The China Maritime Militia Bookshelf: Latest Data, Official Statements, Fleet Estimate & Trilingual Wikipedia Entry
Andrew Erickson
Professor of Strategy (tenured full professor) at Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute
Andrew S. Erickson, “Tracking China’s ‘Little Blue Men’—A Comprehensive Maritime Militia Compendium,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 12 February 2021.
As Coronavirus rages on, fishy things have been happening across the South and East China Seas, home to virtually all of China’s unresolved maritime disputes… Since Beijing remains far from being fully forthcoming and transparent, it is to be hoped that governments whose nations’ ships have been involved with these bilateral incidents with PRC vessels—as well as any other knowledgeable parties—will release complete information on exactly what has happened. Meanwhile, however, ample information is already available concerning China’s People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) and the important role it has played in these waters for decades. You need look no further!
Rarely is a topic so little recognized and so little understood, yet so important and so amenable to research using Chinese-language open sources. To increase awareness and understanding of this important subject, here is a convenient compendium of major publications and other documents available on the matter thus far. If you know of others, please kindly bring them to my attention via <https://www.andrewerickson.com/contact/>.
CHINA’S MARITIME MILITIA: DATA & ANALYSIS
“People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia,” Wikipedia, entry as of 12 February 2021.
The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is the government funded maritime militia of China.[1] For reportedly operating in the South China Sea without clear identification, they are sometimes referred to as the “little blue men”, a term coined by Andrew S. Erickson of the Naval War College in reference to Russia’s “little green men” during the 2014 annexation of Crimea.[2]
The armed fishing fleet are part of China’s power projection,[1] and are deployed to seize territory and to target anyone who challenges China’s claims to the entire South China Sea. In 2016, 230 fishing boats swarmed the same islands.[1] In August 2020, more than 100 fishing boats harassed the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands.[1]
Contents
Overview [edit]
According to research from the Taiwanese think tank Institute for National Defense and Security Research, China’s maritime militia is part of their “grey zone” tactics which are used to wage conflict against China’s neighbors without crossing the threshold into conventional war.[3] The maritime militia is a particularly useful gray zone force because Chinese authorities can deny or claim affiliation with its members depending on context. China can send its militia to harass foreign vessels in contested areas, but publicly assert that the vessels are independent from government control, thus avoiding escalation with other states. At the same time, if militia members are hurt during confrontations with foreign vessels, the Chinese government can claim the need to “defend” its own fishermen, mobilizing domestic nationalism to improve its bargaining position in a crisis.[4]
History [edit]
The PAFMM began soon after the CCP won the Chinese Civil War and forced the KMT to flee the mainland, the newly victorious communists needed to augment their maritime defenses against the nationalist forces which had repeated offshore and therefore the concept of people’s war was applied to the sea with fishermen and other nautical laborers being drafted into a maritime militia. The nationalists had maintained a maritime militia during their time in power but the communists preferred to craft theirs anew given their suspicion of organizations created by the nationalists. The CCP also instituted a national level maritime militia command to unite the local militias, something the KMT had never done. In the early 1950s, the Bureau of Aquatic Products played a key role in institutionalizing and strengthening the maritime militia as it collectivized local fisheries. Bureau of Aquatic Products leaders were also generally former high ranking PLAN officers which lead to close relations between the organizations. The formation of the PAFMM was influenced by the Soviet “Young School” of military theory which emphasized coastal defense over naval power projection for nascent communist powers.[5]
In the 1960s and 1970s, the PLAN established maritime militia schools near the three main fleet headquarters of Qingdao, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.[5] Through the first half of the 1970s, the maritime militia mostly stayed near shore and close to China. However, by the later 1970s, the maritime militia had evolved an important sovereignty support function which brought it into increasing conflict with China’s neighbors, especially in the South China Sea. The PAFMM contributed significantly to the Battle of the Paracel Islands, especially in proving amphibious lift capacity to Chinese forces. These early PAFMM successes have led to their use in nearly every maritime operation undertaken by the China Coast Guard and Navy, often harassing vessels from neighboring states.[5]
The maritime militia is believed to be behind a number of incidents in the South China Sea where high powered lasers were pointed at the cockpits of aircraft. This includes an attack against a Royal Australian Navy helicopter.[6]
In 2019, the United States issued a warning to China over aggressive and unsafe action by their Coast Guard and maritime militia.[7]
Equipment [edit]
Most vessels are just issued with navigation and communication equipment but some are also issued small arms.[8] The communications systems can be used both for communication and espionage. Often fishermen supply their own vessels, however, there are also core contingents of the maritime militia who operate vessels fitted out for militia work instead of fishing; these vessels feature reinforced bows for ramming and high powered water cannons.[9] The increasing sophistication of militia vessels’ communication equipment is a double-edged sword for Chinese authorities. New equipment, as well as training in its use, has substantially improved command, control, and coordination of militia units. However, the vessels’ resulting professionalism and sophisticated maneuvers make them more identifiable as government-sponsored actors, dampening their ability to function as a gray-zone force. Such improvements also potentially make militia vessels more threatening during at-sea confrontations, raising the risk of unintended escalations with foreign militaries.[4]
See also [edit]
- China Coast Guard
- Fishing industry in China
- Territorial disputes in the South China Sea
- Mutiny on Lurongyu 2682
External Link [edit]
References [edit]
- ^ Jump up to:a b c d Thomas, Jason (2 September 2020). “China’s ‘fishermen’ mercenaries”. The Weekend Australian.
- ^ Jakhar, Pratik (15 April 2019). “Analysis: What’s so fishy about China’s ‘maritime militia’?”. monitoring.bbc.co.uk. BBC Monitoring. Retrieved 25 July 2020.
- ^ “DIPLOMACY: Maritime militia warning issued”. Taipei Times. 16 June 2020. Archived from the original on 17 June 2020. Retrieved 8 July 2020.
- ^ Jump up to:a b Luo, Shuxian; Panter, Jonathan (January–February 2021). “China’s Maritime Militia and Fishing Fleets: A Primer for Operational Staffs and Tactical Leaders”. Military Review. 101 (1): 6–21. Retrieved 19 January 2021.
- ^ Jump up to:a b c Grossman, Derek; Ma, Logan (6 April 2020). “A Short History of China’s Fishing Militia and What It May Tell Us”. rand.org. RAND Corporation. Archived from the original on 8 July 2020. Retrieved 9 July 2020.
- ^ Yeo, Mike (31 May 2019). “Testing the waters: China’s maritime militia challenges foreign forces at sea”. Defense News. Retrieved 9 July 2020.
- ^ Sevastopulo, Demetri; Hille, Kathrin (28 April 2019). “US warns China on aggressive acts by fishing boats and coast guard”. Financial Times. Archived from the original on 8 July 2020. Retrieved 9 July 2020.
- ^ Owens, Tess (1 May 2016). “China Is Reportedly Training a ‘Maritime Militia’ to Patrol the Disputed South China Sea”. vice.com. Vice News. Archived from the original on 9 July 2020. Retrieved 9 July 2020.
- ^ Manthorpe, Jonathan (28 April 2019). “Beijing’s maritime militia, the scourge of South China Sea”. Asia Times. Retrieved 9 July 2020.
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中国人民軍海上民兵
出典: フリー百科事典『ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
中国人民軍海上民兵（PAFMM）は、中国の政府出資の海上民兵である[1]。南シナ海で活動していると報じられていることから、2014年のクリミア併合時のロシアの「リトル?グリーン?メン」に言及した海軍兵学校のアンドリュー?S?エリクソンの造語である「リトル?ブルー?メン」と呼ばれることもある[2]。
武装した漁船団は中国のパワープロジェクション[1]の一環であり、領土を掌握し、南シナ海全体の中国の主張に異議を唱える者を標的にするために配備されている。2016年には230隻の漁船が同じ島に群がった[1]。2020年8月には、日本が管理する尖閣諸島に100隻以上の漁船が嫌がらせを行った[1]。
参考文献 [編集]
- ^ a b c d Thomas, Jason (2020年9月2日). “China’s ‘fishermen’ mercenaries”. The Weekend Australian
- ^ Jakhar, Pratik (2019年4月15日). “Analysis: What’s so fishy about China’s ‘maritime militia’?”. monitoring.bbc.co.uk. BBC Monitoring. 2020年7月25日閲覧。
カテゴリ:
最終更新 2020年9月5日 (土) 23:38 （日時は個人設定で未設定ならばUTC）。
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中國海上民兵 [编辑]
维基百科，自由的百科全书
折叠本條目存在以下問題，請協助改善本條目或在討論頁針對議題發表看法。
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中國海上民兵，或人民武装力量海上民兵是中华人民共和国政府资助的海上民兵[1]，以武裝漁船方式為外界所認識。2016年，230艘渔船在同一岛屿上蜂拥而至[1]。2020年8月，100多艘渔船进入中日争议领土钓鱼岛附近海域[1]。
观点 [编辑]
武装渔船队是中国力量投射的一部分[1]，部署渔船是为了控制有争议海上领土、海岛（包括南海、钓鱼台列屿等）。由于在南海活动时没有明确的身份标识，他们有时被[谁？]称为 「小蓝人」[注释 1][2]。
注释 [编辑]
參考文獻 [编辑]
- ^ 跳转至：1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Thomas, Jason. China’s ‘fishermen’ mercenaries. The Weekend Australian. 2020/9/2.
- ^ Jakhar, Pratik. Analysis: What’s so fishy about China’s ‘maritime militia’?. monitoring.bbc.co.uk. BBC Monitoring. 15 April 2019 [25 July 2020].
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Wikipedia?和维基百科标志是维基媒体基金会的注册商标；维基?是维基媒体基金会的商标。
维基媒体基金会是按美国国內稅收法501(c)(3)登记的非营利慈善机构。
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Ryan Martinson, “Catching Sovereignty Fish: Chinese Fishers in the Southern Spratlys,” Marine Policy, Volume 125 (March 2021): 1–11.
Highlights
- Each year, close to 200 Chinese fishing vessels operate in disputed space in the southern Spratlys.
- Chinese government policies play a decisive role in enabling them to operate there safely and profitably.
- Chinese policymakers see fishing vessels as instruments with which to uphold China’s maritime claims.
- China provides generous financial incentives (including fuel and other subsidies) to Chinese fishers and invests heavily in maritime law enforcement forces to ensure their security.
- Guangxi-based maritime militiamen likely operate in the southern Spratlys, but there is little documentary evidence directly connecting them with particular incidents in these waters.
In recent years, Chinese fishers have been involved in a number of incidents in disputed areas of the East and South China Seas. Their presence in contested space is due to a combination of factors, including the individual initiative of private fishing boat owners and state policies that seek to leverage Chinese fishers to achieve political aims. These factors differ depending on the area in question. This article examines the case of Chinese fishing in the southernmost sections of China’s claims in the South China Sea, in waters that fall within the exclusive economic zones of Indonesia and Malaysia. It argues that while most Chinese fishing in these waters is driven by private fishing boat owners pursuing economic gain, the Chinese government has played a decisive role in enabling and supporting their activities. This article also offers evidence that some PRC fishers operate there at the direction of the Chinese military, in their capacity as members of China’s “maritime militia.”
Keywords: South China Sea, Fisheries disputes, Spratly Islands, Chinese marine policy
Introduction
Chinese fishing in disputed waters in the East and South China Seas is a product of individual initiative and state policy. China’s coastal waters are overfished, so Chinese fishers have economic incentives to operate in areas with greater chance for profit. This includes disputed space. For its part, the central government sees value in their presence there. Aside from contributing to the marine economy, Chinese fishing in disputed space upholds China’s claims to sovereignty and jurisdiction in these areas. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) therefore crafts policies to support—and in some cases, direct—the activities of Chinese fishers operating in contested space [1].
Which of these factors—individual initiative or government policy—is the more important driver? It depends on the area in question. This article examines the circumstances of Chinese fishing activities in one particular area, the “southern Spratlys,” defined as Chinese-claimed waters in the South China Sea south of 6 degrees latitude [2].1 It argues that the Chinese government has played a decisive role in enabling and supporting Chinese fishing in these waters. Moreover, this article also offers evidence that some PRC fishers operate there at the direction of the Chinese military, serving as members of China’s maritime militia.
The southern Spratlys merit close examination for two key reasons. First, in recent years these waters have seen a number of fishing incidents involving China and Southeast Asian states, especially Indonesia. There exists an urgent, practical need to better understand the circumstances—policy and otherwise—behind Chinese actions in this area. Second, better understanding of Chinese policies in the southern Spratlys can shed light on Beijing’s South China Sea claims. While the PRC has been very clear that it claims sovereignty over all of the land features within the “nine-dash line,” it has been notoriously vague about the nature and extent of its claimed maritime rights in the vast spaces between these tiny rocks and reefs [3].2 The southern Spratlys are an interesting case because they are largely devoid of land and contain none that could plausibly generate an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). A close examination of Beijing’s policies therefore sheds light on the PRC’s treatment of the nine-dash line as a maritime boundary [4].3
This article comprises six parts. Part one outlines the known facts of Chinese fishing activities in the southern Spratlys. Part two discusses the economic incentives luring Chinese fishers to the southern Spratlys, and the costs and risks associates with pursuing commercial gain in these waters. Part three examines the factors informing Beijing’s policies for Chinese fishing in the southern Spratlys. Parts four, five, and six analyze the three main prongs of its approach. The paper concludes with a summary of key findings. … … …
8. Conclusion
Chinese fishers have operated in the southern Spratlys since the early 1990s. The first expeditions were conducted by vessels from Guangxi’s Beihai city. Beihai fishers continue to dominate Chinese fishing in this area. In 2018, at least 175 Guangxi trawlers operated in these waters, the vast majority from Beihai.
Economic motives are clearly a key driver behind the activities of Guangxi fishers in the southern Spratlys. That is, they go there to catch fish that is unavailable in the same abundance in the Gulf of Tonkin. However, this article shows that government policies have played a decisive role ensuring that these activities are safe and profitable. By implementing robust policy measures, the PRC enables and encourages Guangxi fishers to operate in this highly disputed maritime space.
PRC fisheries policy in the southern Spratlys is largely focused on the political importance of Chinese fishing in these waters. It proceeds from two key beliefs. First, that Chinese fishers have the right to operate in the northern part of the Sunda Shelf because it falls within the nine-dash line. Second, Chinese fishers should operate in the southern Spratlys because their activities serve the political function of upholding China’s claims to maritime rights in these waters. Just by being present there, they demonstrate Chinese sovereignty.
These beliefs drive Beijing’s efforts to support Chinese fishing in these waters. Chinese policymakers heavily subsidize fishing operations in the Spratlys. These subsidies include defraying fixed costs, offsetting fuel costs, and providing other monetary awards to influence the cost-benefit analysis of individual fishing boat owners. Chinese analysts have shown that these incentives are probably the biggest inducements for fishing in the southern Spratlys. Moreover, Chinese policymakers invest huge sums of money to ensure the security of Chinese fishers operating there. They have built dozens of very large law enforcement cutters and charged them with maintaining adequate presence in these waters to deter coastal state EEZ enforcement. Beijing’s efforts have been largely successful: since 2016, Chinese fishing vessels have been able to operate with impunity in the southern Spratlys.
There is some evidence that China’s maritime militia also operates in conjunction with Guangxi’s Spratly fishing fleet. In recent years, Guangxi has invested heavily in the development of maritime militia forces. Boosting the service’s ability to conduct sovereignty operations is a key driver behind these investments. All of the Guangxi ports that host Spratly vessels possess maritime militia units. Moreover, authoritative sources suggest that Guangxi militia vessels perform missions in the Spratlys. Nevertheless, there is no definitive documentary evidence connecting Guangxi militia vessels with individual incidents in these waters. This is not surprising, as China can achieve its current maritime objective without the militia, and if the militia are present they are serving presence and intelligence collection functions, which are generally not newsworthy.
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Ronald O’Rourke, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Implications for U.S. Interests—Background and Issues for Congress, R42784 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 8 February 2021).
If you have trouble accessing the website above, please download a cached copy here.
You can also click here to access the report via the new public CRS website.
KEY EXCERPTS:
p. 9
“Salami-Slicing” Strategy and Gray Zone Operations
Observers frequently characterize China’s approach to the SCS and ECS as a “salami-slicing” strategy that employs a series of incremental actions, none of which by itself is a casus belli, to gradually change the status quo in China’s favor. Other observers have referred to China’s approach as a strategy of gray zone operations (i.e., operations that reside in a gray zone between peace and war), of incrementalism,31 creeping annexation32 or creeping invasion,33 or as a “talk and take” strategy, meaning a strategy in which China engages in (or draws out) negotiations
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31 See, for example, Patrick Mendis and Joey Wang, “China’s Art of Strategic Incrementalism in the South China Sea,” National Interest, August 8, 2020.
32 See, for example, Alan Dupont, “China’s Maritime Power Trip,” The Australian, May 24, 2014.
33 Jackson Diehl, “China’s ‘Creeping Invasion,” Washington Post, September 14, 2014.
p. 10
while taking actions to gain control of contested areas.34 A March 17, 2020, press report in China’s state-controlled media stated that “Chinese military experts on Tuesday [March 17] suggested the use of non-lethal electromagnetic weapons, including low-energy laser devices, in expelling US warships that have been repeatedly intruding into the South China Sea in the past week.”35
A July 15, 2020, press report states
Its navy drills grab most of the attention, but China has also been quietly mounting a range of civilian and scientific operations to consolidate its claims in the South China Sea.
The diversified approach includes setting up a maritime rescue centre in Sansha, a prefecture-level city on Woody Island, which China calls Yongxing. It also involves undisclosed research and oil infrastructure.
Observers said the multi-pronged approach is meant to bolster China’s presence and consolidate its actual control over the waterway as other counties [sic: countries] repeatedly question its claims to the waters.36
Some observers argue that China is using the period of the COVID-19 pandemic to further implement its salami-slicing strategy in the SCS while the world’s attention is focused on addressing the pandemic.37 In a video conference with ASEAN foreign ministers in April 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reportedly stated “It is important to highlight how the Chinese Communist party is exploiting the world’s focus on the Covid-19 crisis by continuing its
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34 The strategy has been called “talk and take” or “take and talk.” See, for example, Anders Corr, “China’s Take-AndTalk Strategy In The South China Sea,” Forbes, March 29, 2017. See also Namrata Goswami, “Can China Be Taken Seriously on its ‘Word’ to Negotiate Disputed Territory?” The Diplomat, August 18, 2017.
35 Liu Xuanzun, “US Intrusions in S.China Sea Can Be Stopped by Electromagnetic Weapons: Experts,” Global Times, March 17, 2020.
36 Kristin Huang, “The Under-the-Radar South China Sea Projects Beijing Uses to Cement Its Claims,” South China Morning Post, July 15, 2020. See also Nguyen Thuy Anh, “Science Journals: A New Frontline in the South China sea Disputes,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]), July 15, 2020.
37 See, for example, Tsukasa Hadano and Alex Fang, “China Steps Up Maritime Activity with Eye on Post-pandemic Order,” Nikkei Asian Review, May 13, 2020; Harsh Pant, “China’s Salami Slicing overdrive: It’s Flexing Military Muscles at a Time When Covid Preoccupies the Rest of the World,” Times of India, May 13, 2020; Veeramalla Anjaiah, “How To Tame Aggressive China In South China Sea Amid COVID-19 Crisis—OpEd,” Eurasia Review, May 14, 2020; Robert A. Manning and Patrick M. Cronin, “Under Cover of Pandemic, China Steps Up Brinkmanship in South China Sea,” Foreign Policy, May 14, 2020.
Another observer, offering a somewhat different perspective, states Recent developments in the South China Sea might lead one to assume that Beijing is taking advantage of the coronavirus crisis to further its ambitions in the disputed waterway. But it’s important to note that China has been following a long-term game plan in the sea for decades. While it’s possible that certain moves were made slightly earlier than planned because of the pandemic, they likely would have been made in any case, sooner or later.
(Steve Mollman, “China’s South China Sea Plan Unfolds Regardless of the Coronavirus,” Quartz, May 9, 2020.)
A May 3, 2020, press report stated Analysts reject the idea that Beijing has embarked on a new South China Sea campaign during the pandemic. But they do believe the outbreak is having an effect on perceptions of Chinese policy. “China is doing what it is always doing in the South China Sea, but it is a lot further along the road towards control than it was a few years ago,” said Gregory Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS, the Washington-based think-tank. (Kathrin Hille and John Reed, “US Looks to Exploit Anger over Beijing’s South China Sea Ambitions,” Financial Times, May 3, 2020.)
p. 11
provocative behaviour. The CCP [Chinese Communist Party] is … coercing its neighbours in the South China Sea.”38
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38 As quoted in Kathrin Hille and John Reed, “US Looks to Exploit Anger over Beijing’s South China Sea Ambitions,” Financial Times, May 3, 2020. (Ellipsis as in original.)
USE OF COAST GUARD SHIPS AND MARITIME MILITIA ………………………………………………………………………………………. 13
p. 13
Use of Coast Guard Ships and Maritime Militia
Use of Coast Guard Ships and Maritime Militia China asserts and defends its maritime claims not only with its navy, but also with its coast guard and its maritime militia. Indeed, China employs its coast guard and maritime militia more regularly and extensively than its navy in its maritime sovereignty-assertion operations. DOD states that China’s navy, coast guard, and maritime militia together “form the largest maritime force in the Indo-Pacific.”43
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43 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, p. 16. See also Andrew S. Erickson, “Maritime Numbers Game, Understanding and Responding to China’s Three Sea Forces,” Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, January 28, 2019.
p. 18
In an April 22, 2020, statement, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated
p. 19
Even as we fight the [COVID-19] outbreak, we must remember that the long-term threats to our shared security have not disappeared. In fact, they’ve become more prominent. Beijing has moved to take advantage of the distraction, from China’s new unilateral announcement of administrative districts over disputed islands and maritime areas in the South China Sea, its sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel earlier this month, and its “research stations” on Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef. The PRC continues to deploy maritime militia around the Spratly Islands and most recently, the PRC has dispatched a flotilla that included an energy survey vessel for the sole purpose of intimidating other claimants from engaging in offshore hydrocarbon development. It is important to highlight how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is exploiting the world’s focus on the COVID19 crisis by continuing its provocative behavior. The CCP is exerting military pressure and coercing its neighbors in the SCS, even going so far as to sink a Vietnamese fishing vessel. The U.S. strongly opposes China’s bullying and we hope other nations will hold them to account too.55
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55 Department of State, “The United States and ASEAN are Partnering to Defeat COVID-19, Build Long-Term Resilience, and Support Economic Recovery,” Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, April 22, 2020. See also A. Ananthalakshmi and Rozanna Latiff, “U.S. Says China Should Stop ‘Bullying Behaviour’ in South China Sea,” Reuters, April 18, 2020; Gordon Lubold and Dion Nissenbaum, “With Trump Facing Virus Crisis, U.S. Warns Rivals Not to Seek Advantage,” Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2020; Brad Lendon, “Coronavirus may be giving Beijing an opening in the South China Sea,” CNN, April 7, 2020; Agence France-Presse, “US Warns China Not to ‘Exploit’ Virus for Sea Disputes,” Channel News Asia, April 6, 2020.
p. 28
Specific Actions
Specific actions taken by the Trump Administration included the following, among others:
p. 29
- As an apparent cost-imposing measure, DOD announced on May 23, 2018, that it was disinviting China from the 2018 RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercise.80
- In November 2018, national security adviser John Bolton said the U.S. would oppose any agreements between China and other claimants to the South China Sea that limit free passage to international shipping.81
- In January 2019, the then-U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Richardson, reportedly warned his Chinese counterpart that the U.S. Navy would treat China’s coast guard cutters and maritime militia vessels as combatants and respond to provocations by them in the same way as it would respond to provocations by Chinese navy ships.82
- On March 1, 2019, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo stated, “As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty [with the Philippines].”83 (For more on this treaty, see Appendix B.)
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80 RIMPAC is a U.S.-led, multilateral naval exercise in the Pacific involving naval forces from more than two dozen countries that is held every two years. At DOD’s invitation, China participated in the 2014 and 2016 RIMPAC exercises. DOD had invited China to participate in the 2018 RIMPAC exercise, and China had accepted that invitation. DOD’s statement regarding the withdrawal of the invitation was reprinted in Megan Eckstein, “China Disinvited from Participating in 2018 RIMPAC Exercise,” USNI News, May 23, 2018. See also Gordon Lubold and Jeremy Page, “U.S. Retracts Invitation to China to Participate in Military Exercise,” Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2018. See also Helene Cooper, “U.S. Disinvites China From Military Exercise Amid Rising Tensions,” New York Times, May 23, 2018; Missy Ryan, “Pentagon Disinvites China from Major Naval Exercise over South China Sea Buildup,” Washington Post, May 23, 2018; James Stavridis, “U.S. Was Right to Give China’s navy the Boot,” Bloomberg, August 2, 2018.
81 Jake Maxwell Watts, “Bolton Warns China Against Limiting Free Passage in South China Sea,” Wall Street Journal, November 13, 2018.
82 See Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “US Warns China on Aggressive Acts by Fishing Boats and Coast Guard; Navy Chief Says Washington Will Use Military Rules of Engagement to Curb Provocative Behavior,” Financial Times, April 28, 2019. See also Shirley Tay, “US Reportedly Warns China Over Hostile Non-Naval Vessels in South China Sea,” CNBC, April 29, 2019; Ryan Pickrell, “China’s South China Sea Strategy Takes a Hit as the US Navy Threatens to Get Tough on Beijing’s Sea Forces,” Business Insider, April 29, 2019; Tyler Durden, “‘Warning Shot Across The Bow:’ US Warns China On Aggressive Acts By Maritime Militia,” Zero Hedge, April 29, 2019; Ankit Panda, “The US Navy’s Shifting View of China’s Coast Guard and ‘Maritime Militia,’” Diplomat, April 30, 2019; Ryan Pickrell, “It Looks Like the US Has Been Quietly Lowering the Threshold for Conflict in the South China Sea,” Business Insider, June 19, 2019.
83 State Department, Remarks With Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin, Jr., Remarks [by] Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, March 1, 2019, accessed August 21, 2019 at https://www.state.gov/remarks-withphilippine-foreign-secretary-teodoro-locsin-jr/. See also James Kraska, “China’s Maritime Militia Vessels May Be Military Objectives During Armed Conflict,” Diplomat, July 7, 2020. See also Regine Cabato and Shibani Mahtani, “Pompeo Promises Intervention If Philippines Is Attacked in South China Sea Amid Rising Chinese Militarization,” Washington Post, February 28, 2019; Claire Jiao and Nick Wadhams, “We Have Your Back in South China Sea, U.S. Assures Philippines,” Bloomberg, February 28 (updated March 1), 2019; Jake Maxwell Watts and Michael R. Gordon, “Pompeo Pledges to Defend Philippine Forces in South China Sea, Philippines Shelves Planned Review of Military Alliance After U.S. Assurances,” Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2019; Jim Gomez, “Pompeo: US to Make Sure China Can’t Blockade South China Sea,” Associated Press, March 1, 2019; Karen Lema and Neil Jerome Morales, “Pompeo Assures Philippines of U.S. Protection in Event of Sea Conflict, Reuters, March 1, 2019; Raissa Robles, “US Promises to Defend the Philippines from ‘Armed Attack’ in South China Sea, as Manila Mulls Review of Defence Treaty,” South China Morning Post, March 1, 2019; Raul Dancel, “US Will Defend Philippines in South China Sea: Pompeo,” Straits Times, March 2, 2019; Ankit Panda, “In Philippines, Pompeo Offers Major Alliance Assurance on South China Sea,” Diplomat, March 4, 2019; Mark Nevitt, “The US-Philippines Defense Treaty and the Pompeo Doctrine on South China Sea,” Just Security, March 11, 2019; Zack Cooper, “The U.S. Quietly Made a Big Splash about the South China Sea; Mike Pompeo Just Reaffirmed Washington Has Manila’s back,” Washington Post, March 19, 2019; Jim Gomez, “US Provides Missiles, Renews Pledge to Defend Philippines,” [CONTINUED…]
p. 30
- As discussed earlier, on July 13, 2020, Secretary Pompeo issued a statement that strengthened, elaborated, and made more specific certain elements of the U.S. position regarding China’s actions in the SCS.
- On August 26, 2020, Secretary Pompeo announced that the United States had begun “imposing visa restrictions on People’s Republic of China (PRC) individuals responsible for, or complicit in, either the large-scale reclamation, construction, or militarization of disputed outposts in the South China Sea, or the PRC’s use of coercion against Southeast Asian claimants to inhibit their access to offshore resources.”84
- On January 14, 2021, Secretary Pompeo announced additional sanctions against Chinese officials, including executives of state-owned enterprises and officials of the Chinese Communist Party and China’s navy “responsible for, or complicit in, either the large-scale reclamation, construction, or militarization of disputed outposts in the South China Sea, or the PRC’s use of coercion against Southeast Asian claimants to inhibit their access to offshore resources in the South China Sea.”85
- Also on January 14, 2021, the Commerce Department added China’s state-owned Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to the Entity List, restricting exports to that firm, citing CNOOC’s role in “helping China intimidate neighbors in the South China Sea.”86 Biden Administration’s Strategy Early Statements A January 27, 2021, press report stated that
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[CONTINUED…] Associated Press, November 23, 2020; Reuters staff, “‘We’ve Got Your Back’—Trump Advisor Vows U.S. Support in South China Sea,” Reuters, November 23, 2020.
84 Department of State, “U.S. Imposes Restrictions on Certain PRC State-Owned Enterprises and Executives for Malign Activities in the South China Sea,” press statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, August 26, 2020. See also Susan Heavey, Daphne Psaledakis, and David Brunnstrom, “U.S. Targets Chinese Individuals, Companies amid South China Sea Dispute,” Reuters, August 26, 2020; Matthew Lee (Associated Press), “US Imposes Sanctions on Chinese Defense Firms over Maritime Dispute,” Defense News, August 26, 2020; Kate O’Keeffe and Chun Han Wong, “U.S. Sanctions Chinese Firms and Executives Active in Contested South China Sea,” Wall Street Journal, August 26, 2020; Ana Swanson, “U.S. Penalizes 24 Chinese Companies Over Role in South China Sea,” New York Times, August 26, 2020; Tal Axelrod, “US Restricting Travel of Individuals Over Beijing’s Moves in South China Sea,” The Hill, August 26, 2020; Jeanne Whalen, “U.S. Slaps Trade Sanctions on More Chinese Entities, This Time for South China Sea Island Building,” Washington Post, August 26, 2020; Gavin Bade, “U.S. Blacklists 24 Chinese Firms, Escalating Military and Trade Tensions,” Politico, August 26, 2020; Paul Handley, “US Blacklists Chinese Individuals, Firms For South China Sea Work,” Barron’s, August 26, 2020. See also Gregory Poling and Zack Cooper, “Washington Tries Pulling Economic Levers in the South China Sea,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]), August 28, 2020; Hau Dinh and Yves Dam Van, “US to ASEAN: Reconsider Deals with Blacklisted China Firms,” Associated Press, September 10, 2020; Michael McDevitt, “Washington Takes a Stand in the South China Sea,” CNA (Arlington, VA), September 8, 2020.
85 Department of State, “Protecting and Preserving a Free and Open South China Sea,” January 14, 2021. See also Matthew Lee, “US Imposes New Sanction on Beijing over South China Sea,” Associated Press, January 14, 2021.
86 Department of Commerce, “Commerce Adds China National Offshore Oil Corporation to the Entity List and Skyrizon to the Military End-User List,” January 14, 2021. See also Ben Lefebvre, “U.S. Bans Exports to China’s State-Owned Oil Company CNOOC,” Politico Pro, January 14, 2021.
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[President] Biden reaffirmed in a telephone call with the Japanese prime minister the U.S.’s commitment to defend uninhabited islands controlled by Japan and claimed by China that have been a persistent point of contention between the Asian powerhouses. Meanwhile, newly confirmed U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken rejected Chinese territorial claims in a call with his Philippine counterpart and emphasized U.S. alliances in talks with top Australian and Thai officials.87
A January 28, 2021, press report similarly stated
One week into the job, US President Joe Biden has sent a clear warning to Beijing against any expansionist intentions in East and Southeast Asia.
In multiple calls and statements, he and his top security officials have underscored support for allies Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines, signaling Washington’s rejection of China’s disputed territorial claims in those areas. On Wednesday [January 27], Biden told Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga that his administration is committed to defending Japan, including the Senkaku Islands, which are claimed both by Japan and China, which calls them the Diaoyu Islands.
That stance was echoed by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who told Japanese counterpart Nobuo Kishi on Saturday that the contested islands were covered by the US-Japan Security Treaty.
Austin affirmed that the United States “remains opposed to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East China Sea,” according to a Pentagon statement on the call. expansionist intentions in East and Southeast Asia.88
Regarding the above-mentioned call between Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin, a January 27, 2021, State Department statement stated that in the call, Blinken
reaffirmed that a strong U.S.-Philippine Alliance is vital to a free and open Indo-Pacific region. Secretary Blinken stressed the importance of the Mutual Defense Treaty for the security of both nations, and its clear application to armed attacks against the Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific, which includes the South China Sea. Secretary Blinken also underscored that the United States rejects China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea to the extent they exceed the maritime zones that China is permitted to claim under international law as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Secretary Blinken pledged to stand with Southeast Asian claimants in the face of PRC pressure.89
A January 22, 2021, press report stated
Washington’s defense treaty with Tokyo applies to the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands, the new U.S. national security adviser confirmed Thursday [January 21], in an early show of support for an ally regarding a source of regional tension.
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87 Isabel Reynolds, “Biden Team Slams China Claims in Swift Calls to Asia Allies,” Bloomberg, January 27 (updated January 28), 2021.
88 Sylvie Lanteaume (Agence France-Presse), “In Multiple Messages, Biden Warns Beijing over Expansionism,” Yahoo News, January 28, 2021. See also Wendy Wu and Teddy Ng, “China-US Tension: Biden Administration Pledges to Back Japan and Philippines in Maritime Disputes,” South China Morning Post, January 28, 2021.
89 Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin,” January 27, 2021. See also Reuters Staff, “U.S. Stands with SE Asian Countries Against China Pressure, Blinken Says,” Reuters, January 27 (updated January 28), 2021; Sebastian Strangio, “Biden Administration Reaches out to Southeast Asian Allies,” Diplomat, January 28, 2021; Ken Moriyasu, “US Vows to Defend Philippines, Including in South China Sea,” Nikkei Asia, January 29, 2021.
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1972 Convention on Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs)
China and the United States, as well as more than 150 other countries (including all those bordering on the South East and South China Seas, but not Taiwan),143 are parties to an October 1972 multilateral convention on international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, commonly known as the collision regulations (COLREGs) or the “rules of the road.”144 Although [CONTINUED… ]
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143 Source: International Maritime Organization, Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General Performs Depositary or Other Functions, As at 28 February 2014, pp. 86-89. The Philippines acceded to the convention on June 10, 2013.
144 28 UST 3459; TIAS 8587. The treaty was done at London October 20, 1972, and entered into force July 15, 1977. The United States is an original signatory to the convention and acceded the convention entered into force for the United States on July 15, 1977. China acceded to the treaty on January 7, 1980. A summary of the agreement is [CONTINUED… ]
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commonly referred to as a set of rules or regulations, this multilateral convention is a binding treaty. The convention applies “to all vessels upon the high seas and in all waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels.”145 It thus applies to military vessels, paramilitary and law enforcement (i.e., coast guard) vessels, maritime militia vessels, and fishing boats, among other vessels.
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[CONTINUED… ] available at https://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/COLREG.aspx. The text of the convention is available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201050/volume-1050-I-15824- English.pdf.
145 Rule 1(a) of the convention.
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Use of Coast Guard Ships and Maritime Militia
Coast Guard Ships
DOD states that the China Coast Guard (CCG) is the world’s largest coast guard.189 It is much larger than the coast guard of any country in the region, and it has increased substantially in size in recent years through the addition of many newly built ships. China makes regular use of CCG ships to assert and defend its maritime claims, particularly in the ECS, with Chinese navy ships sometimes available over the horizon as backup forces.190 The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) states the following:
Under Chinese law, maritime sovereignty is a domestic law enforcement issue under the purview of the CCG. Beijing also prefers to use CCG ships for assertive actions in disputed waters to reduce the risk of escalation and to portray itself more benignly to an international audience. For situations that Beijing perceives carry a heightened risk of escalation, it often deploys PLAN combatants in close proximity for rapid intervention if necessary. China also relies on the PAFMM—a paramilitary force of fishing boats—for sovereignty enforcement actions….
China primarily uses civilian maritime law enforcement agencies in maritime disputes, employing the PLAN [i.e., China’s navy] in a protective capacity in case of escalation.
The CCG has rapidly increased and modernized its forces, improving China’s ability to enforce its maritime claims. Since 2010, the CCG’s large patrol ship fleet (more than 1,000 tons) has more than doubled in size from about 60 to more than 130 ships, making it by far the largest coast guard force in the world and increasing its capacity to conduct extended offshore operations in a number of disputed areas simultaneously. Furthermore, the newer ships are substantially larger and more capable than the older ships, and the majority are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-capacity water cannons, and guns ranging from 30-mm to 76-mm. Among these ships, a number are capable of long-distance, longendurance out-of-area operations. In addition, the CCG operates more than 70 fast patrol combatants ([each displacing] more than 500 tons), which can be used for limited offshore operations, and more than 400 coastal patrol craft (as well as about 1,000 inshore and riverine patrol boats). By the end of the decade, the CCG is expected to add up to 30 patrol ships and patrol combatants before the construction program levels off.191
In March 2018, China announced that control of the CCG would be transferred from the civilian State Oceanic Administration to the Central Military Commission.192 The transfer occurred on July 1, 2018.193 On May 22, 2018, it was reported that China’s navy and the CCG had conducted
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189 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, p. 71.
190 See Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, pp. 3, 7, and 44, and Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, undated but released August 2015, p. 14.
191 Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power, Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, 2019, pp. 66, 78. A similar passage appears in Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, pp. 71-72.
192 See, for example, David Tweed, “China’s Military Handed Control of the Country’s Coast Guard,” Bloomberg, March 26, 2018.
193 See, for example, Global Times, “China’s Military to Lead Coast Guard to Better Defend Sovereignty,” People’s Daily Online, June 25, 2018. See also Economist, “A New Law Would Unshackle China’s Coastguard, Far from Its Coast,” Economist, December 5, 2020; Katsuya Yamamoto, “The China Coast Guard as a Part of the China Communist Party’s Armed Forces,” Sasakawa Peace Foundation, December 10, 2020.
p. 75
their first joint patrols in disputed waters off the Paracel Islands in the SCS, and had expelled at least 10 foreign fishing vessels from those waters.194
A January 22, 2021, press report stated
China passed a law on Friday [January 22] that for the first time explicitly allows its coast guard to fire on foreign vessels, a move that could make the contested waters around China more choppy.…
China’s top legislative body, the National People’s Congress standing committee, passed the Coast Guard Law on Friday, according to state media reports.
According to draft wording in the bill published earlier, the coast guard is allowed to use “all necessary means” to stop or prevent threats from foreign vessels.
The bill specifies the circumstances under which different kind of weapons – hand-held, ship borne or airborne – can be used.
The bill allows coast guard personnel to demolish other countries’ structures built on Chinese-claimed reefs and to board and inspect foreign vessels in waters claimed by China.
The bill also empowers the coastguard to create temporary exclusion zones “as needed” to stop other vessels and personnel from entering.
Responding to concerns, Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said on Friday that the law is in line with international practices.195
Maritime Militia
China also uses the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM)—a force that essentially consists of fishing ships with armed crew members—to defend its maritime claims. In the view of some observers, the PAFMM—even more than China’s navy or coast guard—is the leading component of China’s maritime forces for asserting its maritime claims, particularly in the SCS. U.S. analysts in recent years have paid increasing attention to the role of the PAFMM as a key tool for implementing China’s salami-slicing strategy, and have urged U.S. policymakers to focus on the capabilities and actions of the PAFMM.196
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194 Catherine Wong, “China’s Navy and Coastguard Stage First Joint Patrols Near Disputed South China Sea Islands as ‘Warning to Vietnam,’” South China Morning Post, May 22, 2018. For additional discussion of China’s coast guard, see Andrew S. Erickson, Joshua Hickey, and Henry Holst, “Surging Second Sea Force: China’s Maritime LawEnforcement Forces, Capabilities, and Future in the Gray Zone and Beyond,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2019; Teddy Ng and Laura Zhou, “China Coast Guard Heads to Front Line to Enforce Beijing’s South China Sea Claims,” South China Morning Post, February 9, 2019; Ying Yu Lin, “Changes in China’s Coast Guard,” Diplomat, January 30, 2019. See also Ryan D. Martinson, “Early Warning Brief: Introducing the ‘New, New’ China Coast Guard,” China Brief, January 25, 2021.
195 Yew Lun Tian, “China Authorises Coast Guard to Fire on Foreign Vessels if Needed,” Reuters, January 22, 2021. See also Seth Robson, “China Gets More Aggressive with Its Sea Territory Claims as World Battles Coronavirus,” Stars and Stripes, February 1, 2021.
196 For additional discussion of the PAFMM, see, for example, Chung Li-hua and Jake Chung, “Chinese Coast Guard an Auxiliary Navy: Researcher,” Taipei Times, June 29, 2020; Gregory Poling, “China’s Hidden Navy,” Foreign Policy, June 25, 2019; Mike Yeo, “Testing the Waters: China’s Maritime Militia Challenges Foreign Forces at Sea,” Defense News, May 31, 2019; Laura Zhou, “Beijing’s Blurred Lines between Military and Non-Military Shipping in South China Sea Could Raise Risk of Flashpoint,” South China Morning Post, May 5, 2019; Andrew S. Erickson, “Fact Sheet: The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM),” April 29, 2019, Andrewerickson.com; Jonathan Manthorpe, “Beijing’s Maritime Militia, the Scourge of South China Sea,” Asia Times, April 27, 2019; Dmitry Filipoff, “Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson Discuss China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), March 11, 2019; Jamie Seidel, “China’s Latest Island Grab: Fishing ‘Militia’ Makes Move on Sandbars around Philippines’ Thitu Island,” News.com.au, March 5, 2019; Gregory Poling, [CONTINUED…]
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DOD states that “the PAFMM is the only government-sanctioned maritime militia in the world,” and that it “has organizational ties to, and is sometimes directed by, China’s armed forces.” 197 DIA states that
The PAFMM is a subset of China’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization to perform basic support duties. Militia units organize around towns, villages, urban subdistricts, and enterprises, and they vary widely from one location to another. The composition and mission of each unit reflects local conditions and personnel skills. In the South China Sea, the PAFMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting, part of broader Chinese military doctrine that states that confrontational operations short of war can be an effective means of accomplishing political objectives.
A large number of PAFMM vessels train with and support the PLA and CCG in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, protecting fisheries, and providing logistic support, search and rescue (SAR), and surveillance and reconnaissance. The Chinese government subsidizes local and provincial commercial organizations to operate militia ships to perform “official” missions on an ad hoc basis outside their regular commercial roles. The PAFMM has played a noteworthy role in a number of military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years, including the harassment of Vietnamese survey ships in 2011, a standoff with the Philippines at Scarborough Reef in 2012, and a standoff involving a Chinese oil rig in 2014. In the past, the PAFMM rented fishing boats from companies or individual fisherman, but it appears that China is building a state-owned fishing fleet for its maritime militia force in the South China Sea. Hainan Province, adjacent to the South China Sea, ordered the construction of 84 large militia fishing boats with reinforced hulls
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[CONTINUED…] “Illuminating the South China Sea’s Dark Fishing Fleets,” Stephenson Ocean Security Project (Center for Strategic and International Studies), January 9, 2019; Andrew S. Erickson, “Shining a Spotlight: Revealing China’s Maritime Militia to Deter its Use,” National Interest, November 25, 2018; Todd Crowell and Andrew Salmon, “Chinese Fisherman Wage Hybrid ‘People’s War’ on Asian Seas,” Asia Times, September 6, 2018; Andrew S. Erickson, “Exposed: Pentagon Report Spotlights China’s Maritime Militia,” National Interest, August 20, 2018; Jonathan Odom, “China’s Maritime Militia,” Straits Times, June 16, 2018; Andrew S. Erickson, “Understanding China’s Third Sea Force: The Maritime Militia,” Fairbank Center, September 8, 2017; Andrew Erickson, “New Pentagon China Report Highlights the Rise of Beijing’s Maritime Militia,” National Interest, June 7, 2017; Ryan Pickrell, “New Pentagon Report Finally Drags China’s Secret Sea Weapon Out of The Shadows,” Daily Caller, June 7, 2017; Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: All Hands on Deck for Sovereignty Pt. 3,” Center for International Maritime Security, April 26, 2017; Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: Development Challenges and Opportunities, Pt. 2” Center for International Maritime Security, April 10, 2017; Andrew Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: China Builds A Standing Vanguard, Pt. 1,” Center for International Maritime Security, March 25, 2017; Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA, China Maritime Report No. 1, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, March 2017, 22 pp.; Michael Peck, “‘Little Blue Sailors’: Maritime Hybrid Warfare Is Coming (In the South China Sea and Beyond),” National Interest, December 18, 2016; Peter Brookes, “Take Note of China’s Non-Navy Maritime Force,” The Hill, December 13, 2016; Christopher P. Cavas, “China’s Maritime Militia a Growing Concern,” Defense News, November 21, 2016; Christopher P. Cavas, “China’s Maritime Militia—Time to Call Them Out?” Defense News, September 18, 2016; Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Riding A New Wave of Professionalization and Militarization: Sansha City’s Maritime Militia,” Center for International Maritime Security, September 1, 2016; John Grady, “Experts: China Continues Using Fishing Fleets for Naval Presence Operations,” USNI News, August 17, 2016; David Axe, “China Launches A Stealth Invasion in the South China Sea,” Daily Beast, August 9, 2016; Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia Before They’re Used Again,” National Interest, July 6, 2016; Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia, What It Is and How to Deal With It,” Foreign Affairs, June 23, 2016.
197 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, p. 71.
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and ammunition storage for Sansha City, and the militia took delivery by the end of 2016.198
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198 Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power, Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, 2019, p. 79. A similar passage appears in Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, p. 72.
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A January 18, 2020, press report states
Before assuming his post as commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip S. Davidson issued a stark warning about Washington’s loosening grip in the fiercely contested South China Sea.
“In short, China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios, short of war with the United States,” Davidson said during a Senate confirmation hearing ahead of his appointment as the top US military official in the region in May 2018.
For many analysts, the dire assessment was a long-overdue acknowledgement of their concerns. Today, there is a growing sense it did not go far enough.
Washington’s strategic advantage in the waterway, which holds massive untapped oil and gas reserves and through which about a third of global shipping passes, has diminished so much, according to some experts, that it is powerless to prevent Beijing from restricting access during peacetime and could struggle to gain the upper hand even in the event of an outright conflict with Chinese forces.
China, which claims almost the entire waterway, has tipped the balance of power not just through a massive build-up of its navy, they say, but also through the presence of a de facto militia made up of ostensibly non-military vessels and an island-building campaign, the profound strategic value of which has been lost on US policymakers.… “The US has lost advantage throughout the spectrum of operations, from low-level interaction against China’s maritime militia to higher-end conflict scenarios,” said James Kraska, a former US Navy commander who lectures at the Naval War College. … … …
REPORT SUMMARY
In an international security environment described as one of renewed great power competition, the South China Sea (SCS) has emerged as an arena of U.S.-China strategic competition. U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS formed an element of the Trump Administration’s confrontational overall approach toward China and its efforts for promoting its construct for the Indo-Pacific region, called the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).
China’s actions in the SCS in recent years—including extensive island-building and base-construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands, as well as actions by its maritime forces to assert China’s claims against competing claims by regional neighbors such as the Philippines and Vietnam—have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners. Actions by China’s maritime forces at the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS) are another concern for U.S. observers. Chinese domination of China’s near-seas region—meaning the SCS and ECS, along with the Yellow Sea—could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.
Potential general U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: fulfilling U.S. security commitments in the Western Pacific, including treaty commitments to Japan and the Philippines; maintaining and enhancing the U.S.-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, including U.S. security relationships with treaty allies and partner states; maintaining a regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies and partners; defending the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes and resisting the emergence of an alternative “might-makes-right” approach to international affairs; defending the principle of freedom of the seas, also sometimes called freedom of navigation; preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia; and pursing these goals as part of a larger U.S. strategy for competing strategically and managing relations with China.
Potential specific U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: dissuading China from carrying out additional base-construction activities in the SCS, moving additional military personnel, equipment, and supplies to bases at sites that it occupies in the SCS, initiating island-building or base-construction activities at Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, declaring straight baselines around land features it claims in the SCS, or declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the SCS; and encouraging China to reduce or end operations by its maritime forces at the Senkaku Islands in the ECS, halt actions intended to put pressure against Philippine-occupied sites in the Spratly Islands, provide greater access by Philippine fisherman to waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal or in the Spratly Islands, adopt the U.S./Western definition regarding freedom of the seas, and accept and abide by the July 2016 tribunal award in the SCS arbitration case involving the Philippines and China.
The issue for Congress is whether and how the Biden Administration’s strategy for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS will differ from the Trump Administration’s strategy, whether the Biden Administration’s strategy is appropriate and correctly resourced, and whether Congress should approve, reject, or modify the strategy, the level of resources for implementing it, or both.
AUTHOR’S BIOGRAPHY—RONALD O’ROURKE
Mr. O’Rourke is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the Johns Hopkins University, from which he received his B.A. in international studies, and a valedictorian graduate of the University’s Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, where he received his M.A. in the same field.
Since 1984, Mr. O’Rourke has worked as a naval analyst for the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. He has written many reports for Congress on various issues relating to the Navy, the Coast Guard, defense acquisition, China’s naval forces and maritime territorial disputes, the Arctic, the international security environment, and the U.S. role in the world. He regularly briefs Members of Congress and Congressional staffers, and has testified before Congressional committees on many occasions.
In 1996, he received a Distinguished Service Award from the Library of Congress for his service to Congress on naval issues.
In 2010, he was honored under the Great Federal Employees Initiative for his work on naval, strategic, and budgetary issues.
In 2012, he received the CRS Director’s Award for his outstanding contributions in support of the Congress and the mission of CRS.
In 2017, he received the Superior Public Service Award from the Navy for service in a variety of roles at CRS while providing invaluable analysis of tremendous benefit to the Navy for a period spanning decades.
Mr. O’Rourke is the author of several journal articles on naval issues, and is a past winner of the U.S. Naval Institute’s Arleigh Burke essay contest. He has given presentations on naval, Coast Guard, and strategy issues to a variety of U.S. and international audiences in government, industry, and academia.
CLICK BELOW FOR THE FULL TEXT OF SOME OF THE PUBLICATIONS CITED IN O’ROURKE’S CRS REPORT:
Andrew S. Erickson, “Maritime Numbers Game: Understanding and Responding to China’s Three Sea Forces,” Indo-Pacific Defense Forum Magazine 43.4 (December 2018): 30-35.
Peter A. Dutton and Andrew S. Erickson, “When Eagle Meets Dragon: Managing Risk in Maritime East Asia,” RealClearDefense, 25 March 2015.
Andrew S. Erickson, Joshua Hickey, and Henry Holst, “Surging Second Sea Force: China’s Maritime Law-Enforcement Forces, Capabilities, and Future in the Gray Zone and Beyond,” Naval War College Review 72.2 (Spring 2019): 11-25.
Andrew S. Erickson,“Fact Sheet: The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM),” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 29 April 2019.
Dmitry Filipoff, “Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson Discuss China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 11 March 2019.
Andrew S. Erickson, “Shining a Spotlight: Revealing China’s Maritime Militia to Deter its Use,” The National Interest, 25 November 2018.
Andrew S. Erickson, “Exposed: Pentagon Report Spotlights China’s Maritime Militia,” The National Interest, 20 August 2018.
Andrew S. Erickson, “Understanding China’s Third Sea Force: The Maritime Militia,” Harvard Fairbank Center Blog Post, 8 September 2017.
Andrew S. Erickson, “New Pentagon China Report Highlights the Rise of Beijing’s Maritime Militia,” The National Interest, 7 June 2017.
Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: All Hands on Deck for Sovereignty, Pt. 3,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 26 April 2017.
Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: Development Challenges and Opportunities, Pt. 2,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 10 April 2017.
Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: China Builds a Standing Vanguard, Pt. 1,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 26 March 2017.
Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA, China Maritime Report 1 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, March 2017).
Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Riding a New Wave of Professionalization and Militarization: Sansha City’s Maritime Militia,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 1 September 2016.
Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia before They’re Used Again,” The National Interest, 6 July 2016.
Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia: What It Is and How to Deal With It,” Foreign Affairs, 23 June 2016.
Andrew S. Erickson and Emily de La Bruyere, “Crashing Its Own Party: China’s Unusual Decision to Spy on Joint Naval Exercises,” China Real Time Report (中国实时报), Wall Street Journal, 19 July 2014.
Andrew S. Erickson and Emily de La Bruyere, “China’s RIMPAC Maritime-Surveillance Gambit,” The National Interest, 29 July 2014.
Andrew S. Erickson, “PRC National Defense Ministry Spokesman Sr. Col. Geng Yansheng Offers China’s Most-Detailed Position to Date on Dongdiao-class Ship’s Intelligence Collection in U.S. EEZ during RIMPAC Exercise,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 1 August 2014.
Prashanth Parameswaran, “Andrew Erickson and Ryan Martinson on China and the Maritime Gray Zone,” The Diplomat, 14 May 2019.
Ryan D. Martinson and Andrew S. Erickson, “Re-Orienting American Sea Power For The China Challenge,” War on the Rocks, 10 May 2018.
United States Army Sergeant Major (RET) / USMC - 03 GRUNT - Infantry. Disruptor, Futurist, Innovator - Tactical, Operational and Strategic Servant Thought Leader
4 年RESOURCES: Great share Andrew Erickson