Chinese Presence in The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) - An Indian Perspective

The Indian Ocean-An Excerpt from Antiquity

1. ??The European powers firmly controlled the Indian Ocean during the epoch of twentieth century through its colonies in the region. The American colonies had won their independence and due to loss of these colonies the Europeans had a greater control over the Indian Ocean than the Atlantic. The century saw two great wars and although the war was were mainly centered around the Mediterranean Sea and the European trenches, the Indian Ocean also saw significant action which is mostly forgotten.

2. ??Karl von Muller and The Emden.??This is one of the many fascinating episodes during the World War I wherein the German light cruiser Emden, commanded by Karl von Muller single handedly choked the Allied shipping for months. In July 1914, Emden was one of the German vessels stranded in Tsingtao (Quingdao), a German controlled enclave along the Chinese coast. As the war progressed, it became evident that German colonies in the East were not defensible and the ships had to navigate their way to home. Most of the ships headed east to get to the Atlantic by rounding through South America. However, Karl von Muller sought permission to head west to the Indian Ocean which was subsequently granted. Muller added a fake smoke funnel in order to disguise his ship as a British cruiser and by early September was in the Bay of Bengal where it started to attack and sink ships belonging to the British and its allies.?

3.??British were under the impression that Emden was in the pacific with the rest of the German fleet. However, it was only through the prisoners released by Muller that the British in Calcutta (Kolkata) could gauge what was happening. On 22 Sep 1914, Emden appeared off the coast of Madras (Chennai) and bombarded the port for half an hour, during which approximately 125 shells were fired. The oil containers were set ablaze and the city was thrown into chaos. (Emden is still used in as a Tamil slang to denote cunning or resourcefulness). The plaque commemorating the raid can still be found on the eastern wall of the High Court and it marks the spot where one of the shells landed. The Emden proceeded towards Sri Lanka creating havoc on its way and headed for Diego Garcia, a British held island in Southern Indian Ocean) which was still blissfully unaware of the war and Muller was able to refuel and repair in peace. Emden could have escaped home through the Red Sea but Muller decided to raid Penang in the Malacca Straits, where it destroyed a Russian cruiser. The Emden was now engaged by many British and French ships but managed to slip through. Penang raid was remarkable because a German ship made its way into the Malacca Straits and and damaged the prestige of the Allies by sinking their ships. Muller’s luck finally ran out in the Coco Islands, south of Sumatra, where in an attempt to destroy a major Allied communication station was met by the state of the art cruise HMAS Sydney (part of Australian naval convoy). Muller’s ship was severely damaged by HMAS Sydney’s firepower and Muller was forced to beach Emden to save the remaining crew. Some of Eden’s guns were carried away as trophies and one is still on display in Sydney’s Hyde Park.

4. ??This small excerpt from the history is indicative of the importance of the Indian Ocean to the world and the prime reason for the world super powers to desperately trying to outwit one another to gain control of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)

Indian Ocean Region (IOR)

5.??The Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean in the world and lies at the crossroads of Africa, Asia and Australia. The Indian Ocean is scattered with a?large number of islands and littorals that play a very crucial role in the region. Additionally, the Indian Ocean also has a number of access points, which makes it unique since control of these access points allows control of the extensive shipping lanes that carry vital cargo across the vast expanse of this ocean. It is an important conduit for trade and with crucial choke points like Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Bab-el-Mandeb has become a centre of economic developments, dispute, conflicts. The Indian Ocean is the world’s busiest trade route accounting for 80% of the world’s maritime oil trade and all major super powers seek to have an upper hand in the control of IOR.

6. ??In the last decade, rise of China in the IOR at an aggressive rate has had the world to reshape their maritime strategies to counter the pace of Chinese expansion in the IOR. The Chinese policy of dominating the IOR through military power projection has assumed top priority status in achieving the status of a global super power. The aggressive approach of the Chinese has started a race amongst the other super powers which also have a stake in the IOR to show presence in the region to safeguard its own trade routes. Geographically, India has been blessed with a strategic location in the IOR and can be said to be in a ‘control position’, which makes China look at us as a rival and an obstacle in its quest for world dominance.

China in IOR

7. ??China has been making inroads and developing strategic presence in the IOR through port and infrastructure projects and its first regional military base. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is China’s most ambitious and strategically important project aimed at increasing the outreach of Chinese economy and also provide an alternate means of movement for Chinese imports and exports. The BRI’s most high-profile project is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) designed to link China’s west through Pakistan to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea. China has also proposed a Bangladesh-China-India- Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor which is fast progressing and the Kunming- Kyaukpyu, Burma segment is progressing rapidly. Simultaneously, China is augmenting its oil and gas linkages with Burma by developing a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) at Kyaukpyu on the Bay of Bengal. China is enhancing strategic partnerships with Bangladesh and Pakistan by selling them submarines and has also invested heavily in port facilities and other infrastructure in Hambantota, Colombo, and elsewhere in Sri Lanka. In addition to the above, China is developing investments in port, rail, and pipeline projects in Malaysia, including at Melaka, Selankor, and Perak. Malaysia has purchased four Chinese littoral ships and China has leased an island in the Maldives to develop Maritime Silkroad infrastructure. However, the most?strategic move by the Chinese was setting up its first-ever overseas military base at Djibouti to support Chinese naval ships operating in the area. Djibouti’s location on the Horn of Africa gives it access to the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Mediterranean Sea with the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal. China most likely will seek to establish additional military bases in countries with which it has a longstanding friendly relationship and similar strategic interests, such as Pakistan.?

8. ??China imports more than 70% of its oil and depends largely on supplies from the Middle East, South and Central America, West Africa and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The sea routes for transportation of oil through the Indian Ocean traverse the Straits of Hormuz, Malacca Straits and the Lombok Straits, which are all geographical choke-points. Moreover, these Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) – both through the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean – lie in waters where China does not have the required naval presence to deter threats. The Chinese are naturally concerned with this vulnerability, and hence, this issue finds mention in the military strategy. Additionally, many countries of the region are hugely dependent on Chinese imports, creating a situation where the balance of trade favours China, giving it leverage to be used when required. Therefore, the Chinese are leaving no stone unturned to establish a stronghold in the IOR and if measures to check the spread are not put in place soon, China is poised to become a dominant power in the region. Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled an ambitious initiative for increasing connectivity and pushing forward the development of a number of regions along the route of China’s march to markets in the West, both overland and over the sea. This initiative, variously called the One Belt One Road (OBOR) or the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI), has two distinct components – the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ (SREB) and the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR)’. The Indian Ocean finds place of prominence in both the components of the OBOR initiative, i.e. the CPEC (which is an arm of the SREB) and the MSR. China’s imperatives in the planned convergence of the SREB and the MSR in the Indian Ocean, via the CPEC at Gwadar, are dictated by its overarching energy, economic and strategic interests.?

21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR)

9. ??The MSR initiative was first proposed by the current Chinese President Xi Jinping in an address to the Indonesian Parliament in October 2013. The MSR is intended to increase economic connectivity and accelerate economic development across the countries in the region and intends building of transport networks to connect major ports in the region. The MSR is designed to go from China’s coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from China’s coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific in the other. Chinese officials also take great pains to stress that the BRI, and hence the MSR, is not intended as a master strategy for capturing the ‘heartland’ of Eurasia or a ‘String of Pearls’ or a counter to any economic alignment like the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). They claim that it is part of China’s ‘opening up’ to the world, which will also aid development of its underdeveloped central and western regions. (Map)

China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

10. ??The idea for an economic corridor linking China’s southern regions with Pakistan to ‘promote connectivity’ was mooted during the visit of the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to Pakistan in May 2013. The corridor was planned as a network of roads, railways and energy projects linking Gwadar, a port on the Makran coast of Southern Pakistan to Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The CPEC faces a number of challenges, not least amongst them being the intra-regional political disputes and the hostile terrain that it traverses. The economic viability of the corridor is suspect considering the Pakistani economy, the technological challenges and the economic advantages of seaborne transportation. There is, therefore, obviously a larger strategic game at play by the Chinese, one which aims to gain access to the Indian Ocean through Pakistan. The lynchpin of this move is the port of Gwadar, which can provide the Chinese with base of operations in the Northern Indian Ocean. Gwadar, located in Balochistan on the Makran coast of Pakistan, has been projected as the gateway of the CPEC to the Indian Ocean and beyond. The Straits of Hormuz, the vital waterway for the Persian Gulf, are just 400 nm (720 km) from Gwadar which would give China a huge strategic advantage. The China Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC), a state run company, took over operations of the port after the contract with the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) was terminated by the Pakistanis. This takeover has allowed a seamless dovetailing of the development of Gwadar into the overall ambit of the CPEC. Gwadar is an important part in the Chinese plans for the Indian Ocean Region and likelihood of involvement of the PLAN in ensuring the security of Gwadar, under the guise of ‘open seas protection’ is very high. ?

Chinese Ports in IOR

11. ??China’s overseas maritime expansion has been characterised by the acquisition of existing ports, development of new ports and controlling of port operations at these places. These ventures are being piloted by State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) like the China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC) who not only invest the money need for such ventures but also oversee the construction and thereafter operations of the ports. The OBOR initiative has given further impetus to this maritime expansion and also provided new arenas for focusing of efforts.?

(a) Malaysia. ?Malaysia had earlier granted the PLAN stopover access to it naval base at Kota Kinabalu in Nov 15 and Chinese company Guangxi Beibu Gulf International Port Group Co Ltd brought up a 40 per cent stake in Kuantan port in Eastern Malaysia in Sep 13. The Chinese are now involved in a joint project with Malaysia for the development of a new deep sea port in the Malacca Straits as part of the Melaka Gateway Project (completed or not check). The Malacca Straits are strategically critical for the Chinese with more than 80 per cent of their oil imports coming through these straits. Looking at the growing proximity of Malaysia and China, what with Malaysia buying naval hardware from China, the possibility of China gaining favourable access and maybe control to ports in the region, especially the Malacca Straits cannot be ruled out.

(b) Myanmar. The Chinese are building a deep-sea port on the Bay of Bengal in the Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Kyaukpyu is also the site of a pipeline which ships oil unloaded from tankers at Maday island overland to China. It, therefore, fits in very well with the Chinese requirement to reduce the dependence on Malacca Straits for oil import.

(c) Bangladesh. The modernisation of Chittagong port by the Chinese is another ‘pearl’ whose details have been largely kept out of the public eye. China is also funding the modernisation of Mongla port and has inked two MoUs with Bangladesh for the construction of two of the 19 components of the Payra Deep-sea Port by 2023. China is also developing a military market in these nations with the aim of making them dependent on China for their operations and life time maintenance.

(d) Sri Lanka (Hambantota). The construction of Hambantota port by the China Harbor Engineering Company in collaboration with Sinohydro, was one of the first Chinese ventures in the IOR. Situated at the southern end of Sri Lanka, it is strategically located overlooking the busiest shipping lanes of the region. The project has not been a very satisfying experience for the Sri Lankans who have run up a huge debt with the Chinese during the running of the port. The debt was swapped for a 99 year lease on the operations of the port and China may develop it for military ends. The Chinese are now leveraging that debt for making possible strategic gains in this region to gain a permanent foothold. The Chinese have also helped modernise Colombo port, and a Chinese company now operates Colombo’s new container terminal. The Sri Lankan government has also recently cleared a proposal to develop a port city at Colombo with Chinese investment. Port visits by Chinese warships and specifically submarines have also added to the perception that Chinese intentions in Sri Lanka may not be purely commercial.

(e) East Africa. East Africa is another part of the globe that has seen Chinese activity for not only exploitation of natural resources but also for development of infrastructure like railways and ports to support this exploitation. African ports have been in dire need of modernisation for quite some time because of legacy colonial issues and the turmoil that was prevalent till as late as the first decade of the 21st Century. It will not only strengthen Chinese trade with the region, providing China with access to raw materials and new markets for its manufactured goods, but could also provide the Chinese navy with refueling stations, further fuelling speculation that China is following a ‘string of pearls’ policy in the region, developing ports in key locations.

(i) Djibouti. Djibouti has provided land for the construction of China’s first military base overseas which can also be used as powerful commercial presence in Djibouti. China’s interest in Djibouti obviously stems from its strategic location at the mouth of the Bab-el-Mandeb waterway which leads to the Gulf of Aden from the Suez Canal and is a vital link in the Asian-European trade and energy route.

(ii) Kenya. Kenya is building a large port at Lamu, north of Mombassa, which is intended to rival Mombassa when completed. The project is part of a more ambitious ‘Lamu Port-South Sudan- Ethiopia Transport’ (LAPSSET) corridor which is intended as a network of road, rail, pipeline and fibre-optic cable link between Lamu, Juba in South Sudan, and Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. The port is being built by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), which is investing heavily in the port construction and also building a new container terminal at Mombasa.?

(iii) Tanzania. ?The construction of a megaport a Bagamoyo was announced in early 2013 to decongest the port of Dar-es-Salam. This project has also been controversial with issues of compensation for land acquisition delaying progress and like all Chinese projects, it relies on funds from China which come with strings attached from the conception stage.

(iv) Mozambique. An international consortium comprising of the China Harbour Engineering Co Ltd, a Mozambican company Bela Vista Holdings (BVH) and the South African public rail company Transnet is planning to invest in a new port in Techobanine in Maputo province, to serve Mozambique and neighbouring countries, including South Africa.?Once the project is approved, 70 per cent of the funding will be the responsibility of Chinese financial institutions. China is also financing the reconstruction of a fishing harbor in the small port of Beira to enhance its operating capacity.

12. ??China is involved extensively in development of new ports in East Africa. These ports are intended as the seaward gateway at the head of rail-road links originating in the African hinterland where China has huge interests in natural resources like minerals and metals. China has been importing raw material in huge amounts from Africa for the past couple of decades, but is also now viewing the emerging African markets as destinations for its exports. These ports are, therefore, intended to serve not only as originators of China’s sources of supply of raw material but also as destinations for its finished goods. However, the current state of these African nations, especially as they are at the lower end of the development scale and are handicapped for funds, makes them especially vulnerable to the kind of debt trap that could open if these ports are not viable in the short to medium terms. Looking at the opposition to some of these ventures, such debt traps seem likely, which will give the Chinese leverage to put their strategy of subversive acquisition of maritime real estate near crucial sea lanes into play and gain more than a foothold in this region of their interest.

Mitigation Measures by India

13.??Building own strength in the region.?India has a strategic advantage by virtue of its geographical location in the IOR which can further be enhanced by building up bases and and positioning of ships at critical positions, for instance, Andaman Nicobar Islands, Lakshwadeep and Trivandrum.

14. ?Increasing Partnerships.?India has a very robust maritime partnership with the United States and Japan, which is slowly converging to a trilateral arrangement in the near future. India also shares a trilateral arrangement with Sri Lanka and the Maldives for maritime security cooperation. Similar partnerships with Indonesia, Singapore and other countries in the region can strengthen India’s credentials as a strong superpower in the region.

15.??Military and Strategic Aid.??Many of the smaller countries of the IOR like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the island nations have to bolster their maritime capabilities and capacities to meet current challenges. India has itself provided military hardware and training to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Seychelles, Mauritius, Kenya etc. However, many of these challenges may require military capabilities which India is not in a position to provide. Partnerships with other like-minded powers like Japan can help address these challenges and serve to mitigate untoward Chinese influence. India could also utilise its influence with Russia to provide hardware and thereafter give the necessary support for long term exploitation by these countries.

16.??Increased Presence and Surveillance. ??The Indian Navy and the Coast Guard need to increase their footprint beyond India’s primary area of maritime interests in the Northern IOR and look at the regions beyond this periphery. Surveillance of the choke points leading into the Indian Ocean, like Sunda and Lombok will yield considerable intelligence while also ending a message to the Chinese that their ingress and egress from the Indian Ocean can be easily monitored.

17.?Strengthening the Navy.?The Indian Navy has to be considerably strengthened in terms of providing long range platforms for aerial as also surface surveillance. Anti-submarine warfare has to become a focus area which will integrate all assets including submarines and sea bottom sensors. Increasing the strength of the submarine arm and long range surveillance is mandatory for any efforts to meet the challenge of the increasing Chinese influence in the IOR.

18.???Engaging China.???The reality of China’s expansion into the IOR cannot be contended by opposition alone. India can also collaborate and cooperate with China on number of aspects of the maritime domain which can ensure reduction of mutual suspicion.

19.???Mutual Ship visits and Collaborations.???India and China have exchanged ship visits in the past, with the most recent being the participation of the PLAN in the International Fleet Review conducted by the Indian Navy in Visakhapatnam in February 2016. However, these have not been regular phenomena, and increase in such visits will help establish better relations. High level visits like those of the Chief of Naval Staff very often help in establishing? 1.a personal rapport that can then set the tone for future exchanges. It is important that such visits and dialogues are not episodic and are conducted at frequent intervals, so that their relevance is not lost.

20.??Training. ?Training exercises and exchange programmes between the countries of the IOR can enhance diplomatic relationships and aid cordial friendship between nations.

Conclusion

21. ??China has been actively expanding its area of operations and outreach through a number of strategies like the debt trap and forming alliances in the countries of the IOR. Although, the pretext of all these collaborations is to protect its Sea Lanes of Communication and trade routes but if history has taught us anything, India and the other countries of the IOR should be wary of this Chinese expansion. The East India Company also started expanding their base in the region under the charade of trade and ended up colonising the entire region. Though, in an era today such a recurrence can be totally ruled out but there are other means of arm twisting the nations into submission in today’s world and economical dependence is the most important of all. India needs to keep a close watch of the Chinese activity in the region and build up its own strength and relations with the surrounding nations through diplomatic channel and providing assistance to these countries, if need be, to counter the Chinese influence over these nations.

Bibliography

*China India Rivalry in the Indian Ocean, Congressional Research Service, 16 Aug 2017

*’India’s China Challenge’, In the Indian Ocean and Beyond by Abhijit Singh.

*China’s Expanding Military Maritime Footprint in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), India’s Response, Gopal Suri.

• A Splendid Exchange, How Trade Shaped the World, William J Bernstein

• The Ocean of Churn, How the Indian Ocean Shaped Human History, Sanjeev Sanyal