CEO,China: The Rise of Xi Jinping

Summary: In CEO China, the noted China expert Kerry Brown reveals the hidden story of the rise of the man dubbed the 'Chinese Godfather'. Brown investigates his relationship with his revolutionary father, who was expelled by Mao during the Cultural Revolution, his business dealings and allegiances in China's regional power struggles and his role in the internal battle raging between the old men of the Deng era and the new super-rich 'princelings'.?

Politburo Standing Committee

The central committee acts like a room that contains many doors. Above the central committee is the Politburo, consisting of 25 members, which itself is led by the 7 member PSC- It is here that the Olympians sit.

The Politburo is ostentibly separate from day to day decision making, it owns the crucial function of dispensing ideological, spiritual and political leadership.

This description means it covers nothing and everything. But like the ideal city described in Plato’s Republic, China is really run on the model of philosophical kings. This group invites academics to speak to it, who wait in thickly carpeted hallways, before being ushered with great apprehension into a boardroom in which the current immortals running China sit

When we open the door to this final room, we find where XJP is most tangibly powerful, the place he had to take control of so that he can extend his influence elsewhere. Who rules over these men, rules everywhere else

Calvin's commentary: This incoming Politburo Standing Committee is a proxy indicator of how much power Xi has managed to amass his current term. While it's more or less a given he will stay on for this third term, the big question mark is who will take over Li Keqiang as Premier, the number 2 in terms of ranking within the PBSC. The current guess is Hu Chunhua, who belongs to the same faction as Li and the logical choice in terms of age and experience. However, if he is not chosen, the alternative will possibly be one of Xi's proteges, which eithers breaks the tradition of age limit (Wang Yang)or the prerequisite experience of rising to the role of premier (Li Qiang)

Xi's rise to power

Anyone’s predicting Xi’s becoming CCP leader in the 1990s would have been regarded as crazy.

In 1997, as a sign of his unpopularity, he missed out on election to the central committee of the party, and direct entry into he central elite by one position. Only machinations managed to get him slot.

Being a grassroots leader was a harsh and unglamorous political training. It was made harder by 2 factors.

1)????Xi married the daughter of a diplomat intimately involved with HK issues who was then posted to UK to work at the embassy there, taking his wife with him and leaving him in China. (China in the last 7 decades, have been led by 5 key figures, 3 of whom have divorcees).

2)????His overall boss, party secretary of Hubei Province, Gao Yang, didn’t like him coz he regarded Xi as someone from an elite background who was imposed on the province through family connections, not personal abilities

In many ways, in the early part of his career, Xi succeeded in spite of his elitist links

Calvin's commentary: Although Xi was an offspring of one of the 'Eight Immortals', his life growing up was not smooth. I recall the times where he had to apply ten times before he finally got accepted as a member of the CCP? This man has shown tremendous grit and perserverance, it is no wonder that Mr Lee Kuan Yew had high praises of him stating that "He (Xi) struck me as a man of great breadth," and "I would put him in the Nelson Mandela class of persons." In conclusion, do not underestimate him

Luck?

In the years just before 2007, 3 names appeared regularly in speculation: Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao and Xi Jinping.

The 2 Lis, were preferred over Xi. All 3 were from party aristocracy backgrounds

Yuanchao’s father was a former senior leader in Shanghai and Keqiang's father in law was an important figure in the Communist Youth League. It was through theCommunist Youth League where Li met Hu, his patron.

One of the strange aspects of Xi’s career is just how often at critical junctures, the ill fortunes of others, usually with little or nothing to do with his intervention, has served his own purposes.

In 2006, rumours started to circulate that the party sec of Shanghai, Chen Liangyu was in trouble. People were interested in was who will be appointed to replace him, in view of how Shanghai had been seen in recent years as a major launchpad for political careers.

In 2007, Xi, who was not even a member of the full politburo was to be replacement was

taken as a sign that he had finally poked his nose just slightly above the 2 Lis

Commentary: One way of analysing this was that between the 2 Lis and Xi, Xi was the least threatening option to the various factions back then (as one can tell as Xi wasn't even a politburo member back then). Xi definitely capitalised on this opportunity and performed well enought to place in front of the 2 Lis subsequently.

Importance of Provincial Party Chiefs

Provincial leadership is immensely important to the modern party.

Jiang, Hu and Xi all came from careers directing the party at the most senior level in provinces. Hu and Xi spent the majority of their career outside BJ.

Chinese provinces have population and GDP that easily outnumber most other nation states in the world.

Shanghai is the same size as the Finnish economy, Guangdong is the same size as Indonesia’s economy.

Being the party leader of a Chinese province is therefore a huge job. Final accountability to the central government for stability and prosperity of a province lies with this figure.

Failure means instant recrimination.

The life of a provincial leader is a tough one, not only because of the pressure to deliver targets, but also because they are almost always outsiders, parachuted into areas where they are not native, but surrounded by people who are locally born and bred.

This is a deliberate structural attempt to try to erode the clannish nature of provincial politics in China.

Provincial party bosses have to live in a world where they are, if things goes well, simply passing through.

They have little interest in undertaking risky moves that might upset their career progressions, they also have to be careful not to alienate or take on local networks, which might ignore or simply sabotage their policy implementation orders.

Their deputies, many locals, people who will stay once they move on, have less incentive to take part in changes that might make them unpopular, exposed or vulnerable.

Those who perform will be elevated. Many provincial party bosses are already sitting on the politburo. It is only one step away from the the core of power, the standing committee.

And of the current Standing Committee in 2012, 6/7 forged their careers in provincial leadership.

Calvin's commentary: The tradition of not sending the top provincial official to his/her own province has its roots in the previous dynasties, with the underlying fear being corruption and the threat to the central government. Currently, many of the party secretaries of the top performing large provinces and muncipalities are proteges, it will be interesting to see who will make the final cut, all eyes on the party secretaries of Chongqing, Shanghai and Guangdong.

What is the role of the party leader?

It is not to gain power on the back of a specific manifesto. That, in a consensus based organisation, is already in place and functioning. It is not to direct the govt, but to give it broad political and ideological leadership.

In that sense, it comes closer to a spiritual position like that of the Pope, the general secretary is to supply a vision, to exemplify particular moral qualities and finally display a profound and convincing belief in the Party and the Party mission.

Hence, the position chooses the person, active agitation for the top slot never seems to work in China. Passive acceptance seems to be the trick, something that privileges intuition by a contender over raw ambition,

That means for the candidates, it is more about displaying real, deep down commitment to the Party, showing that it is part of their lifeblood something they absolutely belong to, and will serve faithfully, without ego or personal gain.

This is a hard posture to adopt when the party has become the custodian of the world’s most dynamic economy, when it is in the key position to enjoy the material fruits of this success

Calvin's commentary: As China's economy and society becomes more modern and capitalist, I honestly wonders what is the percentage of people still believe in the ideologies, it will incresingly hard for the CCP to govern based on what worked in the past

Important figures

Ding Xuexiang

His main talent is an ability to write well, and to transfer his master’s ideas into clearly written instructions. He was previously Yu Zhengsheng secretary. He will likely replace Li Zhanshu who is due to retire in 2018 as director of the General Office.

Wang Huning

Worked in Fudan during the 1980s, elevated during the era of Jiang Zemin in 1994 to become the director of CCP Policy Research Office and stayed for more than a decade. This position serves as the think tank of think tanks and provides great access to elite leaders and powerful networks

His fingerprints have been found on the ‘Three Represents’ of Jiang, the ‘Theory of Scientific Devt’ of Hu, and now Xi’s ‘China Dream’. This ability to feel out the ideas of his political masters and then give them some structure and definition has meant that Wang does not have any ideological position.

He is the 21st century version of Thomas Cromwell or Robespeirre, someone who carries a night shadow around in broad daylight and appears beside at key moments, in the best vantage points, to whisper and influence

Calvin's commentary: Of all the potential candidates for the PBSC, I am the most intrigued by Wang Huning, he is really an enigma

Control of power

In the shifting terrain of risk assessment and threats, the Chinese government cannot do everything and keep everyone happy. It has to prioritize.

For Xi, holding all this power himself means that at least he can control things, instead of being helpless as he watches them unfold.

But it carries one major risk: the bucks stop with him.

He can suddenly fall from being China’s godfather to being China’s arch-criminal

Without the guidance of the Party and its unified and unifying vision, China’s problems will be insoluble. The structural and institutional consolidation of power means that Xi sits at the heart of the body that directs government and party policy across all areas. It ties the party’s leadership into the solution.

The message is simple: jettison the party, and you jettison the hope of dealing with this grim menu of issues.

Calvin's commentary: Unpopular opinion but in order to have a fighting chance of tackling China's enormous challanges from economic, environmental and social, concentration of power is required to make sure everyone pull in the same direction in such a large country. A decentralisation of power and system of government will not be able to solve the problems

USA

Wherever China looks, USA seems to get involved. It has treaty alliances running in a great wall across the Pacific, from Japan to South Korea and down to the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand.

China does appreciate the way this create more strategic certainty, making it clear who their friends are.

US is also also linked to India, Pakistan and Afghanistan and has made significant diplomatic alliances with partners even as historically complex for China as Vn and Myanmar.

Taiwan and Hong Kong remain the thorniest of international policy issues for Xi because they are ones that he and his circle could consider domestic, but which the US and the outside world feel they have a direct interest and involvement in.

Calvin's commentary: Given that this book was written in 2016, 6 years later, the relations between USA and China have definitely worsened to a new low and the threat of bifurcation and unintentional flashpoints could escalate to something far beyond what we anticipate

Xi's future China

For all our qualms about the CCP, when we look at the future of and at the vision expressed in what the Chinese leaders now say, it is one that most of us could easily live with.

We are hoping for stability , a world where we can live sustainably , equitably and peacefully. For this reason, Xi’s party becomes our best bet to get there

Looking into the eyes of XJP, you look into the eyes of the party itself -?the personification of its ambitions and spirit, its most faithful and truest servant, and someone like Pope Francis, who, for all his outward exemplification of influence, persuasion and force, would almost certainly object to the claim that he is pursuing his own interests and indulging the narcissism of power.

The truly powerful, locate their power far away from themselves. And for XJP, that is in the ideals, beliefs and passions of the world’s final communist party, holding a monopoly of power over a colossal country