proliferate of inspirational efforts by individual Christians and Christian organisations to produce lasting change in African lives.

What are we to make then of this mixed and sometimes paradoxical relationship between the extent of Christianisation of countries and measures of social well-being? Is it too simplistic to assume a straightforward, causal relationship between the two? Is it more likely that some degree of apparently inverse correlation does exist, but that plausible explanations are most likely to be found through a multifactorial approach?

Interestingly, Abdulkareem Alhassan and Walter Ugwuoke attempt a rather complex statistical analysis of the relationship between corruption and extent of ‘religiosity’ in sub-Saharan Africa. It is important to note that the study related to religion rather than to Christianity specifically, but it is instructive in that it concluded that, “Religion is a significant determinant of the level of corruption in Africa. Also, Religiosity increases the level of corruption when there are no strong institutions in place”.[18]?Alhassan and Ugwuoke suggest that that acquisitive materialism has become a strong factor in African society to which religious communities are not immune.[19]

The next sections of this essay seek to explore a number of different factors which apart from, or intertwined with, Christianity, may influence the quality of public life in Africa.

Christianity and development

In seeking to understand the impact of Christianisation on social conditions in Africa, it is important to recognize that Christianity is not a homogenous concept in terms of practice; there are many different streams (Pentecostal, Catholic, Anglican, Baptist, African Initiated Churches, etc.) with varying approaches to community engagement and development. Pew Research Centre reports that while all mainline categories of Christianity have grown significantly over recent decades in Africa, “even by African standards, the Pentecostal boom stands out, and many of Africa’s most populous and politically significant countries reflect this trend”.[20]?Ogbu Kalu echoes these comments, noting that the Pentecostal movement has grown rapidly and continuously, attracting “attention and concern”.[21]?Given this extraordinary growth and the distinctives of the Pentecostal movement, it is instructive to pay some attention to its possible impact on social conditions in sub-Saharan Africa.

Paul Gifford, in his analysis of Pentecostalism in Africa, suggests sweepingly that, “All Africa’s Pentecostal churches originate from the same idea: a Christian is destined for victory in every aspect of life, which includes material prosperity”.[22]?In relation to development issues, Gifford argues that there are six identifiable ways in which African Pentecostalism is seen as potentially contributing to success and wealth: (1) Motivation to succeed; (2) Entrepreneurship; (3) Practical skills for personal living and for business; (4) Faith gospel, claiming what is already yours; (5) Anointing of the Pastor as the ‘Man of God’; and (6) Defeating the spirits blocking personal advance.[23]?Gifford suggests that focusing on the first three of these dimensions may well lead to positive outcomes. More broadly, Peter Berger, believes that the spread of Pentecostalism is analogous to a new form of ‘Protestant work ethic’ and therefore advantageous to development.[24]?However, Gifford argues that the effect of pursuit of the remaining dimensions (4-6) – which he regards as more prevalent - is counterproductive in that it can lead to a focus on self rather than the wider community, lack of moral responsibility and sense of personal agency, discounting of scientific rationality, an underestimation of the value of hard work and an overdependence on the ‘Big Man’.[25]

In terms of social engagement and development, Gifford argues that Catholicism is the “biggest single development agency on the continent. No other single body can rival its involvement in health and education”.[26]?Yet, he continues, “The more Catholicism has opted for development, the more it has ceased to cater for or appeal to Africans with an enchanted religious imagination”.[27]

Afe Adogame in a robust critique and response to Gifford, writes:

"Even if one were to take Gifford’s idea of development and modernity with a pinch of salt, it is evident that some African Pentecostal and charismatic churches have made and continue to make giant strides in this direction – as sustainable health care providers and purveyors of education".[28]

Philip Jenkins argues that there can be an artificial distinction between the spiritual and the practical, day-to-day lives and imperatives for Africans. He writes:

"Yet readings that appear intellectually reactionary do not prevent the same believers from engaging in social activism…..Deliverance in the charismatic sense can easily be linked to political or social liberation and the two words are of course close cognates".[29]

Another relevant issue is the concept and measurement of development itself. Adogame writes, “Religion and development are two enigmatic phenomena to operationalise”.[30]?He suggests that while the Human Development Index (HDI) and its associated reports place emphasis on enlargement of people’s choices, in practice they do not seem to consider “religious development as analogous to and essential for human development”.[31]?To the extent therefore that the role of religion (including Christianity) is arguably not explored and measured sufficiently within the HDI, we may reach erroneous conclusions about Christianity’s positive impact on individual and social life. Adogame argues for a ‘development from below approach’ which takes greater account of the impact of religion on development.[32]

The necessarily limited scope of this essay prevents a fuller analysis of the influence of different streams of Christianity on development. The purpose of this discussion, however, is to demonstrate that the varying emphases in multiple strands of Christianity can have important impacts – positive and negative - on social and human development.?There are also important questions about how the notion of development itself is conceptualised and measured.

Legacy of colonial influence on social conditions in sub-Saharan Africa

Another, much written about, factor likely to have influenced current social conditions and behavior in sub-Saharan Africa is the legacy left by colonial rule.[33]?Although academic and other literature points to mixed impacts of colonial rule on the present state of affairs in sub-Saharan Africa, it has to be said that a good deal of it is negative.[34],[35].[36],[37],[38]?This relates in particular to its often brutal and extractive nature, to the insensitive and self-serving imposition by colonial powers of national boundaries, without regard to natural people groupings, and to the arrangements and structures put in place for the exercise of authoritarian power. These issues are explored briefly below.

Turning firstly to the?sometimes?harsh treatment of Africans by colonial authorities, Paul Nugent writes about the forced dispossession of Africans to make way for white settlers in Rhodesia and Kenya. He also points to the characterisation by Portuguese colonial authorities of their African subjects as, “beasts of burden, to be yoked to metropolitan progress…..coming close to denying the common humanity of Africans”.[39]

Crawford Young highlights the imposition of forced labour by colonial authorities.[40]?Nugent writing about the extractive nature of colonialism, notes that Belgium’s King Leopold II had no particular concern for the African people, but only in his own interests.[41]?Indeed his brutal rule in the Congo is well critiqued by, among others, Robert Weisbord and Martin Ewans.[42],[43]??John Mbaku, reinforcing this line of argument, writes that “the institutions brought to the African colonies by the Europeans were primarily structures of exploitation, despotism and degradation”.[44]

A number of authors argue that colonial powers imposed new state boundaries in a culturally and tribally insensitive way.[45],[46]?Richard Grabowski claims that the “arbitrary nature by which (national) boundaries were constructed resulted in a situation in which local political, cultural and ethnic realities were ignored”[47], undermining political development.[48]?He argues that this approach “creates many faultlines which divide society. This provides ample opportunity for the ruling elite to play one group against another as a means of maintaining their dominant position”.[49]

Ilorah believes that rather than aiming to make positive investment in society and to promote inter-ethnic harmony, the leaders of post-colonial African states have broadly continued to follow the extractive and divisive political approaches modelled by their former colonial rulers.[50]?Echoing this theme, John Githongo argues that African colonial states were founded on the manipulation by colonial powers of tribal relationships, by dividing and ruling,[51]?“managed by a hearty mix of corruption-fuelled patronage, authoritarianism, fear and violence”.[52]

Given the above assessment of the structural impact of the colonial legacy on African life, this appears to be a significant factor in understanding some of the current poor indicators of individual and societal life in sub-Saharan Africa.

Culture and corruption

A further important area to explore is whether, as discussed by some authors, social practices and cultural norms in Africa, which traditionally emphasise family, clan and tribal loyalties, may - unwittingly - play a role in facilitating corruption.[53],[54],[55]?Ilorah, commenting on the possible link between corruption and cultural and familial issues, writes:

"It is not uncommon for authorities to award government contracts to unqualified bidders who are in cahoots with relatives and cronies……Friends and relatives are prioritised in the granting of business permits and export and import business licences…"[56]??

Mbaku argues that civil servants:

"may be obliged to share the proceeds of their public offices with their kinfolk. The African extended family places significant pressure on the civil servant, forcing him to engage in corrupt and nepotic practices".[57]

In an attempt to facilitate a more subtle analysis of cultural issues and corruption, Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan offers a useful framework - summarised below - and based on six ‘logics’ which he argues are deeply ingrained in African social life and underpin individual and group behaviours.[58]?Olivier de Sardin makes the point very clearly that these behaviours are?not?themselves about corruption, but that they can, “while exerting continuous pressure on social actors, help to accord a cultural acceptability to corruption”.[59]

Logic 1?–?Negotiation?– Embedded within the bargaining practices which are found ubiquitously in everyday transactions, for example, the extensive rituals and costs involved in inter-family marriage negotiations.

Logic 2?–?Gift-giving?– The practice of gift giving to show appreciation is widespread in African society. In this case, those who have received assistance are under an obligation to show some kind of tangible appreciation (for example, to a civil servant who may have offered help). Failure to do so is “not only a sign of avarice or of bad manners, but also carries the risk of attracting misfortune”.

Logic 3?–?Solidarity networks?– These, which are especially important in African society, and which are found in many different social groupings - e.g. fellow church members, school friends, etc. - can be highly supportive, but can also be so strong that if an individual fails to deliver on expectations, he “suffers reproach, and becomes the object of considerable and sustained pressure from all members of the network”.

Logic 4?–?Predatory authority?– Concerns the way in which holders of power and authority expect, as a positional right, to be able to gain some benefit from those over whom they hold power.

Logics 5?–?Redistributive accumulation?– Concerns relatives’ expectations that a family member elevated to an influential position should share that benefit with his relatives. In this case, social pressure strongly drives an expectation of wealth accumulation so that this can be shared with family members.

Logic 6?–?Rivalry?– Relates to competitive forces operating in African society. Despite very strong social and familial networks, there can also be intense rivalry among individuals and groups. Olivier de Sardan argues that this can give rise to jealousy, motivation to outdo rivals, and - together with the redistributive accumulation of Logic 5 - lead to a drive for individuals to profit from and act ostentatiously in relation to, positions of power.

It can be argued then that there are strong cultural norms in play in Africa, which whilst appearing intrinsically neutral, may engender a favourable climate for corruption to flourish. Aspects of these cultural norms, for example, strong family and social networks, mutual support and concern, may indeed have positive elements, resonating strongly with the African notion of ‘Ubuntu’ – living in harmony with one’s neighbours and community.[60]?However, the strong expectations of reciprocity implicit in these cultural norms may, at the same time, run counter to the teaching of selfless service, without expectation of return, so fundamental to Christianity. Unless Christian values and Christ-focused living in Africa – or indeed anywhere else in the world – run deep in the hearts of individuals and communities, and become more powerful than other, fundamental cultural norms, then Christianity will continue to fall short of its enormous potential to transform society for the better. These issues are briefly explored below.

Questions of the heart and imagination

In a thought-provoking argument, Katongole develops the idea that colonial powers in Africa, together with aspects of Christian thinking and Western missionary effort,??share some responsibility for seeding an ongoing narrative of conflict and lack of hope by Africans in relation to their status and future. Analysing specifically the tragic genocide in Rwanda in which Christians themselves were utterly complicit in their murderous actions toward other Christians and non-Christians, Katongole writes, “Rwandans became people who were willing to kill one another because of a story they were first told by Europeans and later learnt to tell themselves”.[61]?It is a story (author’s note: a story of justification of racial inequality based on a particular understanding of the rejection by Noah of his son, Ham, in the Biblical Old Testament)[62], “rooted in the imagination of Europe, told by European colonialists, retold and deepened over centuries by the church’s missionarise, and accepted by converts to the Christian faith.”[63]?He asserts that:

"rather than questioning, resisting and interrupting the formation of identity through racial, economic, and national categories, Christianity so often affirms, intensifies, and radiates these identities. When this happens, Christianity becomes little more than a thin veneer over what we imagine our natural identity to be".[64]

A key question - in sub-Saharan Africa as elsewhere - relates therefore to the depth of renewal of hearts, understanding and imagination, when a commitment is made to follow Jesus Christ. Self-identification as a Christian is merely a label unless it leads to inner transformation. Kelvin Onongha argues that the coexistence of a dramatic growth in Christianity alongside the ‘cancer’ of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa “implies…..that greater emphasis needs to be placed by the church on the issue of genuine conversion”.[65]?This is echoed by Qeko Jere who, in exploring how the church might tackle its own corruption and model a transformed lifestyle to others, emphasises the critical role of?kenōsis – the emptying by Christians of selfish interest - modelled on the Biblical account of Jesus’ own actions[66]:

"Your attitude should be the same as that of Christ Jesus: Who, being in very nature God, did not consider equality with God something to be grasped, but made himself nothing, taking the very nature of a servant, being made in human likeness".[67]

Conclusion

In exploring the phenomenon of extensive Christianisation of sub-Saharan Africa coexisting with poor indicators of social conditions, the simplistic conclusion to draw might be that in some sense Christianity has ‘failed’ in this case. As argued in this essay however, it appears much more likely that the relationship between Christianisation and social improvement is complex and is better explained using a multifactorial approach. This essay has sought to identify a number of these factors, including the enduring, negative aspects of colonial legacy, the theological imperatives and approaches adopted by different ‘streams’ of Christianity, the interplay with deeply-held cultural values, and the extent of control mechanisms in place aimed at limiting corruption in public and corporate life.

It is essential to acknowledge, in presenting a balanced scorecard, that there is much evidence for the?positiveimpact of the Christianisation of sub-Saharan Africa, examples of which has been touched on in this essay. This should not be casually dismissed.

If Christianity is to have its biggest positive future impact on sub-Saharan Africa - amongst the other factors influencing social development - we come back inescapably to questions of heart transformation among self-identified followers of Jesus Christ, leading to altered outward lives and a re-imagining of a hopeful future for this major area of the world. What is required is for deeply instilled and well cultivated Biblical values for living to become so powerful that they supplant other, negative cultural attitudes and practices. This, of course, is a challenge not only for sub-Saharan Africa, but for Christianity globally.

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?

[1]?Pew Research Center, ‘Religious Composition by Country, 2010-2050’ (April 2015),?https://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projection-table/2020/percent/all/. Accessed 23rd?October 2019.

[2]?Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2018’,?https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018. Accessed 23rd October 2019.

[3]?Pew Research Center, ‘Religious Composition by Country, 2010-2050’.

[4]?Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2018’.

[5]?Pew Research Center, ‘Religious Composition by Country, 2010-2050’.

[6]?Institute for Economics and Peace, ‘Global Peace Index 2019’ (June 2019),?https://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/10/PPR-2019-web.pdf. Accessed 16th?December 2019.

[7]?Pew Research Center, ‘Religious Composition by Country, 2010-2050’.

[8]?United Nations Development Programme, ‘2019 Human Development Index Ranking’,?www.hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi. Accessed 11th?December 2019.

[9]?United Nations Development Programme, ‘2019 Human Development Index Ranking’.

[10]?Pew Research Center,?‘Religious Composition by Country, 2010-2050’.

[11]?Matsobane J. Manala, ‘The impact of Christianity on sub-Saharan Africa’, in?Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae,?vol. 39, no. 2 (February 2013),?https://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1017-04992013000200016. Accessed 23rd October 2019.

[12]?Christine M. Bodewes, ‘The Catholic Church and Civic Education in the Slums of Nairobi’, in Mwenda Ntarangwi, ed.,?Jesus and Ubuntu: Exploring the Social Impact of Christianity in Africa?(Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2011), pp. 147-174.

[13]?Johanna Kuyvenhoven, ‘Literacy, Teaching and Learning in Sierra Leone’, in Mwenda Ntarangwi, ed.,?Jesus and Ubuntu: Exploring the Social Impact of Christianity in Africa?(Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2011), pp. 191-215.

[14]?Emmanuel Katongole,?The Sacrifice of Africa: A Political Theology for Africa.?The Eerdmans Ekklesia Series (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011), pp. 135-147.

[15]?Katongole,?The Sacrifice of Africa,?pp. 148-165.

[16]?Katongole,?The Sacrifice of Africa,?pp. 166-192.

[17]?F.P. Kruger, and H.J.C. Pieterse, ‘Reasons why government leaders, officials and church leaders have to act against corruption’, in Ferdinand Kruger and Ben de Klerk, eds.,?Corruption in South Africa’s liberal democratic context: Equipping Christian leaders and communities for their role in countering corruption?(Cape Town: AOSIS, 2016), pp. 64-95: 82-91.

[18]?Abdulkareem Alhassan, and Walter Ugwuoke, ‘Religiosity, Institutions and Corruption in Africa’, in?Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, vol. 9, no. 18 (2018), pp. 145-151: 150.

[19]?Alhassan and Ugwuoke, ‘Religiosity, Institutions and Corruption in Africa’, p. 146.

[20]?Pew Research Center, ‘Spirit and Power – A 10-Country Survey of Pentecostalism’ (October 2006),?www.pewforum.org/2006/10/05/overview-pentecostalism-in-africa. Accessed 16th?December 2019.

[21]?Ogbu U. Kalu,?African Pentecostalism: An Introduction?(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.5.

[22]?Paul Gifford,?Christianity, Development and Modernity in Africa?(London: C. Hurst and Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 2015), p. 29.

[23]?Gifford,?Christianity, Development and Modernity in Africa,?p. 48.

[24]?Peter L. Berger, ‘Max Weber is Alive and Well, and Living in Guatemala: The Protestant Ethic Today’, in?The Review of Faith and International Affairs’ no. 8, no. 4 (December 2010), pp. 3-9.

[25]?Gifford,?Christianity, Development and Modernity in Africa,?pp. 53-68.

[26]?Gifford,?Christianity, Development and Modernity in Africa,?p. 151.

[27]?Gifford,?Christianity, Development and Modernity in Africa,?pp. 151-152.

[28]?Afe Adogame, ‘African Christianities and the politics of development from below’, in?HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies, vol. 72, no. 4 (November 2016),?https://dx.doi.org/10.4102/hts.v72i4.4065. Accessed 23rd October 2019.

[29]?Philip Jenkins,?The New Faces of Christianity: Believing the Bible in the Global South?(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 13.

[30]?Adogame, ‘African Christianities and the politics of development from below’.

[31]?Adogame, ‘African Christianities and the politics of development from below’.

[32]?Adogame, ‘African Christianities and the politics of development from below’.

[33]?John P.G. Neate, ‘Corruption in Africa - Cultural Influence and Colonial Legacy’, (unpublished Postgraduate Certificate essay, University of Edinburgh, April 2012). This section of the paper draws, in outline, on ideas formulated originally in the 2012 essay, now suitably updated.

[34]?Katongole,?The Sacrifice of Africa, pp. 1-25.

[35]?Harvey C. Kwiyani,?Sent Forth: African Missionary Work in the West?(New York: Orbis Books, 2014), pp. 62-63.

[36]?Laurenti Magesa,?What is Not Sacred?: African Spirituality?(New York: Orbis Books, 2013), p. 158.

[37]?Allan H. Anderson,?African Reformation: African Initiated Christianity in the 20th?Century?(Trenton NJ and Asmara Eritrea: Africa World Press, Inc., 2001), pp. 24-25.

[38]?Nathan, J. Robinson, ‘A Quick Reminder of Why Colonialism Was Bad’ (14th?September 2017), Current Affairs,?https://www.currentaffairs.org/2017/09/a-quick-reminder-of-why-colonialism-was-bad. Accessed 6th?January 2020.

[39]?Paul Nugent,?Africa Since Independence: A Comparative History?(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 11.

[40]?Crawford Young, ‘The End of the Post-Colonial State in Africa? Reflections on Changing African Political Dynamics’, in?African Affairs, vol. 103, no. 410 (2004), pp. 23-49: 26.

[41]?Nugent,?Africa Since Independence, p. 11.

[42]?Robert G. Weisbord, ‘The King, the Cardinal and the Pope: Leopold II’s Genocide in the Congo and the Vatican’, in?Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 5, no. 1 (March 2003), pp. 35-45.

[43]?Ewans, Martin, ‘Belgium and the Colonial Experience’, in?Journal of Contemporary European Studies,?vol. 11, no. 2 (November 2003), pp. 167-180.

[44]?John M. Mbaku, ‘Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: The Futility of Cleanups’, in?CATO Journal,?vol. 16, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1996), pp. 99-118: 113.

[45]?Richard Ilorah, ‘Ethnic Bias, Favouritism and Development in Africa’ in?Development Southern Africa,?vol. 26, no. 5 (December 2009), pp. 657-707.

[46]?William, F. Kumuyi, ‘The Case for Servant Leadership’, in?New African,?no. 467 (November 2007), pp. 18-19.

[47]?Richard Grabowski, ‘Political Development, Agriculture, and Ethnic Divisions: An African Perspective’, in?African Development Review, vol. 18, no. 2 (September 2006), pp. 163-182: 171.

[48]?Grabowski, ‘Political Development, Agriculture and Ethnic Divisions’, p. 171.

[49]?Grabowski, ‘Political Development, Agriculture and Ethnic Divisions’, p. 175.

[50]?Ilorah, ‘Ethnic Bias, Favouritism and Development in Africa’, p. 698.

[51]?John Githongo, ‘Inequality, Ethnicity and the Fight Against Corruption in Africa: A Kenyan Perspective’, in?Economic Affairs,?vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 19-23.

[52]?Githongo, ‘Inequality, Ethnicity and the Fight Against Corruption in Africa’, p. 20.

[53]?Abigail Barr, and Danila Serra, ‘Corruption and Culture: An Experimental Analysis’, in?Journal of Public Economics,?vol. 94 (July 2010), pp. 862-869,?https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.07.006.?Accessed 23rd?December 2019.

[54]?Mbaku, ‘Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: The Futility of Cleanups’, pp. 99-111.

[55]?John P.G. Neate, ‘Corruption in Africa - Cultural Influence and Colonial Legacy’, (unpublished Postgraduate Certificate essay, University of Edinburgh, April 2012). This section of the paper draws, in outline, on ideas formulated originally in the 2012 essay, now suitably updated.

[56]?Ilorah, ‘Ethnic Bias, Favouritism and Development in Africa’, pp. 695-696.

[57]?Mbaku, ‘Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: The Futility of Cleanups’, p 104.

[58]?Jean-Pierre?Olivier de Sardin, ‘A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa?’, in?The Journal of Modern African Studies,?vol. 37, no. 1 (1999), pp. 25-52: 36-44.

[59]?Olivier de Sardin, ‘A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa?’, p. 44.

[60]?Magesa,?What is Not Sacred?.

[61]?Emmanuel Katongole, and Jonathan Wilson-Hartgrove,?Mirror to the Church: Resurrecting Faith after Genocide in Rwanda.?(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 2009), p. 52.

[62]?Gen 9:18-29 (NIV).

[63]?Katongole and Wilson-Hartgrove,?Mirror to the Church,?pp. 52-53.

[64]?Katongole and Wilson-Hartgrove,?Mirror to the Church,?p. 53.

[65]?Kelvin Onongha, ‘Corruption, Culture, and Conversion: The Role of the Church in Correcting a Global Concern’, in?The Journal of Applied Christian Leadership,?vol. 8, no. 2 (Autumn 2014), pp. 67-82: 78.

[66]?Qeko Jere, ‘Public role of the church in anti-corruption: An assessment of the CCAP?Livingstonia Synod in Malawi from a?kenōsis?perspective’, in?Verbum et Ecclesia,?vol. 39, no.1 (July 2018),?https://doi.org/10.4102/ve.v39i1.1776. Accessed 22nd?October 2019.

[67]?Phil 1:5-7 (NIV).