China's 'Magic' Intelligence Agencies: The Political Work Department and The United Front Work Department

(This is an excerpt (Chapt. 33) of the book "Treatise On China’s Clandestine Financial Warfare: China’s Intelligence Community And The Communist Party As Key Players In Geofinance In The 21st Century") 

According to the book, titled the ‘China United Front Course Book’, it is stated that: ‘The United Front . . . is a big magic weapon which can rid us of 10,000 problems in order to seize victory’[i]...

As such, there exists a little-known branch under the ruling Communist Party of China known as the Political Work Department and the United Front Work Department which are leading Beijing’s push for global “soft power” through securing support for China’s political agenda, accumulating influence overseas and gathering key information. This includes efforts to co-opt or subvert a broad range of actors and institutions, from politicians to media outlets to universities, although it primarily targets the Chinese diaspora — an estimated 60 million people around the world. China spends between $10 – 12 billion annually on a wide range of “soft power” efforts. Such efforts include traditional lobbying and public relations campaigns, as well as more clandestine forms of influence-building.

For example, the Chinese authorities are deliberately undermining the political processes in foreign countries, such as Australia[ii], New Zealand[iii], Germany[iv], and the United States[v], for example[vi]. It is a public secret that the Communist Party of China is shaping the elections, in overseas countries, supporting China-friendly candidates, promoting pro-China propaganda and the so-called China Model.

As already alluded to in earlier sections of this book, Chinese intelligence agencies operate differently from other espionage organizations by employing primarily academics or students who will be in their host country only a short time, rather than spending years cultivating a few high-level sources or double agents. The use of non-traditional intelligence assets is codified in Chinese law. Article 14 of China's 2017 National Intelligence Law[vii] mandates that Chinese intelligence agencies may ask relevant institutions, organizations and citizens to provide necessary support, assistance and cooperation.

Political Work Department Of The CMC

Fact sheet on the Political Work Department: The activities of the PWD comprise mainly the PLA’s political work, including organization, propaganda, and education. The headquarters are in Beijing. From an organizational perspective, the PWD is part of the CMC and reports also to the PLA. Its director is Maio Hua.[viii] No information is available on the PWD’s annual budget (but unofficially and practically unlimited financial resources). The PWD’s manpower is estimated to be at 156,000.[ix]

The Political Work Department is often cast as a member of China’s intelligence community. Indeed, an historical review reveals the co- evolution of CPC political warfare and clandestine intelligence operations. Its scope, however, appears limited to intelligence that may support political warfare, including development of psychological and social profiles of elites best positioned to influence foreign and defense policies[x]. The Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission is the chief political organ under the Central Military Commission. It was created in January 2016 following the 2015 People's Republic of China military reform. Its predecessor was the People's Liberation Army General Political Department. 

The Political Work Department leverages organic intelligence, and likely is a prominent consumer of intelligence produced by MSS, PLA Military Intelligence Second Department as well as Third Department signals intelligence and cyber reconnaissance. Operating at a nexus of politics, finance, military operations, and intelligence, the Political Warfare Department amplifies or attenuates the political effects of the military instrument of national power[xi].

The Department leads all political activities in the People's Liberation Army. Its current director is Admiral Miao Hua; its deputy directors are Hou Hehua and Yu Guang. The Political Work Department's Liaison Department controls a united front organization called the China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC) that is active in overseas intelligence gathering and influence operations. The Political Work Department maintains the Communist Party of China structure that exists at every level of the PLA. It is responsible for overseeing the political education, indoctrination and discipline that is a prerequisite for advancement within the PLA[xii]. The PWD controls the internal prison system of the PLA. 

The department prepares political and economic information for the reference of the Political Bureau. The department conducts ideological and political work on foreign armies, explaining China's policies, and disintegrate enemy armies by dampening their morale. It is also tasked with instigating rebellions within the Taiwan army and other foreign armies. The Liaison Office has dispatched agents to infiltrate Chinese-funded companies and private institutions in Hong Kong. Their mission is counterespionage, keeping watch on their agents, and preventing foreign agents buying off Chinese personnel[xiii].

The International Liaison Department of the General Political Department is publicly known as the China Association for International Friendly Contacts. The CAIFC performs dual roles of intelligence collection and conducting propaganda and perception management campaigns. The CAIFC operates an affiliated think tank called the Center for Peace and Development Studies. The PLA political warfare shares common roots with the former Soviet Union. Similar to the former Soviet Union, the CPC augments diplomacy with active measures in order to influence perceptions of foreign audiences and policies. A prominent characteristic of Soviet active measures program was centralization and integration under the KGB. By contrast, no single authority, with the exception of the Politburo Standing Committee, appears to enjoy an exclusive monopoly over political warfare[xiv]. The PWD is managed by a director, four deputy directors, and two assistants to the director[xv]. The leading departments are:

-       The General Office provides executive support for the PWD leadership[xvi]. 

-       The Cadre Department oversees officer personnel management, including policy and planning, evaluations, approval of promotions, retirements, and other personnel actions [xvii].

-       The Organization Department is tasked with the management of political work and party affairs system of the PLA [xviii]

-       The Propaganda Department carries out domestic political education work, and manages overt propaganda in support of military diplomacy.

-       The Security Department has law enforcement responsibilities (i.e., crime prevention, criminal investigation, counterintelligence, personnel background investigations, political reliability assessments, and safeguarding of classified military information)[xix].

Anecdotally, German propaganda theory during World War Two stressed several principles, such as the centrality of intelligence. Sources today could include communications intelligence and cyber-espionage. China’s PWD does precisely that: tailoring intelligence for propaganda, and political warfare more broadly, through a targeted, sustained, well-funded and staffed service that is appropriately subordinated within the command structure.

CPC United Front Work Department of the CPC

Fact sheet on the United Front Work Department: The activities of the UFWD are collecting intelligence about people and entities outside the CPC proper. The HQ are located in Beijing, its parent is the CPC, and the director is Zhang Yijong (but some claim it might be Sun Chunlan).[xx] The UFWD annual budget remains undisclosed (officially, but unofficially and practically unlimited financial resources). Supposedly, its manpower exceeds 180,000.[xxi]

From an intelligence perspective, the mandate and operations of the UWFD constitute undue interference in other nations' internal affairs. The United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (UWFD) is a department that reports to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, which gathers intelligence on, manages relations with, and attempts to influence elite individuals and organizations inside and outside China[xxii]. The UWFD focuses its work on people or entities that are outside the Party proper, especially in the overseas Chinese community, who hold social, commercial, or academic influence, or who represent interest groups. Through its efforts, the UWFD seeks to ensure that these individuals and groups are supportive of or useful to Communist Party of China interests and potential critics remain divided[xxiii]. United Front strategy is critical, not only for maintaining control over potentially problematic groups, such as religious and ethnic minorities and overseas Chinese, but also as a vital part of China’s interference strategy abroad.

The Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries has been described as the public face of the UWFD. The UWFD and its proxy organizations re-purpose democratic governance structures to serve as tools of extraterritorial influence. The UWFD can be described as being able to call upon a latent network of civic, educational, and non-governmental groups and affiliated individuals internally and abroad for its political purposes, especially in times of crisis. For instance, the UWFD uses members of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference to carry out influence-building activities, often covertly. The United Front Work Department manages crucial dossiers concerning foreign countries. These include propaganda, the control of Chinese students abroad, the recruiting of agents among the Chinese diaspora (and among sympathetic foreigners), and long-term clandestine operations. For example, China runs thousands of linked and subsidized pro-government groups across Europe[xxiv]:

-       to ensure that its overseas citizens, and others of ethnic Chinese descent, are loyal.

-       to shape the conversation about China in Europe.

-       to bring back technology and expertise. 

The UWFD regularly attempts to suppress overseas protests and acts of expression critical of the Communist Party of China. The CPC United Front organizations and agents target businesses, universities, think tanks, scholars, journalists, and local, state, and Federal officials in the United States and around the world, attempting to influence discourse and restrict external influence inside the PRC. In March 2018, it was announced that the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office would be absorbed into the United Front Work Department. With the absorption of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the UWFD gained full control of the country's second largest state-run media apparatus, the China News Service.

The UWFD is reported to have over 180,000 personnel and oversees and directs eight minor and subordinate political parties and the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce. It historically maintained a close relationship with the now-absorbed State Administration for Religious Affairs, which has overseen the country's five officially sanctioned religious organizations[xxv]. In 2018, the UFWD went through a reorganization in which it absorbed the State Administration for Religious Affairs and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office to become two internal bureaus. The UWFD has also taken a leading role in anti-religious campaigns in China under the official pretense of ‘sinicizing’ religions. The UFWD has thirteen subdivisions, including nine bureaus and four other units[xxvi]:

-       General Office: Oversees the functioning of the Department, including its finances, security, assets, and work with other government and Party bodies.

-       Policy and Theory Research Office: Handles ideological and policy research, internal propaganda, and the drafting of essential documents. Works with other government agencies to develop propaganda efforts abroad.

-       First Bureau—Party Work Bureau: Governs affairs related to the eight minor, non-Communist parties legally allowed to operate in China.

-       Second Bureau—Minority and Religious Work: Researches and recommends policy on minorities and religious affairs in the country, and liaises with other government agencies in their related work[xxvii].

-       Third Bureau—Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and Overseas Liaison Bureau: Coordinates and communicates with friendly figures in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.

-       Fourth Bureau—Cadre Bureau: Handles personnel matters, including the political training, selection, and examination of non-Party members in leadership positions in the government.

-       Fifth Bureau—Economic Bureau: Coordinates with figures from the private sector.

-       Sixth Bureau—Independent and Non-Party Intellectuals Work Bureau: Liaises with intellectuals not formally affiliated with the Communist Party.

-       Seventh Bureau: Responsible for ethnic minority and religious work, particularly as it relates to Tibet.

-       Eighth Bureau—New Social Class Representatives Work Bureau: Focuses on the new social class, i.e., the rising Chinese middle class.

-       Ninth Bureau: Responsible for research, analysis, and policy recommendations for issues in Xinjiang.

-       Department Party Committee.

-       Retired Cadre Office.

The UWFD also directs the State Ethnic Affairs Commission. As such, the UWFD is China's primary agency overseeing and managing ethnic, religious and overseas Chinese affairs. The UWFD plays an active role in the ‘sinicization’ of ethnic and religious minorities, particularly in Tibet and of the Uyghurs through the Xinjiang re-education camps.

Conclusion

Apart from cyber warfare, and distinct from traditional intelligence agencies, modern Chinese intelligence activities also include cultural infiltration and the promotion of global Chinese interests via the proliferation of Confucius Institutes throughout the world and the use of the United Front through organizations such as the Chinese Students and Scholars Association, the China Overseas Friendship Association, the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce), or the China Peoples Friendship Association.

Not as innocent as the names might sound, the Political Work Department and the United Front Work both aim to influence foreign actors and their state policies to the benefit of Chinese national interests, through means that may be legal, clandestine, or exploit hybrid areas. From epistemological point of view, this notion of 'influence activities' originates from the days of Lenin and his aim to assemble all enemies of colonialism and imperialism as a transitional phase toward the ultimate victory of communism.

These CCP’s influence operations are orchestrated both within as well as outside China toward the same objective, that is to mobilize the CCP’s friends to strike at the CCP’s enemies. Now expanded under the leadership of Xi Jinping, these influence activities have brought covert CCP influence operations to bear inside foreign political parties, diaspora communities, colleges and corporations, all with the goal of promoting the party’s interests by co-opting local organizations.

Numerically speaking, China’s intelligence services are the world’s largest, and they are deemed competent and effective. Embracing the method of a Thousand Grains, they are involved in the massive siphoning of economic, scientific, and technological intelligence from other countries. President Xi Jinping has amassed more individual power than any Chinese leader since Mao, and he is committed to using the intelligence services and all the other pillars of Chinese power to advance China’s global economic and geopolitical interests.

[i] See The Financial Times ‘Inside China’s secret ‘magic weapon’ for worldwide influence’:https://www.ft.com/content/fb2b3934-b004-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4

[ii] In June 2017, Fairfax Media and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation reported on a concerted campaign by China to “infiltrate” Australian politics to promote Chinese interests. Six months later, Australian senator Sam Dastyari quit his post after coming under heavy scrutiny over his relationship with a wealthy political donor associated with the Chinese Communist Party. Subsequently, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull singled out Beijing when he said foreign powers were attempting to “influence the political process” in Australia. Canberra in December introduced laws to crack down on interference by overseas powers, banning foreign political donations and toughening up definitions of treason and espionage.

[iii] The Financial Times reported in September 2017 that Mr Jian Yang - a Chinese-born member of the New Zealand parliament, had served on the country’s parliamentary select committee for foreign affairs, defense and trade despite having spent 15 years training and working in Chinese military intelligence. In briefings prepared for Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and Mr Andrew Little, the minister in charge of security agencies, the intelligence community has expressed concern over Beijing’s political influence in New Zealand. There appears to have been a surge in political activity from people with alleged ties to China’s Communist party. 

[iv] Late 2017, China denied that its intelligence agents had used fake social network profiles to gather information about German officials and politicians. The denial comes after Germany released a list of such profiles and warned of a broad attempt to infiltrate German parliaments and government agencies.

[v] In Washington in December 2017, the US Congress held a hearing to discuss the “long arm of China” following concerns over the Asian giant’s growing influence. “Attempts by the Chinese government to guide, buy, or coerce political influence and control discussion of ‘sensitive’ topics are pervasive, and pose serious challenges in the United States and our like-minded allies,” said Mr Marco Rubio, chairman of the congressional executive commission on China. Additionally, the Wall Street Journal reported that American counter-intelligence officials warned US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law and senior adviser Jared Kushner early last year that a close friend, Ms Wendi Deng Murdoch, could be using her friendship with him to aid the Chinese government. 

[vi] See The New York Times ‘Australian Politician’s Home Raided in Chinese Influence Inquiry’: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/26/world/australia/politician-home-raid-china-influence.html

[vii] See Quartz ‘What you need to know about China’s intelligence law that takes effect today’: https://qz.com/1016531/what-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-intelligence-law-that-takes-effect-today/

[viii] See US Department of Defense ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019’: 

  https://fas.org/man/eprint/dod-china-2019.pdf

[ix] Extrapolation: 30,000 engaged in political work for PLAAF, or representing 7.5%. Thus, for PLA as a whole, it corresponds to 152,000 cadres active in political work. Source: People's Republic of China People's Liberation Army Air Force: Research paper Unknown Binding – January 1, 1991, by Kenneth W Allen. 

[x] See Project2049 ‘The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department’: https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/P2049_Stokes_Hsiao_PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_101413.pdf

[xi] See War on the Rocks ‘China’s ‘Three Warfares’ In Perspective’: https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/chinas-three-warfares-perspective/

[xii] See The Jamestown Foundation ‘Party Congress Reshuffle Strengthens Xi’s Hold on Central Military Commission’: https://jamestown.org/program/party-congress-reshuffle-strengthens-xis-hold-central-military-commission/

[xiii] See e-International Relations ‘Review – Tiger Trap: America’s Secret Spy War with China’: https://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/19/review-tiger-trap-americas-secret-spy-war-with-china/

[xiv] See Project2049 ‘The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department’: https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/P2049_Stokes_Hsiao_PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_101413.pdf

[xv] See the Rand Corporation ‘The Consolidation of Political Power in China Under Xi Jinping. Implications for the PLA and Domestic Security Forces’: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT500/CT503/RAND_CT503.pdf

[xvi] See China Military: https://eng.chinamil.com.cn/cmc/node_86706.htm

[xvii] See Nikkei Asian Review ‘China's military reorganization could be a force for destabilization’: https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/China-s-military-reorganization-could-be-a-force-for-destabilization

[xviii] See Project2049 ‘The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department’: https://project2049.net/2013/10/14/the-peoples-liberation-army-general-political-department-political-warfare-with-chinese-characteristics/

[xix] See Reuters ‘China Military’: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-military-idU.S.KCN1BJ0U9

[xx] See The Financial Times ‘Inside China’s secret ‘magic weapon’ for worldwide influence’:https://www.ft.com/content/fb2b3934-b004-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4

[xxi] Xi Jinping added another 40,000 personnel to the United Front Work Department in 2015 when he created two more bureaus for the UFWD. Thus, extrapolating 20,000 per bureau, and there are in total nine bureaus, this corresponds to at least 180,000 personnel working for the UFWD. SEe The News Lens ‘China's 'Magic Weapon': The United Front Work Department’:  https://international.thenewslens.com/article/75278

[xxii] See U.S.-China Economic And Security Review Commission ‘China’s Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implications for the United States’: https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-overseas-united-front-work-background-and-implications-united-states

[xxiii] See U.S.-China Economic And Security Review Commission ‘China’s Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implications for the United States’: https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China's%20Overseas%20United%20Front%20Work%20-%20Background%20and%20Implications%20for%20U.S._final_0.pdf

[xxiv] See The Jamestown Foundation ‘Reorganizing the United Front Work Department: New Structures for a New Era of Diaspora and Religious Affairs Work’: https://jamestown.org/program/reorganizing-the-united-front-work-department-new-structures-for-a-new-era-of-diaspora-and-religious-affairs-work/

[xxv] See Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies ‘China’s United Front Work in the Xi Jinping era – institutional developments and activities’: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24761028.2019.1627714

[xxvi] See The Diplomat ‘China’s United Front Work: Propaganda as Policy’: https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/chinas-united-front-work-propaganda-as-policy/

[xxvii] See China Government: https://web.archive.org/web/20200430020106/https://www.zytzb.gov.cn/tzb2010/jgsz/201012/690112.shtml