The China Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Bookshelf

Andrew S. Erickson, “The China Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Bookshelf,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 17 November 2020.

“Warning to the United States!” In August 2020, China ‘went ballistic’—firing DF-26B and DF-21D “aircraft carrier killer” anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) into the South China Sea. PRC sources just confirmed that the missiles struck a moving target. Time to check out this latest bookshelf compilation… To increase awareness and understanding of this important subject, here is a convenient compendium of major publications and other documents available on the matter thus far. If you know of others, please kindly bring them to my attention via <https://www.andrewerickson.com/contact/>. Thanks!

CHINA’S ASBMs: DATA & ANALYSIS

Andrew S. Erickson, interviewed by Harry J. Kazianis, “China’s DF-21D And DF-26B ASBMs: Is The U.S. Military Ready?” 19FortyFive, 15 November 2020.

… … … With its continued development of ASBMs and associated targeting architecture, China continues to work on changing the game in the South China Sea and beyond—but so too does the United States with its own developments and countermeasures. The game is afoot, and much is at stake. But by no means is the game over for the U.S. Navy, in the South China Sea or anywhere else. My bottom line: there’s no cause for declinist defeatism.

First, give us your sense of the development of both these missiles? Are you surprised at the speed of how quickly China has developed, deployed and tested them over the last decade?

I’m not surprised at the speed of PRC ASBM development overall. My study of Chinese aerospace history for my doctorate at Princeton revealed Beijing’s early emphasis on ballistic missiles, including some ASBM-relevant thinking. Three sentences alone repaid several years of graduate reading. In 1972 Vice Premier Zhang Chunqiao told China’s Central Military Commission: “We are continentalists. Now guided missiles are well developed. Installed on shore, they can hit any target, and there is no need to build a big navy.” In March 2007, I testified before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: “China is…thought to be in the process of developing anti-ship homing warheads for its ballistic missiles, which is a very worrisome development…If they work, they would be extremely difficult to defend against.” Several years of intense open-source research culminated in my 2013 book, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategic Implications.

That said, the following wording in DoD’s 2020 China report leapt out at me: “The PLA has fielded approximately 200 IRBM launchers and more than 200 missiles.” To me, this is the single most important sentence in what I believe is the best-written report to Congress yet in the two decades that the Pentagon has been issuing them. Reported ranges for systems currently in the PLA Rocket Force inventory suggest that these 200 IRBMs are DF-26s, with some number of the DF-26B ASBM variant among them. The DF-26’s dominance of China’s arsenal within that set of operationally-important range parameters suggests great confidence in this particular missile for two major reasons: (1) extraordinarily fast production and deployment in high numbers of a modern weapon system, and (2) no apparent need to hedge with multiple missile types with broadly overlapping capabilities.

While we knew back in the summer that China tested the DF-21D and DF-26 missiles, we did not know they were tested against moving vessels, as many assumed the missiles splashed down into the sea. What message is China trying to send? 

With its recent ASBM tests, reportedly against moving targets, Beijing seeks to demonstrate a maturing capability and enhance deterrence. It seeks to overawe audiences limited in access to technical details and limited in understanding of basic technical principles—and thereby to generate deference that it has not earned operationally. But however sophisticated and successful, these tests are but one element in a far greater equation. First, ASBMs’ effectiveness in practice hinges on a comprehensive reconnaissance and targeting architecture. As datapoints at the last four Zhuhai Airshows I attended impressed upon me, China is clearly working diligently to develop such architecture. But it remains a work in progress that has not been validated concretely in critical respects. Second, growing American countermeasures make this at least a two-sided contest.

In your view, has the United States and its allies taken this threat seriously? Have we done enough to try and mitigate it? 

The U.S. Navy has taken this threat very seriously; both in terms of hard kill and soft kill systems. There is certainly more work to be done, but America is pacing the threat with manifold potent countermeasures. Soviet Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov termed this struggle of opposites the “dialectic of negation in military affairs.” In American parlance, “The enemy gets a vote.” American military “votes” thus far include Aegis ballistic missile defense, Standard Missile-6, and electronic warfare systems with the potential to confuse incoming ASBMs with false targets that—proportionately speaking—could already far exceed the 355+ ship force that the U.S. Navy is planning to build. As well it should.

Kristin Huang, “China’s ‘Aircraft-Carrier Killer’ Missiles Successfully Hit Target Ship in South China Sea, PLA Insider Reveals,” South China Morning Post, 14 November 2020.

• DF-26B and DF-21D missiles launched in August struck moving vessel close to Paracel Islands, former senior colonel Wang Xiangsui says
• ‘This is a warning to the US, asking it not to take any military risk,’ he saysThe two “aircraft-carrier killer” missiles that China launched in August travelled thousands of kilometres and hit their designated target, a moving ship, near the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, according to a Chinese military expert.

This is the first time the Chinese side has revealed details of the missile launches, which were first reported by the South China Morning Post in August. The news was later confirmed by the US military.

After the launches it was reported that the missiles fell into the South China Sea, but Wang Xiangsui, a former senior colonel who now works as a professor at Beihang University in Beijing, said they hit a ship, their intended target.

One of the missiles, a DF-26B, was launched from the northwestern province of Qinghai, while the other, a DF-21D, lifted off from Zhejiang province in China’s east.

The launches came a day after Beijing said a US U-2 spy plane entered a no-fly zone without permission during a Chinese live-fire naval drill in the Bohai Sea off its northern coast. The US Navy had earlier sent two aircraft carrier strike groups into the South China Sea.

“So several days later [after the aircraft carrier manoeuvres], we launched the DF-21 and DF-26, and the missiles hit a vessel sailing south of the Paracel Islands,” Wang said at a closed-door meeting in Zhejiang last month. The details of his speech were published for the first time on Wednesday.

“Shortly after that, an American military attaché in Geneva complained [to us] and said it would lead to severe consequences if the missiles hit an American aircraft carrier. They see this as a show of force. But we are doing this because of their provocation,” Wang said.

His remarks were made during the four-day Moganshan forum to discuss domestic and international issues and China’s new five-year plan. The event was organised by the National Development and Reform Commission and attended by 80 economists, former government officials and entrepreneurs.

“This is a warning to the US, asking it not to take any military risks,” Wang said. “Such actions mark the bottom line of Sino-US confrontation.”

The missile launches came at a time of high tensions between Beijing and Washington over the disputed South China Sea.

The US Navy said on July 4 it had deployed two aircraft carrier groups, led by the USS Nimitz and USS Ronald Reagan, to conduct tactical air defence exercises in the disputed waters “in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific”.

Beijing blasted the manoeuvres, describing them as provocative, while the US said China’s missile launches were reckless and destabilising.

Song Zhongping, a former instructor with the People’s Liberation Army’s Second Artillery Corps, said the mission was evidence that China could carry out long-range precision strikes against medium to large surface vessels.

“To hit a moving object is not an easy task, especially for ballistic missiles, which normally hit a stationary target,” he said. “The mission shows Chinese missiles are a real deterrent against US warships.”

Michael Raska, an assistant professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, said China was developing advanced combat systems capable of negating the United States’ traditional military superiority.

“The key problem for the US is to sustain its long-term deterrence, particularly in contested areas, while simultaneously mitigating risks,” he said.

According to a report published by the US defence department in September,

China may have already overtaken America in the area of missile development and shipbuilding, and is set to double its nuclear warhead stockpile over the next decade.

The PLA has more than 1,250 ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges of up to 5,500km (3,400 miles). The US has a single type of conventional ground-launched ballistic missile, with a range of 70km to 300km, the report said.

ADDITIONAL SOURCES:

Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, RL33153 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 28 October 2020).

Andrew S. Erickson, “Breaking Down the Pentagon’s 2020 China Military Power Report: A Quest for PLA Parity?” The National Interest, 2 September 2020.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020 (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 1 September 2020).

Liu Zhen, “Why China Brought Out the ‘Aircraft-Carrier Killer’ to Flex Its Military Muscle,” South China Morning Post, 28 August 2020.

Bill Gertz, “Pentagon Confirms China Missile Test in South China Sea,” The Washington Times, 26 August 2020.

Kristin Huang, “Chinese Military Fires ‘Aircraft-Carrier Killer’ Missile into South China Sea in ‘Warning to the United States’,” South China Morning Post, 26 August 2020.

Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Massive Military Parade Shows Beijing is a Missile Superpower,” The National Interest, 1 October 2019.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Good Riddance to the INF Treaty: Washington Shouldn’t Tie Its Own Hands in Asia,” Foreign Affairs, 29 August 2019.

アンドリュー?S?エリクソン [Andrew S. Erickson], 米海軍大学教授（戦略学）、ハーバード大学フェアバンクセンターの客員スカラー [Professor of Strategy, U.S. Naval War College and Visiting Scholar, Fairbank Center, Harvard University], “中国ミサイル戦力の脅威―― ＩＮＦ条約後の米アジア戦略” [Good Riddance to the INF Treaty: Washington Shouldn’t Tie Its Own Hands in Asia], フォーリン?アフェアーズ?リポート [Foreign Affairs Report], 4 September 2019.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2 May 2019).

China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019).

“Ultrafast Anti-Ship Missiles Offered for Sale,” China Daily, 25 December 2018.

Rick Fisher, “An Assessment of China’s Missile Systems at the 12th Zhuhai Airshow,” Epoch Times, 18 November 2018.

Nikolai Novichkov, “Airshow China 2018: CASIC Unveils CM-401 Anti-Ship Missile System,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8 November 2018.

Jeremy Page, “China Parades New Missile in Warning to Rivals Abroad—and at Home,” Wall Street Journal, 30 July 2017.

Zhang Zhihao, “DF-26 Missile Enters Service,” China Daily, 26 April 2018.

National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, 2017).

Henri Kenhmann, “DF-26B : Une Nouvelle Variante de L’ASBM Longue Portée Chinois,” East Pendulum, 8 May 2017.

Andrew S. Erickson, Evan Braden Montgomery, Craig Neuman, Stephen Biddle, and Ivan Oelrich, “Correspondence: How Good Are China’s Antiaccess/Area-Denial Capabilities?” International Security 41.4 (Spring 2017): 202-13.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Development and Counter-intervention Efforts,” testified at Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons held by U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, 23 February 2017.

Andrew S. Erickson, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategic Implications (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation/Brookings Institution Press, 2013).

Jordan Wilson, China’s Expanding Ability to Conduct Conventional Missile Strikes on Guam (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 10 May 2016).

Andrew S. Erickson, “Raining Down: Assessing the Emergent ASBM Threat,” Jane’s Navy International, 16 March 2016.

RELATED ANALYSIS:

2015 MILITARY PARADE

Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM)—Officially Revealed at 3 September Parade—Complete Open Source Research Compendium,”China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国 10 September 2015.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Showtime: China Reveals Two ‘Carrier-Killer’ Missiles,” The National Interest, 3 September 2015.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Missile March: China Parade Projects Patriotism at Home, Aims for Awe Abroad,” China Real Time Report (中国实时报), Wall Street Journal, 3 September 2015.

ANTI-SHIP BALLISTIC MISSILES (ASBMS), DF-21D AND ANTI-SHIP VARIANT OF DF-26

Andrew S. Erickson, “Academy of Military Science Researchers: ‘Why We Had to Develop the Dongfeng-26 Ballistic Missile’—Bilingual Text, Analysis & Related Links,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 5 December 2015.

Andrew S. Erickson, “How China Got There First: Beijing’s Unique Path to ASBM Development and Deployment,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 13.12 (7 June 2013).

Andrew S. Erickson, “China Channels Billy Mitchell: Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Alters Region’s Military Geography,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 13.5 (4 March 2013).

Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, “China Deploys World’s First Long-Range, Land-Based ‘Carrier Killer’: DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Reaches ‘Initial Operational Capability’ (IOC),” China SignPost? (洞察中国), No. 14 (26 December 2010).

Andrew S. Erickson, “Take China’s ASBM Potential Seriously,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 136.2 (February 2010): 8.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Ballistic Trajectory—China Develops New Anti-Ship Missile,” China Watch, Jane’s Intelligence Review 22 (4 January 2010): 2-4.

Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese Analysts Consider the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile,” Naval War College Review 62.4 (Autumn 2009): 53-86.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese ASBM Development: Knowns and Unknowns,” Jamestown China Brief 9.13 (24 June 2009): 4-8.

Andrew S. Erickson and David Yang, “On the Verge of a Game-Changer,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 135.3 (May 2009): 26-32.

Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Reaches Equivalent of ‘Initial Operational Capability’ (IOC)—Where It’s Going and What it Means,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 12 July 2011.

Andrew S. Erickson, “China Testing Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM); U.S. Preparing Accordingly–Now Updated With Additional Sources,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 25 December 2010. 

Andrew S. Erickson, A Statement Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “PLA Modernization in Traditional Warfare Capabilities” panel, “China’s Military Modernization and its Impact on the United States and the Asia-Pacific” hearing, Washington, DC, 29 March 2007, 72-78; published in 2007 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 110th Congress, 1st Session, November 2007, 91.

OTHER BALLISTIC MISSILES

Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Space Development History: A Comparison of the Rocket and Satellite Sectors,” Acta Astronautica 103 (October/November 2014): 142–67.

Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase, “China’s Strategic Rocket Force: Upgrading Hardware and Software (Part 2 of 2),” Jamestown China Brief 14.14 (17 July 2014).

Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase, “China’s Strategic Rocket Force: Sharpening the Sword (Part 1 of 2),” Jamestown China Brief 14.13 (3 July 2014).

Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase, “China Goes Ballistic,” The National Interest 131 (May-June 2014): 58-64.

Michael S. Chase and Andrew S. Erickson, “A Competitive Strategy with Chinese Characteristics? The Second Artillery’s Growing Conventional Forces and Missions,” in Thomas Mahnken, ed., Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 206-18.

Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, “China’s Ballistic Missiles: A Force to be Reckoned With,” China Real Time Report (中国事实报), Wall Street Journal, 24 August 2012.

Michael S. Chase and Andrew S. Erickson, “The Conventional Missile Capabilities of China’s Second Artillery Force: Cornerstone of Deterrence and Warfighting,” Asian Security, 8.2 (Summer 2012): 115-37.

Christopher T. Yeaw, Andrew S. Erickson, and Michael S. Chase, “The Future of Chinese Nuclear Policy and Strategy,” in Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, eds., Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 53-80.

Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase, “China’s SSBN Force: Transitioning to the Next Generation,” Jamestown China Brief, Vol. 9, No. 12 (10 June 2009).

Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase, “An Undersea Deterrent? China’s Emerging SSBN Force,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 135.4 (June 2009): 36-41.

Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson, and Christopher T. Yeaw, “The Future of Chinese Deterrence Strategy,” Jamestown China Brief 9.5 (4 March 2009): 6-9.

Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson, and Christopher Yeaw, “Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32.1 (February 2009): 67-114.