China and the battle of coalitions: the 'circle of friends' vs the Indo-Pacific strategy
EU Institute for Security Studies
The EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) is the EU Agency analysing foreign, security and defence policy issues.
Since the advent of Xi Jinping as the President of the People’s Republic of China in March 2013, China has focused on enlarging its ‘circle of friends’ and on finally putting an end to the partial diplomatic isolation the country inherited from the Mao and Deng eras. Opposed to the concept of ‘alliances’, Chinese diplomacy has been particularly active in developing a network of partnerships since 2016, taking advantage of the Trump administration’s withdrawal from several multilateral organisations. In recent years, Beijing has often counted on a group of more than 50 countries to support its position at the United Nations (UN) on various sensitive issues – including Hong Kong and Xinjiang.
The election of Joe Biden as President of the United States has not lessened China’s diplomatic activism, although Beijing is aware that its coalition-building task is becoming harder at a time when Washington is rebuilding bridges with international allies and jointly consolidating the Indo-Pacific strategy.
China's ambition: reforming global governance
China’s coalition-building efforts are currently supported by Russia and a growing number of countries, and fuelled by strong resentment against the United States and its allies, as well as official rejection of NATO and, more recently, the US Indo-Pacific strategy. But the ‘battle of coalitions’ is more than a pragmatic quest for global military, diplomatic, economic or technological influence. It is also framing a competition between political systems, in a context of a growing ideological divide between the first and second-largest economies in the world.
Through its diplomatic endeavours China is not only seeking to promote a specific type of domestic governance beyond its borders, but also to restructure the global governance system. In particular, it wishes to craft a new approach to security and conflict intervention at the United Nations and other multilateral organisations.
An ambition shared by others: polarisation of the world
At this point in time, the emerging polarisation of the international order is shaped by two distinct groups of countries with significant weight and the political drive to promote their own governance systems and norms. For this reason, the outcome of the ‘battle of coalitions’ that has started remains unpredictable. It is unclear whether China will be able to continue to enlarge its network of partners in the coming years.
The war in Ukraine is likely to accelerate the polarisation of the world into two camps – with a clear distinction between countries who are imposing sanctions on Russia, such as the United States, and those who are not, such as China. The breadth and scope of the sanctions, and their extraterritorial implementation, will restructure global trade and it is possible that several countries who are facing Western sanctions will decide to jointly and more actively promote alternative standards and norms in the fields of finance, logistics, military or space technology.
In any case, the process of polarisation will continue to be characterised by the global confrontation of two opposing political systems, with authoritarian governments being more inclined to import surveillance tools and technologies from China, as well as to support China’s and Russia’s general opposition to regime change at the UN, and democracies being more active in joining forces to defend their values and positions. Both poles will likely continue to enlarge their network of partners in parallel, tapping into the large group of countries who have so far avoided taking sides at the UN and at home, whether on human rights, territorial disputes or matters of technological competition.
All in all, Beijing’s ambitious coalition-building strategy should not be underestimated, as China is managing to expand its network of partners despite the challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic or the ongoing trade and technology tensions with the United States, and the Chinese authorities’ determination to shape a post-Western order remains strong and focused on a long-term agenda (with 2050 as the time horizon).
What role for the EU in the battle of coalitions?
Our Chaillot Paper "China and the battle of coalitions" suggests that, in this context, the EU and other members of the Indo-Pacific grouping need to reach out to a larger group of countries, beyond ‘like-minded’ partners. Through the swift and effective implementation of the Global Gateway strategy, the EU could renew and enhance cooperation on technology to provide global telecommunication networks and norms to third countries in a more interoperable and competitive way.
But this alone would not be enough to modify the rapport de force at a time when coalition battle lines are hardening. The EU and its partner states could consider forging a larger and stronger coalition dynamic, by engaging in renewed and creative diplomatic activism to gather a diverse of range of countries around positions and norms that the EU and its Member States considers important to defend. To be efficient, such a strategy would need to be supported by a pragmatic and well-grounded methodology of implementation at both bilateral and multilateral levels.
Alice Ekman, "China and the battle of coalitions - The 'circle of friends' versus the Indo-Pacific strategy", May 2022.