China's Increasing Power and US Foreign and Defense Policy (Review of Relevant Articles, 2012)
Week Twelve from National Security Studies Course with Dr. Kalu. China Rising: Friend or Foe. March 29, 2012.
by Samuel Gras?????????
Introduction
The following articles analyze China's increasing power as it relates to United States (US) foreign and defense policy, regional security, and recommendations by the authors. All the articles caution that a steady and long term balancing act is required by the US at the intersection of diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of power for responding to China appropriately without creating a security dilemma, arms race, and spiral of hostile relations or future direct conflict.
James Hoge, A Global Power Shift in the Making: Is the United States Ready?
James Hoge's article describes regional trends in Asia and a shifting of focus and power in international relations to the East, all the while without an appropriate US policy for addressing the new reality. He notes well-known potential flashpoints in Taiwan, Korea, and Kashmir. Other areas of concern he points to are the historically novel situation of both China and Japan being powerful at the same time, and Sino-India relations.
Although he warns of the likelihood of strategic great power competition between the US and China, he is less certain of its inevitability than offensive realists such as John Mearsheimer. To accommodate rising powers in Asia, Hoge takes the liberal internationalist perspective of wanting to retrain them like Gulliver by subsuming them into the current system through increased responsibility in multilateral institutions such as the UN Security Council, G-20, World Trade Organization; and through economic interdependence.
Patrick Stewart, Irresponsible Stakeholders?????
In a similar vein, Patrick Stewart proposes an adaptive international system—with the UN Security Council and G-20 better adjusted to reflect the realities of multipolar power relations in the 21st Century. Stewart explains the acute challenge that the US has as a status quo power to establish a working framework that integrates emerging powers into the existing post-World War II status quo; accommodating all interests without provoking a backlash or breakdown into more traditional and anarchic security competition.
As such, Stewart applauds Presidents Bush and Obama's attempts to encourage China to become a "responsible stakeholder." Furthermore, he cites Secretary Clinton's attempt to re-characterize contemporary and future relations from multipolar to "multipartner." Partnership may be a worthy goal, but the phrase oversimplifies the real concerns and thorny issues by leaving out areas of disagreement, conflicting interests, or regional military and resource competition. As Stewart reminds us, "the world remains more Hobbesian than the White House cares to admit." (Stewart, 3)
Stewart cautions not to assume that other states will define their interests parallel to the US or abide by current international norms. The component he points for integrating rising powers peacefully into the existing status quo is to give them a stake in its stability. As such, they must accept some responsibility for maintenance, safety, and security.
China has been free-riding for the most part in international security affairs. For example, it has as much of a security threat from chaos in Afghanistan or Syria as does the US, UK, France, or Russia. China has been able to sit back while the US, NATO, Russia, Japan, Pakistan, India, and others did the heavy lifting and financing for the global war against international terrorism, and who would blame them? They accept all the benefits of the international system without the maintenance costs for international safety and commerce, yet expect to be treated as an equal to those who do.
This condition is a failure of US foreign and defense policy in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras. Afghanistan, for example, is in Russia and China's backyard, not the US’s. They should provide as much if not more to help rebuild and stabilize Afghanistan. Who would blame them though for letting the US and NATO carry the lion's share of the burden? While the US continues to maintain its Cold War foreign and defense policy of as the preeminent military power and guarantor of the post-World War II status quo.
As explained well in Stewart's article, the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras require more burden-sharing with China than we've seen heretofore. Many aspects from more traditional views of international relations regarding great power competition, arms races, economic interdependence, military primacy, and security are outdated. Although still informative and relevant, much of the old analysis and Cold War-esque US foreign policy approaches to concepts such as deterrence or mutually assured destruction is irrelevant now because it does not incorporate fundamental technological changes over recent decades involving:
Each of the above require multilateral cooperation, i.e. there is more security to be gained by an effective cooperative working relationship between the US and China, than there is by an expensive military competition.
Whereas traditional security dilemmas are zero-sum competitions, a focus on areas of mutual interest would benefit the US by decreasing the costs of maintaining its global military primacy. Nevertheless, until a modus vivendi and common ground is established between the US and China for going forward, the security dilemma will necessitate a viable military capacity for both should the status quo drastically fail.
David Shambaugh, Facing Reality in China Policy
David Shambaugh's article sets the context of Sino-US relations and makes some suggestions for US policy going forward. Some of the critical components of the relationship he points to are as follows:
·??????Taiwan and arms sales
·??????Achieving a framework for dialogue
·??????Security dilemma, nuclear proliferation, and missiles
·??????Korea
·??????Human rights
·??????Military-military relations
·??????World Trade Organization.
While Sino-US relations are challenged by these issues, Shambaugh describes a deep relationship of economic interdependence, educational and professional collaborations, trade and commercial ties, and cooperation on global security issues. Similar to the other authors, he maintains that adversarial relations are not preordained, but preventing the occurrence of a hostile relationship will be challenging for US policymakers to navigate.
LTC Kathryn Gauthier, China as Peer Competitor? Trends in Nuclear Weapons, Space, and Information Warfare
LTC Kathryn Gauthier outlines the strategic framework of China's military focus and areas of concern for the US. She notes a dichotomy of views toward China as either expansionist and increasingly interested in capabilities for power projection, or internally focused with a "fortress China" mentality. Her paper focuses primarily on three areas:
·??????China's nuclear weapons
·??????Space
·??????Information warfare capabilities.
With respect to strategic considerations, she describes China's doctrine of limited deterrence as being increasingly threatened by US missile defense capabilities, and likely to expand correlatively. With respect to its space program, she points to the improving accuracy of ICBMs; better command, control, and intelligence; and increasing anti-satellite capabilities. For example, the Chinese tested an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 to the consternation of the US.
领英推荐
Several times throughout the article, the Gulf War in 1990-91 is portrayed as the critical juncture for Chinese adjustments in defense thinking, planning, and policy. Along such lines, asymmetric warfare is seen as a necessary and effective alternative to matching US military power conventionally through force on force.
LTC Gauthier describes how network-centric warfare relies so heavily on satellites and radio communications links, that information has become the key terrain. She goes on to place qualities of asymmetric warfare within Chinese cultural traditions and to list some of the implications for US policy. Some implications of note are:
She concludes that hostile relations are not inevitable and recommends a policy of constructive engagement rather than containment to avoid unnecessarily causing a significant deterioration of security or overly expensive arms race.
Erickson and Goldstein, Hoping for the Best, Preparing for the Worst: China’s Response to US Hegemony
Erickson and Goldstein trace Sino-US relations through the post-Cold War era, analyze Chinese foreign policy, and recommend a balanced US approach. The authors describe the brief era of unity in international relations in the initial years after September 11th, but note that with the passing of time, relations have increasingly returned to more traditional state-centered competitions.
From a low point during the Clinton administration’s bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and Taiwan straits showdown in 1996, to initial descriptions by the Bush administration of China as a "strategic competitor," the evolving and inconsistent descriptions and views toward China demonstrates that the US doesn't really know what exactly to think or do. There is no foreign policy consensus, which results is erratic and unpredictable ebbs and flows.
Common security and economic interests between the US and China are suggested by the authors for maintaining cooperative relations, which can include cyber security, transnational crime, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, ensuring that Afghanistan doesn’t become a failed state, stability in Pakistan, and economic spheres. On the other hand, the US’s preference to maintain the political status quo, military dominance, and virulent rhetoric toward preventing China from achieving influence and status correlative to its power, creates a security dilemma and pushes China even more to prepare for eventual conflict.
China's increasingly mature diplomacy is divided in the article between soft and hard power. The oft-cited example of China extolling the high bar of internal sovereignty by not making development aid and loans contingent on human rights or anti-corruption, provides an avenue for Chinese diplomacy at the expense of the US and Europe in Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. The authors describe Chinese inroads around the world as being paved with a cold lack of morality, i.e., Realpolitik.
With respect to military power, the article points to China's increasing naval power projection including air craft carriers, and area denial capabilities with submarines, cruise missiles, and mines. Furthermore, the authors point to significant gains by the Chinese Air Force, ISR, and space sectors.
Erich Weede, The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: Establishing Global Harmony by Economic Interdependence?????
Erich Weede makes a liberal internationalist case for economic interdependence and free market capitalism as the best method for preventing the rise of China from repeating the example set by Germany and Japan, which led to great power conflict. Weede labels this view as: "peace by free trade." (Weede, 206) He is more critical of the democratic peace thesis and maintains that capitalist peace offers a better approach.
Along this line of thinking, Weede proposes a phased process of reform focused on national identity, the rule of law, and accountable government leading eventually to mass franchise. I agree that the chaos of the Arab spring and collapse of the Soviet Union is not the desired model for reform in China. Rather than liberal determinism, each state and political culture should be provided with enough space to determine its own preferred way. The process can certainly be encouraged and guided in the right direction, but chaos is unlikely to lead to the type of democratic pluralism for which the proponents of revolution yearn.
Weede therefore contends that in the short to medium term, a focus on economic cooperation, free markets, and interdependence is more likely to achieve the desired stability and peaceful relations than a heavy push toward democratization. Although I mostly agree with Weede about the salutary effects of economic globalization, he neglects the potential flashpoints of disputed maritime borders, political conditions with Taiwan, or acute resource competition. Responding to China appropriately will require the use of components from both the liberal and realist traditions, the latter for which this article falls short.
CONCLUSION???????
In conclusion, these articles all agree that managing the rise and maturing of China will be a significant challenge for US foreign and defense policy going forward. It will require skillful and well-informed diplomacy buttressed by military power. Listening to the Republican candidates recently in the primaries and the recent pronouncement by President Obama that American is "an Asian power," make me skeptical though that US leaders will be savvy enough to manage the relationship.
How should we expect China to translate President Obama's statement that the US is an Asian power? How would the US feel about China declaring itself as an American power? Regardless, all the articles warn about the possibility of an arms race and security dilemma creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of hostility in Sino-US relations; devolving into an expensive new type of Cold War. Erickson and Goldstein explain this concern as follows:
"US policy must not fall into the trap of creating an enemy by pursuing Cold War era dogmas." (Erickson and Goldstein, 977)
Finally, the articles warn against the destabilizing historical precedent of rising powers set by Germany and Japan. To prevent a reoccurrence of great power warfare or a new Cold War, the articles agree that it will require balancing the integration of China into international organizations, and acceptance of its increased participation, financial contributions, and responsibility in areas such as: United Nations and multi-national peacekeeping missions, non-proliferation, transparency in defense spending, cyber security, transnational crime, counterterrorism, and carbon emissions.
Although the articles agree that a certain level that rivalry is natural and to be expected, all the authors exhibit a clear sense of unease, concern, and lack of certainty about the future character of Sino-US relations.
REFERENCES
Gauthier, Katheryn LTC USAF. “China as Peer Competitor? Trends in Nuclear Weapons, Space, and Information Warfare.” Air War College (1999)
Goldstein, Lyle and Erickson, Andrew. “Hoping for the Best, Preparing for the Worst: China’s Response to US Hegemony.” The Journal of Strategic Studies, 29: 6 (2006) 955-986).
Hoge, James. “A Global Power Shift in the Making: Is the United States Ready?” World Politics, McGraw-Hill; 2007.
Kaplan, Robert. “How We Would Fight China.” World Politics. McGraw-Hill; 2007.
Shambaugh, David, “Facing Reality in China Policy.” Foreign Affairs 80: 1 (2001) 50.
Stewart, Patrick. “Irresponsible Stakeholders?” Foreign Affairs 89:6 (2010): 44-53.
Weede, Erich. “The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: Establishing Global Harmony by Economic Interdependence," Commentaries. University of Bonn.
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