China 2024-2030 electricity dilemma: country's domestic political issue that affects the world
Frank Araujo
Senior Risk Manager I Compliance I Audit I Sustainability I ESG I Adaptation & Mitigation I Decarbonization
Today, I delved into Amy Harder's insightful article on Cipher, shedding light on the impact of our decarbonization efforts. It's encouraging to see progress, with projected temperatures in 2100 hovering around 2.7oC—not good, but certainly better than the catastrophic 4oC scenario of RCP 8.5[i].
And then I decided to write about China. And for anyone who is willing to do this, the responsibility is huge.
In this article, you won't find exaggerated descriptions of China's emissions data, nor a romanticized view of its green initiatives. Likewise, I won't dwell on the recent surge in the country's thermal generation capacity.
First let's talk about the motivation for the topic. What is at stake is not just the ~13 Gton GHG ?(24% of the global total) of Chinese emissions[ii]. But also, that this country in particular has an unparalleled capacity for achievement, this has already been demonstrated so much that it has become a cliché to talk about it. If the Communist Party of China (CPC) decides, there is no doubt that this decision will materialize. Therefore, the magnitude of emissions involved, and the consequences of this decision will be felt across the planet. We are talking about 13 Mbd of oil or 4 billion ton/year of thermal coal in economic terms. On the other hand, we are also talking about the 1.5 million Chinese who die each year from air pollution. Much is at stake.
Why the 2024 – 2030 window? Firstly, theoretically, we should reach 2030 with around 25 Gton of emissions and with the peak of Chinese emissions in the past. Halfway, and 220 Gton away, lies Paris' 1.5oC target. Therefore, China alone has the power to move the world further or closer to the Paris target and more than ever, the short term in emissions matters.
The case is simple. Today, in 2024, China already has around 2.8 TW of electrical energy generation capacity, with 1.3 fossil and 1.5 non-fossil in rounded numbers (and by the way, this number is always growing). Let me emphasizes, capacity. When we look at the dispatch, that is, how much energy is actually produced from each source, the proportion is reversed: 60% fossil and 40% non-fossil. Everyone sees the prism in a different way. While some warn of the “epidemic” of licenses for new coal projects in 2024 (CRED)[iii], others prefer to emphasize the gigantic solar and wind wave taking over the Gobi deserts (Matt Ferrel)[iv] and even project the peak of emissions in 2024 (Carbon Brief)[v]. Others are in the middle of the road (S&P)[vi].
In both cases these are superlative numbers, after all, we are talking about China.
The low use of UHV (long-distance, high-voltage transmission lines that connect renewable plants in the Northwest to consumption centers in the east/south - see map), indicates that transmission is not necessarily a problem, causing China to underutilize its renewable sources.
Something is a fact that stands out when analyzing Chinese energy policy over the last decade: energy security is a paramount. This reason alone explains the over-implementation of electrical energy generation capacity (whether renewable or not) and the emphasis on fleet electrification. Whether through coal or renewables, they do not want to depend on external inputs (notably oil).
Which from an environmental point of view is good. Remembering that an electric car charged with electrical energy from coal is still better than a combustion car (Forbes)[vii].
But back to the point. Given the forecast of new plants (renewable or not) to be installed in the next 5 years, where will the approximately 10 PWh that the Chinese consume of electricity per year come from? From fossils? Of the non-fossils?
The documentary “China’s electricity problem”[viii] and CRED rightly highlight Chinese internal policy and the autonomy of the provinces as a key element in answering this question by prioritizing energy produced within the limits of its province territory. And this is the central point of the article. The decision to issue around a few GTons of GHG in the 2024-2030 window lies in discussion between the provincial governments and Beijing. We already see some rules trying to regulate this discussion (Mining.com)[ix].
It is a paradox that China is itself one of the great victims of coal. It is estimated that around 1.5 million Chinese people die every year due to air pollution[x], the main source of which is coal burning. One can add the hundreds of deaths in accidents in mines and pollution of water bodies. Furthermore, there are climate extremes events. The World Weather Attribution group of scientists analyzed 59 events in the last 10 years in China[xi], finding robust evidence that Climate Change affected the probability and/or severity of these events in 49 of them. Including the drought that strongly affected hydroelectricity production. Each of these events cost billions to the Chinese economy and human lives.
Beijing has already shown for a few decades the importance of sovereignty when dealing with internal affairs. Well, these are legitimate reasons for Beijing to intervene, for the good of the Chinese people, and prioritize the generation of non-fossil electrical energy. In addition to encouraging storage solutions, as the country is the leader in renewable and battery technology. In short, a mission as big as the country’s greatness.
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We can only hope that this happens over the next 6 years. We, I mean you, me, and the rest of the world.
#climatechange #energytransition #china
[i] How we know the energy transition is here. Harder, Amy. Ciphernews. Link.